white_paper_on_data_protection_in_india_171127_final_v2

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protecting the privacy of EU residents against cross border action. 185 The exact extent of the new rules of jurisdiction under the EU GDPR are not yet clear, particularly the clause on tracking the behaviour of EU residents. For instance, use of persistent cookies or IP address logs (along with some other data) could result in the monitoring of online behaviour of residents. 186 The territorial principle in clause (1), on its own, has a significantly wide reach. In the case of Google Spain, 187 the argument that processing of data by Google Inc (based in the US) for operating Google Search was not subject to EU law was rejected by the European Court of Justice. The Court held that this processing was in the context of the activities of Google Spain, an establishment in the EU despite the fact that it was only operating in the area of advertising. Australia Australia adopts a different approach by prescribing two tests to determine whether the Privacy Act applies to an organisation. 188 First, the Privacy Act applies to all Australian organisations, such as companies or trusts incorporated in Australia irrespective of where personal data is collected by such organisations. Second, in respect of organisations and operators not constituted in Australia, they are subject to the jurisdiction of Australian courts if they have an Australian link. An organisation has an Australian link if it carries on business in Australia and the personal data has been collected or held in Australia. The phrase ―carries on business in Australia‖ has not been defined and the Office of the Australian Information Commission (OAIC) has suggested that the application of the Act is to be guided by judicial interpretation in this regard. 189 Consistent and regular activity in Australia with the aim of profit has been held to be carrying on business in Australia. 190 Singapore The data protection legislation of Singapore (the Singapore Personal Data Protection Act, 2012 or the Singapore Act) does not explicitly set out its territorial jurisdiction. However, the Singapore Act includes any individual, company, association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, whether or not, formed or recognised under the law of Singapore, and whether or not resident, or having an office or a place of business, in Singapore within the 185 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, ‗Extraterritoriality in the context of Data Privacy Regulation‘, 7(1) Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 87 (2012). 186 ‗New Rules, Wider Reach: The Extraterritorial Scope of the GDPR‘, Slaughter and May (June 2016), available at: https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2535540/new-rules-wider-reach-the-extraterritorialscope-of-the-gdpr.pdf, (last accessed 31 October 2017). 187 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, Case C131/12, (2014), European Court of Justice. 188 Section 5 B, Privacy Act. 189 OAIC, ‗APP Guidelines- Key Concepts‘ (March 2015), available at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-andorganisations/app-guidelines/chapter-b-key-concepts#australian-link, (last accessed 1 November 2017). 190 OAIC, ‗APP Guidelines- Key Concepts‘ (March 2015), available at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-andorganisations/app-guidelines/chapter-b-key-concepts#australian-link, (last accessed 1 November 2017). 26

ambit of the term organisation. 191 This may well be construed to be an indirect claim of jurisdiction over foreign entities as well. South Africa The Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 (POPI Act) of South Africa applies to processing of personal information by parties domiciled in South Africa or where parties not domiciled in South Africa, use automated or non-automated means within the territory of South Africa. 192 Canada The experience of Canada in applying the PIPEDA is also instructive. Section 4 of the PIPEDA is silent on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Canadian courts have interpreted this silence to mean that there is no bar on applying the PIPEDA to foreign entities in all circumstances where there is a real and substantial link to Canada. 193 From these practices it is clear that in area of data protection, claims of jurisdiction under the exceptions to the territoriality norm, such as passive personality are commonly found in statutes. Vulnerability to harm arising from action which may not be strictly within territorial jurisdiction is perhaps the reason why most jurisdictions have clauses which permit such extraterritorial jurisdiction or jurisdiction over foreign entities as the case may be. 1.4. Enforceability of provisions of laws Prescribing provisions that depart from ordinary principles of territoriality may not by themselves be sufficient to ensure that the interests of a State in protecting the personal data of its residents are secured. In several cases, foreign entities have expressed reluctance to comply with orders of courts or directions of governments to comply with local laws. A common plea in such cases is that it is only the local arm (of a multinational corporation) that is answerable to the concerned jurisdiction. The primary method of enforcing jurisdictional claims against foreign entities remains the cumbersome processes of letters rogatory or through Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. 194 There are suggestions that restricting access to markets may be a method of dealing with such issues. 195 For instance, a Brazilian Court in 2013 ordered that all Facebook IP domains be blocked for failure to remove offending content on the ground that it was the responsibility of entities incorporated in other jurisdictions. 196 A more acceptable approach may perhaps be to adopt penalties of the nature 191 Section 2, Singapore Act. 192 Section 3, POPI Act. 193 A.T. v. Globe24h.com 2017, FC 114 (CanLII), available at: https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2017/2017fc114/2017fc114.html, (last accessed 2 November 2017). 194 Andrew Keane Woods, ‗Against Data Exceptionalism‘, 68(4) Stanford Law Review 729, 748 (April 2016). 195 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, ‗Extraterritoriality in the context of Data Privacy Regulation‘, 7(1) Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 87,138 (2012). 196 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, ‗Extraterritoriality in the context of Data Privacy Regulation‘, 7(1) Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 87,138 (2012). 27

