fire hazard management guideline - Brunei Shell Petroleum ...

Rev. 02 

Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad 

F IRE H AZARD M ANAGEMENT 

G UIDELINE 

F IRE H AZARD M ANAGEMENT G UIDELINE 

FOR O FFSHORE F ACILITIES 

Document BSP-02-Guideline- 006 

Approved by: HSE 

Document Owner: HSE/4

Brunei Shell Petroleum Co Sdn Bhd 

Document Control 

TYPE OWNER SECURITY CLASS 

Corporate Philosophy HSE/4 CONFIDENTIAL 

REFERENCE AUTHOR APPROVED BY 

BSP-12-Guideline-xxx HSE/4 HSE 

KEY WORDS 

Fire Hazard Management Guidelines 

Send improvement suggestions to the Document Owner through a Document Change Proposal Form 

according to: 

� Documentation Control Procedure (TMS0436). 

Revision Record 

REV REVISION DESCRIPTION DATE 

Draft Issued for internal BSP review 08-2002 

Draft Comments from the line incorporated 26-11-02 

Rev. 01 Comments from the line incorporated 23-01-03 

Rev. 02 Update following identification of spelling mistakes 

and inconsistent numbering of sections 

14-05-2004 

This document has a maximum validity of five years after the last revision date. Beyond this, it must be 

re-validated according to TMS0436. Confirm validity with the Document Owner (or through CORMS) 

before application. 

Distribution Control 

The distribution of this document is covered by the BSP livelink information 

Notice and Warning 

Copyright © 2002, Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad 

This document is the property of Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad (BSP), Seria 

KB3534, Negara Brunei Darussalam. Circulation is restricted to BSP and its designated associates, 

contractors and consultants. It must not be copied or used for any other purpose other than which it is 

supplied, without the expressed written authority of BSP. 

Except where provided for purposes of contractual requirements, BSP disclaims any responsibility or 

liability for any use or misuse of the document by any person and makes no warranty as to the accuracy 

or suitability of the information to any third party. Any misuse of the document is not authorised by 

BSP. 

Fire Hazard Management Guideline Rev.02 Page 2 of 39


TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1 INTRODUCTION. ........................................................................................................................................... 4 

1.1 Terminology...................................................................................................................................................... 4 

1.2 Content of this Guideline .................................................................................................................................. 4 

1.3 Objective of Fire Protection .............................................................................................................................. 4 

1.4 Objectives of this document.............................................................................................................................. 4 

1.5 Fire Detection/Prevention/Protection/Response Philosophy............................................................................. 5 

1.6 Fundamental Requirements for Fire Protection ................................................................................................ 6 

1.7 Risk Assessment Process ................................................................................................................................ 6 

1.8 Basis for decision making on fire risk reduction measures. .............................................................................. 7 

1.8.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment.......................................................................................................................... 7 

1.8.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment............................................................................................................................ 7 

1.9 Codes and Standards ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

2 Fire & Explosion Assessment Tools & Techniques (not just identification?)......................................... 9 

2.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 9 

2.2 Planning and Team Composition.................................................................................................................... 10 

2.3 Tools and Techniques .................................................................................................................................... 10 

2.4 Documentation and Results.......................................................................................................................... 101 

3 Prevention of Fires and Explosions.......................................................................................................... 12 

4 Passive Fire Protection................................................................................................................................. 13 

4.1 General incl. walls coverings and furnishing ................................................................................................... 13 

4.2 Ventilation and Air-conditioning ...................................................................................................................... 10 

5 

5.1 

5.2 

Fire Detection, Annunciation & ESD......................................................................................................... 16 

Fire, Gas & Smoke Detection ......................................................................................................................... 16 

Annunciation................................................................................................................................................... 16 

5.3 ESD ................................................................................................................................................................ 17 

5.4 Depressurisation ............................................................................................................................................... 17 

6 Fire fighting Equipment ............................................................................................................................. 19 

6.1 Manual Fire Fighting....................................................................................................................................... 19 

6.2 Fireman’s Equipment...................................................................................................................................... 20 

6.3 Active / Fixed Fire Fighting Systems............................................................................................................... 21 

6.3.1 Firewater ........................................................................................................................................................ 21 

6.3.2 Hydrants & Hoses .......................................................................................................................................... 21 

6.3.3 Monitors ......................................................................................................................................................... 21 

6.3.4 Deluge............................................................................................................................................................ 21 

6.3.5 Sprinklers ....................................................................................................................................................... 22 

6.3.6 Foam systems................................................................................................................................................ 22 

6.3.7 CO2, water mist & Halon systems .................................................................................................................. 22 

6.4 Stand-by & Support Vessels .......................................................................................................................... 22 

6.4.1 Stand-by Vessel ............................................................................................................................................. 22 

6.4.2 FIFI1 Fire Fighting Vessel .............................................................................................................................. 22 

7 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

7.4 

7.5 

7.6 

Protection of Specific Areas...................................................................................................................... 23 

Living Quarters and Control Centres .............................................................................................................. 23 

Muster areas................................................................................................................................................... 23 

Office and Utility Areas ................................................................................................................................... 24 

Electrical Rooms............................................................................................................................................. 24 

Gas turbines ................................................................................................................................................... 24 

Helidecks ........................................................................................................................................................ 24 

7.7 Fire Systems Integrity Assurance ................................................................................................................... 24 

8 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

8.4 

Emergency Response ................................................................................................................................ 26 

Emergency Response Plan ............................................................................................................................ 26 

Fire fighting equipment ................................................................................................................................... 26 

Fire fighting and Rescue................................................................................................................................. 26 

Command and Control.................................................................................................................................... 26 

9 Information Feedback ................................................................................................................................ 27 

Appendix 1: Terminology 

Appendix 2 Type of Fires 

Appendix 3 Fire Scenarios and corresponding mitigation measures 



1 INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Terminology 

For terminology / abbreviations used in this document reference is made to Appendix 1. 

1.2 Content of this Guideline 

This document provides a guideline for use for identification, prevention, detection and response systems for 

potential fires on offshore oil and gas production and processing facilities. It is intended as a higher level 

document to the standards, DEPs and other Codes of Practice referenced in it. Explanatory notes and guidance are 

included to provide background information on the purpose and application of the referenced standards 

General recommendations:- 

• National legislation and DEP (BSP’s technical engineering standard) requirements should be applied as a 

minimum 

• The requirements of this guideline should be met where they exceed DEP requirements (this includes the 

application of Fire Risk Assessment). 

• Where (e.g. as a result of the Fire Risk Assessment) there is a specific situation for the subject facility that 

requires a deviation from the DEP then a deviation should be granted only providing the appropriate 

Technical Authority approves the justification. 

• In cases where there is no prescribed requirement in the DEP or rigid adherence to codes and standards is 

not appropriate (e.g. location of gas detectors, positioning of deluge sprinklers) the risk based analysis 

principles described herein should be adopted. 

The scope of this document excludes specific provisions for: 

• Mitigation of explosions (Refer DEP 80.47.10.12 Section H for guidance). 

• Concurrent operations where special provisions may be necessary to achieve the appropriate degree of 

control (Refer CPRA, CPEMA & CPPA methodologies) 

• Protection of offshore drilling rigs, ships, boats and other mobile facilities 

1.3 Objective of Fire Protection 

The primary objective of fire protection is to protect personnel, the environment, the assets and BSP’s reputation 

(PEAR) against the effects of fires and explosions that may occur on a given facility, without endangering the 

lives of emergency response personnel (fire fighters & rescue teams) and without incurring untenable costs or 

maintenance requirements or adversely impacting on the environment. 

1.4 Objectives of this document 

The objective of this fire hazard management guideline is to provide corporate guidance on the means to: 

• Prevent the occurrence of fires 

• Detect gas/vapour releases 

• Detect fires if they occur 

• Extinguish or mitigate the effects of fires (as appropriate to the specific fire) 

• Tailor emergency response for specific fire scenarios. 

This process would require the identification and analysis of realistic potential losses of containment and 

associated fire types, sizes and effects for the subject facility. 



The requirements set out in this philosophy document should be applied, either retrospectively (existing facilities) 

or at the design definition stage, to all new BSP offshore facilities being:- 

− manned facilities 

− not-normally manned facilities 

− unmanned facilities 

1.5 Fire Prevention/Protection/Responses Philosophy 

In general, all (Existing and New) facilities must undergo the HEMP process of identification, assessment, control 

and recovery with specific attention to potential of fire & explosions at the facilities. 

In every stage of the HEMP process the most appropriate / recommended methods to be used to assure protection 

on PEAR against FIRE must be defined. The primary objective of fire protection, detection and fire fighting 

facilities should be the preservation of human life. 

For manned, normally unmanned and unmanned offshore complexes / facilities, the first line of defence is gas/fire 

detection followed by automatic isolation and dependant on the strategic importance of the facility, blowdown of 

the facilities. 

While all facilities are to be equipped with manual fire fighting equipment, manned complexes would also be 

equipped with fire water ring main systems, sprinkler systems, localised water mist systems and supported by 

trained fire fighters (trained in accordance with OPITO requirements). The prime objective of the fire team is to 

perform rescue operations, assist in securing the escape / evacuation of staff and fighting of minor fires. 

The following philosophies are to be applied in response to the situation when potential Fire is occurring: 

Philosophies for (keep in mind on the PEAR): - 

Manned facilities 

- Means of protection for People must be provided: - 

- Escape route, mustering of people, evacuation of people, personal protection, etc 

- Means of rescue of people within a defined time scale:- 

- Means of evacuation of people from the facilities within a defined time scale:- 

- Removal of the source, Auto-protection of Asset, containment of hydrocarbon, blowdown of 

hydrocarbon, etc 

- Means of minimising escalation of FIRE must be provided: - 

- Means of communication on who should be involved, people awareness, minimising/avoidance of 

public knowledge, etc 

Not normally manned facilities 

- Means of protection for People must be provided: - 

- Escape route, mustering of people, evacuation of people, Personal protection, etc 

- Removal of the source, Auto-protection of Asset, automatic isolation of hydrocarbon and for 

strategic important facilities, , blowdown of hydrocarbon. 


