In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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Why Emotional Intelligence Matters Emotional intelligence is a crucial but often overlooked presidential asset. Greenstein claims that “the presidency is a defective instrument of democratic governance” in the “absence of emotional intelligence” (Greenstein 2010, 8). This claim is accurate when examining the consequences of Trump’s incendiary rhetoric. For one, Trump’s impromptu remarks and goading have exacerbated North Korea’s siege mentality and escalated tensions between North Korea and the US. President Trump remarked in August, “any more threats to the United States” will be met “with fire and fury like the world has never seen” (Osnos 2017, 2). Only a few hours afterward, North Korea threatened to launch four missiles into the Pacific Ocean near Guam. As a result of Trump’s impulsiveness, the possibility of a nuclear confrontation had suddenly “entered a realm of psychological calculation” reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Osnos 2017, 2). Trump is too emotionally volatile to be entrusted with a responsible public position. Secondly, Trump’s lack of emotional intelligence has driven a wedge between himself and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, creating setbacks in foreign diplomacy. As Zengerle observes in “Rex Tillerson and the Unraveling of the State Department,” American foreign policy “is adrift in the world” with Trump “dismantling international relations one tweet at a time.” In one of his recent attacks, he accuses Rex Tillerson of “wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man” (Zengerle 2017, 1). Before Tillerson took a third trip to Asia in an effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, Trump threatened in August that “military solutions are fully in place, locked and loaded” (deGrandpre 2017, 1). In September, he claimed that if the US was “forced to defend itself or its allies, [it] will have no choice but to totally destroy #Noko.” As a result, the “impossibility of Tillerson’s assignment was apparent” (Zengerle 2017, 1-2). Left without the crucial support of the President, Tillerson’s diplomatic 4
efforts are no longer seen as representing the President’s foreign policy. Thus, the channel of communication with North Korea remains closed at a time when the US requires diplomatic contact and on-scene insight into North Korean affairs. Rather than supplementing diplomatic efforts, the President has rhetorically committed himself to a position of bombing North Korea. Trump’s boorish remarks and emotional outbursts have undermined his ability to coordinate with his colleagues to effectively engage in peace talks with North Korea. According to Evan Osnos in “The Risk of Nuclear War With North Korea,” rational leaders may “compete to appear the more irrational, impetuous, and stubborn” in order to incite the “right amount of fear without losing control.” Osnos then provocatively inquires, “what if the adversaries are irrational, impetuous, and stubborn?” (Osnos 2017, 3). Greenstein appears to answer Osnos’ question with a following moral: “Beware the presidential contender who lacks emotional intelligence. In its absence all else may turn to ashes” (Greenstein 2010, 231). However, the President is not the sole actor in international relations. There are factors other than the President’s character that affect decision-making in foreign policy. One evidence supporting this claim is that Khrushchev and Kennedy were rational actors but still ended up with a nuclear confrontation. The second piece of evidence is the fact that there are dangerous similarities between the Trump and Kennedy administrations, even though Trump and Kennedy have drastically different temperaments. As such, Models II and III come into play in creating a more comprehensive answer to Osnos’ question. Why Model II Matters Organizations play a huge role in the decision-making process because they determine what information and options are available to the President. Therefore, the lack of both available and accurate information as a result of organizational day-to-day routines will contribute to 5
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In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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