History Of The 1st Battalion 9th Marines - Walking Dead 1/9/3

History of the 1 st Battalion 9 th Marines 3 rd 

Marine Division - “The The Walking Dead” Dead 

By Sergeant Thomas J. Holmes, USMC 

and 

Sergeant Major Larry E. Gugle, USMC, Retired

Introduction 

• The History of the 9 th Marines in WWI, WWII, and Vietnam 

• Vietnam Operations & Battle Locations 

• 1 st Battalion 9 th Marines in Vietnam 

– Operations March 1965 – March 1966 

– Operations April and May 1966 

• “The Walking Dead” – How the Nickname was earned 

• 1 st Battalion 9 th Marines in Vietnam 

– Operations: Liberty, Buffalo, Hill 64, and Dewey Canyon 1967 - 1969 

• Statistics About the 1 st Battalion 9 th Marines in Vietnam 

• Medal Recipients (Medal of Honor, Navy Cross Medal, & Silver Star Medal) 

• Poems Written by individuals who where with 1 st Battalion 9th Marines 

• Statistics About Vietnam 

• Myths and Facts About Vietnam 

“Some people spend an entire LIFETIME wondering if they made a DIFFERENCE. 

The MARINES don’t have that Problem.” 

President Ronald Reagan, 1985

History Of The 

9 th Marines

World War One 

• The 9 th Marines had its origin in the great expansion of the Marine Corps during 

World War I. Created as one of the two Infantry regiments of the Advanced Base 

Force, it was assigned to duty in the Caribbean area as a mobile force in readiness. 

The 9 th 's mission was the protection of advanced naval bases and the Panama 

Canal in the event of enemy action. On 10 November 1917, the 142d anniversary of 

the Marine Corps, the Commandant signed the order directing the formation of 

the regiment. 

• Ten days later, at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, the 9 th Regiment was 

organized. Its Headquarters Company was activated and one machine gun and 

eight rifle companies were assigned to its three battalions. Three of the units, the 

14 th (machine gun), 36 th , and 100 th Companies, were transferred to the east coast 

from the naval base at San Diego; the remaining six, the 121 st through 126 th 

Companies, were formed from Marines in training at Parris Island, South 

Carolina 

• With the end of hostilities, the need for the 9 th evaporated, so the regiment 

embarked 10 April 1919 aboard USS HANCOCK for Philadelphia, where it 

arrived and unloaded 25 April. The same day, it was officially disbanded. 

Although the 9 th did not win combat honors during World War I, it did perform 

the exacting task of keeping itself at peak effectiveness as a mobile force in 

readiness.

World War Two 

• Enough of the great surge of Marine recruits following Pearl Harbor had been 

processed by 12 February 1942 to make the establishment of another regiment 

possible, and the 9 th Marines was organized at Camp Elliott, San Diego, as part of 

the 2 nd Marine Division. By this reactivation, the regiment acquired its present and 

permanent designation, the 9 th Marines. 

• Officers and men of the 2 nd Marines formed the nucleus of the newly activated 

regiment, Headquarters and Service Company and the 3 rd Battalion. On 1 March, 

the 1 st Battalion was activated, the largest percentage of its men coming from the 

3 rd Battalion, 6 th Marines, recently returned from duty in Iceland. Regimental 

Weapons Company and the 2 nd Battalion were organized on 1 April, completing 

the regiment and increasing its strength to 99 officers and 3,003 enlisted men. 

• Immediately, a training program was inaugurated to weld the 9 th Marines into a 

hard-striking, fighting team. During the months of May and June, amphibious 

training was conducted In the San Diego-La Jolla area. A depletion of strength 

was suffered on 15 June; when the regiment was called on to furnish the cadre for 

the formation of the 22 nd Marines. Again in July the unit was further reduced 

when it supplied personnel for the newly formed 23 rd Marines. Beginning 1 

August, a gradual replacement of personnel soon brought the 9 th back up to full 

strength. Two days later, it was detached from the 2 nd Marine Division and 

assigned to Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet.

World War Two Continued… 

Continued 

• The first four days of September were spent marching from Camp Elliott up the 

coast to the new Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside. On 8 

September, the 9 th was transferred to the newly activated 3 rd Marine Division, an 

association that was to last until the end of the war. Again the regiment engaged in 

intensive combat training, including two weeks of amphibious exercises in the San 

Diego-Oceanside area. Just a few weeks before shipping overseas, Colonel Lemuel 

C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 9 th and later the 20 th Commandant 

of the Marine Corps (1952-1955) suggested the design for the unique "Striking 

Ninth" insignia. Although not authorized for a shoulder patch, it was generally 

accepted and remained the regimental insignia during World War II. "The 

emblem consists of a bald eagle with outstretched wings carrying three chain links 

in each claw, the motto 'Striking' on a ribbon running through a large figure nine 

and another ribbon lettered 'Ninth Marines' below the shield. The chain links 

typify the interlocked, interdependent battalions forming the backbone of the 

Regiment. The eagle itself and the flashing lightning represent the striking power 

of the regiment."


Continued 

Bougainville 

• Like the earlier Guadalcanal operation, the Bougainville campaign was a limitedobjective 

assault designed to capture and defend a strategic airfield site--a vital 

link in the campaign to neutralize Rabaul, the Japanese stronghold on New Britain 

that was blocking the Allied advance up the Solomon chain. The Cape Torokina 

region was selected for the landing because the Japanese lightly defended it, 

possessed a suitable site for an air base, and was part of a natural defensive region 

approximately eight miles by six miles in dimension. 

• At 0730 on D-Day, the landing craft carrying the 9 th Marines' assault waves 

crossed the line of departure and headed for the chosen beaches of Empress 

Augusta Bay. Landing with three battalions abreast on the extreme left of the 

division beachhead, the regiment encountered little enemy opposition. It rapidly 

crossed the beaches, established defensive positions, and sent a strong patrol to the 

Laruma River mouth to protect the divisions left flank. 

• When it did not appear that the Japanese would offer opposition on the left (west) 

flank, the 1st and 2 nd Battalions of the 9 th Marines were moved on 2-3 November to 

the east sector. This consolidation of the beachhead left the 3 rd Battalion, 9 th 

Marines (3/9) on the extreme left flank. Before 3/9 could rejoin its regiment, the 

Japanese made their only attempt to reinforce their troops and the Battle of 

Koromokina Lagoon was on.

World War Two Continued… Continued Guam 

• Assigned Blue Beach on the extreme right flank of the 3 rd Marine Division, the 9 th 

had several missions. Its first objective was to seize the ridges just inland from the 

beach and then, to expand the beachhead to the perimeter designated by III Corps. 

On order, the regiment was to drive west around the shore of Apra Harbor to link 

up with the 1 st Brigade. 

• At 0740 on 21 July 1944, the amphibian tractors carrying the first assault waves of 

the 9 th Marines started toward the shore of Guam, which had just undergone the 

heaviest preparatory bombardment yet delivered by the Navy in the Pacific. After 

crossing the reefs and landing the Marines on the beach, the amphibian tractors 

hastened back to the reef's edge to rendezvous with landing boats bringing up 

following waves. 

• During a division attack on 25 July, the 9 th ‘s 2 nd Battalion, attached to the 3 rd 

Marines, spearheaded that regiment's assault upon the Fonte Plateau, the site of an 

elaborate Japanese Division command post. Within an hour, 2/9 had secured its 

first objective, Mt. Tenjo Road, which gave the Marines a much-needed route over 

which to bring up tanks. 

• On the night of 25-26 July, the 2 nd Battalion, in its exposed position, received the 

brunt of the Japanese Fonte Plateau counterattack. Beating off seven determined 

thrusts, the Marines held their ground, although they suffered over 50 per cent 

casualties. In the morning, the bodies of 950 Japanese soldiers in front of the 

battalion's lines testified to the fury of the enemy attack. Still continuing in the 

advance, 2/9 was to see much heavy fighting before it seized the Fonte Plateau on 29 

July.


Continued 

Iwo Jima 

Iwo Jima 

• Embarking aboard ship 8 February 1945, the 9 th Marines sailed from Guam to 

Iwo Jima on the 17 th , arriving in the floating reserve area on D-Day, 19 February. 

Five days later, the regiment landed and moved up to the front. The situation 

ashore at this time found the Japanese controlling the rough high ground to the 

north, east, and west, looking down the throats of the Marines below. Before any 

general advance could be made, a breakthrough in the Japanese center was 

essential. To the 3 rd Marine Division was given this task of clearing the critical 

central portion of the Motoyama Plateau by means of a frontal assault. 

• On the morning of 25 February, the fresh 9 th Marines passed through the front 

lines on the southern edge of Motoyama Airfield No. 2, and attacked with two 

battalions in assault and one in reserve. For three days, the Marines fought on and 

around the airfield, while a hail of fire from rifles, machine guns, mortars, and 

artillery rained down on the slow-moving Marines from the heights ahead. 

• Enemy defenders on two key terrain features, Hills PETER and 199 OBOE, 

continually hampered the advance. Finally, by means of a coordinated attack 

between the 1 st and 2 nd Battalions on 27 February, the 9 th overran Hill PETER and 

continued down the reverse slope and up to the crest of 199 OBOE. The next 

morning the 21 st Marines relieved the depleted regiment to push the attack and 

break the main line of resistance of the Japanese that same day.

The 9 th Marines in Vietnam 

• A battalion of the 9 th Marines was one of the first units to land in Vietnam 

following the decision to commit Marine forces against the Viet Cong. On 8 March 

1965, BLT (Battalion Landing Team) 3/9, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Charles E. McPartllin, Jr., landed in Da Nang in central Vietnam as part of the 9 th 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The brigade's mission was to defend the Da Nang 

Air Base, which at that time was under constant threat of attack by the Viet Cong. 

Marines of 3/9 quickly and effectively secured the airbase and its immediate 

vicinity and remained at that location. On 16 June 1965, BLT 1/9 under Lieutenant 

Colonel Verle E. Ludwig, relieved them. 

• Beginning in September 1965, at the height of the rice harvest season, the 9 th 

Marines inaugurated Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, so named because of the 

nature of the mission. Working in conjunction with local Vietnamese units and 

district officials, 9 th Marines units conducted search and destroy operations in the 

vicinity of areas where rice was to be harvested and also provided security for the 

villagers. This type of operation was successful both militarily and politically and 

was instrumental in establishing Marine-Vietnamese rapport throughout the 

regimental zone of action. 

• In an effort to provide maximum assistance to the pacification program and, at the 

same time, to accomplish one of its priority missions, the destruction of the Viet 

Cong--the 9 th Marines developed Operation COUNTY FAIR in February 1966.

The 9 th Marines in Vietnam Continued… 

Continued 

• The 9 th Marines' participation in COUNTY FAIR operations consisted of 

cordoning a target area (village or hamlet) in order to isolate it for the 

duration of the operation (normally two days) and providing limited 

medical and logistical assistance. To the largest extent possible, 

Vietnamese military, police, and civil authorities performed the task of 

searching the target areas and handling the populace. This was 

considered an essential element of COUNTRY FAIR operations, since one 

of its primary purposes was to restore the populace's confidence in the 

Vietnamese governmental structure and to instill a sense of trust and 

loyalty towards duly appointed officials. 

• During its first year of deployment in Vietnam, the 9 th Marines took part 

in approximately 45 battalion and several hundred company-size 

operations within the Da Nang tactical area of responsibility as well as in 

several III Marine Amphibious Force operations outside the Da Nang 

area.