- Standby- vessel must be present and available within a defined time scale. 

Unmanned facilities 


- Removal of the source, Auto-protection of Asset, automatic isolation t of hydrocarbon. 



1.6 Fundamental Requirements for Fire Protection 

The following requirements are recommended:- 

• Identification, analysis and assessment of fire and explosion hazards and effects. 

• Reduction of residual risks to personnel associated with potential fire and explosion scenarios to a level 

that is tolerable and as low as is reasonably practicable. 

• Fire detection, protection and response risk controls should be provided to a level that commensurate 

with the hazards and risks on a facility, with the order of priority being: 

− Avoiding the occurrence of fires 

− Protecting personnel against the immediate effects of gas/vapour releases 

− protecting all personnel against the immediate effects of fires 

− removing personnel from the danger zone presented by potential escalation of the initial incident 

(fire or gas release) 

− preventing fire escalation 

− protecting the environment. 

− protecting the asset 

The analysis of fire and explosion risks may require quantitative modelling of releases and potential 

consequences. The subsequent assessment of risks to personnel from fire and explosion hazards on 

manned complexes would normally require quantitative methods. For un-manned and not-normally 

manned facilities assessment a qualitative assessment would normally suffice, unless it is deemed that 

the level of personnel exposure and the hazards involved justifies a quantitative approach. The advice 

of HSE/4 should be sought in determining the appropriate degree of assessment. 

Not withstanding the above order of priority, the primary objective of fire protection should 

always be the protection of human life. 

1.7 Risk Assessment Process 

Fire protection is to be provided so that risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 

Through the application of the standards contained in this document and supplementary studies such as Hazard 

Identification, consequence modelling, fire and explosion analysis and escape analysis, which may ultimately feed 

in to a Quantitative Risk Assessment an assessment of risks to personnel (and assets) can be made. 

The outcome of this assessment should be compared with tolerability levels, performance standards etc. These 

studies may also identify opportunities for reducing risk as well as indicate the main contributors to overall risk 

that can then help focus risk reduction efforts. Finally these studies provide input to emergency response 

planning, including exercise programmes. 

This process would contribute to the demonstration of ALARP and provide the project manager and ultimate asset 

holder with a demonstration of assurance. 

The figure below gives a typical process for such assessments. 



Process 

Events 

Hazard 

Identification 

Other 

Events 

Fire & 

Explosion 

Analysis 

Or 

FIREPRAN 

Explosion 

Protection 

Review 

Structural 

Response 

Analysis 

Misc 

Analysis 

Fig. 1: QRA Process Typical for a complex offshore facility 

1.8 Basis for decision making on fire risk reduction measures. 

1.8.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment 

Where there are options to consider or a decision is required on the appropriate level of fire detection and 

protection, comparative QRA may be used to provide support to the decision making process. This should not be 

done to justify a reduction in standard. In such cases the assessment criteria should be based on: 

� Either, a direct comparison of potential cost benefit based on differences in potential asset value and 

production loss, (Cost Benefit Analysis) or, where there is concern for safety 

� Or, an assessment of the implied cost to avert a fatality, ICAF. (refer EP 95 –0352 and Guide to 

application of BSP HSE Risk Tolerability and Control Acceptance Critieria Doc No. BSP-02-Guideline- 

005) 

� Or a combination of both (there may be circumstances where the application of CBA is not appropriate 

for example when the risk levels of individual workers are already at a high level). 

QRA may or may not provide a conclusive result; in such cases the decision must be based on qualitative risk 

assessment. In all cases factors such as perceived risk assessment and possible future changes in standards 

and legislation should be taken into account. 

The degree of fire protection provided for a facility may also be linked to the criticality of that facility in terms 

of securing BSP’s oil and gas production. Offshore this aspect must be taken in balance with the normally 

overriding safeguarding philosophy driver of personnel safety (onshore there is often more opportunity to 

have varying degrees of protection). 

1.8.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment 

Emergency System 

Survivability Analysis 

Evacuation & 

Escape Analysis 

Riser, dropped 

objects etc. 

studies 

QRA Support Studies 

(optional depending on facility) 

Exposure based 

Analysis 

Risk 

Tolerance 

Criteria 

Further 

Risk 

Reduction 

Measures 

- 

Feed in to 

design 

& 

Ops 

In combination with quantitative assessments the qualitative application of HEMP, in particular to develop bow-tie 

analysis (e.g. using the THESIS tool) in relation to assessing adequacy of controls should be carried out for 

representative fire scenarios. Here the number and effectiveness of threat barriers and escalation controls can be 

screened and assessed applying the qualitative risk tolerance criteria contained in BSP-02-Guideline-005. Bow-tie 

based analysis can address specific hardware, procedure and organisational issues such as the role of Permit to 

Fire Hazard Management Guideline Rev.02 Page 7 of 39 

QRA


Work, emergency response measures and infrastructure that supports general fire safety, such as firewater supply. 

Bow-tie analysis would also identify critical activities essential to establishing and maintaining controls. It would 

be necessary to make a judgement and highlight the factors supporting such a judgement such as industry practice 

and standards. The ALARP principle that is integral to Shell’s HEMP process should be applied. 

1.9 Codes and Standards 

Generally, the fire protection on BSP facilities would be designed using a combination of engineering standards 

and fire and explosion risk assessment. [Ref 1.2] 

Specific Fire Engineering Standards used in BSP, are: 

ISO 13702 Standard Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore Production 

Installations – Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions – 

Requirements and Guidelines, 1999 

NFPA 11 Foam Systems 

NFPA 12 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems 1993 

NFPA 13 Installation of Sprinkler Systems 1991 

NFPA 15 Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection 1985 

NFPA 20 Centrifugal Fire Pumps 1990 

NFPA 96 Fixed fire extinguisher system 

NFPA 101 Life Safety Code 

NFPA 105 Installation of Smoke Control Near Assemblies 

NFPA 750 Water Mist Systems 

CAP168 Licensing of Aerodromes 

(http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP168.pdf) 

CAP437 Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas, Guidance on Standards 

(http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/Cap437.pdf). 

DEP 32.30.20.11 Gen Fire, Gas and Smoke Detection Systems 

DEP 80.47.10.10-Gen Fire fighting agents 

DEP 80.47.10.12-Gen Water-based fire protection systems for offshore facilities 

DEP 80.47.10.30-Gen Assessment of the Fire Safety of Onshore Installations 

DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen Active Fire Protection Systems and Equipment for Onshore Facilities 

SOLAS IMO Safety of Life at Sea 

OGP Fire Systems Integrity Assurance 

BSP-12.S.500 Process Safeguarding Standard 

BSP 12.2.201 Design of Helidecks 

BS-1400 British Standard for Foam Monitors 

BS-4275 British Standard for Breathing Apparatus 

BS-4547 British Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers 

BS-6391 British Standard for Fire Hoses 

EP99-5807 Fire & Gas Methodologi (developed by SGSI) 



2 FIRE & EXPLOSION A SSESSMENT T OOLS & TECHNIQUES 

2.1 Introduction 

Supplementary studies such as Hazard Identification, consequence modelling, fire and explosion analysis and 

escape analysis, which may ultimately feed in to a Quantitative Risk Assessment are introduced in Section 1.6. 

The formal studies adopted in BSP are summarised below. The details of the studies are documented separately, 

while the key findings are captured in Hazard and Risk Registers. Ultimately all studies should be referenced in 

the relevant HSE Case. 

2.2 Planning and Team composition and competency of participants 

2.2.1 Planning 

Execution of fire hazard studies (e.g. FIREPRAN) associated with new designs, should be planned and executed at 

an early stage e.g. conceptual design stage. 

2.2.2 Team Composition 

Most fire hazard studies and reviews are best executed by a team of staff representing different disciplines such as 

design & engineering, operations and for more complex studies and an HSE specialists with knowledge of HEMP 

tool appliance.. The exact composition of the team will need to be determined on the basis of type of review and 

the scope of work. 

2.2.3 Staff Competency 

a) Skilled Technical Safety Engineering (HSE-S1) 

� Specifies system requirements and manage the design, manufacture, commissioning and operation of all 

main safety systems. 

� Is consulted by other disciplines for guidance on the engineering of systems that have a role in major 

accidents. 

� Troubleshoots problems and produce effective solutions. 

� Advises line management on the impact of any system problems so that they are able to make wellinformed 

risk management decisions. 

b) Skilled applicant of specific HEMP Tools 

� Able to plan and execute a specific tool or technique. 

� Able to lead or undertake work associated with the application of a specific tool or technique 

� Uses a specific tool or technique to arrive at robust recommendations for risk reduction measures. 

� Effectively communicates both in writing and verbally, the process, the findings and recommendations 

from the application a specific tool or technique. 

� Can document the findings from the application of a specific tool or technique in a structured report e.g. 

HSE Case, Hazard Register etc. 

Incorporates workforce views into a specific tool or technique and is able to communicate results to workforce 

representatives. 



2.3 TOOLS & TECHNIQUES 

2.3.1 HAZID 

� EP 95-0312 HAZID 

HAZID (HAZard IDentification) is described in Shell EP 95-0312. A HAZID study in the context of fires and 

explosion focuses on identifying the hazards, top events and possible causes of such events that may lead to a fire 

and/or explosion. There may also be a high level identification of effects and targets (personnel, environment, 

assets). Such HAZIDs would tend to focus on specific facilities and cover various modes of operation over the 

project life cycle. 

