JPI Spring 2018
The discussion surrounding proper reforms is varied, but any research moving forward should fully take into account the vulnerability of any state, large or small, to fall into the cycle of moral hazard as it relates to credit, lending, and managing financial and fiscal policy. Based on what has been observed, the only viable way forward is beginning from the lowest levels, be they state or community, to correct financial errors as they begin to occur. Stricter rule-based policies could achieve this, but then present the risk of over-regulating capital markets in the face of global integration. As such, further research is needed to find where the equilibrium lies between stop-losses that are built in to prevent further financial manipulation while still maintaining capital inflows. In order to appropriately find such equilibrium balance, it is crucial to take into account that any country or political actor is equally vulnerable to commit such manipulations. JPI Fall 2017, pg. 40
Why Do Cease-Fire Agreements Mediated by Third Parties Fail? Syrian Cases 2011-2016 Kazumichi Uchida INTRODUCTION Why are cease-fire agreements mediated by third parties likely to be short-lived? Scholars and practitioners generally believe that to end civil wars, they should employ third party mediators to halt violence and protect the combatants. 1 Among them, they argue, the most critical factors are security guarantees and power sharing guarantees that third parties provide for the combatants. 2 All combatants in civil wars fear that even if they reach ceasefire agreements, their opponents will not comply and, instead, exploit them. They are afraid that soon after they conform to the agreements and disarm, their opponents will betray them and attack them again. In other words, “the reason civil war negotiations fail is that it is almost impossible for the combatants themselves to arrange credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement.” 3 To resolve the problem, Barbara Walter postulates that third parties should provide combatants with both security guarantees and power sharing guarantees. 4 The former guarantees that groups will be protected, violations detected, and promises kept. 5 The latter guarantees combatants independent control over key leadership positions to insulate them from future harm and to prevent their rival from consolidating power. 6 Scholars argue that only if third parties guarantee both physical and political safety will combatants terminate civil wars peacefully. In this essay, I will prove that cease-fire agreements mediated by third parties fail by demonstrating that the guarantees third parties provide for combatants worsen the commitment problem. I will begin with a review of current peacemaking theories. In the model section, I will use game theory to demonstrate that both the security and power sharing guarantees third parties provide for combatants worsen the commitment problem instead of resolving it, which results in the failures of cease-fire agreements. In the case studies section, I demonstrate that both power sharing and security guarantees are significantly associated with civil war duration by using Syrian cases from 2011 to 2016. In the conclusion, I sum up this study with a few remarks. LITERATURE REVIEW There are two schools of thought concerning the peaceful conclusion of civil wars: the Walter hypothesis and the Wagner hypothesis. 7 The former insists on negotiated settlements, which employ 1 Monica Dufty Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010) p.7. 2 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002) pp. 26-31. 3 Ibid., p. 5. 4 Ibid., p. 3. 5 Ibid., p. 26. 6 Ibid., p, 30. 7 Monica Duffy Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010) p. 7. She called the schools “Negotiated Settlements” and “Give War a Chance.” JPI Fall 2017, pg. 41
- Page 1 and 2: Spring 2018 Journal of Political In
- Page 3 and 4: EDITORIAL BOARD ALINA ZHENG Editor
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- Page 7 and 8: COMMON CONTROVERSIES The definition
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- Page 47 and 48: CONCLUSION In the Walter hypothesis
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The discussion surrounding proper reforms is varied, but any research moving forward should<br />
fully take into account the vulnerability of any state, large or small, to fall into the cycle of moral hazard<br />
as it relates to credit, lending, and managing financial and fiscal policy. Based on what has been<br />
observed, the only viable way forward is beginning from the lowest levels, be they state or community,<br />
to correct financial errors as they begin to occur. Stricter rule-based policies could achieve this, but<br />
then present the risk of over-regulating capital markets in the face of global integration. As such,<br />
further research is needed to find where the equilibrium lies between stop-losses that are built in to<br />
prevent further financial manipulation while still maintaining capital inflows. In order to appropriately<br />
find such equilibrium balance, it is crucial to take into account that any country or political actor is<br />
equally vulnerable to commit such manipulations.<br />
<strong>JPI</strong> Fall 2017, pg. 40
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