Vietnam Operations & Battle Locations 

OPERATION DATES 

OERATIONS and BATTLE LOCATIONS 

UNITS INVOLVED 

LOCATION PROVINCE 

Blastout I Aug-65 1/3, 1/9 

Cam Ne, Cau Do, North of Da Nang Quang Nam 

Golden Fleece Sep-Oct 65 9th Mar 

Hoa Vang District Quang Nam 

County Fair Sept-Dec 65 1/1, 1/3, 1/9 

Villlage surround and search Various 

Rice Straw Oct-Nov 65 9th Mar 

TAOR Extension to Ky Lam River Quang Nam 

Independence Feb-66 1/9, 2/9 

S of Song Vu Gia Quang Nam 

Montgomery May-66 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/4 

Ky Lam Campaign May-66 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/4 

Dai Loc area, 6 mi S of Da Nang Quang Nam 

Liberty Jul-66 1/9, 2/9, 1/1 

Dai Loc area, 6 mi S of Da Nang Quang Nam 

Macon Jul-Oct 66 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 2/3 An Hoa Area, S of Da Nang Quang Nam 

Deckhouse V Jan-67 1/9 

Mekong Delta, Co Chien, Ham Luong Kien Hoa 

Prairie II Feb-Mar 67 2/3, 3/3, 3/4, 1/9, 2/9 DMZ, North of Cam Lo Quang Tri 

Beacon Hill Mar-Apr 67 3/3, 1/9, 1/4 

DMZ N of Cam Lo, Gio Linh area Quang Tri 

Prairie III Mar-Apr 67 3/4, 2/3, 2/9, 1/9, 3/3 DMZ Quang Tri 

Prairie IV Apr-May 67 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/3, 3/3, 1/4, 3/4 DMZ Quang Tri 

Chinook II Apr-67 1/9 

St w/o Joy , 12 mi North of Hue Thua Thien 

Cimarron Jun-Jul 67 3/3, 1/9, 2/9, 3/9,1/4, 3/4 DMZ N of Cam lo Quang Tri 

Buffalo Jul-67 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 2/3 NE of Con Thien Quang Tri 

Fremont Jul-Oct 67 1/9, 3/4, 1/4, 1/3, 2/3 Cobi-Thanh Tan N of Hue Thua Thien, 

Kingfisher Jul-Oct 67 9th Mar , 2/3 

DMZ Con Thien to Cam Lo area Quang Tri 

Kentucky Nov 67-Feb 69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/4, 3/3 DMZ Leatherneck Square Quang Tri 

Neosho Nov 67-Jan 68 3/4, 1/9 

Cobi-Thanh Tan sector N of Hue Thua Thien 

Scotland Nov 67-Mar 68 26th Mar, 1/9 

Khe Sanh Plateau (was Ardmore) Quang Tri 

Ballistic Armor Jan-68 2/4, 1/9 

N of Hue Thua Thien 

Dai Do Apr-May 68 2/4, 1/3, 1/9 

Battle of Dai Do - Cau Viet Quang Tri 

Pegasus/LamSon 207 Apr-68 26th Mar, 1/9, 2/1, 2/3 Khe Sanh Area Quang Tri 

July Action Jul-68 1/9,2/9,3/9,1/3,2/3,3/3 N of Camp Carroll Quang Tri 

Dawson River Nov 68-Jan 69 1/9, 2/9 

Ba Long Valley Quang Tri 

Dawson River West Jan-69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 

West of Khe Snh - to Loation Border Quang Tri 

Dewey Canyon Jan-Mar 69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 

Da Krong Valley Base Area 611 Quang Tri 

Apache Snow May 69-Jun 69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 

Da Krong Valley Quang Tri 

Utah Mesa Jun-Jul 69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 

Khe Sanh Plateau Quang Tri 

Cameron Falls Jun-69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 

Da Krong Valley SW of Vandergift Quang Tri 

Keystone Eagle Jul-69 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 

Redeployment

The 1 st Battalion 9 th Marines in Vietnam 

March 1965 – March 1966 

For the Marine Corps, the Vietnam war will prove the longest campaign in its 

history. It will also be one of the largest in scale. By 1968, over 85,000 Marines will 

be committed to the conflict, a larger force than that which stormed ashore at 

Okinawa. 

On July 1st 1965 Vietcong sappers attack the heart of the Marine presence in 

Vietnam - the Air Base at Da Nang. Although the losses are of minor significance, 

the propaganda value to the VC is incalculable, and pressure builds to allow the 

Marines a more aggressive posture. 

Marine Patrols ordered to secure Vietnamese villages face problems none have 

before encountered. Marine training, the toughest in the United States armed forces, 

has not prepared men for an enemy hidden amongst the civilian population. 

This is a new world, a world in which villagers are fearful, hostile by turn. A 

community of apparently peaceful farmers could harbour a deadly guerilla army. 

For the Marines in Vietnam the nightmare is beginning - a hell of snipers and of 

booby traps, of ceaseless fear and suspicion............



1 st Battalion, 9 th Marines, formerly 3 rd Battalion, 1 st Marines, was formed January 2, 1965. Composed of men fresh 

out of ITR and the nucleus of the old battalion returning from leave, we began Lock-On training at Camp Pendleton 

California. We would learn how to work as an efficient team. From fireteam tactics to the battalion FEX many days 

and nights were spent in classrooms and in the field. While becoming acquainted with Case Springs, the firing ranges 

and the hills around the San Mateo area, we watched the situation in Southeast Asia develop, wondering how long it 

would be before we would put this training to practical use. 

After a well earned 'ninety-six' we began preparing for our overseas tour. We shipped from San Diego March 14 

aboard the USS General J. C. Breckinridge. Aboard ship we attended lectures, stood inspections and continued 

training, even though some of us suffered seasickness. We got liberty in Hawaii and Yokohama and on April 2 offloaded 

at Naha Port, Okinawa. That same day we officially became 1 st Battalion, 9 th Marines when we traded colors 

with the old 1/9. We were now a unit of the 3 rd Marine Division. The 'like new' barracks at Camp Hansen were quite 

an improvement over the living quarters at Pendleton. 

Almost immediately Bravo Company set out for the Northern Training Area for a lengthy stay as host company. 

Delta Company went to Raid School and was soon followed by Alpha Company. All of the line companies spent a 

very wet ten days at NTA for jungle warfare training. Not many of us realized at that time how valuable that training 

would be. We weathered a couple typhoon warnings with no more than heavy rain and a bit of wind. We even 

weathered a few weekends in such unlikely spots as Kin Village, Koza, Kadena, Naha and Four Corners. 

In the field we worked with many of the units that were to join us when we became a Battalion Landing Team. When 

we got the word: "pack your gear and be ready to board ship by June 12, you're going to Vietnam as BLT 1/9," it 

came as no great surprise. We suspected something like this would happen, but we had had our hopes set for Fuji. A 

hectic two days and nights of loading and we were under way. 

Remember how happy those "salts" in 3/9 were when we "walked" ashore at Da Nang. They sure were glad to see 

us. In fact, they started loading even before we were all ashore. Bravo moved out immediately to participate in an 

operation in the western TAOR while the rest of us moved to Da Nang airfield and began to improve the positions.



Then the word was passed that most of the CP would be moved to the base of Hill 268 within 24 hours to make 

room for the Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG). 

Every now and then a Viet Cong sniper would try his luck at us, but usually nothing came of it Except once in a 

while one of them would get lucky and get close enough to make the dirt fly. 

On July 1 the VC sent a suicide squad equipped with 81 mm mortars and 57 mm recoilless rifles to the airfield. 

Before it was over three Air Force jets were destroyed and three were damaged. Later on we captured one of the VC 

who participated in the attack and from him learned that thanks to our alertness they didn't fully accomplish their 

mission. Shortly after this we moved back to the airfield. By now we were beginning to feel like Ringling Brothers 

with all that moving around. We stayed at the airstrip for a short time before we got word that we were to move 

again. We got pretty comfortable down by the Cau Do River, but it wasn't long until we moved to Marble Mountain. 

When we were instructed in the finer points of the inter-Division Transfer System that was being initiated so that 

the rotation tour dates would be mixed in each unit, we lost a lot of friends and comrades to other outfits. 

That night the VC hit Da Nang East, Da Nang Main and Chu Lai was a real thriller. With Da Nang East just a mile 

down that bumpy road we saw some action. We lost a lot of choppers that night and MCB-9 got it pretty bad but we 

got about 20 of them. 

Life at Marble Mountain was a steady stream of sweeps, village searches and perimeter security, but we soon got 

strong back tents to live in and life wasn't so bad after all. 

We may have moved again before this book is off the presses but we'll do our best wherever we are because we're 

an organization rich in the spirit and pride that makes the Marine Corps the best fighting force of its kind in the 

world today. In early June the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clements, 

"convinced" the inhabitants of two hamlets to move about five miles, near the village of Le My, where the Marines 

had already established a strong presence............"I influenced their decision by honesty, sincerity, and a hell of a lot of 

H & I fires." "This permitted the battalion to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign based upon the situation as it 

appeared to the (Vietnamese) people on the ground. This privileged position permitted a great deal of person-toperson 

confidence to develop, and along with it, a personal commitment to the government cause."



The American troops in their enclave bases had been spared the brunt of the enemy offensive which was concentrated around 

Saigon and in the central highlands. But shortly after midnight on July 1, 1965 the marines guarding the air base at Da Nang got 

their first taste of heavy Vietcong firepower. Late on the night before, a heavily armed VC attack force consisting of a special 

operations company and motor company crossed the Cau Do River south of Da Nang. By midnight they reached the southeastern 

perimeter of the air base, knowing that the outer portion of the southern perimeter was guarded by ARVN troops rather than U.S. 

Marines. Digging under the outer perimeter fence, a thirteen-man demolition team then crossed an open area and cut a hole in the 

inner perimeter fence. A single marine sentry, hearing something in the dark, threw an illumination grenade. 

At that moment the enemy opened fire and ten demolition's experts raced onto the airfield. They destroyed an F-102 Corvair and 

two C-130 transport planes and damaged another F-102 and C-130. Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig immediately sent a 

reinforcing squad from Company C of his 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. But in those few minutes the enemy withdrew from the field. 

By 7:AM Company B from 1/9 was searching the area for the sappers. Fourteen suspects were rounded up, but none was 

connected to the attack. ARVN soldiers did find a wounded North Vietnamese intelligence officer who told them that the attack 

had been planned and rehearsed for over a month.


March 1965 – March 1966


March 1965 – March 1966

Fire at Cam Ne 



On July 2, 1965 one day after the attack, General Walt sought authorization form 

the ARVN I Corps commander, General Thi, to extend the marine TAOR (tactical 

area of responsibility) south of the air base to include the area five miles south of 

the Cau Do River, the direction from which the attack came. On July 20 General 

Thi reluctantly agreed, acknowledging that his men could not guarantee the 

security of the air base. But the extension of the TAOR presented the marines with 

a new problem. The area south of the Cau Do was densely populated and 

sympathetic to the VC. Contact between marines and Vietnamese civilians was 

bound to increase as the marines attempted to secure the area. Within two weeks a 

Zippo cigarette lighter would ignite the tense situation on the ground and on the 

American television screen. 

William R. Melton Squad Leader, 

Company D, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines 1965 

Take what happened at Cam Ne. At the beginning of August we got word that 

Company D was going to a known Vietcong village called Cam Ne. It was the same 

area where another company had been a little earlier and run into some real 

trouble. To get to the village we came up along a river on amtracs and debarked a 

short distance away. Just as we formed for attack the enemy took us under fire, 

wounding four men from another platoon. So we went in there and destroyed the 

village. Those were our orders. In fact, I had asked our platoon commander before 

we set off, and he said if they fire on us we can destroy the village. The unfortunate 

part of it was that one of the men in our platoon used a Zippo lighter to set fire to 

one of the houses, and that got on television because we had Morley Safer of CBS 

News with us. Boy, he did us a job.