HAZID should be carried out for all facilities. HAZIDs may be carried out as an integral part of other studies such 

as FRA and FIREPRAN. 

2.3.2 F(E)RA 

� Add EP 95 reference for a F(E)RA 

Fire (and Explosion) Risk Analysis is something of a misnomer: this study analyses hazards, not risks. It would 

normally comprise a detail inventory of fuel sources for fires, associated fire types and existing controls. An 

F(E)RA would normally be a desktop exercise. The F(E)RA should be undertaken by a competent (skill level) 

specialist with appropriate experience. 

F(E)RA’s are generally carried out as pre-cursor to QRA [Ref Fig. 1] where escalation scenarios are potentially 

complex. 

2.3.3 FIREPRAN 

� EP 95-0350 FIREPRAN 

� Fire and Explosion Standard (FIREPRAN), document number 1388-R-803, Rev 1 March 2000 

FIRE PRotection ANalysis is a scenario-based structured group assessment study aimed at determining the 

adequacy of existing fire protection measures and/or the need for new fire protection measures in the light of 

major fire and explosion hazards at the subject facility FIREPRAN covers analyses what happens in various 

scenarios, model this and look at escape, structural loading, escalation etc FIREPRAN is a stand-alone technique 

that does not necessarily need to be supported by a QRA. 

FIREPRAN has its limitations when escalation is not predictable, for simple 2-dimensional facility analysis and 

simpler offshore facilities. FIREPRAN is fit for purpose. It is may be used on existing facilities but is also 

effective for screening and scrutinising designs. 

FIREPRAN is BSP’s preferred method for assessing the adequacy of fire protection measures on its hydrocarbon 

production and processing facilities. FIREPRAN’s should be carried out for: 

• Manned facilities 

• Not-normally-manned facilities where potential fires and/or explosions are the major contributor to high 

personnel risks as measured by IRPA 

• Not-normally-manned and unmanned facilities where loss of the facility through fire or explosion would incur 

major financial impact on the company (directly or via reputation damage) or major impact on the 

environment, 



2.3.4 QRA 

� EP 95-0352 Quantitative Risk Assessment 

Quantitative Risk Assessment involves quantification of risks to personnel and assets from identified hazards, by 

application of generic failure data to the subject facility, with suitable parametric modelling to account for subjectspecific 

conditions. 

QRA should be performed for all manned facilities in order to determine: 

• that risks to personnel from fire and explosion hazards are tolerable 

• compare the risk of alternative modifications / upgrades and to assist in the selection process in accordance 

with the ALARP principles 

QRA’s for BSP offshore facilities should preferably be performed using existing SQRAM QRA models where 

available or through development of new SQRAM models as necessary. Note that to date SQRAM models have 

been developed for all BSP’s offshore manned complexes and for a few of the not-normally-manned and 

unmanned offshore complexes 

� 

2.4 Documentation of Results 

Key findings of Fire Hazard studies should be included in the HSE cases for the respective facilities, while the 

study report should be made available in livelink. Action items identified as a result of the studies would normally 

be traced by the use of OmniSafe. 

. 



3 PREVENTION OF F IRES AND E XPLOSIONS 

The first element of managing fire hazard is preventive; this section describes the required measures to prevent 

fires and explosions from occurring. A large number of established measures contribute to prevention of release 

and, in the event of release, prevention of an ensuing fire: 

• Approved engineering design standards for equipment and systems 

• Classification of hazardous areas, linked to requirements for all certified equipment installed or used in 

these areas 

• Maintenance of asset integrity (AIMS) including inspection work and change control 

• The Permit To Work system for control of maintenance and engineering activities 

• Procedure based control of major activities (drilling, construction, painting) through the CP procedures 

(CPRA, CPEMA, CPPA) 

• Proper organisation and maintenance of all facilities (“good fire safety practice”) including Control, 

Utility, LQ, Aviation, Marine 

• Safety audits, with follow-up 

• Timely detection of process upsets and corrective action 

• Effective shutdown and blowdown in process conditions likely to lead to immediate fire hazard 

• Operator patrols of all areas 

• Operator and Fire Team Leader/Member incident response training 

• Smoking control 

• Specification and ongoing monitoring of furnishings and structure finishes to reduce ignition and fire 

spread probabilities 

All of these measures are part of BSP’s normal HSE-MS and are not specific to control of fire hazards. They are 

identified here for completeness. 



4 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION 

4.1 General 

Passive fire protection (PFP) in the form of fire rated enclosures should be provided for control rooms, 

accommodation, offices and safety critical equipment rooms e.g. UPS. See section 7.1. 

PFP is not generally required for BSP’s process and utility installations, however specific cases can be justified 

through risk analysis and Cost Benefit evaluations. 

Where passive fire protection of equipment and structures is shown as justifiable to reduce risk, the specification 

should be appropriate to the risk. Particular care should be taken to ensure that any PFP that is installed does not 

compromise long-term asset integrity and takes proper account of inspection needs. 

For general requirement related to LQs, reference is made to SOLAS requirements. 

Some helidecks may be fitted with Enhanced Aluminium Helideck with a fire suppression system designed into 

the helideck surface structure. Such helidecks have a perforated appearance. 

4.1.1 Wall Coverings 

a) Wall coverings for “A” class walls should be of non-combustible materials. 

b) Wall coverings for “B” and “C” class walls should be of low fire spread materials. 

c) Continuous “B” class ceilings should be constructed of non-combustible materials. 

d) Suspended ceiling panels should be constructed of non-combustible materials. 

e) Interior finish materials, excluding floor material, should meet or exceed the requirements of class “A” 

interiors finish in accordance with NFPA 101 except that the smoke developed rating should be no higher than 

55. 

f) Interior flooring materials should meet or exceed requirements of a class 1 interior floor finish with a minimum 

critical radiant flux of 0.45 watts/sq.cm. as specified in NFPA 101. 

g) Interior finish paints which are shown to contribute to surface spread of flame should not be used. This 

requirement effectively limits interior finish paints to water based emulsion types only. Gloss paints are 

normally oil based and contribute to rapid fire spread. 

h) PVC and other plastic wall linings should not be used for bathroom/shower room finishing or fittings. 

i) For Local Control Room and Containerised Equipment Room located on manned and unmanned platforms 

A60 for external and B15 for internal partitions & floors are recommended. 

4.1.2 Furnishing 

Furnishings for the living quarters should, as far as practicable, be of non-combustible construction with flame 

retardant and/or low flame propagation material used throughout. 

a) Cabinets, lockers, drawers, shelving and related fittings should be factory fabricated and constructed of 

combinations of recognised fire retardant materials and non-combustible materials. 

b) Office furniture should be standard design and should be constructed of fire retardant materials. 

c) Bedding mattresses should be of low flammability material with a low ignition potential meetings standard 

ignition specification requirements of BS 7176 or equivalent. 



d) Seating with expanded foam upholstery should only be permitted where smoke and flame inhibited foams are 

used on the construction. 

e) The number of furnishing items in cabins should be kept to that which is the minimum requirement for the 

occupants use. 

Additional lockers are accepted in cabins to cater for personnel working back-to-back. 

f) Twin cabins should have fire retardant curtains meeting International standards surrounding bunks for personal 

privacy. 

g) Additional table lamps, bedside lamps and other lamps of commercial design to be provided in addition to 

fixed lighting and should require to be of an approved safe design. 

Interior cabin carpeting should be of low ignition potential and low surface spread of flame and should be of 

low toxic fumes emission. 

h) Offices, cabins and recreation areas should be provided with non-combustible refuse bins without plastic 

lining. 

4.2 Ventilation and Air Conditioning 

4.2.1 General: 

HVAC systems should be designed to fulfil appropriate combinations of the following functions: 

a) Maintenance of a pressure differential between the internal and external of the living quarters. 

i. HVAC services to all areas of the living quarters should be fan powered. 

b) HVAC systems should run continuously during normal conditions in the living quarters but should, during 

a fire or emergency incident, be shut down with provision for start-up to required areas. Living quarters are 

segregated in zones by bulkheads and fire dampers. On detection of smoke or heat the effected zone is 

closed off / isolated and corridors kept smoke free by maintaining an over –pressure. 

i. HVAC systems should be capable of being kept in constant use by the provision of adequate stand-by 

systems. 

ii. HVAC systems controls and power supply from vital emergency power supply. 

iii. Air intakes for the living quarters should be located on the side of the platform furthest away from 

classified hazardous areas. 

iv. Location of air intakes should take due account of the requirements for maintaining a habitable 

atmosphere in the living quarters and should be positioned such that they would not ingest exhaust 

fumes from platform motors, marine vessels or air exhaust from accommodation ventilation outlets. 

4.2.2 Specifics: 

a) Ventilation ducts should be constructed of non-combustible materials throughout. 

b) Ventilation ducts, external to the living quarters, shall be of welded and gas tight construction throughout. 

Cross-joints shall be sealed with appropriate gasket material. 

c) ‘A’-rated ducts internal to the living quarters shall be of welded and gas tight construction throughout. Crossjoints 

shall be sealed with non-combustible gasket material. 

d) Non ‘A’-rated ducts internal to the living quarters shall be shall be formed from light gauge sheet-metal. 

