Proofs - Personal Webspace for QMUL - Queen Mary, University of ...

society, history (slavery and colonization) and gender relations
on self- concepts. We compare such cultural concepts with
respect to three topics: fi rst, the question of dissociation and
spirit possession, secondly the question of the embodied self
including a discussion of current neurobiological explanations
of self- referential processing, and fi nally with respect to social
performances of self- related narratives. We end by suggesting
that core aspects of self- related experiences such as prerefl ective
self awareness appear to be a universal human trait, while diverse
social and cultural norms interact with and modify narration and
performance of self concepts and constructions. Such a cultural
variety has to be considered when diagnosing alterations of
self- concepts and “ego disorders” in various cultural and social
contexts.
2. Classical concepts of the self and the problem
of circularity: the “infi nite regress”
of self- consciousness
While neither history nor culture originated in classical
Greece, concepts which have been articulated in this culture
coined central aspects of the European tradition. Some of the
oldest traditions appear not to distinguish categorically between
mind and matter, and pre- Socratic philosophies tried to identify
fundamental principles of nature. Such fundamental principles
were alternatively identifi ed in the element of water (Thalis)
or the air or individual breath (Anaximenis). In this context
Pythagoras was one of the fi rst to suggest the idea of an eternal
soul, which appears to be infl uenced by East- Asian concepts
of reincarnation or soul migration and by the ecstatic cult of
Dionysos [43]. Plato also articulated a concept of an immortal
soul and distinguished between the deceitful world of the senses
and the immortal forms or “ideas”. This concept of ideas was for
example developed when asking what it means to be “beautiful”
and was aimed at the defi nition of “the beautiful” itself, and it
was suggested that this idea is an object of pure thought and not
of the senses [39]. The relation of any concrete object to such an
idea was conceptualised as a form of participation.
Aristoteles (1970), on the other hand, did not propose that
ideas have an existence which is independent of concrete objects.
His key concept is easier to grasp when we acknowledge that
the Greek word “eidos” can be translated into Latin as “forma” or
“species”, suggesting that ideas represent the form of an object.
For example, Aristoteles suggested that the form of a human
being would only manifest in matter, namely in the fl esh, bones
and other parts of a human being; nevertheless, bones and fl esh
would not be a part of the form or concept of a human being but
instead represent the matter, in which the form manifests itself.
He went on to suggest that the soul would be the primary form
of a living being, and this concept thus acquired a functional
meaning [2]. The soul is therefore not perceived as an immortal
idea, which somehow resides in a material body, but rather
Aristoteles suggested that the soul is the form or function of a
defi nite body, like “being an axe” represents the functional form
of this instrument [3]. As form or function of a human being,
the soul has three different aspects: the potential of nutrition,
which is shared with all living beings such as plants, the potential
of sense perception and desire for positive experiences, which
is shared with animals, and intellectual insight, the highest
A. Heinz et al. / European Psychiatry 27 (2012) / supplement n°2 / S32-S43 S33
potential of any human being. Aristoteles compared the domination
of intellectual insight over desires with the domination,
which politicians exert with respect to the people, and suggested
that such intellectual capacities are lacking in slaves and are
ineffective in women and undeveloped in children [43].
Aristoteles also identifi ed one of the problems characterising
several concepts of self- consciousness: the question who or
what actually perceives what is represented in the senses. This
problem can be illustrated when we refl ect on some common
concepts of sense perception. For example, when we look at a
tree, we are usually aware that the outer object (the “real tree”)
may somehow differ from our percept: we perceive only some
part of the outer object or the way in which we perceive it may
depend as much on the constitution of our senses as on the out
object itself, e.g. the “real tree” refl ects light waves, which we
perceive as green but which appear indistinguishable from red
in case of colour- blindness. Nevertheless, in everyday life, we
usually assume that our senses represent a reliable and useful
percept of our environment. Hume (1978) called such perceptions
“impressions”. When we close our eyes, we can maintain a
mental picture of what we have just seen – Hume called this an
“idea” and suggested, that, compared to impressions, ideas are
less vivid and clear [27]. However, we would like to suggest that
a decisive difference between an impression and an idea resides
in the malleability of the phenomenon: an idea can be actively
modifi ed (for example, we can imagine that the tree stands on
its head), while this is not possible with any given perception. So
if “we” can modify “ideas”, which are obviously different from
impressions, one may ask where such ideas are “perceived” and
modifi ed. In everyday life, we may assume that this perception is
located somewhere in the mind or brain; however, this explanation
only doubles the problem: now we have three trees, a real
one (the thing in itself), a perceived one (the impression) and an
imagined tree (the idea). Husserl (1962) would probably object
to our “common sense” reasoning and point to the fact that there
is not “one tree in the mind (brain)” and “the other one outside”
but that instead in both situations we are intentionally focussed
on the tree, in one case on a tree that we assume to be real and
in another case on a tree that we imagine to be an idea [28].
However, this argument may still not help to answer the question
who or what actually perceives the ideas or impressions. Is there
an independent “ego” in the mind or brain, which “perceives”
the impressions or ideas of sense objects? Or are these impressions
somehow transparent for consciousness? But than what is
consciousness? In Aristoteles words: “Inasmuch as we perceive
that we see and hear, it must either be by sight or by some other
sense that the percipient perceives that he sees. But, it may be
urged, the same sense which perceives sight will also perceive the
colour which is the object of sight. So that either there will be two
senses that perceive the same thing or the one sense, sight, will
perceive itself. Further, if the sense concerned with sight were
really a distinct sense, either the series would go on to infi nity
or some one of the series of senses would perceive itself” [3].
Aristoteles did not try to answer the question who is the
subject of perception and instead focuses on the problem how
the sense organ can get in contact with the perceived object.
Nevertheless, the question who perceives ideas in the mind
continues to trouble Western philosophy. If the ideas are impressions
of outer objects, is a “self” or “soul” the entity that perceives
Proofs
07_Heinz.indd S33 14/06/2012 11:29:58