Operation Starlite August 17, 1965 

Perhaps the most important outcome of Operation Starlite was its 

psychological lift. In the first major engagement between American troops and 

Main Force Vietcong soldiers the Americans has been victorious. Had the 

American forces lost - a real possibility given their inexperience - the effects might 

have been severe indeed. The old tactics of the VC, which had worked so well 

against ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), failed to rout the marines. So 

the enemy learned a lesson as well; it would be many months before they would 

again stand to fight against the marines. 

For the marines, Starlite, or the Battle of Chu Lai as it became known in their 

lore, took on an almost mythical importance. For those marines who came later 

and for whom the landings at Iwo Jima and Inchon Beach were the glory of 

another generation, the Battle of Chu Lai remained for many months the only 

evidence of what the marines could do if the enemy stood and engaged. Now, in 

late August 1965 the number of marines - and soldiers, airmen, and sailors - 

arriving in Vietnam was no longer a trickle, but a torrent. Fateful decisions had 

been made in Washington, by one man, sitting alone in his office: the president of 

the United States.

Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig 



Operation Gloden Fleece August 30, 1965 

Another marine program proved more productive than County Fair. On August 30, 

1965, Huynh Ba Trinh, the chief of Hoi Hai Village, visited the headquarters of the 

1 st Battalion, 9 th Marines, to ask the marines to provide security for his people 

during their September rice harvest. Each harvest, the village chief explained, the 

VC demand a sizable portion of the rice yield. What the VC took usually amounted 

to the only surplus the villagers could sell in the marketplace. Already, the village 

chief knew, the insurgents had moved into the area to collect the rice. 

Lieutenant Colonel Verle Ludwig, commander of the 1/9 Marines, agreed to 

ward off the Vietcong and devised a project called Golden Fleece. When the rice 

harvest began on September 10, companies from the 1/9 saturated the area around 

Hoi Hai Village, conducted night ambushes, and set up cordons around the 

harvesters working in the fields. After a major unsuccessful fight with the marines 

on September 12, most of the VC left. The marines met only sporadic resistance 

during the rest of the harvest. Golden Fleece was an economic success because it 

preserved the harvest and it was also a psychological success. The marines proved 

they could defend the villagers, and they forced the Vietcong to increase their rice 

levy in other areas, thereby diminishing their popular support there. 

Control over rice had been an important element of the war in Vietnam, and the 

success of Golden Fleece reinforced this fact among the marines. Soon other marine 

units, often working together with ARVN troops, took up rice protection at harvest 

time. Emphasis on the technique also spread south among U.S. Army units. Not all 

subsequent Golden Fleece operations proved successful, in part because sometimes 

ARVN troops pilfered from the harvests they were assigned to protect. But the 

technique became a standard component of military operations conducted at 

harvest time.

April 1966 Action 

April 1966 Action 

• Colonel Simmons compared the role of his regiment to that of the "ham in the 

sandwich," the filler to absorb the shock of the confrontation between the two 

opposing sides. This situation could only benefit the Communist. The 9 th Marines 

had to revert to the defensive because of the threat to the security of Da Nang 

created by the polarization of the ARVN forces into hostile factions. With the 

abandonment of several government outposts along Route 4 and vast amounts of 

ammunition, the VC not only rearmed at GVN expense, but also reentered the area 

the Marines had just cleared during Operation Kings. 

• On 16 April, an old enemy, the R-20 "Doc Lap" Battalion, attacked one of the 

companies from Lieutenant Colonel Donahue's 2 nd Battalion, 9 th Marines in position 

north of the abandoned 39 th Ranger outpost at Phung Thu. Company H, 

commanded by Captain Everette S. Roane, had established defensive positions 

north of Route 4, and put a squad ambush south of the road. Suddenly, at 0400, the 

enemy opened up with recoilless rifle and mortar fire. Simultaneously, the enemy 

launched two company-size assaults, one from the southeast and the other from the 

southwest. The attack from the southwest, about 100 men, ran into a Marine 

ambush and stalled. According to the Marine squad leader, his men "shot 12-15 VC 

for sure-most likely more." At dawn the following morning, the squad found two 

enemy bodies in front of its position. The approximately 150-man force attacking 

from the southeast reached the north side of Route 4, but was unable to penetrate 

the Marine Company’s perimeter.

April 1966 Action Continued… 

• Many VC were shot as they crossed the road and went down into the 

paddy in front of the 2 nd Platoon. At one point, 22 VC were shot as they 

attempted to remove bodies. During the lulls in illumination, as bodies 

would be removed and more VC would cross the road, there would be 

more bodies. 

• At first light, the Marines counted 12 enemy bodies, but estimated killing 

another 63. Company H had not gone unscathed, suffering seven dead 

and 37 wounded, largely as a result of the enemy's recoilless rifle and 

mortar attack. 

• In mid-April the 9 th Marines resumed the initiative, following the 

temporary standoff of the political crisis. Originally, the regiment 

planned to follow Kings with a one-battalion operation beginning on 10 

April in the An Hoa region south of the Ky Lam and Thu Bon. Though 

unable to meet the original date, the 9 th Marines completed its revised 

order for Operation Georgia. The mission was assigned to Lieutenant 

Colonel Taylor's 3 rd Battalion, 9 th Marines.

The May 1966 - Ky Lam Campaign 

(The Lost Patrol "B" 1/9) 

• The Ky Lam Campaign, named after the river, was to be a three-phased advance. At the end 

of May 1966, the forward battalions were to reach Phase Line Brown, a line which extended 

from below Dai Loc in the west and followed the La Tho-Thanh Quit Rivers eastward, with 

the exception of a 2,000 meter-wide horseshoe-shaped salient extending south 5,000 meters 

along both sides of Route 1 to just above Dien Ban. In June, the regiment was to begin the 

second phase of the operation, securing all of Route 4 west of Route 1 and extending the 

Marines' lines down to the Ky Lam. During July, the 9 th Marines, in the final phase of the 

campaign, was to advance southward in the region east of Route 1 and incorporate the city of 

Hoi An in its area of responsibility. 

• The heaviest fighting in the early stages of the campaign was in 1/9's zone of action. On 10 

May, they had established the battalion's forward command post in Dai Loc. Company B was 

on the eastern bank of the Vu Gia, 3,500 meters south of Dai Loc to provide a covering force 

for units leaving the Georgia area of operations. That morning, Company A, 9 th Marines 

crossed the Vu Gia in LVTs and rejoined its parent battalion at Dai Loc. After the river 

crossing, Company A, prepared for a clearing operation around the town of Dai Loc, which 

Company B made preparations for a similar operation in southern Dai Loc District above the 

Thu Bon. 

• Allied intelligence sources indicated that the R-20 Battalion had re-infiltrated this area. A 

report received on 11 May stated that a company of the battalion was in the hamlet of Do 

Nam near a small finger lake, 2,000 meters northwest of Company B's position.


Continued… 

Continued 

• On the morning of 12 May, one of Company B's patrols unexpectedly came upon the 

enemy. The 14-man patrol squad had left the company CP at 0630, moving east. One hour 

later, the patrol reported that it had come under small arms fire and captured a VC 

suspect. Encountering no further resistance, the Marines continued their patrol. At 0830, the 

squad leader radioed back that a water buffalo was in its path. Captain Henry ordered the 

squad to avoid the animal, but "if threatened by it, they were given permission to shoot." In 

the squad's next report, about 30 minutes later, the Marines stated that they had wounded the 

buffalo and were giving chase to finish it off. Fifteen minutes after that, the patrol reported 

harassing fire and seeing Viet Cong fleeing to the east "and that the patrol was giving physical 

pursuit." The patrol leader asked for supporting mortar fire. Company B's mortar section 

fired an 81mm ranging round, but the patrol was unable to observe its impact. Captain Henry 

ordered his mortars to cease firing, fearing that they might hit his own men. About that time, 

the company sent out a second squad to follow the route of the first patrol. The second squad 

came under small arms and mortar fire itself. The Marines countered with mortar fire from 

the companies base area, which silenced the enemy's weapons. About 1030, the squad leader 

reported hearing a 'heavy volume of small arms fire, mortars, M79s, and hand grenades due 

east of their position," near the village of Do Nam. Believing that he had found the missing 

Marines, he asked for an aerial observer. An Army AO {aerial observer} happened into the 

area and reported an apparent firefight in the vicinity of the action recently reported by the 

second squad. The Army aircraft dropped a red smoke grenade in the village of Do Nam and 

fired four rockets into a trench line in front of the Marines. Making another pass, the Army 

AO threw out two messages to the Marines below, informing them that there were 20 VC in the 

trench line.


Continued… 

Continued 

• By 1145 Company B had established a 500-meter defensive line near the village of 

Hoa Tay, 500 meters southwest of the second squad's position. By 1230, the entire 

company was heavily engaged. The company's 81mm and 60mm mortars failed to 

silence the enemy's weapons and Capt. Henry asked for artillery and air 

support. After an artillery mission fired by the 2 nd Battalion, 12 th Marines, the action 

died down for about 20 minutes. At noon, the enemy opened up again with small 

arms and mortars, but by this time F-4Bs from VMFA-542 were overhead. The jets' 

first runs on the entrenched VC in Do Nam once more temporarily silenced the 

enemy. Following the air strikes, about 1320, Captain Henry's men spotted two 

Marines crossing an open field toward their lines. Henry ordered "a base of fire and 

mortar fire" to cover the two men. Both Marines were from the first patrol and 

badly wounded. The company commander asked them, before they went under 

sedation, where the rest of the squad was. The men vaguely pointed in a general 

direction to the northeast and said they were all dead. Before being overrun, the 

wounded men claimed that the patrol had killed 30 of the enemy. Shortly after 1330, 

the 1 st Battalion commander decided to reinforce his Company B. After some initial 

problems in obtaining helicopter support, he moved Company D and a platoon from 

Company A to link up with Capt. Henry's company. By 1815, the three Marine units 

were consolidated in a 360-degree defensive perimeter around the hamlet of Hoa 

Tay. 

• The afternoon of May 13 Company B recovered the bodies of the 12 missing Marines 

near the western tip of the small finger lake.

The Lost Patrol “B” 1/9

The Story Of How The 1 st 

Battalion, 9 th Marines Earned the 

Nickname 

“The Walking Dead” 

st

There is a valley about 15 miles south of Da Nang, Republic of South Vietnam, which has ALWAYS been a strong 

hold of the Viet Min. Neither the Japanese nor the French could ever establish a garrison in that valley, many tried and 

died, but none could. That was until some genius noticed the 1st Bn. 9th Marines were getting a little fat and sassy 

hanging around the airbase and Marble Mountain. Everything out side of our wire was undisputedly controlled by 

Victor Charlie [“VC”, “Viet Cong”, or “Charlie”], including the village at the bottom of the hill. Our mission was to 

Search and Destroy the enemy and all of his support. Charlie found out within weeks we were not the Japanese or the 

French and he couldn't hold his own in fighting us man for man. So he changed his tactics to harassing & sniper fire, 

mines & booby-traps, he would only take us on if he out numbered us 10 to 1, or he had a good escape route. Dodge 

City, Indian Country, Arizona Territory, Hand Grenade Alley are just a few of the names given to areas we fought the 

enemy. Marine Corps history of the Battalion states that we were in hundreds of company size operations in our first 

year in country. 