Longitudinal joints shall be lockformed with sealant applied to the joint. Cross-joints shall be sealed with 

gasket material 



e) A positive pressure of at least 50Pa above outside atmospheric pressure should be maintained in the living 

quarters to minimise the ingress of smoke and gases. 

f) Fire/gas dampers should be installed in ducts at every location where ducts pass, either vertically or 

horizontally, through “H” or “A” or “B” class divisions and should meet the requirements of BS 476 Part 8 or 

equivalent. 

g) All fire/gas dampers and ducts should have as a minimum the same fire resistance and thermal insulation 

properties as the wall or deck in which they are to be located and should not impair the rating of the division. 

h) Fire/gas dampers should be of a type which permits a maximum leakage of 0.1 cu.m/sec per sq.m of damper 

face area where the damper is in the closed position and should be suitable for high velocity and pressure 

systems of 2000 Pa. 

i) Each fire/gas damper should have a suitable indicator fitted externally to identify open and closed positions and 

should remain open during normal operating conditions with all controls arranged to failsafe close in the event 

of loss of power. 

j) All fire/gas damper open and/or closed position status should be indicated on the main DCS system F & G 

graphics in the control room. 

k) Fire/gas dampers should be capable of operation by the following methods: 

- A quartzoid bulb in the air stream which should actuate at 68 degrees C. 

- Confirmed smoke or gas detection input to the F&G system 

- Manual operation of local pneumatic shut-down valve or switch. 

l) All main air intakes should be fitted with fire/gas dampers. 

m) All extract outlets should be fitted with fire/gas dampers. 

n) Where the exhaust ducts from kitchen ranges pass through accommodation areas or areas containing 

combustible materials such exhaust ducts should be constructed of class “A60” divisions and each exhaust duct 

should be fitted with the following:- 

- A grease trap easily and readily removable for cleaning. 

- A fire/gas damper located in the outlet end. 

- A manual fire/gas damper shut off control device. 

- A fixed fire extinguishing system complying with NFPA-96 or similar standard 

- Access for internal cleaning / de-greasing of exhaust ducts. 

o) All fire/gas dampers throughout the living quarters should have easy and simplified access for testing, 

inspecting and maintenance purposes. 

p) Air extraction from accommodation spaces into common ceiling voids should not be permitted and should be 

avoided by the provision of supply and return air registers and ducting in each accommodation space. 

q) Fire/gas dampers fitted to air outlets in external divisions should be rated for hydrocarbon fires according to 

QRA results and findings. 

r) HVAC systems shall be designed to avoid transfer of air from rooms / cabins to corridors to assist in 

maintaining smoke-free escape routes. 



5 FIRE D ETECTION, ANNUNCIATION & ESD 

5.1 Fire, Gas & Smoke Detection 

Fire, Gas & Smoke detector coverage should be provided in all areas, appropriate to identified hazards and risks. 

Generally this means comprehensive coverage for manned facilities, with lesser coverage for not-normally manned 

and unmanned facilities, in accordance with the stated priorities set out in section 1.6. The minimum coverage, 

applicable to unmanned facilities, should comprise fusible plug heat detection 

In process areas the preferred type of detectors are IR flame detector for fire and IR flammable gas detectors of 

either the line of sight (LOS) or the point type for detection of hydrocarbon releases. Use of CCTV cameras may 

also be considered for new installations. 

In enclosed areas the preferred type of detector is generally a heat (rate compensated type) or smoke detector of 

either optical or ionisation type. For gas turbine enclosures see Section 6.3.7 and 7.5. 

Aspirating smoke detectors may be used for critical electrical switchgear rooms and should be designed in 

consultation with the equipment vendors and with reference to the E&P Forum report for Incipient Fire Detection 

(No 6.75/284) – note that the EE&P forum has since been renamed to OGP – Oil and Gas Producers. Aspirating 

Smoke Detectors may be considered for normally unmanned computer rooms, telecommunications rooms and 

electrical rooms. 

Location and type of detectors should be determined using the Fire and Gas mapping methodology as developed 

by SGSI. (EP99-5807). This must be linked into the QRA or FIREPRAN for the subject facility to ensure no 

scenario contradictions exist. The mapping exercise is done after QRA and FIREPRAN and adopts the scenarios 

from these. 

Zone areas should be determined during the FIREPRAN (analysis) or during the Fire and Gas mapping exercise, 

which considers gas dispersion mechanics and visibility to fire detectors. In principle zone areas on offshore 

platforms are created by physical barriers (e.g. fire rated walls) or in the absence of these, determined on a deck or 

platform basis. 

Voting rules for detectors are set out in section 5.3 below. 

In addition to Fire, Gas and Smoke detectors, CCTV should be used on manned facilities and critical notnormally-manned 

/ unmanned facilities, to allow the control room operators to view critical facilities. 

Personnel can also play a major role in FGS detection. Table 5.2 below sets out recommended practice on BSP 

complexes for provision of Audio Visual Alarms (AVA) associated with gas detection systems. 

5.2 Annunciation (applies to manned complexes only) 

Facilities should be provided in all areas to allow someone who detects fire hazard to raise the alarm promptly and 

communicate details by phone or walkie-talkie to the Control Room. The alarm should be raised as a higher 

priority than any attack on a fire. 

General Alarm points (GPA buttons) should be provided at each access and exit point on all decks including boat 

landings and helidecks. 

An efficient visual and audible alarm (AVA) and PA system is required, providing coverage for all areas of a 

complex or platform including living accommodation/quarters and boat landings used for alternative evacuation. 

AVA (alarms) should be provided at strategic locations and bridges, with automatic response on detection of gas 

or fire. Note that audible alarms should take account of background ambient noise levels and noise associated 

with any event for which the alarm is intended. 

The philosophy underlying the provision of AVAs is as follows: 

1. Personnel should be warned when a Fire or Gas event arises, i.e. Fire or Gas detected anywhere on the 

complex/ process area 



2. Personnel are to be alerted to avoid platform/ process area where first level (i.e. 20% LFL or 1 LFL/m) gas or 

single fire has been detected. 

3. When gas detection on a platform has been detected (i.e. single or voted high-high) or where fire has been 

detected (i.e. single or voted) , a complex/plant wide alarm (i.e. including the affected platform/ process area) 

consisting of red / amber (depending on hi or hi-hi) flashing beacons and intermittent sounder would be 

raised. 

4. Prepare to Abandon Platform (PAPA) which is manually activated, should be implemented throughout the 

complex via the raising of the red flashing beacons and continuous sounder. In accordance with the DEP on 

Fire, Gas and Smoke Detection Systems (DEP 32.30.20.11-Gen) the sounder should be supplanted by a motor 

driven siren for increased reliability and should be fed from the vital switchboard. 

The following tabulates the philosophy: 

Table 5.2: FGS AVA Philosophy 

BSP’s philosophy with regards to FGS detection is based on automatic shutdown on confirmed fire and gas 

(detection) and applies also on all platforms and complexes. Therefore where FGS alarms are enunciated 

graphically on DCS, there is no requirement to provide a dedicated hard-wired mimic panel. 

5.3 ESD 

Central Control Room 

Platform/Process 

Area 

Amber flashing beacon 

Rest of Complex/Plant 

General Alarm Call Point X X 

Gas detector - High (Single) X X X 

Gas detector - High High (Single) X X X X X X 

Gas detector - High High (Voted) X X X X X X 

Flame detector - Single X X X X X 

Flame detector - Voted X X X X X 

Smoke detector - Single X X X X X 

Smoke detector - Voted X X X X X 

Heat detector X X X X X 

MCP / kill knob X X X X X 

PAPA X X 

Table 4.2 FGS AVA Philosophy 

Emergency Shut-Down is the first line of defence upon occurrence of a flammable hydrocarbon loss of 

containment or fire event. Both manual ESD and executive ESD provisions should be provided on BSP facilities. 

Manual ESD points should be provided at each access and exit point on all decks including boat landings, and in 

the control room. 

To avoid occurrence of trips due to spurious detection, executive action should be voted as follows: 

• for gas and flame detection: 2ooN/D i.e. 2 out of “N” number of detectors in the voting group/zone. “D” 

denotes that if any detector in the group has failed (non-deterministic fault) then the logic should revert to 

1ooN, i.e. single shot. 

• point smoke detectors should be voted 2ooN where “N” is the number of detectors in the zone. Aspirating 

smoke detectors (commonly known as HSSD - High Sensitivity Smoke Detectors) should be voted with 

Fire Hazard Management Guideline Rev.02 Page 17 of 39 

Red flashing beacon 

Sounder intermittent 

Amber flashing beacon 

Red flashing beacon 

Sounder intermittent 

Sounder continuous


any point smoke detectors within the zone. The highest alert level from the aspirating smoke detector 

should be used (max. of incipient stage). 

• heat detectors (e.g. fusible plugs) are slow devices, not prone to spurious activation and should therefore 

never be voted 

5.4 Depressurisation 

The standard for blow down system are stated in our Process Safe guarding standard, BSP-12-Standard-500. 



6 FIRE FIGHTING E QUIPMENT 

6.1 Manual Fire Fighting 

The general standard to be used for application of extinguishers for offshore manned complexes should be as per 

the BS-1400/4275/4547/6391 Standards (Reference is also made to BSP-02-Standard-001). 

Table 6.1 below shows the recommended provision of manual fire appliances on manned and not-normallymanned 

production and processing platforms. Provision of manual fire fighting appliances at accommodation and 

utility platforms must be assessed specifically because the fire hazards are more complex. 

Table 6.1 : Provision Of Manual Fire Appliances 

Type of deck 9 kg dry powder 6kg or 4.5kg 

(min)CO2 

Deck which is 

plated or with 

a drip pan 

≥2 units at each 

access and exit 

point 1 

Wireline deck ≥2 units at each 


point 1 

Grated deck ≥2 units at each 


point 1 

Helideck ≥2 units Dry Powder 

extinguisher with a 

combined capacity 

of no less than 45 

kg.) A minimum of 

one unit to be 

installed at each 

access 5 

LQ Galley 1 unit at access 

and exit for 9kgs 

dry powder. 

