In the Event of a North Korean Missile Crisis

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McNamara against the use of airstrikes. It was this powerful coalition and the “incompatibility between the President and the air strike advocates” that played a vital role in preventing the air strike. As Robert Kennedy recalled: “The fourteen people involved were very significant…If six of them had been the President of the US, I think that the world might have been blown up” (Preston 2001, 251). The decision to launch a blockade was the sum of activities of all the key individuals rather than a rational unitary actor. Model III: Lessons, Related Problems, and Solutions So how is a Model III analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis relevant to the current administration? For one, much like Kennedy, Trump has rhetorically committed himself as a hardliner, prepared to go to nuclear war with North Korea. In fact, when Osnos asked Lieutenant Colonel Pang Myong Jin of the Korean People’s Army how he expects Trump to respond to an attack on Guam, Pang recalled, “Trump said if there is a war, then it will happen in the D.P.K., not in the US. So clearly he is preparing for war. He understands what he’s saying” (Osnos 2017, 35). Trump’s imprudent comments will limit his variety of response options in the event that North Korea strikes Guam. In accordance with Model III, he will be compelled to take military action because his reputation and presidential career will be at stake; Trump will be helplessly bound by his own words. In order to avoid making a bad situation worse, the President of America needs to moderate his rhetoric. Second, the deliberations of ExComm show just how much effective power individual players have over foreign policy decisions. It is also worth noting that under Model III, “the probability of nuclear attack depends primarily on the probability of attack emerging as an outcome of the bureaucratic politics of the attacking government.” This specific Model III proposition reinforces the need to gain intelligence about the perceptions, priorities, and power 12
of major individual players in North Korea. As such, Allison acknowledges some specific questions that must be considered in order to better understand North Korea’s bureaucratic politics: one, “which players can decide to launch an attack?” (Allison 1969, 711). Osnos offers some insights in response to this query; he mentions that although “some analysts in Seoul argue that senior Party officials can overrule or direct him,” US intelligence believes that “Kim is in sole command” (Osnos 2017, 20). These two contradictory views reveal the poor understanding of power dynamics in North Korea. More than ever, there is a need for intelligence to obtain a fuller understanding of North Korea’s bureaucratic politics. If Kim Jong-un is actually in full control over North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the possibility of nuclear war increases. In a second question, Allison asks, “what patterns of bargaining “could yield attack as an outcome?” (Allison 1969, 711). Allison answers his own question in part by suggesting that a “stable balance of terror” can only result when most of the relevant players “appreciate fully the consequences of an attack” (Allison 1969, 712). But is this the case in North Korea? Once again, Osnos offers an answer: “Analysts worry that, as Kim moves deeper into a confrontation with America, he does not have advisers who speak candidly to him” (Osnos 2017, 21). This fact bears significantly on the simmering crisis. Even if some of his commanders fully grasp the prospect of nuclear doom, it is unlikely that they will speak out and risk their personal interests like their own lives or military ranking. If the players are unmotivated to resist Kim Jong-un, then the probability of nuclear war increases; if Kim Jong-un decides to launch an attack, there is currently little evidence that anyone will hold him back. As such, it is wise to reexamine US diplomacy policies to open up communication channels (i.e. a hotline) and negotiate directly with Kim Jong-un. Conclusion 13
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