At first 1/9 became infamous as the 'Zippo', battalion, because we had operational orders to burn and kill 

everything if a Vill was deserted when we entered. Villagers ran or hid when we swept through their Vill, so we burned 

most of them. 

A lineman from 9th Engineers, running wire out to our hill was captured, tortured and mutilated. It seems from 

that day forward, all illusions of codes of conducts and humanity seemed to end. The sweeps to find Charlie became 

very vicious. And Charlie got better at making & placing his mines, which were horrific. Dozens of our men were cut in 

half, or were decapitated. It seemed like we lost a couple of our friends everyday. We were all insane with fear and 

hatred. 

None of the events in our Valley escaped Hanoi. During a speech in early spring of 1966, Ho Chi Minh said the 

phrase "Di bo chet" (The Walking Dead) to describe the Marines in the Valley, He meant us, that we were already dead, 

just had not been buried yet. During the same event, General Vo Nguyen Giap promised President Ho and the 

Vietnamese people that he would liberate the valley as a birthday present for Ho. 

It just happened that within weeks of the speech, on May 12th, Bravo Company stepped into a VC Boot 

camp. For 4 days we fought a VERY fierce series of battles that saw a lot of our brothers die, and it gutted the military 

options of General Giap. On Ho's birthday, the grunt companies Alpha, Bravo, Charlie & Delta re-enforced H&S 

Company and dug in around the hill for their attack, it was a non-event. Bravo, with the support of Alpha and Delta, 

had destroyed them at the village of Ho Thay. Hanoi Hanna had labeled us 'The Walking Dead', and played our song 

'No-Where to Run, No-Where to Hide, which we were very proud of. 

I remember Captain Hart's reaction when General Walt told him that Ho & Giap had promised to wipe us 

out. He said, "Lew, does this mean they'll be coming to us? And we won't have to keep looking for them little 

bastards?“ You can thank a patrol of 14 Marines from Bravo Company that on May 12th 1966 paid a very high price 

for 1st Battalion 9th Marines to be proudly known as the ” Di bo Chet”, “The Walking Dead

Operation Liberty - June 1966 

• By mid-June General Kyle could expect to have three Marine infantry 

regiments consisting of eight battalions at Da Nang. He planned to reduce 

the extensive 9 th Marines TAOR by assigning the 1 st Marines to the eastern 

flank while the 3 rd Marines took over that part of the 9 th Marines TAOR 

west of the Yen River. In effect, Kyle visualized a shoulder-to-shoulder 

advance to the Ky Lam. The operation, codenamed Liberty, was scheduled 

to begin on 7 June, with the 9 th Marines bearing the brunt of the campaign 

in its initial stages. 

• The 3 rd Battalion, 9 th Marines was to continue its two-company holding 

action in the An Hoa region. All the remaining infantry companies were 

assigned tot he three forward battalions, the 1 st Battalion, 1 st Marines on the 

eastern flank, the 2 nd Battalion 9 th Marines in the center, and the 1 st 

Battalion 9 th Marines on the western flank. Thus each forward battalion 

was to consist of five infantry companies instead of the usual four, with 

three companies deployed to the front and two to the rear. The advancing 

battalions were to secure Route 4 by 20 June 1966 and reach the Ky Lam by 

the end of the month. 

• On 7 June Operation Liberty began with heavy preparatory artillery fires. 

Marine artillery neutralized 35 objective areas in front of the advancing 

infantry. Initially, the enemy countered the Marine offensive with only 

small arms fire and mines. The mines were the more deadly of the two.

Operation Liberty - June 1966 

Continued… 

• On 18 June 1966, Company C, 9th Marines, operating 2,000 meters south 

of Dai Loc, came under heavy mortar and small arms fire, suffering eight 

wounded. The company asked for supporting air and artillery, which 

ended the enemy resistance. 

• 2 nd Battalion, 9 th Marines underwent a similar attack on 22 June in the 

hamlet of La Hoa, immediately east of the railroad and 4,000 meters 

north of the Ky Lam. Marines once more called upon supporting arms, 

including naval gunfire from the destroyer USS Marton (DD 948), to 

silence the enemy. 

• By the end of the month, all three Marine regiments reached Phase Line 

Green and the operation ended. VC resistance to the Marines advance 

had been scattered and ineffective. The 9 th Marines observed that the 

lack of major enemy resistance gave plausibility to the thesis that the 

momentum of Operation Liberty prevented them from gaining any degree 

of initiative and uprooted them "from what had been a relatively secure 

operating area." That regiment alone claimed to have recovered 40 

square miles from the VC. The Marines were once more optimistic about 

pacifying the extensive Da Nang enclave

Operation Buffalo - July 2, 1967 

• Operation Buffalo began on 2 July utilizing 1 st Battalion, 9 th Marines in and around Con Thien. 

Companies A and B operated north-northeast of the strong point near a former market place on Route 

561, while Company D, Headquarters and Service Company, and the battalion command group 

remained within the outpost perimeter. Company C was at Dong Ha at the 9 th Marines command post. In 

an attempt to counter this NVA maneuver, it was decided to send two companies of 1/9 ("A" and "B" 

Cos.) into the area (1,200 yards east of Con Thien and north of the Trace) which had just been swept 

during the last few days in June. This is the reason the two companies were there on 2 July. 

• That morning, Company B, a company which gained a reputation for finding the enemy during earlier 

actions at Khe Sanh, walked into the heaviest combat of its Vietnam assignment. It had moved a mile east 

of Con Thien the day before in company with Company A to conduct a sweep north of the cleared trace. 

At 0800 on the 2nd, both units began moving north. Company A was on the left. Company B moved along 

Route 561, an old 8- to 10-foot-wide cart road bordered by waist-high hedgerows. The road led to 

trouble; two NVA battalions waited in prepared positions. 

• Company B's movement started smoothly and by 0900 the 2d Platoon had secured its first objective, a 

small crossroads 1,200 meters north of the trace. There was no contact. As the 3d Platoon and the 

command group moved up the trail, enemy sniper fire started. The 3d Platoon and Captain Coates' 

command group moved to the left to suppress the enemy's fire, but as they pushed north the NVA fire 

intensified, halting the platoon. Captain Coates directed his 2d Platoon to shift to the right in a second 

attempt to outflank the Communist position; at the same time he ordered the 1st Platoon forward to 

provide rear security for the company. The 2d Platoon tried to move, but enemy fire forced it back onto 

the road. The number of wounded and dead mounted as NVA fire hit the unit from the front and both 

flanks. To worsen matters, the enemy began pounding the Marines with artillery and mortars. 

• Shortly after the sweep began, Company A tripped two Claymore mines and the need for casualty 

evacuation delayed its movement. Afterward, Captain Slater moved his company eastward to help 

Company B, but could not link up because of heavy small arms fire. Soon the company had so many 

casualties that it was unable to fight and move simultaneously.

Operation Buffalo Continued… 

• Company B's position deteriorated. Enemy artillery and mortar fire cut off the 3 rd Platoon and the 

command group from the 2 nd Platoon. The NVA troops then used flamethrowers to ignite the hedgerows on 

both sides of Captain Coates' unit, as well as massed artillery in close coordination with a ground attack. 

Many of the Marines, forced into the open by the flamethrowers, died under the enemy fire. 

• Down the road, the 1 st Platoon also took heavy punishment as it tried to push its way up to the lead elements 

of the company. North Vietnamese troops swarmed against the platoon's flanks, but air support arrived and 

the platoon commander, Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns, directed strikes against the enemy. The air strikes 

disrupted the enemy assault and the 1 st Platoon reached what was left of the 2 nd Platoon. 

• The 1 st Battalion command post at Con Thien heard the crackle of small-arms fire from the 0930 action, 

followed by a radio report that Company B had encountered a dug-in NVA unit. The first assessment of 

enemy strength was a platoon, then a battalion, and ultimately a multi-battalion force. When the firing 

began to increase, Lieutenant Colonel Schening alerted his Company C, at Dong Ha, to stand by to be helilifted 

into Company B's area. Lieutenant Colonel Schening dispatched a rescue force composed of four tanks 

and a platoon from Company D. Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, went with the small force to take command 

of Company B if link-up could be made. First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, the battalion intelligence officer, 

went also because he was familiar with the area where the enemy engaged Company B. The remainder of 

the battalion command group remained at Con Thien. 

• The small rescue force moved down the cleared trace from Con Thien to the junction of Route 561 without 

incident, but as it turned north up the road it came under fire. A North Vietnamese unit, trying to encircle 

Company B, had moved south and was opposite Captain Radcliffe's small force. Helicopter gunships and the 

fire from the four tanks dispersed the enemy. Company C began arriving by helicopter and Captain 

Radcliffe ordered the Company D platoon to secure the landing zone and evacuate casualties. As the lead 

elements of Company C came into the zone they met a heavy artillery barrage, which wounded 11 Marines. 

• The Marines set up a hasty defense, making maximum use of the tanks' firepower, and brought the dead 

and wounded into the perimeter. The Marines then loaded their casualties on the tanks. The rescue force 

found it impossible to recover all the bodies immediately; some bodies remained along the road.


• During the battle, friendly and enemy supporting arms engaged in a furious duel. In the first few hours of 

the engagement Marine aircraft dropped 90 tons of ordnance during during 

28 sorties. Artillery fired 453 

missions, while Navy destroyers fired 142 5-inch 5 inch rounds into enemy positions. The NVA force fired 1,065 

artillery and mortar rounds during the day at Gio Linh and Con Thien; Thien; 

more than 700 rounds fell on 

Lieutenant Colonel Schening's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines alone. 

• When the necessity of carrying the increasing numbers of wounded brought the company to a halt, 

Company A’s A s 3 rd Platoon established a hasty landing zone in the rear of the company. company. 

After the first 

flight of medevac helicopters departed the zone, the enemy hit the the 

3 rd Platoon with mortars and assaulted 

the position. 2 nd Platoon and company command group moved to reinforce the 3 rd Platoon. The enemy 

advanced to within 50 meters of Company A's lines before small arms arms 

and artillery fire broke up their 

attack. Enemy pressure and the remaining casualties kept Company A in the defensive position until the 

NVA force withdrew later in the evening. 

• At 1500 3 rd Battalion, 9 th Marines were ordered to move by helicopter to Lieutenant Colonel Colonel 

Schening's 

assistance. Three companies and the command group of the 3 rd Battalion were in position north of the 

trace by 1800. 

• After landing, Major Woodring assumed operational control of Companies Companies 

A and C of the 1 st Battalion. 

The combined force made a twilight attack on the enemy s left flank, flank, 

while elements of Company B and 

the platoon from Company D holding the landing zone pulled back to the Con Thien perimeter in 

expectation of an attack on the outpost. The increased pressure provided by the 3 rd Battalion caused the 

enemy to break contact. 

• 1 st battalion lost 53 killed, 190 wounded, and 34 missing. Not until until 

5 July did the battalion complete the 

recovery efforts that reduced the number of missing to nine, but the number of dead increased to 84. The 

battalion established no accurate count of enemy killed. 

• On 3 July BLT 1/3 from SLF Alpha joined the 9 th Marines and tied in with 3/9’s 3/9 s right flank. The 

regiment planned a drive north to recover missing bodies and push push 

the NVA out of the Lang Son area, 

only 4,000 meters northeast of the Con Thien perimeter.