≥1 units inside control 

or switchgear rooms 





≥2 units or more 22.5 

kg. CO 2 extinguishers 

with extension 

applicators capable of 

reaching the S61N 

engine fire fighting 

points. 5 . 

2 units within galley 

area with CO 2 

50kg 

wheeled dry 

powder 

(excl. unmanned 

complexes) 

≥1 unit at 

main access 

point 2 

Optional; at 

main access 

point 2 . 

Wheeled 

foam unit 

(AF120) 


complexes) 

Optional. for 

decks with 

pool or 

running fire 

potential3 . 

Double outlet 

hydrants with 

hose cabinet 


complexes) 

1 at main 

access point 2 

Not required 1 at main 


Not required Not required 1 at main 


1 unit at 

each access 

2 units fixed 

foam monitor 

1 at main 

access 

Gallery 

should be 

provided with 

a fire blanket. 



Notes: 

1 Access and exit points are considered to be 

• at bridge links connection to a platform 

• at entry to stairs to a deck 

• at entry to stairs leading to a boat landing 

1 The main access point to a deck is the bridge landing to the AP or the stairs leading directly to the boat 

landing. On a large deck, additional large extinguishers may be needed, e.g. CP decks 

1 Pool fire can occur on solid decks at decks under which there is a drip pan deck at equipment drip pans or 

spill containment 

4. Location of hydrants should be assessed as part of FIREPRAN exercise. 

5. Helideck fire extinguishers to be marked with next date due for test 

6.2 Fireman’s Equipment 

Each manned installation should carry a minimum of 4 (four) sets of Fireman's equipment. The sets of equipment 

would be kept in pairs, and one pair would be kept in a place that is readily accessible from the helicopter landing 

area. 

Each set contains: 

a) a protective outfit inherently fire resistant turnout gear including gloves, boots, a face mask or hood and 

helmet, 

b) a self contained breathing apparatus with minimum 30 minutes working duration (incl. Spare bottle), 

c) a fireman's axe, 

d) a safety harness and lifeline, and 

e) a portable , intrinsically safe, battery operated safety lamp capable of operating efficiently for a period of 

not less than 3 hours. 

In addition rescue equipment shall be provided in a crash box adjacent to the helideck as required by CAP 437 

f) an adjustable wrench 

g) 1 set bolt cutters 

h) 1 large crowbar 

i) 1 grab or salving hook 

j) a heavy duty hacksaw with 6 spare blades 

k) a fire resistant blanket 

l) a ladder 

m) a pair of side cutting pliers (tin snips) 

n) a set of assorted screwdrivers, 

All personnel assigned to rescue and fire fighting duties are provided with suitable personal protective equipment 

(PPE) such as; helmet and fitted visor, fire tunic and trousers (or one piece suit), gloves and boots. 

The protective equipment should meet appropriate safety standards and should not in any way restrict the wearer 

from carrying out his duties. 

Fire extinguishers would be available on unmanned platforms, but no firemen’s equipment, as the visitors are not 

expected to fight fires. 



6.3 Active / Fixed Fire Fighting Systems 

6.3.1 Firewater 

Firewater supply is required for all areas of manned facilities. For not-normally-manned and unmanned facilities, 

firewater is only required during hot work and may be temporarily supplied from the attendant workboat. Refer to 

DEP 80.47.10.12 for general requirement. 

At least one diesel engine driven fire pump is required as back up to electric motor driven pumps on manned 

facilities. All firewater pumps should be protected against the fires for which they are required to operate. The 

main and emergency back-up pump sets should each be sized to provide adequate firewater for coverage of any 

one fire zone plus 2 hoses for rescue operations. Zone areas are created by physical barriers (e.g. fire rated walls) 

or in the absence of these, determined on a deck or platform basis according to hazard range. Note that entire LQ 

sprinkler systems should be counted as a single zone. 

A minimum practical firewater supply of 250 m³/hr with an operating pressure at the hydrant of 8 barg is required. 

This is ample for rescue operations and would also support one or two mobile monitors (see below). 

Wherever practicable the main firewater supply distribution should be in the form of a ringmain with isolatable 

sections that are not prone to common mode failure. However, it is recognised that this has not been achieved on 

all existing BSP complexes and retrofitting of new ringmains is rarely practicable (or cost justified). Consequently 

effort must be directed at protecting the main supply to ensure that the risk of supply failure during fire fighting 

and particularly during rescue operations, is ALARP and mitigation measures or alternative escape plans are in 

place to assure the safety of the fire / rescue teams. 

6.3.2 Hydrants & Hoses 

The purposes of hydrants are for support of hot work activities, and where practically safe to permit safe 

operations by a fire team engaged in rescuing casualties during an incident to provide cooling on equipment or 

structure during emergency. Where hydrants are provided to back-up fixed systems they should not be supplied 

from the same unisolatable fire main sections. 

All areas of manned facilities should have firewater hose coverage within two hose lengths from closest hydrants 

(to comply with standard fire fighting practice in providing redundancy of supply for rescue operations). 

6.3.3 Monitors 

Fixed monitors need positioned and re-positioned under fire conditions, to achieve effective cooling. Selfoscillating 

monitors or remote controlled monitors can provide useful cooling without the need for personnel to 

remain in the danger area. However, careful attention needs to be paid to the realistic reach and coverage of 

monitors, as units that are not properly specified can give false reassurance and act as a drain on the firewater 

system. Consequently, fixed monitors are only required if deemed necessary for specific scenarios from the 

FIREPRAN study. 

Mobile monitors can provide a useful facility for a fire team for example water spray protection for personnel 

doing rescue operations or to protect casualties from heat radiation. Fire team leaders and others involved in 

emergency response should identify the numbers and types of equipment required to support foreseeable rescue 

activities by the team. Mobile monitors are only recommended on not-normally-manned and unmanned facilities 

if specific activities and hazards necessitate their (temporary) provision. 

For specific requirements for monitors on helidecks reference is made to section 7.6 of this document. 

6.3.4 Deluge 

Area deluge is only required if the CAPEX and OPEX (cost to maintain the deluge system and to account for 

potential instrumentation damage associated with regular deluge tests) are justified by quantified Cost Benefit 

Analysis with risk values including the potential for causing electrical short circuits and personnel exposure for 

maintenance of the system. A combination of QRA and FIREPRAN is required to justify provision of deluge, 

with procedures for regular testing to ensure continued effectiveness to be provided. 



6.3.5 Sprinklers 

Wet pipe frangible bulb sprinkler systems are required for Living Quarters, covering sleeping, office and service 

areas, with the design based on a recognised internationally accepted standard such as NFPA 13. Engineering of 

sprinkler systems should give high priority to avoiding leakage and false alarms. Exceptions to complete sprinkler 

coverage are permitted, for example electrical rooms and fryer facilities in kitchens, but there must be a robust 

demonstration that alternative fire safety measures provide an equivalent degree of safety. See also section 7.1. 

6,3,6 Foam systems 

Foam is to be provided for helidecks as well as for fighting of contained liquid pool fires on decks, in drip pans 

and in drains, on manned complexes. Where justified by the hazards and risks, a central foam injection unit 

should be provided for the main firewater supply. Where this is not justified, mobile (wheeled) foam units with 

scenario-specific reaches should be provided on manned facilities. 

Foam systems are not generally required for not-normally-manned and unmanned facilities, unless specific 

activities and hazards necessitate their (temporary) provision. 

Helidecks on manned installations should be provided with foam monitor systems. 

6.3.7 CO2, water mist & Halon systems 

Fixed CO2 systems are generally only required for special areas, e.g. vent (snuffing systems). Water mist systems 

are recommended for gas turbine enclosures (see section 7.5). 

6.4 Stand-by & Support Vessels 

6.4.1 Rescue / Stand-by Vessel 

A rescue / stand-by vessel (SBV) is required to:- 

• support man-over board rescue operations within a defined time scale. 

• support specific operations such as when working outside the platform railing. 

• facilitate / assist the evacuation of staff during emergencies 

In addition a stand-by vessel may be used to facilitate movement of staff within the field as long as rescue 

operations within the defined time scale can be maintained. 

6.4.2 FIFI1 Fire Fighting Vessel/Equipment 

Provision of dedicated fire fighting vessel / stand-by vessels with FIF1 fire fighting capability would be assessed 

on the basis of Cost Benefit Analysis or if other issues such as unacceptable IRPA, reputation or environmental 

risks dictate it. The response time for the vessel should be determined by the specific scenarios that are justifying 

its provision. 



7 PROTECTION OF S PECIFIC A REAS 

In general, fire protection should be provided in accordance with sections 5 and 6 above. This section covers 

some specific requirements for special areas of a facility. 

7.1 Living Quarters and Control Centres 

Accommodation areas should have an outer envelope that is appropriately protected against fire and smoke risks, 

based on technical assessments. 

Safety of life in fire situations should be based on the requirements of NFPA 101 “Life Safety Code” treating 

accommodation areas under the provisions for “Existing hotels and dormitories” and other areas under the 

provisions of “Industrial occupancies”. 

The ability of control centres (as defined in SOLAS) to continue in operation during foreseeable fires should be 

evaluated and appropriate measures taken for protection against fire spread, protection of safety critical systems 

and prevention of smoke ingress. 

As a general principle, Control Centres should be protected by A60 rated bulkheads, floors and ceilings as a 

minimum. Fire doors and fire-dampers are required to maintain the integrity of fire rated barriers, by protecting 

penetrations. All penetrations through enclosures rated ‘A0’, ‘A60’ or ‘H120’ should be suitably designed so as to 

fully maintain the fire-rating of the enclosure. As far as possible, any penetration through an ‘H120’ barrier should 

be avoided. Further guidance on fire-rating of enclosures for offshore living quarters is given in Section 13.3.6 of 

DEP 37.17.10.10-Gen: Design of Offshore Living Quarters. 

