In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis
Although President Donald Trump’s hardline rhetoric has stymied diplomatic talks with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, the President is not the sole actor in international relations. Whether the two leaders are rational or emotionally intelligent will not bear as decisively on the simmering crisis as one may expect. Government actions and decisions are largely determined by existing organizations and bargaining among relevant players. In pinpointing the various factors that will influence American foreign policy with North Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis is analyzed using the three conceptual models outlined in Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis and "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Though most analysts explain occurrences in foreign affairs as the rational and deliberate acts of united national governments, the Organizational Process Model (II) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (III) offer more insightful and comprehensive explanations. Both Models II and III hold substantial predictive and explanatory power; using these two models, key lessons are extrapolated from the failures of the Kennedy administration and solutions to the North Korea crisis are proposed.
Although President Donald Trump’s hardline rhetoric has stymied diplomatic talks with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, the President is not the sole actor in international relations. Whether the two leaders are rational or emotionally intelligent will not bear as decisively on the simmering crisis as one may expect. Government actions and decisions are largely determined by existing organizations and bargaining among relevant players. In pinpointing the various factors that will influence American foreign policy with North Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis is analyzed using the three conceptual models outlined in Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis and "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Though most analysts explain occurrences in foreign affairs as the rational and deliberate acts of united national governments, the Organizational Process Model (II) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (III) offer more insightful and comprehensive explanations. Both Models II and III hold substantial predictive and explanatory power; using these two models, key lessons are extrapolated from the failures of the Kennedy administration and solutions to the North Korea crisis are proposed.
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Models II and III undermine <strong>the</strong> idea that <strong>the</strong> Trump administration is a rational unitary<br />
actor, motivated by a conscious calculation <strong>of</strong> advantages and costs based on a “consistent value<br />
system” (Allison 1969, 693). Model III acknowledges that “<strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong><br />
representatives <strong>of</strong> a government relevant to an issue was rarely intended by any individual or<br />
group” (Allison 1969, 694). Similarly, Model II recognizes that “a considerable gap separates<br />
what leaders choose (or might rationally have chosen) and what organizations implement”<br />
(Allison 1969, 703). However, this does not mean that <strong>the</strong> President holds no effective power<br />
over government decisions. <strong>In</strong> fact, parts <strong>of</strong> Greenstein's work can be applied to Model II.<br />
Trump’s lack <strong>of</strong> organizational capacity or inability to effectively rally his colleagues (i.e.<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Rex Tillerson and Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense James Mattis) and structure <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
activities, has unraveled <strong>the</strong> State Department. Meanwhile, political skill plays into Model III,<br />
which emphasizes <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> bargaining and persuasion. Although Model I, II, and III<br />
<strong>of</strong>fer different lenses in which to reexamine <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> foreign and military policy, <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
not mutually exclusive. Through <strong>the</strong>se conceptual models, lessons can be drawn from <strong>the</strong> Cuban<br />
<strong>Missile</strong> <strong>Crisis</strong> and solutions to <strong>the</strong> simmering <strong>North</strong> Korea crisis can be <strong>of</strong>fered.<br />
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