• The attack started early the morning of the 4 th . The 3 rd Battalion encountered heavy resistance from 

concealed enemy positions southwest of the site of Company B's engagement on 2 July. A prolonged fight 

followed, involving tanks, artillery, and close air support. By 1830 when the final Marine assault ended, 3 rd 

Battalion, 9 th Marines had lost 15 dead and 33 wounded. BLT 1/3 had 11 wounded during the same action. 

The same day BLT 2/3 from SLF Bravo joined the operation; the battalion landed by helicopter north of 

Cam Lo at LZ Canary and moved west and then northward on the western edge of the battle area toward 

Con Thien. 

• 3/9 decided to move a reinforced company 1,500 meters to the north-northwest to cover their left flank. 

Company A, 9th Marines, which now included the survivors of Company C, and a detachment from 3d 

Reconnaissance Battalion, were chosen to complete the task. Company A moved into position without 

opposition and established a strong combat outpost. Company A's composite force dug concealed fighting 

positions and sent reconnaissance patrols north in an attempt to discover where the enemy crossed the Ben 

Hai River. 

• As 3 rd Battalion advanced, they encountered increasingly heavy artillery fire and by 1600 they could go no 

further. Company B, BLT 1/3, Commander climbed a tree to spot for air strikes and artillery fire in front 

of his position. An aerial observer radioed that a large enemy force was approaching his position. The AO 

had spotted a 400-man force crossing the Ben Hai River heading directly for the two battalions. After the 

sightings, both battalions, less Company A, came under heavy, accurate artillery fire. Between 500-600 

rounds hit the 3 rd Battalion's position and about 1,000 landed on BLT 1/3. The enemy, still in column 

formation, was unaware that it was heading directly into Company A. The Marines opened fire at less than 

150 meters distance. When the enemy formed and attacked, heavy accurate artillery was walked to within 

75 meters of the perimeter. The few NVA that penetrated the perimeter were killed and all lines held. 

• In the early evening some NVA soldiers crept close enough to hurl hand grenades into the Marine lines. 

One of Company C fire-team leaders, Lance Corporal James L. Stuckey, responded by picking up the 

grenades and throwing them back toward their source. He was wounded when the third grenade exploded 

as it left his hand. He continued, however, to lead his fire-team for the rest of the night without medical 

assistance. 

• For the rest of the night, enemy small arms and mortar fire harass ed Company A, but the NVA units were 

withdrawing. First light revealed 154 enemy bodies strewn around Company A's perimeter; the defenders 

had 12 casualties. Among the wounded Marines was Lance Corporal Stuckey; only tattered flesh remain ed 

where his hand had been.


• While the attack on Company A took place, the rest of what intelligence officers later determined to have 

been the 90 th NVA Regiment assaulted the two Marine battalions. To add to the effect of their preparatory 

fires, the attacking North Vietnamese threw fused blocks of TNT into the Marine positions to keep the 

Marines down as the assaulting troops moved in. The Marines countered with supporting arms; flare ships, 

attack aircraft, helicopter gun-ships, naval gunfire, and all available artillery concentrated their fire on the 

attacking enemy. By 2130, the Marines had repelled the assault and the Communist forces began 

withdrawing to the north. 

• On 7 July, enemy artillery scored a direct hit on the command bunker of the 1 st Battalion, 9 th Marines at 

Con Thien, killing 11, including First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, the intelligence officer who had gone to 

the aid of Company B, 9 th Marines on 2 July. Eighteen others sustained wounds; one was the battalion 

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schening. The cause of the damage was a 152mm howitzer round, which 

penetrated five feet of sand bags, loose dirt, and 12x12-inch timbers. 

• By 8 July the Marines raised the NVA casualty count to more than 800. Hundreds of bodies covered the 

scarred battleground, some half buried, others in pieces, all surrounded by a carpet of battered equipment 

and ammunition. 

• Operation Buffalo closed on 14 July 1967. The Marines reported enemy losses as 1,290 dead and two 

captured. Marine losses, in contrast, totaled 159 killed and 345 wounded. The most savage aspect was the 

heavy employment of supporting arms by both sides. Of the known enemy killed, more than 500 came from 

air, artillery, and naval gunfire. In addition, supporting arms destroyed 164 enemy bunkers and 15 artillery 

and rocket positions, and caused 46 secondary explosions. To accomplish this, Marine aviation used 1,066 

tons of ordnance, Marine and Army artillery consumed more than 40,000 rounds, and ships of the U.S. 

Seventh Fleet fired 1,500 rounds from their 5- and 8-inch naval guns. On the other hand, enemy artillery 

accounted for half of the Marine casualties during the operation and posed a constant threat to the Marine 

logistical support installations. 

• The July fighting around Con Thien reaffirmed the Marines' faith in supporting arms. In spite of the 

appearance of SAMs and the presence of excellent, long-range Communist artillery, the Marines could 

prove that the latest enemy offensive had failed. Con Thien had held and at least one first line enemy 

regiment was in shambles. The Buffalo victory did not breed overconfidence, but the body-strewn 

wasteland along the DMZ provided mute evidence of the effectiveness of III MAF's defenses.

Battle For Hill 64 – Feb. 8, 1968 

• At 0420, 8 Feb, 1968 a reinforced battalion from the 101D Regiment, 325C NVA 

Division launched an attack against the 1 st Plt A/1/9, which occupied Hill 64 some 

500 meters west of the 1/9 perimeter at Khe Sanh. Following their usual pattern, the 

North Vietnamese tried to disrupt the Marines artillery support with simultaneous 

bombardment of the Khe Sanh combat base. To prevent friendly reinforcements 

from reaching the small hill, the enemy also shelled the platoon's parent unit and, 

during the fight some 350 mortar and artillery shells fell on 1/9 positions. 

• The enemy soldiers poured into the trench line and attacked the bunkers with RPGs 

and satchel charges. They also emplaced machine guns at the edge of the 

penetrations and pinned down those Marines in the Eastern half of the perimeter 

that were trying to cross over the hill to reinforce their comrades. The men in the 

northeastern sector, led by platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terence R. 

Roach, Jr. counterattacked down the trench line and became engaged in savage 

hand-to-hand fighting. While rallying his troops and directing fire from atop an 

exposed bunker, Lieutenant Roach was mortally wounded. 

• From the sheer weight of numbers, the North Vietnamese gradually pushed the 

Marines back until the enemy owned two thirds of the outpost. At that point, neither 

side was able to press the advantage. Pre-registered mortar barrages from 1/9 and 

artillery fire from Khe Sanh Combat Base had isolated the NVA assault units from 

any reinforcements but at the same time the depleted 1 st Plt was not strong enough 

to dislodge the enemy.


Continued… 

• A relief force of approximately two squads of volunteers, led by Captain J.J.M. Radcliffe, Alpha Company 

Commander, Shortly after daylight, made its way to the eastern slope of the hill. With a squad-size force 

along the southeastern side to block any enemy reinforcements along the trail, the remainder of the small 

force made contact with the shattered fragments of the 1st platoon. In addition to Lt. Roach, the platoon 

sergeant, S/Sgt. McKinney and the platoon radio operator, PFC Rizzo were KIA and two of the three-squad 

leaders were out of action. Capt. Radcliffe consolidated the remaining members of the platoon, placing a 

small squad size force on the north, a squad of the relief force under Cpl. Jay Enzinna on the south, and took 

a small force of approximately nine Marines to include the company gunnery sergeant, Camile D. Hont, two 

radio operators, and Cpl. Clopton to move down the center of the position. The north and south squads were 

to coordinate their counter-attack to retake the position with the force in the center, thus preventing any 

NVA attempts to breach 'Alpha' company's efforts to re-gain the outpost. In close hand-to-hand combat 

including a continuing exchange of grenades (ours were far superior), the marines moved forward slowly, 

their efforts hampered by the NVA who had over-run and occupied many of the bunkers. Realizing that some 

of the bunkers under NVA control and the trench lines contained wounded Marines, the relief force did not 

use LAAWs to blow the bunkers for fear of inflicting further Marine casualties. 

• The NVA attempted at least twice to stop the Marine force but were re-buffed. As quickly as tactically sound, 

but slowly, the Marines regained the hill. NVA bodies blocked the trench lines, clogged the bunkers, and were 

strewn over the western approaches to the hill. Attempts by the NVA to come up the western slope of the 

position were stopped by the supporting fires from Bravo and Delta companies, fires from 1/9's and 81's and 

from a tank within 1/9's lines. Capt. Radcliffe and Cpl. Genty, the former radio operator who was over-due to 

rotate home, stopped one NVA element attempting to come up the slope, and stymied either a counter-attack 

or an effort to retrieve NVA casualties by firing into a platoon size force coming out of the tree line and 

elephant grass at the bottom of the hill.


Continued… 

• The rain, fog and winds reduced the effect of supporting arms. Fixed wing close air support was 

minimal until long after daylight. The first air on station was RVN sky-raiders, propeller driven, slow 

moving and bomb-loaded. They were dropping in the suspected enemy staging areas and within 50 

yards of the base of the western approaches. 

• Upon securing the position, the priorities were: casualty treatment and evacuation, accounting for 

personnel, equipment, and ammunition, evacuation of POWs (at least four were alive among the 150 

plus NVA bodies on the position and the western slope), and removing our KIAs. A lack of personnel, 

the battle fatigue of those still able to function, and the losses of the leaders - Platoon Commander, 

Platoon Sergeant, & Squad Leaders, slowed these efforts. 

• The order to evacuate the position, despite having re-taken it and having complete control of it, was 

slowly carried out. Wounded and dead were carried down the eastern slope and loaded onto otters. 

Once this was accomplished, two otters were loaded with weapons, both US and NVA, and taken to 

the battalion position. Weapons, equipment, and personal gear that couldn't be removed because of 

the lack of personnel and the time restraint to clear the position, were blown in place. 

• Later in the day after the 1st platoon's area had been cleared, an air strike was called on it; bombs and 

napalm shook the hill and created an eerie look which now that the fog and rain had vanished could be 

seen from Khe Sanh Combat Base as well as the positions on 381, 861, and 915 (1050). 

• Marine casualties were 23 KIA and 29 WIA. NVA losses were 152 KIA and over 60 weapons captured.

Operation Dewey Canyon - 1969 

• A year after the Tet Offensive of 1968, military intelligence reports indicted a massive enemy 

buildup in the already heavily enemy-controlled A Shau. Plans at this stage of the war were for 

a decreasing role for US ground troops, and transfer of responsibility for combat actions to the 

soldiers of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN). But the enemy strength in A Shau posed a 

threat that demanded an immediate American effort to deny the enemy his sanctuary, capture 

his supplies, and prove that the A Shau would no longer be a haven. Primary responsibility for 

this mission fell to the men of the 9 th Marines, 3 rd Marine Division (Reinforced) FMF. 

• Headquartered 50 miles northeast of the A Shau at Vandergrift Combat Base under the 

command of Colonel Robert H. Barrow, the 9 th Marines boasted three battalions to be 

marshaled for the formidable task. The mission would be one of the last major offensives 

conducted by US Marines in Vietnam. It would be tough, it would be deadly, but it would be in 

the tradition of the US Marine Corps, an engagement fought valiantly and successfully. 

• The commanding general of the 3 rd Marine Division, headquartered out of Da Nang, was Major 

General Raymond G. Davis. General Davis referred to the 9 th Marines as the "Mountain 

Regiment" and his "Strike Force Regiment". As Operation Dewey Canyon began on January 

22, 1969, General Davis had good reason to pay close attention to the efforts of his Marines. 

Operation Dewey Canyon would send General Davis' son, Lieutenant Miles Davis, into harms 

way. 