HVAC systems for accommodation areas and control centres should be protected by reliable means of smoke and 

gas detection at intakes, linked to shutdown dampers in intakes and exhausts and tripping of the Air Handling Unit 

(AHU). Further guidance on the design of HVAC systems for offshore living quarters is given in Section 3.3.10.2 

of DEP 37.10.10-Gen: Design of Offshore Living Quarters, and in Section 7.7 of DEP 37.17.10.11-Gen: Design of 

Offshore Temporary Refuges. 

Living quarters should be protected with an automatic sprinkler system covering sleeping, office and service areas, 

based on a recognised internationally accepted standard such as NFPA 13. Engineering of sprinkler systems 

should give high priority to avoiding leakage and false alarms. Exceptions to complete sprinkler coverage are 

permitted, for example electrical rooms and fryer facilities in kitchens, but there must be a robust demonstration 

that alternative fire safety measures provide an equivalent degree of safety. The kitchen cooker hood should have a 

fixed wet chemical or water mist system. 

Smoke detection should be provided in all areas of LQs and control centres except those where a high level of 

false alarms would result. 

Smoking should be prohibited except for in designated rooms. A dedicated electric cigarette lighter should be 

provided in the designated smoking room(s). 

Personal electrical equipment should be permitted subject to agreement of responsible supervisor. It should be 

certified and intrinsically safe if used in hazardous area. (Note that the voltage for offshore is 254V, 60Hz which is 

10% higher than mains supply onshore 220-240 V, 50Hz). 

Effective means for manual fire fighting should be provided, including hose reels and portable extinguishers. In 

selecting hand held extinguishers in LQ areas, consider Film Forming Foam Spray extinguishers which are 

efficient and minimise clean-up compared to dry chemical units. 

7.2 Muster areas 

Muster areas should be protected against gas, fire and smoke risks, based on technical assessments. 

The ability of muster areas to continue in operation for as long as is necessary to achieve safe evacuation of all 

non-essential personnel during foreseeable fires should be evaluated and appropriate measures taken for protection 

against fire spread, impingement of thermal radiation and prevention of smoke and gas ingress. 



7.3 Office and Utility Areas 

Effective fire detection (e.g. smoke detectors) should be provided in all areas, including office and storage areas. 

Further provision should be considered through analysing case by case. Sprinklers should be considered for areas 

where there is high combustible loading or recognised potential for difficulty in fighting the fire and achieving 

control of it, for example stores areas. 

7.4 Electrical Rooms 

Electrical rooms should be provided with smoke detection as a minimum. This should be of the optical type. 

Aspirating smoke detectors (HSSD) should be specified where electrical equipment under protection is critical for 

safety or production. This may include communication and computer rooms. 

• For HVAC without fresh air intake, fire and smoke detection shall trip the HVAC to avoid air circulation and 

to suffocate the fire. Alarm only to control room and no trip to switchgear. 

• For HVAC with fresh air intake, fire and smoke detection shall close fresh air intake, trip HVAC to suffocate 

the fire. Alarm only to control room and no trip to switchgear. 

• Gas detection shall trip switchgear but the detection signal must be voted to avoid nuisance tripping. 

• Where HSSD is installed, it shall give an early alarm only to the operator. 

Fixed fire fighting systems (clean agent or CO2) are not considered necessary in electrical rooms. However, 

electrical rooms are to be fitted with mandatory detection and it must be possible to de-energise electrical 

equipment in any electrical equipment room from outside the room. Where there is already provision for 

automatic isolation, fire and gas detection systems may be arranged to implement automatic isolation. Emergency 

response teams should include technical staff trained in safe isolation of electrical equipment. 

Fire extinguishing devices should include CO2 hand held extinguishers outside entrances to electrical rooms. 

Where there is a high concentration of electrical equipment, provide 45kg cylinders with hose to increase response 

capability, positioned outside the room. In large rooms, consider additional extinguishers within the room. 

Note that the use of halon is no longer acceptable for environmental reasons. 

7.5 Gas turbines 

Gas Turbine suppliers should be requested to standardise the detectors within enclosures with those used 

elsewhere on the platform where ambient conditions within the enclosure allow. 

Water mist systems are the preferred method of fixed fire protection for turbine enclosures. Fire and gas detection 

should be provided in accordance with gas turbine manufacturers standard. However as a minimum the following 

should be provided: 

• gas detection at combustion air intake. Voted gas should trip turbine but maintain enclosure purge fans. 

• gas detection at enclosure exhaust duct to detect internal leakages. Voted gas should trip turbine but maintain 

enclosure purge fans 

• flame detection in enclosure. Due to ambient temperature limitation of IR type flame detectors, UV detectors 

should be applied. Voted flame should trip turbine, trip enclosure fan, close dampers and activate the fire 

water mist system 

• heat detectors in enclosure (rate compensated type). Single heat detector should have the same executive 

actions as confirmed flame detection 

7.6 Helidecks 

The overall minimum requirement should be to comply with CAP 437. 

(http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/Cap437.pdf) 

Helidecks on manned complexes should be equipped with a foam system consisting of a foam-mixing unit (AFFF 

system), distribution system and two low profile, oscillating fixed monitor nozzles located either side of the 

helideck. For calculation of the required capacity of each monitor, reference is made to BSP-12-Standard-201. A 

foam concentrate package, comprising tank and pump is dedicated to each monitor. The foam concentrate tank 



should be sized for a minimum of 10 minutes of foam consumption based upon the calculated foam monitors 

consumption rate and the foam solution selected (1% solution recommended i.e. to ensure quick knockout effect). 

The foam concentrate pump should be a rotary gear pump capable of injecting the required concentrate quantities 

up to full flow rate at the operating pressure of the main fire pump. The motor driver for the foam concentrate 

pumps should be a "pelton-wheel style" water driven motor. The water to drive the motor should be taken from 

the firewater header on the "dry side" of the monitor isolation valve. 

Foam monitors shall be positioned on opposite side of the helideck so that all areas of the helideck may be reached 

in all anticipated wind directions. It may be appropriate to install an unattended and remotely operated oscillating 

foam monitor on an outboard section of a helideck where no foam monitor platform is available. 

All foam concentrate procurement should be subjected to witnessed CAP 168 Level B fire test. 

(http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP168.pdf) 

Wherever possible fluorine free concentrates should be used for new platforms in order to minimise potential 

environmental effects of concentrate discharge. 

In addition to the two foam monitors, hand controlled hose line(s) capable of applying water in a jet/ spray pattern 

at a minimum of 250 litres/min for cooling, or specific fire fighting tactics should be provided. Not all fires are 

capable of being accessed by monitors or on some occasions the use of monitors alone may endanger passengers. 

Therefore, hand controlled hose line(s) for the application of foam should also be provided. Reserve stocks of 

foam concentrate must be held on the installation to allow for replenishment as a result of activation of the system 

during an incident or following training or testing. Most new facilities offshore now prefer to provide 3 foam 

monitors not 2 in order to allow for all wind conditions. 

Hand held extinguishers are also required, adjacent to the access / exit points viz.: 

a) 2 or more Carbon Dioxide (CO2) extinguishers of a total capacity of not less than 22.5 g (50 lbs) with 

extension applicators capable of reaching the S61N engine fire fighting points. 

b) 2 or more Dry Powder extinguishers with a total capacity of not less than 45 kg (100 bs). An additional dry 

powder extinguisher provided at each helideck access point should be a lightweight 9kg unit for taking 

inside the helicopter to assist with evacuation from the helicopter 

Two sets of fireman’s equipment (see section 0) should be kept in a place which is readily accessible from the 

helideck. 

Sufficient personnel to operate the helideck fire fighting equipment effectively should be dressed in protective 

clothing prior to helicopter movements taking place. The normal minimum manning standard for manned 

helidecksis one HLO and 2 Helideck Assistants with appropriate training (see 7.7). 

7.7 Fire Systems Integrity Assurance 

All active and passive fire systems should be subjected to a formal inspection, testing and maintenance 

system to assure their ongoing performance. Reference is made to the Fire System Maintenance 

Standard BSP 72 s 011 & 012” 



8 EMERGENCY R ESPONSE 

8.1 Emergency Response Plan 

All facilities should be covered by an emergency response plan that should take account of the following: 

� Fire Fighting Equipment 

� Fire fighting and Rescue responsibilities 

� Command and Control responsibilities 

8.2 Fire fighting equipment 

Fire fighting equipment should be provided in accordance with this philosophy. Location plans for fire fighting 

equipment should be displayed at all deck access points and copies included in the emergency response plans. 

8.3 Fire fighting and Rescue 

Protection of life should be the overriding primary objective in all circumstances. No attempt to manually fight a 

fire should be made if this involves exposing fire fighting personnel to the risk of fire escalation: in particular, the 

fire host platform process system should be shut down and any fire-impinged process inventories should be 

depressurised before fire fighting personnel go onboard. 

For rescue operations conflicts may arise between preservation of the rescuers’ lives and preservation of the 

trapped/injured personnel lives. In such circumstances, extremely hard decisions may be necessary. All such 

decisions are the responsibility of the On-Scene Commander, who must decide whether and when the rescue 

attempt should go ahead. Inputs to this decision should include: 

• Knowledge about the numbers and condition of trapped / injured personnel 

• Generic knowledge of fire characteristics, thermal radiation levels and effects, smoke exposure effects 

• Understanding of fire escalation particularly with respect to time elapsed 

• Knowledge about the fire and the status of engulfed or impinged targets (elapsed time of engulfment, 

inventory sizes, shut-in, depressurised, criticality of structures) 

• Knowledge about the security of firewater supply if this is required for the rescue operation 

• Alternative rescue approaches or methods 

8.4 Command and Control 

A qualified On-Scene Commander (OSC) should be available at all facilities whenever personnel are present and 

production is on-going. 

