JPI Spring 2018

maintained a balanced budget, while Greece produced deficits almost double those of Portugal. 20
Table 2 portrays Greece as the “closest approximation” of majoritarianism in the region, marked by
single-party majority governments and fewer parties in Parliament. Furthermore, cabinet
stability/durability—based on strict party discipline, as they point out—has been a tenet of Greek
economic growth since the consolidation of democracy. They present the idea that moderate voters
choose between two parties that differ only slightly in socioeconomic policy. Swift succession in
government more accurately reflects the electorate’s preferences, punishes a failure to perform, and
increases the likelihood of firm policy implementation. 21 Yet this, as Greek experience illustrates, might
not always be the case. Greek policies set a “lethal” institutional trap: to ensure the formation of a
majority government, mainstream political parties had to rely on institutionalized electoral outbidding
across a wide spectrum of issues 22 . Even small differences in the popular vote between the two main
parties would mean that the victor could win parliamentary majority. Loizides and Kovras argue that
this perpetuated a populist discourse and "clientelistic" network that attracted swing voters while
maintaining the loyalty of partisan voters.
20
Iosif Kovras and Neophytos Loizides, “The Greek Debt Crisis and Southern Europe: Majoritarian Pitfalls?” Comparative Politics vol. 47, no. 1 (Jan.
2014): 1–20. doi:10.5129/001041514813623164.
21
Iosif Kovras and Neophytos Loizides, “The Greek Debt Crisis and Southern Europe: Majoritarian Pitfalls?” Comparative Politics vol. 47, no. 1 (Jan.
2014): 1–20. doi:10.5129/001041514813623164.
22
Iosif Kovras and Neophytos Loizides, “The Greek Debt Crisis and Southern Europe: Majoritarian Pitfalls?” Comparative Politics vol. 47, no. 1 (Jan.
2014): 1–20. doi:10.5129/001041514813623164.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 36