• Phase I of Operation Dewey Canyon primarily involved the movement and positioning of air 

assets. Phase II, the movement of the 3 battalions of the 9 th Marines out of Vandergrift Combat 

Base began on January 31 st . 

• From January 31 until February 10, 1969, 2/9 continued its movement south, flanked by 1/9 

and 3/9. By February 10 th the three battalions were poised and ready to enter Phase III, the 

incursion into A Shau. Along the way they had built numerous firebases with names like 

Henderson, Tun Tavern, Shiloh, Razor, and Cunningham, to provide artillery support and 

maintain supply routes.


Continued… 

• Phase II of Operation Dewey Canyon was under way. Far to the south of Vandergrift the 3 rd 

Battalion, 9 th Marines were crossing the Da Krong River only 13 kilometers from Laos. The 

following morning the Marines of 1/9 and 2/9 began moving out of their firebases as well, 

heading southward and towards the North Vietnamese Base Area 611 that ran from the north 

boundary of A Shau and into Laos. 

• Triple-canopy jungle made movement difficult and two weeks of continuous fog and heavy 

monsoon rains removed any possibility of personal comfort and made resupply difficult. The 

enemy moved freely through the A Shau at night on roads they would carefully camouflage 

during the day with movable trees and shrubs ingeniously planted in containers. As they 

moved, the Marines were subjected to heavy artillery fire from NVA guns inside Laos. At 

night, more troops and weapons moved down the Ho Chi Minh trail. General Davis caused a 

slight stir on the home front when a newspaper reported a remark made in a personal 

conversation. "It makes me sick," the 3 rd Marine Division C.G. had said, "to sit on this hill and 

watch those 1,000 (enemy) trucks go down those roads in Laos, hauling ammunition down 

south to kill Americans with." 

• By February 20 th the Marines had moved all the way to the Laotian border. While the enemy 

played their deadly game of hide-and-seek, raining death on young American Marines and then 

quickly scurrying across the border into the safety of Laos. 

• The policy of US commanders had always been that units could enter Laos or Cambodia, only 

when American lives were endangered by enemy forces therein. Colonel Barrow saw the 

danger his own men faced from within and, despite the very real possibility of sacrificing his 

distinguished military career, ordered Hotel Company, 2/9 to cross the border and set up 

ambush positions INSIDE Laos. (This plan was approved by General Creighton Abrams, 

commander of all U.S. Forces in Vietnam after it took place)


Continued… 

• With elements of the 9 th Marines now operating inside Laos, the other battalions moved out to take up 

positions along the border. On the morning of February 22 nd , the 1 st Battalion was in place on a ridge 

overlooking Laos. The Marines of 1/9 called themselves the Walking Dead. On this day, for one company 

in particular, the name would be all too real. 

• As dawn broke on the forested hillside overlooking Laos, Alpha Company 1/9 was sent out to look for and 

destroy a suspected enemy force operating in the region. 3 rd platoon had made contact with them the 

previous day, and now the Company was looking to finish the fight. In addition, First Battalion was low on 

water. A detail from Charlie Company was dispatched to get resupply from a stream below, Alpha 

Company leading the way to provide security. As they reached the stream, the enemy appeared. 

• The NVA seemed to be everywhere, popping up out of hidden spider holes to rain devastating machinegun 

and small arms fire on Alpha Company and Charlie Company water detail, while enemy mortars fell on 

the embattled Marines. The suddenness and the ferocity of the attack caught the Marines by surprise, 

many falling wounded in the initial onslaught. 

• Quickly Lieutenant Fox moved out, working his way through the heavy jungle overgrowth to gain a 

position where he could assess the situation and direct his platoon leaders. Deadly missiles struck the 

foliage and bamboo palms around him. Fox located a sniper's position, quickly killing the enemy with his 

M-16 rifle before moving on. 

• As Lieutenant Fox deployed his platoons, two enemy mortar rounds landed in his position, killing his 

radiomen and air and artillery observers. Shrapnel stuck the lieutenant in the shoulder but, despite the 

bleeding wounds, he grabbed both radios and continued to direct the movements of his Marines. 

• The lieutenant who led Lieutenant Fox's 2 nd platoon was seriously wounded, and Lieutenant Fox instructed 

his executive officer to take command of that platoon. When his platoon leader in the 3 rd platoon was 

killed, Lieutenant Fox quickly moved in to fill the void and take command. He personally destroyed one 

position while continuing to should orders and give encouragement. Coolly he spoke into the radio to 

coordinate aerial and artillery support for his Marines.

Operation Dewey Canyon -1969 1969 

Continued… 

•Heedless of his battered body, Lieutenant Fox began organizing his survivors in 

establishing a defensive position. As corpsmen moved about to locate and treat the 

wounded, Fox refused aid, setting himself to the tasks leadership demanded. By late 

afternoon his Marines had secured their position, and Delta Company 2/9 arrived to 

relieve them. Ten of Lieutenant Fox's brave Marines had died and, of the 153 men who 

had joined him that morning in the patrol down from the ridge, only 66 were able to 

continue the mission the following day. Despite his wounds, and determined not to leave 

Alpha Company leaderless, Lieutenant Fox was among them. 

•As the enemy fire continued unabated, the executive officer Lieutenant Fox had sent to 

2 nd Platoon was killed, and another of his lieutenants was wounded. Though wounded 

himself, Lieutenant Fox was the only officer in Alpha Company still capable of leading 

the resistance. This he did with calm professionalism, his Marines repulsing a final 

enemy assault during which the Company Commander was wounded a second time.

Operation Dewey Canyon Map

1st Battalion 9th Marines 

Statistics In Vietnam 

During Service in the Vietnam War, the 1 st Battalion, 9 th Marine Regiment, 3 rd 

Marine Division, 3 rd Marine Amphibious Force, earned by Bravery and Sacrifice, an 

Honor and Reverence, unique in the history of the United States Marine Corps 

(USMC). 

• The Battalion endured the Longest Sustained Combat and suffered the Highest 

Killed In Action (KIA) rate in USMC history. 

• The Battalion was engaged in combat for 48 months, from June 16, 1965 to July 

14, 1969. 

• The Battalion sustained KIA 48 of the 48 months of its Vietnam War service. 

• With a typical Battalion unit strength of 800 Marines, the KIA to unit strength 

rate was 76%. 

• The Vietnam War Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C., honors the supreme 

sacrifice of 618 Marines of the Battalion. 

• Ho Chi Minh, the President of the North Vietnamese Enemy Armed forces, 

nicknamed them Di Bo Chet (The Walking Dead.) in early spring of 1966.

Medal Of Honor Recipients & 

Other Awards

Second Lieutenant Leims, John H. 

U.S. Marine Corps, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division 

Iwo Jima, 7 March 1945 

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding 

Officer of Company B, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in action against enemy 

Japanese forces on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands, on 7 March 1945. Launching a surprise attack against the 

rock-imbedded fortifications of a dominating Japanese hill position, Second Lieutenant Leims spurred his 

company forward with indomitable determination and, skillfully directing his assault platoons against the 

cave-emplaced enemy troops and heavily fortified pillboxes, succeeded in capturing the objective in the late 

afternoon. When it became apparent that his assault platoons were cut off in this newly won position, 

approximately four hundred yards forward of adjacent units and lacked all communication with the command 

post, he personally advanced and laid telephone lines across the isolating expanse of open, fire-swept terrain. 

Ordered to withdraw his command after he had joined his forward platoons, he immediately complied, 

adroitly effecting the withdrawal of his troops without incident. Upon arriving at the rear, he was informed 

that several casualties had been left at the abandoned ridge position beyond the front lines. Although suffering 

acutely from strain and exhaustion of battle, he instantly went forward despite darkness and the slashing fury 

of hostile machine-gun fire, located and carried to safety one seriously wounded Marine and then, running the 

gauntlet of enemy fire for the third time that night, again made his tortuous way into the bullet-riddled 

deathtrap and rescued another of his wounded men. A dauntless leader, concerned at all times for the welfare 

of his men, Second Lieutenant Leims soundly maintained the coordinated strength of his battle-wearied 

company under extremely difficult conditions and, by his bold tactics, sustained aggressiveness and heroic 

disregard of all personal danger, contributed essentially to the success of his division's operations against this 

vital Japanese base. His valiant conduct in the face of fanatic opposition sustained and enhanced the highest 

traditions of the United States Marine Corps.

Private First Class Witek, Frank P. 

U.S. Marine Corps, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division 

Guam, 3 August 1944 

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while 

serving with the First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, during the Battle of 

Finegayan at Guam, Marianas, on 3 August 1944. When his rifle platoon was halted by heavy 

surprise fire from well camouflaged enemy positions, Private First Class Witek daringly remained 

standing to fire a full magazine from his automatic point-blank range into a depression housing 

Japanese troops, killing eight of the enemy and enabling the greater part of his platoon to take cover. 

During his platoon's withdrawal for consolidation of lines, he remained to safeguard a severely 

wounded comrade, courageously returning the enemy's fire until the arrival of stretcher bearers and 

then covering the evacuation by sustained fire as he moved backward toward his own lines. With his 

platoon again pinned down by a hostile machine-gun, Private First Class Witek, on his own initiative, 

moved forward boldly ahead of the reinforcing tanks and infantry, alternately throwing hand 

grenades and firing as he advanced to within five to ten yards of the enemy position, destroying the 

hostile machine-gun emplacement and an additional eight Japanese before he, himself, was struck 

down by an enemy rifleman. His valiant and inspiring action effectively reduced the enemy's firepower, 

thereby enabling his platoon to attain its objective, and reflects the highest credit upon Private 

First Class Witek and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

Sergeant Singleton, Walter K. 

U.S. Marine Corps, Company A, 1 st Battalion, 9 th Marines, 3 rd Marine Division 

Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, 24 March 1967. 

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life 

above and beyond the call of duty. Sgt. Singleton's company 

was conducting combat operations when the lead platoon 

received intense small arms, automatic weapons, rocket, and 

mortar fire from a well-entrenched enemy force. As the 

company fought its way forward, the extremely heavy enemy 

fire caused numerous friendly casualties. Sensing the need for 

early treatment of the wounded, Sgt. Singleton quickly moved 

from his relatively safe position in the rear of the foremost 

point of the advance and made numerous trips through the 

enemy killing zone to move the injured men out of the danger 

area. Noting that a large part of the enemy fire was coming 

from a hedgerow, he seized a machinegun and assaulted the 

key enemy location, delivering devastating fire as he 

advanced. He forced his way through the hedgerow directly 

into the enemy strong point. Although he was mortally 

wounded, his fearless attack killed 8 of the enemy and drove 

the remainder from the hedgerow. Sgt. Singleton's bold 

actions completely disorganized the enemy defense and saved 

the lives of many of his comrades. His daring initiative 

selfless devotion to duty and indomitable fighting spirit 

reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and 

his performance upheld the highest traditions of the U.S. 

Naval Service.

Captain Fox, Wesley L. 

U.S. Marine Corps, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division 

Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, 22 February 1969 

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life 

above and beyond the call of duty while serving as 

commanding officer of Company A, in action against the 

enemy in the northern A Shau Valley. Capt. (then 1st Lt.) 

Fox's company came under intense fire from a large wellconcealed 

enemy force. Capt. Fox maneuvered to a position 

from which he could assess the situation and confer with his 

platoon leaders. As they departed to execute the plan he had 

devised, the enemy attacked and Capt. Fox was wounded 

along with all of the other members of the command group, 

except the executive officer. Capt. Fox continued to direct 

the activity of his company. Advancing through heavy 

enemy fire, he personally neutralized 1 enemy position and 

calmly ordered an assault against the hostile emplacements. 

