JPI Spring 2018

is stemming from within society. Studying populism at the individual level rather than the aggregate
level more clearly illustrates its origin point. While it seems like Akkerman could fall victim to sample
bias, individual studies pinpoint the emotional connection to elections as well as the visceral, rather
than rational, motivations for apparent economic voting. This has led to a more nuanced way in
examining populism rather than simply categorizing and labeling the different types for the sake of
observation alone. Akkerman accomplished this individual-level study by analyzing by surveying 600
Dutch citizens in 2013. The study showed that populism is associated with a dynamic shift away from
the status quo and that attention-grabbing, paradigm-shifting campaigns are motivating to modern
populist supporters who find this anti-politic way of campaigning to be worth their time. This method
is very successful in today’s media, which focuses on shorter soundbites and headline stories rather
than elaborated content.
With coalition building, populist parties that are unable to remain relevant on their own not
only have more representation, but they also have more motivation to influence fellow coalition
members to switch into their populist party. With this, populists who lead their parties or coalitions
can expand their scope of party influence on a greater number of voters.
It is clear that populism can successfully unify voters, encourage participation, and effectively
bring about centrist policies that satisfy a large majority of voters’ needs. However, fringe groups and
the extremes of the left-right political spectrum can also become successful as new major parties via
coalition formation. For instance, the Law and Justice Party in Poland (“PiS”), a previously far-right
minority party, has succeeded in becoming the ruling party in their respective countries while being
definitively exclusionary populist. Similarly to how the United States’ Republican Party, which had
become polarized, less powerful, and felt antagonized during President Obama’s time in office, has
gilded support across the socio-economic plain by disguising their upper-class focused economic
policies as universal.
Despite these countries’ obvious economic, social, and ethnic differences, their exclusionary
leaders campaigned on similar platforms. This paper seeks to identify the methodology behind
populist party success and explore the voting behavior of their supporters by examining how
economic incentives, income, and education levels determine whether support for exclusionary
populism is predictable. Process-oriented approaches to democracy differ from constitutional,
substantive, and procedural accounts, instead identifying minimum qualifications for democracy 6 .
According to Robert Dahl, the following are all requirements for substantive democracy: effective
participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of
adults. 7 Tilly exemplifies the simplicity of Dahl’s criteria, which are also often the same standards that
populists hold themselves to in order to appeal to the masses while maintaining exclusivity. However,
since voters want substantive democracy (i.e. change and influence), populists, especially softpopulists,
often fall short due to vagueness of policies. Platforms that are strong enough for voters to
pursue have to be specific and tailored. Therefore, if an empty or anti-elitist populist wins an election,
they often sacrifice some of their original promises to their voters and consequently lose support.
However, when exclusionary or complete populists succeed, they are able to fulfill their campaign
promises and then, because their constituents are satisfied, they feel free to execute their own radical
agenda.
6
Tilly, Charles., Democracy, Cambridge University Press (2007), Ch. 1.
7
Tilly, pg. 9; Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Print., pp. 37-38.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 18