OSC training should include the major fire and explosion scenarios for the facilities and activities covered. 

Scenario data should be drawn from the following sources in order of preference: 

a) The facility QRA 

b) The facility F(E)RA or FIREPRAN 

c) The facility HAZID 



9 INFORMATION F EEDBACK 

A BSP Incident Investigation Team would review all fire and explosion incidents. The incident review would be 

conducted in accordance with BSP HSE modules 30 & 31 and would include the use of TRIPOD beta 

methodology. A full incident report would be prepared including the following information:- 

� TRIPOD beta (ref. EP 95-0321) 

� Accuracy of Hazard register / HAZID / FIREPRAN / QRA scenarios 

� Learning points 

� Inputs to HSE Case and QRA 

The information from all such reports should be considered during the next revision of this Fire Protection 

Philosophy document. 



APPENDICES 


Appendix 2: Fire Types 

Appendix 3: Fire Scenarios and corresponding mitigation measures 




Term Definition 

AFP Active Fire Protection – i.e. fire protection systems that take action, e.g. water 

deluge 

AHU Air Handling Unit 

AIMS Asset Integrity Management System 

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable - a term applied to risk levels which are 

between intolerable and negligible, when all risk reduction options have been 

investigated and implemented if practical 

Anomaly Corrosion or erosion defect discovered on process piping or process vessel. 

Anomalies are classified according to their severity. Classifications include 

“Red”, “Orange-tolerable” and “Orange-potential”. Refer also to “PAR” & “PA” 

definition 

AVA Audio Visual Alarm 

Barrier Any physical means of preventing an uncontrolled hydrocarbon release 

BOP Blow Out Preventer 

BSP Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad 

CAPEX Capital Expenditure (i.e. the net capital outlay to provide a system or service, 

excluding on-going operating & maintenance costs – see OPEX) 

CAS Competency Assessment Standard 

CBA Cost Benefit Analysis (i.e. formal comparison of benefits against costs for an 

upgrade measure) 

CCTV Closed Circuit Television 

CO2 Carbon dioxide 

Concurrent activities Two or more separate activities on a single facility simultaneously 

CPEMA Concurrent Production and Engineering Maintenance Activities 

CPPA Concurrent Production and Painting Activities 

CPRA Concurrent Production and Rig Activities 

DCS Digital Distributed Control System 

DEP Design Engineering Practice 

Drilling Rig Jack Up / Semi-Submersible / Tender Drilling Vessel or Drilling Barge 

ECOCALC Economic calculation spreadsheet program developed in Microsoft Excel by 

BSP’s TAE department 

EP 95-0000 Shell International Exploration and Production Health, Safety and Environment 

Manual 

ERO Emergency Response Organisation 

Escalation Growth of a fire to encompass multiple fuel sources and/or collapse of primary 

structures. In QRA terminology, escalation refers specifically to growth of a fire 

to encompass and substantially destroy the entire host module or platform. 

ESD Emergency Shut Down 

ETC Emergency Team Co-ordinator 

FGS Fire, Gas & Smoke (Detection system) 

F(E)RA Fire & Explosion Risk Analysis 

FIREPRAN Fire Protection Analysis using a structured group assessment (ref. FIREPRAN 

doc. 1388-R-803 rev. 1 (March 2000). 

FIFI Fire Fighting Classification 

GA General Alarm 

HAC Hazardous Area Classification drawings showing the classification for each 

area of a platform 

HAZID Hazard Identification exercise using brainstorming approach defined in 

EP95-0312 

Heavy lift The lifting of any object, which if dropped, would exceed the strength of any 

impact protection provided and severely damage process equipment (lift > 5 

tons). 

HEMP Hazard and Effects Management Process 

HSE-MS Health, Safety, Environment – Management System 



HSSD High Sensitivity Smoke Detector 

HVAC Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning system 

ICAF Incremental Cost to Avoid a Fatality (i.e. the pro-rata NPV cost to reduce PLL 

by 1) 

IR Infra Red 

IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum 

LFL Lower Flammable Limit 

LOS Line Of Sight 

LQ Living Quarters 

Manned Complex Complexes with living quarters e.g. AMPA-6, AMPA-9, Fairley-4, Champion-7 

MCP Manual Call Point (Kill knobs) 

MOPO Manual of Permitted Operations 

NFPA National Fire Protection Association 

Not-normally manned 

facility 

Platforms or complexes which are operated by day visitors only e.g. AMDP- 

15/24 

OPEX Operating Expenditure (i.e. the cost of maintaining a system in functional order, 

expressed on an annual basis) 

OPITO Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (UK standards) 

PA Public Address (system) 

PAPA Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm 

PAR Piping Anomaly Report. In common usage this term is interchangeable with the 

term “anomaly” 

PFP Passive Fire Protection (i.e. a fire protection measure that takes no action but 

protects by virtue of its presence) 

PLL Potential Loss of Life (normally quoted per annum) 

POB Personnel On Board i.e. the number of people on a platform or complex 

Potential impact area The area of the platform that would be damaged by a dropped object 

Production The controlled flow and processing of oil, gas and condensate from one or 

more wells. This includes production crossing the platform from another 

location 

PTW Permit To Work 

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 

TA Tolerable Anomaly 

Underrated flow line A flow line with a maximum design pressure that is less than the theoretical 

maximum closed in tubing head pressure connected to it 

Unmanned facility Platforms or complexes which do not require operators to be present every day 

e.g. CPDP-10 

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply 



Appendix 2: Type of Fires – (reference is made to EP95-0314). 

9.1 Gas Jet Fires 

Gas jet fires can be up to more than 100m in length, depending on the gas release rate, pressure and hole size. as 

the source blows down, the flame would reduce in length and move back towards the source. 

Hydrocarbon gas jet fires produce extremely high levels of thermal radiation that are lethal to anyone caught in the 

immediate vicinity and cause heating of adjacent structures (rapid if of impinging). They are one of the most 

difficult types of fire to combat: surface heat flux is extremely high and the momentum of the jet flame tends to 

displace water deluge and prevent effective cooling, whilst extinguishing them altogether is often undesirable as 

the unignited gas may then form an explosive cloud and or migrate in an uncontrolled manner to other areas of the 

facility. The most effective means of protection are therefore rapid source depressurisation and/or intumescent 

PFP on all vulnerable structural and process targets. And cooling Neither of these measures would protect 

personnel against the immediate effects of thermal radiation from a gas jet fire. 

Source blow-down designed to API 521 standard may not prevent a jet fire from escalating. If the fire impinges on 

critical process or structural targets, escalation can be expected within 10 to 15minutes. Given isolation of the gas 

source, a gas jet fire can be expected to decay in size exponentially as a function of mass release rate over 

inventory size; that is to say, the fire may go on for a long time even with ESD and blowdown! 

An example gas jet fire is depicted in Figure 9.1 below: 

Figure 9.1: Gas Jet Fire 



9.2 2-Phase Jet Fires 

Volatile (flashing) liquids and 2-phase streams (e.g. well fluids) 

Two-phase jet fires are momentum-driven hydrocarbon fluid fires from a pressurised source of Volatile (flashing, 

e.g. CHPS) liquids or 2-phase streams (e.g. well fluids). The volatile liquid flashes into a gas phase upon release 

or is carried as droplets in the vapour stream until heated and the resulting vapour adds to the jet fire size. They 

can be over 100m in length, depending on the release rate, flash-fraction, pressure and hole size. 

Two-phase hydrocarbon jet fires produce very high levels of thermal radiation that are lethal to anyone caught in 

the immediate vicinity and cause rapid heating of adjacent of impinged structures, and large volumes of 

suffocating smoke. Like gas jet fires, they are very difficult to combat: surface heat flux is high and the 

momentum of the jet flame may displace water deluge and prevent effective cooling, whilst extinguishing them 

altogether is often undesirable as the unignited vapour may then form an explosive cloud and or migrate in an 

uncontrolled manner to other areas of the facility. Also, higher flash point liquids may fall out of the jet to form 

burning liquid pools on the surface below. The most effective means of protection are therefore rapid source 

depressurisation and/or intumescent PFP on all vulnerable structural and process targets. Neither of these 

measures would protect personnel against the immediate effects of thermal radiation and smoke from a 2-phase jet 

fire. 

Source blow-down designed to API 521 standard would not prevent a jet fire from escalating. If the fire impinges 

on critical process or structural targets, escalation can be expected within 10 to 15 minutes. Given isolation of the 

fluid source, a 2-phase jet fire can be expected to decay in size exponentially as a function of mass release rate 

over inventory size; that is to say, the fire may go on for a long time even with ESD and blowdown! 

An example 2-phase jet fire is depicted in Figure 9.2 below: 

Figure 9.2: 2-Phase Jet Fire 



9.3 Blowouts 

Ignited blowouts are basically the same as jet fires (normally multi-phase) but without the option of ESD, as the 

fluids are emanating from a well where control has been lost. The jet would normally be obstructed resulting in 

loss of momentum and lateral fire spread, at least until collapse of impinged surface structures. Blowouts are 

normally associated with drilling activities, but are also possible during wirelining and other well intervention 

activities and even during normal production due to spurious failures of containment systems. 

Blowouts only occur on or below Drilling Platforms (DP’s) and Well Jackets (WJ’s). Without specialist 

intervention, their duration is only limited by natural plugging or bridging of the well – ESD and blowdown are 

not an option for blowouts. 