He then moved through the hazardous area coordinating 

aircraft support with the activities of his men. When his 

executive officer was mortally wounded, Capt. Fox 

reorganized the company and directed the fire of his men as 

they hurled grenades against the enemy and drove the hostile 

forces into retreat. Wounded again in the final assault, Capt. 

Fox refused medical attention, established a defensive 

posture, and supervised the preparation of casualties for 

medical evacuation. His indomitable courage, inspiring 

initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of 

grave personal danger inspired his marines to such 

aggressive action that they overcame all enemy resistance 

and destroyed a large bunker complex. Capt. Fox's heroic 

actions reflect great credit upon himself and the Marine 

Corps, and uphold the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval 

Service.

Medal Recipients 

st Battalion 9 th Marines Vietnam War 

1 st 

MEDAL OF HONOR (2) 

Name Rank Co. Date Age Hometown 

Fox, Wesley L. 1stLt A 2/22/69 40 Round Hill, Virginia 

Singleton, Walter K. Sgt A 3/24/67* 22 Memphis, Tennessee 

NAVY CROSS (17) 


Burns, Leon R. SSgt B 7/2/67 -- ---------------------- 

Christman, William J. III 2ndLt A 2/22/69* 23 Gaithersburg, Maryland 

Duff, Barry W. Cpl C 5/21/66* 21 Baltimore, Maryland 

Herron, Lee R. 1stLt A 2/22/69* 23 Lubbock, Texas 

Holmes, Walter C. Sgt B 11/27/65 -- ----------------------- 

Howell, Gatlin J. 1stLt IO-1/9 7/2-7/67* 31 Colma, California 

Hunnicutt, Hubert H. III Cpl C 4/16-18/68 23 Lutz, Florida 

Keys, William M. Capt D 3/2/67 -- ---------------------- 

Malone, George M. 2ndLt A 2/22/69 -- ---------------------- 

Monahan, Robert E. LCpl D 5/28/67* 20 Swedesboro, New Jersey 

Rivers, Jettie Jr. 2ndLt D 5/14-15/67* 34 Nashville, Tennessee 

Sadler, Charles D. Cpl A 5/21/66 -- ----------------------

Medal Recipients Continued… 

Continued 

NAVY CROSS (17) 


Slater, Albert C. Jr. Capt A 7/6-7/67 26 ----------------------- 

Stewart, Michael E. LCpl A 5/13/67* 18 Culpepper, Virginia 

Stuckey, James L. LCpl C 7/6/67 21 Seminole, Florida 

Thoryk, Barry L. Cpl A 4/4/68 -- ------------------------ 

Wilhelm, Mack H. HM3 D 2/19/69 23 Rockport, Texas 

SILVER STAR (53) 


Aaron, Robert J. Jr. 1stLt A 3/24/67 -- -------------------------- 

Alderette, Arnold L. Cpl A 2/8/68 -- -------------------------- 

Baird, John R. Jr. LCpl A 2/22/69* 19 Oak Lawn, Illinois 

Beyerlein, David Sgt A 2/22/69 -- -------------------------- 

Blocker, Eugene SSgt A 2/21/67 

Bollinger, Larry C. HM- A 5/21/66 

Broquist, Steven A. 2ndLt D 5/14/67 22 Champaign, Illinois 

Caceres, Edgardo LCpl B 5/12/66* 21 Tacoma, Washington 

Chacon, David A. LCpl A 2/22/69* 20 Gilcrest, Colorado 

Chapman, Darrell H. LCpl A 2/22/69 20 Claremont, N.H.


Continued 



Chapman, William W. SSgt B 8/22/68 

Christy, Howard A. Capt A 5/21/66 Provo, Utah 

Clark, Robert N. Jr. 2ndLt D 3/4/67* 24 Indianapolis, Indiana 

Connell, George M. 1stLt C 5/21/66 23 Cheverly, Maryland 

Connelly, William 1stLt C 4/16/68 

Creel, John B. Jr. 2ndLt A 9/9/65 

Curd, James H. R. Capt 3/4/67 

Curd, James H. R. Capt C 3/24/67 

Dartt, Robert J. Cpl C 12/25/65 Maunie, Illinois 

Davis, Earl R. SSgt B 5/12/66 

Davis, Edward D. PFC C 7/6/67 

Dias, Raymond R. III Pvt A 4/16/68 

Festa, Donald Capt A 3/3/67 

Gugle, Larry E. LCpl C 4/16/68 20 Ottumwa, Iowa 

Gomez, Harold Cpl A 2/21/67* 20 East Chicago, Illinois


Continued 



Hutchinson, Edward L. Jr. Capt C 7/12/67 26 Merritt Island, Florida 

Jacques, Raymond J. Jr. Sgt B 5/12/66 

Jadlow, Robert L. 1stLt B 5/12/66 

Jensen, Robert R. SSgt A 2/22/69 

Keys, William M. Capt D 3/5/67 

Lefefe, Anthony T. Sgt C 7/6/67 

Libutti, Frank 2ndLt C 7/2/67 

Lopinto, Frank T. LCpl B 4/27/67 19 Lindhurst, N. Jersey 

Maxim, Robert J. Cpl B 8/24/67 

Minehart, Russell E. Sgt B 7/12/65 

Morgan, Edward E. LCpl D 2/18/69 

Myers, Donald F. Sgt C 2/13/69 

Northington, William C. LCpl A 2/22/69 20 Prattville, Alabama 

Pace, Simone J. 2ndLt A 5/21/66 

Parr, William T. Cpl C


Continued 



Price, Thomas H. Cpl B 3/2/67 

Radcliffe, Henry J.M. Capt A 2/8/68 

Ruiz, Jose Cpl C 4/16/68* 24 New York, N.Y. 

Sankey, David H. PFC A 7/6/67 

Simms, James W. 2ndLt D 2/11/69 24 Carrolton, Missouri 

Simms, James W. 2ndLt D 2/26/69* 24 Carrolton, Missouri 

Simon, Jerry W. LCpl A 5/21/66 

Smith, Charles L. PFC A 3/4/69* 18 Oklahoma City, OK. 

Smith, George W. LtCol CO-1/9 3/18/69 

Talone, James R. 1stLt B 8/22/68 

VonHarten, William R. LtCol XO-1/9 3/4-5/67 

Wallace, Paul H. 1stLt A 4/4/68 

Wright, Edward R. LCpl D 2/11/69 

• Reference: Honor the Warrior by Billy Meyers (with assistance from Medals & Awards Branch in 

Clarendon, Virginia and later Quantico, Virginia and the Marine Corps Historical Center and the 

Command Museum MCRD, San Diego) 

• * indicates posthumous award

“THESE THESE GOOD MEN” MEN 

I now know why men who have been to war yearn to reunite. Not to tell stories or look at old 

pictures. Not to laugh or weep. Comrades gather because they long to be with the men who 

once acted their best, men who suffered and sacrificed, who were stripped raw, right down to 

their humanity. I did not pick these men. They were delivered by fate and the U.S. Marine 

Corps. But I know them in a way I know no other men. I have never given anyone such trust. 

They were willing to guard something more precious than my life. They would have carried my 

reputation, the memory of me. It was part of the bargain we all made, the reason we were so 

willing to die for one another. 

I cannot say where we are headed. Ours are not perfect friendships; those are the province of 

legend and myth. 

A few of my comrades drift far from me now, sending back only occasional word. I know that one 

day even these could fall to silence. Some of the men will stay close, a couple, perhaps, always at 

hand. 

As long as I have memory, I will think of them all, every day. I am sure that when I leave this world, 

my last thought will be of my family and my comrades.....such good men. 

from "These Good Men" by Michael Norman

“Always Always Faithful” Faithful 

Here are those who have borne the battle 

Those, in the crucible of combat, tried. 

Tempered and turned of the finest mettle, 

These were The Sons of America's Pride! 

The First Battalion of The Ninth Marines, 

Hammered and forged in the fires of Hell; 

Built of their blood and their broken dreams, 

A legend for scribes, unborn, to tell. 

They fought like Warriors and they died like men 

‘Till their page of history was stained blood red; 

And they earned from foe as well as from friend 

That Honorable title, "The Walking Dead"! 

These were the Sons who stepped forward bravely-- 

Courage and Strength and Faith un-tried; 

To fight as the Valorous "Always Faithful". 

These are The Sons of America's Pride!--- 

(C)1997 Doug Todd

Statistics About The Vietnam 

War 

All statistics were Courtesy of the VFW Magazine and the Public Information Office, 

HQ CP Forward Observer -1st Recon April 12, 1997.

In Uniform And In Country… Country 

• Vietnam Vets were 9.7% of their generation. 

• 9,087,000 military personnel served on active duty during the Vietnam Era (Aug. 5, 

1964-May 7, 1975). 

• 8,744,000 military personnel were on active duty during the war (Aug 5, 1964 - 

March 28, 1973). 

• 3,403,100 (Including 514,300 offshore) personnel served in the Southeast Asia 

Theater (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, flight crews based in Thailand, and sailors in 

adjacent South China Sea waters). 

• 2,594,000 personnel served within the borders of South Vietnam (Jan. 1, 1965 - 

March 28, 1973) 

• Another 50,000 men served in Vietnam between 1960 and 1964. 

• Of the 2.6 million, between 1 - 1.6 million (40 - 60%) either fought in combat, 

provided close support or were at least fairly regularly exposed to enemy attack. 

• 7,484 women served in Vietnam. (6,250 or 83.5% were nurses) 

• Peak troop strength in Vietnam was 543,482 (April 30, 1968)

Casualties… 

Casualties 

• Hostile deaths: 47,378 

• Non-hostile deaths: 10,800 

• Total: 58,202 (Includes men formerly classified as MIA and Mayaguez casualties). 

Men who have subsequently died of wounds account for the changing total. 

• 8 nurses died -- 1 was KIA. 

• Married men killed: 17,539 

• 61% of the men killed were 21 or younger. 

• Wounded: 303,704 -- 153,329 hospitalized + 150,375 injured requiring no hospital 

care. 

• Severely disabled: 75,000 -- 23,214 - 100% disabled; 5,283 lost limbs; 1,081 

sustained multiple amputations. 

• Amputation or crippling wounds to the lower extremities were 300% higher than 

in WWII and 70% higher than Korea. Multiple amputations occurred at the rate 

of 18.4% compared to 5.7% in WWII. 

• Missing in Action: 2,338 

• POWs: 766 (114 died in captivity)

Draftees VS. Volunteers… 

Volunteers 

• 25% (648,500) of total forces in country were draftees. (66% of U.S. armed forces members 

were drafted during WWII.) 

• Draftees accounted for 30.4% (17,725) of combat deaths in Vietnam. 

• Reservists killed: 5,977 

• National Guard: 6,140 served: 101 died. 

• Total draftees (1965 - 73): 1,728,344. 

• Actually served in Vietnam: 38% 

• Marine Corps Draft: 42,633. 

• Last man drafted: June 30, 1973.

Race & Ethnic Background… 

Background 

• 88.4% of the men who actually served in Vietnam were Caucasian; 10.6% (275,000) were 

African American; 1% belonged to other races. 

• 86.3% of the men who died in Vietnam were Caucasian (includes Hispanics); 12.5% (7,241) 

were African American; 1.2% belonged to other races. 

• 170,000 Hispanics served in Vietnam; 3,070 (5.2% of total) died there. 

• 70% of enlisted men killed were of North-west European descent. 

