JPI Spring 2018

12.05.2018 Views

As the European Union has eliminated the exchange rate factor in calculating inflation or productivity and GDP of its nations, national wage and productivity trends within monetary unions can be most easily understood in terms of Mundell’s 1961 contribution to “optimum currency area” theory. This focuses on “asymmetric shocks,” and how either market mechanisms and/or policy responses might help to rebalance off-kilter economies. 9 A relatable example is to compare France 9 Bibow, Jörg. “The Euro Debt Crisis and Germany’s Euro Trilemma.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2060325. JPI Fall 2017, pg. 28

and Italy, two of the largest and most influential economic players in Europe. Consider a hypothetical shift in the wine market, with a newfound international interest in Italian over French. Ordinarily, these types of competitive markets would have currencies that would be reflected in their respective exchange rates—in a monetary union though, this is not possible. This leads to out-of-sync cyclical positions and trade imbalances between the two markets subjected to the asymmetric shock. Bibow explains that an easy way to counter asymmetric shock involves exchange rate realignment. 10 Since this is not an option in a monetary union, the same outcome could be achieved through wage-price flexibility, with an “internal devaluation” in France (now that no one wants their wine anymore) and/or the opposite in Italy (in our example, an internal increase in value). According to Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory, common wage bargaining—or wage coordination—is critical in preventing asymmetric shocks and sustaining a monetary union. Ironically, we see Germany departing from its own historical stability norm, with potentially catastrophic effects for the Euro. Upon creation of the EU, the ECB defined price stability as an EUwide Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices with an inflation rate of about 2 percent. In the absence of any asymmetric shocks that require adjustment in relative competitiveness positions, this implies that national unit labor trends should converge to 2 percent 11 . Agreement of all EU countries to comply with this common 2 percent trend would be in line with commitment to a uniform inflation rate, as well as signifying the avoidance of any devaluation strategies to internally compete. Bibow states that at the start of the Euro most of Europe had fully converged to the historical German norm of 2 percent and has stayed close to that ever since—except for Germany itself. Starting in 1996, Germany shifted down, and established its own new, lower standard of zero nominal labor cost inflation. 10 Bibow. 11 Maastricht Treaty, Article 103 Sec. 1. JPI Fall 2017, pg. 29

As the European Union has eliminated the exchange rate factor in calculating inflation or<br />

productivity and GDP of its nations, national wage and productivity trends within monetary unions<br />

can be most easily understood in terms of Mundell’s 1961 contribution to “optimum currency area”<br />

theory. This focuses on “asymmetric shocks,” and how either market mechanisms and/or policy<br />

responses might help to rebalance off-kilter economies. 9 A relatable example is to compare France<br />

9<br />

Bibow, Jörg. “The Euro Debt Crisis and Germany’s Euro Trilemma.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2060325.<br />

<strong>JPI</strong> Fall 2017, pg. 28

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