In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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potentially disastrous outcomes during a crisis. For instance, the “September estimate” falsely concluded that the Soviet Union would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba despite refugee reports of missile sightings, a CIA agent’s sighting of a strategic missile’s rear profile, the arrival of large-hatch Soviet lumber ships in Cuba, and September U-2 photos showing the construction of SAM sites. Not all the information were made available to the estimators “as a consequence of the established routines and procedures of the organizations which constitute the US intelligence community” (Allison 1969, 704). The intelligence community was gathering information not just on Cuba but on all parts of the world, and the information base showed nothing out of the ordinary. Allison suggests that “from an organizational perspective” there was nothing “startling about the gradual accumulation of evidence that led to the formulation of the hypothesis that the Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba…” (Allison 1969, 705). Inaccurate information also played a decisive role during the crisis. General Walter C. Sweeney, Commander of Tactical Air Forces, wrongly asserted that the Air Force could guarantee no higher than a 90 percent effectiveness in a surgical air strike (Allison 1969, 706). The inaccurate information, which was neither probed nor questioned, greatly contributed to President Kennedy’s decision to permit a blockade instead (and the decision to do so most likely avoided a nuclear devastation). There was also a delay in information about the installation of missiles in Cuba because of territorial disputes between the CIA and Air Force over who should conduct a special flight over western Cuba. The CIA contended that it was an intelligence operation within CIA jurisdiction while the Air Force maintained that the pilot should be an officer in uniform rather than a CIA agent due to the increased danger that a U-2 plane would be downed. Had the 10-day delay been avoided, photographs of Soviet missile sites in Cuba would have reached US leaders 6
earlier. As Allison puts it, the “squabbling between organizations” determined the “context in which American leaders came to choose the blockade” (Allison 1969, 705). Model II: Lessons, Related Problems, and Solutions So how does a Model II analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis relate to the simmering crisis in North Korea? For one, the “September estimate” shows just how crucial intelligence is. Had more information been made available “on the desk of estimators” in September, there would have been more time to reach prudent and preemptive resolutions. The lack thereof, as a result of the intelligence community’s organizational day-to-day routines and procedures, constrained Kennedy’s menu of options as he wandered into a nuclear stand-off. And although the behaviors of organizations are determined by routines, Allison suggests that “organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over time. Dramatic organizational change occurs in response to major crises” or “dramatic performance failures” (Allison 1969, 698, 701). Certainly, Trump’s understaffed and “demoralized diplomatic corps” is not an organizational improvement (Zengerle 2017, 1). There is a great need for communication channels and intelligence at a time when it is unclear whether the threats are serious or, as Osnos puts it, “mere posturing” (Osnos 2017, 2). Tillerson should be hiring more highly-qualified foreign-policy professionals, not eliminating much of the State Department's most experienced diplomats. As Zengerle notes, “few of the nominees have qualifications that match those of their predecessors” (Zengerle 2017, 9). A Foreign Service officer recalls that while “the world is going to hell in a handbasket,” the most urgent issues being discussed were FOIA requests and typographical mistakes in memos to the secretary’s office (Zengerle 2017, 15). The intelligence community requires more bureaucrats who know how to effectively gather and filter through crucial information, not an inexperienced cohort that fails to accomplish routine assignments. 7
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In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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