• 86.8% of the men who were killed as a result of hostile action were Caucasian; 12.1% (5,711) 

were African American; 1.1% belonged to other races. 

• 14.6% (1,530) of non-combat deaths were among African Americans. 

• 34% of African Americans who enlisted volunteered for the combat arms. 

• Overall, African Americans suffered 12.5% of the deaths in Vietnam at a time when the 

percentage of African Americans of military age was 13.5% of the total population. 

• Religion of Dead: Protestant -- 64.4%; Catholic -- 28.9%; other/none -- 6.7%

Socio-Economic Socio Economic Status… Status 

• 76% of the men sent to Vietnam were from lower middle/working class backgrounds. 

• Three-fourths had family incomes above the poverty level; 50% were from middle income 

backgrounds. 

• Some 23% of Vietnam vets had fathers with professional, managerial or technical occupations. 

• 79% of the men who served in Vietnam had a high school education or better when they 

entered the military service. (63% of Korean War vets and only 45% of WWII vets had 

completed high school upon separation.) 

• Deaths by region per 100,000 of population: South -- 31%, West -- 29.9%; Midwest -- 28.4%; 

Northeast -- 23.5%.

Winning & Losing… Losing 

• 82% of veterans who saw heavy combat strongly believe the war was not lost by the U.S. but 

was lost by the South Vietnamese, and that the American Military was denied the right to win 

because of lack of political will. 

• Nearly 75% of the public agrees it was a failure of political will, not of arms.

Honorable Service… Service 

• 97% of Vietnam-era veterans were honorably discharged. 

• 91% of actual Vietnam War veterans are proud to have served their country. 

• 90% of those who saw heavy combat are proud to have served their country. 

• 66% of Vietnam vets say they would serve again if called upon. 

• 87% of the public now holds Vietnam veterans in high esteem!!!!!

Here are statistics from the Combat Area 

Casualty File (CACF) as of November 1993. 

• Average age of 58,148 killed in Vietnam was 23.11 years. (Although 58,169 names are in the 

Nov. 93 database, only 58,148 have both event date and birth date. Event date is used instead of 

declared dead date for some of those who were listed as missing in action) [CACF] 

• Five men killed in Vietnam were only 16 years old. [CACF] 

• The oldest man killed was 62 years old. [CACF] 

• 11,465 KIA’s were less than 20 years old. [CACF] 

Deaths Average Age 

Total 58,148 23.11 years 

Enlisted 50,274 22.37 years 

Officers 6,598 28.43 years 

Warrants 1,276 24.73 years 

E1 525 20.34 years 

11B MOS (Infantry) 18,465 22.55 years

Myths & Facts About Vietnam 

"No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam 

War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now. Rarely 

have so many people been so wrong about so much. Never have the 

consequences of their misunderstanding been so tragic." 

President Nixon

Myth: Most American soldiers were addicted 

to drugs, guilt-ridden guilt ridden about their role in the 

war, and deliberately used cruel and inhumane 

tactics. 

The Vietnam War has been the subject of thousands of 

newspaper and magazine articles, hundreds of books, and 

scores of movies and television documentaries. The great 

majority of these efforts have erroneously portrayed many 

myths about the Vietnam War as being facts. 

President Nixon

The facts are: 

• 91% of Vietnam Veterans say they are glad they served [General Westmoreland] 

• 74% said they would serve again even knowing the outcome [General Westmoreland] 

• There is no difference in drug usage between Vietnam Veterans and non-veterans of the same 

age group (from a Veterans Administration study) [General Westmoreland] 

• Isolated atrocities committed by American soldiers produced torrents of outrage from antiwar 

critics and the news media while Communist atrocities were so common that they received 

hardly any attention at all. The United States sought to minimize and prevent attacks on 

civilians while North Vietnam made attacks on civilians a centerpiece of its strategy. 

Americans who deliberately killed civilians received prison sentences while Communists who 

did so received commendations. From 1957 to 1973, the National Liberation Front 

assassinated 36,725 South Vietnamese and abducted another 58,499. The death squads focused 

on leaders at the village level and on anyone who improved the lives of the peasants such as 

medical personnel, social workers, and schoolteachers. Atrocities - every war has atrocities. 

War is brutal and not fair. Innocent people get killed. [President Nixon] 

• Vietnam Veterans are less likely to be in prison - only 1/2 of one percent of Vietnam Veterans 

have been jailed for crimes. [General Westmoreland] 

• 97% were discharged under honorable conditions; the same percentage of honorable 

discharges as ten years prior to Vietnam [General Westmoreland] 

• 85% of Vietnam Veterans made a successful transition to civilian life. [Lt. General McCaffrey] 

• Vietnam veterans' personal income exceeds that of our non-veteran age group by more than 18 

percent. [Lt. General McCaffrey] 

• Vietnam veterans have a lower unemployment rate than our non-vet age group. [Lt. General 

McCaffrey] 

• 87% of the American people hold Vietnam Vets in high esteem. [Lt. General McCaffrey]

Myth: Most Vietnam veterans were drafted.


• 2/3 of the men who served in Vietnam were volunteers. 2/3 of the 

men who served in World War II were drafted. [General 

Westmoreland] 

• Approximately 70% of those killed were volunteers. [Lt. General 

McCaffrey]

Myth: The media have reported that suicides 

among Vietnam veterans range from 50,000 

to 100,000 - 6 to 11 times the non-Vietnam 

non Vietnam 

veteran population.


• Mortality studies show that 9,000 is a better estimate. "The CDC 

Vietnam Experience Study Mortality Assessment showed that 

during the first 5 years after discharge, deaths from suicide were 

1.7 times more likely among Vietnam veterans than non-Vietnam 

veterans. After that initial post-service period, Vietnam veterans 

were no more likely to die from suicide than non-Vietnam 

veterans. In fact, after the 5-year post-service period, the rate of 

suicides is less in the Vietnam veterans' group." [Doctor Houk]

Myth: The domino theory was proved false.


• The domino theory was accurate. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations) countries, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 

stayed free of Communism because of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The 

Indonesians threw the Soviets out in 1966 because of America's commitment in 

Vietnam. Without that commitment, Communism would have swept all the way to 

the Malacca Straits that is south of Singapore and of great strategic importance to 

the free world. If you ask people who live in these countries that won the war in 

Vietnam, they have a different opinion from the American news media. The 

Vietnam War was the turning point for Communism. [General Westmoreland] 

• Democracy Catching On - In the wake of the Cold War, democracies are 

flourishing, with 179 of the world's 192 sovereign states (93%) now electing their 

legislators, according to the Geneva-based Inter-Parliamentary Union. In the last 

decade, 69 nations have held multi-party elections for the first time in their 

histories. Three of the five newest democracies are former Soviet republics: 

Belarus (where elections were first held in November 1995), Armenia (July 1995) 

and Kyrgyzstan (February 1995). And two are in Africa: Tanzania (October 1995) 

and Guinea (June 1995). [Parade Magazine]

Myth: The fighting in Vietnam was not as 

intense as in World War II.


• The average infantryman in the South Pacific during World War II saw about 40 

days of combat in four years. The average infantryman in Vietnam saw about 240 

days of combat in one year thanks to the mobility of the helicopter. 

• One out of every 10 Americans who served in Vietnam was a casualty. 58,169 were 

killed and 304,000 wounded out of 2.59 million who served. Although the percent 

that died is similar to other wars, amputations or crippling wounds were 300 

percent higher than in World War II. 75,000 Vietnam veterans are severely 

disabled. [Lt. General McCaffrey] 

• MEDEVAC helicopters flew nearly 500,000 missions. Over 900,000 patients were 

airlifted (nearly half were American). The average time lapse between wounding to 

hospitalization was less than one hour. As a result, less than one percent of all 

Americans wounded who survived the first 24 hours died. [VHPA 1993] 

• The helicopter provided unprecedented mobility. Without the helicopter it would 

have taken three times as many troops to secure the 800-mile border with 

Cambodia and Laos (the politicians thought the Geneva Conventions of 1954 and 

the Geneva Accords or 1962 would secure the border) [General Westmoreland]

Myth: Air America, the airline operated by the 

CIA in Southeast Asia, and its pilots were 

involved in drug trafficking


• The 1990 unsuccessful movie "Air America" helped to establish the myth 

of a connection between Air America, the CIA, and the Laotian drug 

trade. The movie and a book the movie was based on contend that the 

CIA condoned a drug trade conducted by a Laotian client; both agree 

that Air America provided the essential transportation for the trade; and 

both view the pilots with sympathetic understanding. American-owned 

airlines never knowingly transported opium in or out of Laos, nor did 

their American pilots ever profit from its transport. Yet undoubtedly 

every plane in Laos carried opium at some time, unknown to the pilot and 

his superiors. 

• For more information see http://www.air-America.org

Myth: The American military was running for 

their lives during the fall of Saigon in April 

1975.


• It was a "civilian" (Air America) 

Huey not Army or Marines. 

• It was NOT the U.S. Embassy. 

The building is the Pittman 

Apartments. The U.S. Embassy 

and its helipad were much larger. 

• The evacuees were Vietnamese 

not American military. 

• The person that can be seen 

aiding the refugees is Mr. O.B. 

Harnage, a CIA case officer and 

now retired.

Myth: Kim Phuc, the little nine-year nine year-old old Vietnamese 

girl running naked from the napalm strike near Trang 

Bang on 8 June 1972, was burned by Americans. Americans 

• No American had involvement in this 

incident near Trang Bang that burned 

Phan Thi Kim Phuc. The planes doing the 

bombing near the village were VNAF 

(Vietnam Air Force) and were being flown 

by Vietnamese pilots in support of South 

Vietnamese troops on the ground. Even the 

AP photographer, Nick Ut, who took the 

picture, was Vietnamese. The incident in 

the photo took place on the second day of a 

three-day battle between the North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) who occupied the 

village of Trang Bang and the ARVN 

(Army of the Republic of Vietnam) who 

were trying to force the NVA out of the 

village. Recent reports in the news media 

that an American commander ordered the 

air strike that burned Kim Phuc are 

incorrect. There were no Americans 

involved in any capacity. "We (Americans) 

had nothing to do with controlling VNAF," 

according to Lieutenant General (Ret) 

James F. Hollingsworth, the Commanding 

General of TRAC at that time.

Sources: 

• [President Nixon] No More Vietnams by Richard Nixon 

• [Parade Magazine] August 18, 1996 page 10. 

• [CACF] (Combat Area Casualty File) November 1993. (The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam 

Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, 

Washington, DC 

• [General Westmoreland] Speech by General William C. Westmoreland before the Third 

Annual Reunion of the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association (VHPA) at the Washington, DC 

Hilton Hotel on July 5th, 1986 (reproduced in a Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association 

Historical Reference Directory Volume 2A) 

• [LtGen. McCaffrey] Speech by Lt. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, (reproduced in the Pentagram, 

June 4, 1993) assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Vietnam veterans and 

visitors gathered at "The Wall", Memorial Day 1993. 

• [Dr. Houk] Testimony by Dr. Houk, Oversight on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 14 July 

1988 page 17, Hearing before the Committee on Veterans' Affairs United States Senate one 

hundredth Congress second session. Also "Estimating the Number of Suicides Among Vietnam 

Veterans" (Am J Psychiatry 147, 6 June 1990 pages 772-776) 

• [VHPA 1993] Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association 1993 Membership Directory page 130. 

• [The Vietnam Experience] Time/Life series books "The Vietnam Experience" published in 

multibook series in mid 80's by Boston Publishing Company

History Of The 1st Battalion 9th Marines - Walking Dead 1/9/3

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