Ignited blowouts produce very high levels of thermal radiation that are lethal to anyone caught in the immediate 

vicinity and cause rapid heating of adjacent of impinged structures, and large volumes of suffocating smoke. Like 

process jet fires, they are very difficult to combat: surface heat flux is high and the momentum of the flame may 

displace water deluge and prevent effective cooling, whilst extinguishing them altogether may lead to undesirable 

explosion risks. Also, higher flash point liquids may fall out of the flame to form burning liquid pools on the 

surface below. Fire rated walls and/or intumescent PFP on all vulnerable structural and process targets are the 

only available fire protection means for ignited blowouts. 

If the ignited blowout impinges on critical process or structural targets, escalation can be expected within 10 to 15 

minutes. 

An example ignited Blowout is depicted in Figure 9.3 below: 

Fig. 9.3 Simulated blowout on offshore platform 



Pool Fires 

A pool fire occurs when a pool of flammable is ignited. The liquid can be from a process source (e.g. crude oil in 

a process line) or a non-process/utility source (e.g. fuel oils, lube oils, flammable chemicals like inhibitor). The 

latter fluids are difficult to ignite as pools without a significant heat source already being present. The pool may 

be on a deck, in a drip pan or drain, or on the sea. 

Pool fires tend to radiate less heat, and produce more smoke, than jet fires. In still air, the flame of a pool fire is 

vertical and most of the heat goes up, but in wind the flame tilts and more heat is radiated sideways. If not limited 

by physical containment, a pool fire would tend to grow in size until the rate of burning equals the rate of fuel 

release into the pool less the rate of draining. The rate of burning, and the flame height are dependent on the liquid 

properties and the size of the pool. 

Pool fires are most readily extinguished by application of foam if the pool is contained. Foam is less effective if 

the pool fire is on the open sea – in this case use of water jets to break up the hydrocarbon film is more effective. 

If the fire impinges on critical process or structural targets, escalation can be expected within 10 to 20 minutes. 

The term ‘pool fire’ may also be used to refer to the ignited ‘pool’ of bubbling gas that can occur on the sea 

surface in the event of a sub-sea gas release. 

A typical pool fire on the deck of an offshore platform is depicted in Figure 9.4 below. 

Figure 9.4: deck pool fire 



9.4 Spray fires 

A spray fire is formed from a pinhole leak in a high pressure non-volatile liquid hydrocarbon system, such as the 

lube-oil or seal-oil system of a gas turbine. The spray of lube oil or seal oil is readily ignited (unlike a pool these 

oils), and burns like a smoky two phase jet fire. ESD is effective in stopping the spray fire unless a pressure 

accumulator is in use. Unlike gas and true 2-phase jet fires, extinguishing a spray fire is normally desirable even if 

the leak is on-going. Spray fires in enclosed spaces can be extinguished by water mist or CO2 systems. Spray 

fires in open areas are best dealt with by shut-down of the pressure source (usually the oil pump). 

A pool fire resulting from liquid drop-out would often accompany a spray fire. 

Figure 9.5 below depicts a typical spray fire. 

Figure 9.5 : Typical lube oil spray fire 



9.5 Compartment fires 

Compartment fires are fires inside enclosed spaces. Normally the term is restricted to class A fires such as the 

bedding and furniture in a living quarters cabin burning. After the fire has started, its growth depends on the ease 

with which further combustible material is ignited. The longer a compartment fire burns, the higher the 

temperature that is attained, until the fire becomes oxygen-limited or a ‘flashover’ occurs. 

Prior to flashover, large temperature differentials would exist from floor to ceiling as the hot gases and smoke 

from the compartment fire accumulate in a hot layer immediately below the ceiling. 

A flashover is the point where the fire is no longer localised, but is spread throughout the whole compartment. 

There is a sudden propagation of flame through the unburned gas below the ceiling and all the combustible 

surfaces become involved in the fire. At this point, the rate limiting feature is no longer the amount of fuel in the 

compartment, but the air supply. An oxygen-limited compartment fire may not flash-over until a new source of air 

becomes available, such as an external door to the compartment being opened. 

Compartment fires can be fought by application of an appropriate extinguishing medium to the fire source, 

providing that safe access to the fire is possible. Otherwise air supply starvation is effective providing that the 

compartment is kept sealed until the entire contents have cooled down. 

Figure 9.6 below shows an experimental compartment fire. 

Figure 9.6 : Experimental compartment Fire 



8.6 Helideck Fires 

A fire caused either by a helicopter having a leakage of aviation fuel or a leakage of oil or hydraulic fluid 

which makes contact with a hot point causing flash point to be reached. This may occur during a heavy 

landing or crash scenario. Helicopter structures often include magnesium alloys, which once ignited are 

extremely difficult to extinguish. Once this point is reached total burn-out of the airframe can occur in 

just a few minutes. Consequential loss of burning aviation fuel may spill over the helideck and 

superstructure below the helideck. Foam suppression must immediately be applied to effect rescue of 

passengers and crew and to prevent escalation to surrounding areas. 



Appendix 3: Fire Scenarios and corresponding mitigation measures 

Scenario Preferred Mitigation means and comments 

Process gas jet fire High thermal radiation, high risk of escalation; do not approach 

fire: use ESD and rapid depressurisation (blowdown) of source and 

adjacent/impinged process inventories. Remote water spray, if 

available may be used for cooling escalation targets or shielding escape 

routes. PFP on targets can prevent escalation. Beware that 

extinguishing the fire without stopping the gas leak may result in 

uncontrolled explosion risk. 

Process 2-phase jet fire High thermal radiation, intoxicating smoke, high risk of escalation; 

do not approach fire: use ESD and rapid depressurisation (blowdown) 

of source and adjacent/impinged process inventories. Remote water 

spray, if available may be used for cooling escalation targets or 

shielding escape routes. PFP on targets can prevent escalation. Foam 

may be required to extinguish pool fires associated with liquid drop-out. 

Beware that extinguishing the fire without stopping the gas leak may 

result in uncontrolled explosion risk. 

Liquid HC pool fire on deck or in drip pan Intoxicating smoke, rapid heating of anything above fire. Mitigate 

via ESD & blowdown, drains, use of mobile foam units. 

Liquid HC pool fire on sea Intoxicating smoke, rapid heating of anything above fire, risk of 

rapid drift or spread to sensitive areas (e.g. muster area). Mitigate 

via ESD & blowdown, sbv (or other vessel) water monitors, use of 

remote foam monitors if available. 

Gas / vapour cloud flash fire Short duration hot blinding flash. The only effective way of avoiding 

injury is not to enter the gas cloud – stay upwind, use gas 

detection to monitor cloud extent etc. 

Gas / vapour cloud explosion Short duration high momentum, high overpressure hot blinding 

flash: no effective means of mitigation other than avoidance by facility 

design including incorporation of blast panels in enclosed modules . 

Beware of ensuing jet fire (see above). 

Ignited Blowout High thermal radiation, intoxicating smoke, high risk of escalation, 

no ESD possible; do not approach fire, evacuate. Remote water 

spray, if available may be used for cooling escalation targets or 

shielding escape routes. Foam may be required to extinguish pool fires 

associated with liquid drop-out. Beware that extinguishing the fire 

without stopping the gas leak may result in uncontrolled explosion risk. 

Blowout may self-seal / bridge-over, else specialist services needed 

(use of explosive is generally required to extinguish the fire). 

Helideck fire Typically a running heli fuel pool fire - Intoxicating smoke, rapid 

heating of anything in the fire, possible escalation to 

Aluminium/Magnesium (alloy) helicopter body parts. Use of helideck 

(foam) units for main liquid fire, CO 2 for engine fires, special dry powder 

for metal fires. 

Diesel fuel fires Spray fires with similar characteristics to two-phase jet fires are possible 

from pressurised systems. Pool fires are possible due to liquid dropout. 

Intoxicating smoke, rapid heating of anything in the fire. Use 

fuel supply cut-off, mobile foam units and remote water spray cooling of 

escalation targets. 

Lube oil fire (external) Spray fires with similar characteristics to two-phase jet fires are possible 

from pressurised systems. Intoxicating smoke, rapid heating of 

anything in the fire. Pool fires are unlikely due to high flash point. 

Use ESD and remote water spray cooling of escalation targets. 

Turbine enclosure fire Lube or seal oil fire or (less likely) gas jet fire within the enclosure. 

Water mist systems are BSP’s preferred means of mitigation. 

Vent fires Thermal radiation risk. Use CO 2 snuffing system 



Office / Cabin fire Intoxicating smoke & flash-over risks. HVAC shut-down, water 

sprinklers, firewater hoses and manual (light water and dry powder) 

extinguishers may be used. Early detection is essential. 

Control room fire Use portable CO2 extinguishers and/or dry chemical to extinguish fire. 

Kitchen / Galley fire Fat/grease and oil fires producing intoxicating smoke. Fire blankets and 

CO2 fixed and portable extinguishers should be employed. 

External class A fire Wood (scaffold planks), Oily rags etc. Dry powder hand held 

extinguishers and firewater hoses may be used. 

Chemical fire Treat in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations 

Electrical room fire Isolate electric supply to remove heat source and to avoid further short 

circuits / electrocution of personnel. Use portable CO2 extinguishers to 

extinguish fire. 

Workshop fire Intoxicating smoke & flash-over risks. HVAC shut-down, water 

sprinklers, firewater hoses and manual (light water and dry powder) 

extinguishers may be used. 

Battery rooms fire Treat same as electrical room fire 

Cable fires in concealed or hard to access Electrical isolation and use of long-nozzle CO2 extinguishers 

areas

fire hazard management guideline - Brunei Shell Petroleum ...

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