In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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Secondly, the dispute between the CIA and Air Force reveals the importance of coordination. Allison observes that “jobs do not fall neatly into precisely defined organizational jurisdictions,” and the discord between the two organizations caused inefficiency and delay (Allison 1969, 705). Perhaps an implication can be drawn from that territorial dispute: coordination failure within an organization can have similar consequences. For instance, disarray in the State Department continues to delay the opening of effective diplomatic channels, limiting the President to only military options if a crisis were to happen soon. Zengerle points out that “Tillerson’s true legacy may have transformed a venerable American institution into the caricature of its most fevered, irrational critics” (Zengerle 2017, 8). Tillerson fails to coordinate with and cater to the needs of the State Department staff. In fact, many employees suspected that he had a “fundamental misunderstanding of what they did.” According to one senior State Department official, Tillerson’s questionnaire and personal interviews with the employees “came away with the impression that we’re very ‘patriotic’ and ‘professional.’ You don’t need a survey to know that. It’s completely demeaning” (Zengerle 2017, 15). Tillerson’s standoffishness combined with his plan to “gut the Foreign Service” has left the diplomatic corps perplexed, demoralized, unraveled, and paralyzed at a time when diplomatic contact with North Korea is more crucial than ever. In the absence of important assistant-secretary positions, Brain Hook, the head of the department’s office of policy planning, has found himself attempting to “do the job of 30 people.” The office of policy planning is particularly bogged down as it now handles day-to-day operations when it has traditionally functioned as an “in-house think tank” that handles tough issues like North Korea’s aggressive pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (Zengerle 2017, 10). Diplomats have also reportedly lacked guidance and coordination with other employees. One ambassador recalls, “I’d request instructions on action items, saying I need 8
a decision, and I’d hear absolutely nothing” (Zengerle 2017, 17). In nearly 300 embassies, “missions and consulates around the world where State Department officials work to promote and defend America’s interests, diplomats complain about not just a dearth of resources but also a lack of guidance” (Zengerle 2017, 15). If the State Department remains crippled and diplomatic channels remain closed, Trump will be left with only military options during a nuclear stand-off. As Allison remarks, “the probability of a nuclear attack is less sensitive to stability and instability or balance and imbalance than it is to organizational factors” (Allison 1969, 703). If and when Tillerson leaves, gradual reforms to the State Department’s lineup will have to be made. And filling vacant positions should be the first order of business. Finally, lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis disprove the notion that rationality will always lead to rational decisions. According to Model II, rationality and a stable nuclear balance are not enough to prevent a nuclear disaster. Kennedy did not avert a nuclear disaster primarily because he was a rational actor; the fate of the world essentially depended upon an inaccurate piece of information. Thus, whether or not Trump and Kim Jong-un are rational actors will not bear as decisively on the simmering crisis. Rather, organizational outputs will dictate the decision-making process during a crisis. If rationality cannot be relied upon to save the US from a nuclear catastrophe, then what can be relied upon? The answer lies in existing organizations and the development of new organizations. In order to broaden the President’s manual of options in the event of a nuclear crisis, Congress has already made an emergency request for $4 billion dollars to develop cyber weapons, drones, and fighter jets (Sanger and Broad 2017, 1). Before this all-out effort in response to the unexpected progress of North Korea’s weapons development, the only solution had been Alaska and California’s missile batteries that would attempt to shoot down long-range 9
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In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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