History Part 1 - 70th Infantry Division Association

2. Special Situation:
a. 101st Cay Gp, Mecz, reinforced,
oocupied defensive positions along the
line EMMERSWEILLER WADGASSEN,
GERMANY, both exclusive, and was
prepared to attack to the north on Corps
order to clear all enemy south and southwest
of the SAAR RIVER in zone.
b. Plans previously prepared by Hq
101st Cay Gp assigned Hill 283 and the
towns of GEISLAUTERN and WEHRDEN
to the 101st Cay Ren Sq Mecz, LtCol Milton
Kendall, commanding, as objectives.
SCHAFFHAUSEN and HOSTENBACH
were the assigned objectives of the 116 th
Cay Ren Sq Mecz, Lt Col Hubert C.
Leonard, commanding.
c. (1) Hill283 was the dominating terrain
feature in the Group zone. This hill
was protected by elaborate defensive
works and dense AT and AP mine fields.
Entry into, or possession of, WEHRDEN
was impracticable while Hill283 remained
in enemy hands. The approaches to
GEISLAUTERN lent themselves to effective
defense in depth from strong points
located in the houses lining both sides of
the single street.
(2) The approach to the town of
SCHAFFHAUSEN necessitated movement
either 'by a single road or across gently
sloping terrain, both of which were
totally devoid of cover or concealment
for a distance of more than 1000 meters.
Hill283 also dominated all approaches to
that town from the south and east. Enemy
defenses consisted of entrenchments, foxholes,
strong points located in houses on
the southern fringe of town, and several
broad belts of AT and AP mines. The
town of HOSTENBACH was dominated
by elaborate defensive works on the high
ground north of the SAAR RIVER.
d. Information previously obtained
from reliable sources, and repeatedly
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confirmed by PWs, indicated that the
towns of GEISLAUTERN and WEHRDEN
were garrisoned by the 2ndBn, 861 Volksgrenadier
Regiment and that the Ist Bn,
861 Volksgrenadier Regiment, occupied
the towns of SCHAFFHAUSEN and HO­
STENBACH. The total enemy strength in
the Group zone was estimated at 800 men,
supported by the defensive works on the
north bank of the SAAR RIVER.
c. Information obtained from PWs in
the late afternoon, 13 March 1945, indicated
that the enemy in the 101st Cay Gp
zone planned to assemble that night and
withdraw to the north bank of the SAAR
RIVER.
3. Narrative:
a. At1800A, 13 March 1945, C. O. 101st
Cay Gp Mecz, directed the 101st Cay Ren
Sq to dispatch a strong combat patrol to
Hill 283 and another north along the
LUDWEILER- GEISLAUTERN road with
the mission of gaining and maintaining
contact with the enemy. At the same date
and hour, the 116th Cay Ren Sq was
directed to send a similar patrol to the
town of SCHAFFHAUSEN to determine
strength, composition, and dispositions of
enemy forces. Both Squadrons were alerted
for an early attack.
b. (1) At 2045A, one platoon Tr A,
101st Cay Ren Sq, 1 squad Co C, 290th
Engr (C) Bn atchd, Ist LtRobert Ulmschneider,
commanding, proceeded through
the enemy mine fields and defensive
works and reached Hill 283 (the patrol
objective) undetected, and there held its
position for the remainder of the night.
The balance of the troop attempted to
follow,but was repulsed by strong enemy
resistance. The troop commander, Captain
Ralph Ritchie, was wounded but refused
evacuation. LtUlmschneider directed artillery
fire during the night on enemy
defensive positions vicinity of Hill 283
causing numerous enemy casualties.