protect<strong>in</strong>g the privacy of EU residents aga<strong>in</strong>st cross border acti<strong>on</strong>. 185 The exact extent of the<br />

new rules of jurisdicti<strong>on</strong> under the EU GDPR are not yet clear, particularly the clause <strong>on</strong><br />

track<strong>in</strong>g the behaviour of EU residents. For <strong>in</strong>stance, use of persistent cookies or IP address<br />

logs (al<strong>on</strong>g with some other <strong>data</strong>) could result <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>on</strong>itor<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>on</strong>l<strong>in</strong>e behaviour of<br />

residents. 186<br />

The territorial pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> clause (1), <strong>on</strong> its own, has a significantly wide reach. In the case of<br />

Google Spa<strong>in</strong>, 187 the argument that process<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>data</strong> by Google Inc (based <strong>in</strong> the US) for<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g Google Search was not subject to EU law was rejected by the European Court of<br />

Justice. The Court held that this process<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>text of the activities of Google<br />

Spa<strong>in</strong>, an establishment <strong>in</strong> the EU despite the fact that it was <strong>on</strong>ly operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the area of<br />

advertis<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Australia<br />

Australia adopts a different approach by prescrib<strong>in</strong>g two tests to determ<strong>in</strong>e whether the<br />

Privacy Act applies to an organisati<strong>on</strong>. 188 First, the Privacy Act applies to all Australian<br />

organisati<strong>on</strong>s, such as companies or trusts <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> Australia irrespective of where<br />

pers<strong>on</strong>al <strong>data</strong> is collected by such organisati<strong>on</strong>s. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> respect of organisati<strong>on</strong>s and<br />

operators not c<strong>on</strong>stituted <strong>in</strong> Australia, they are subject to the jurisdicti<strong>on</strong> of Australian courts<br />

if they have an Australian l<strong>in</strong>k. An organisati<strong>on</strong> has an Australian l<strong>in</strong>k if it carries <strong>on</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />

<strong>in</strong> Australia and the pers<strong>on</strong>al <strong>data</strong> has been collected or held <strong>in</strong> Australia. The phrase ―carries<br />

<strong>on</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> Australia‖ has not been def<strong>in</strong>ed and the Office of the Australian Informati<strong>on</strong><br />

Commissi<strong>on</strong> (OAIC) has suggested that the applicati<strong>on</strong> of the Act is to be guided by judicial<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpretati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> this regard. 189 C<strong>on</strong>sistent and regular activity <strong>in</strong> Australia with the aim of<br />

profit has been held to be carry<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> Australia. 190<br />

S<strong>in</strong>gapore<br />

The <strong>data</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> legislati<strong>on</strong> of S<strong>in</strong>gapore (the S<strong>in</strong>gapore Pers<strong>on</strong>al Data Protecti<strong>on</strong> Act,<br />

2012 or the S<strong>in</strong>gapore Act) does not explicitly set out its territorial jurisdicti<strong>on</strong>. However, the<br />

S<strong>in</strong>gapore Act <strong>in</strong>cludes any <strong>in</strong>dividual, company, associati<strong>on</strong> or body of pers<strong>on</strong>s, corporate or<br />

un<strong>in</strong>corporated, whether or not, formed or recognised under the law of S<strong>in</strong>gapore, and<br />

whether or not resident, or hav<strong>in</strong>g an office or a place of bus<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore with<strong>in</strong> the<br />

185 Dan Jerker B. Svantess<strong>on</strong>, ‗Extraterritoriality <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>text of Data Privacy Regulati<strong>on</strong>‘, 7(1) Masaryk<br />

University Journal of Law and Technology 87 (2012).<br />

186 ‗New Rules, Wider Reach: The Extraterritorial Scope of the GDPR‘, Slaughter and May (June 2016),<br />

available at: https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2535540/new-rules-wider-reach-the-extraterritorialscope-of-the-gdpr.pdf,<br />

(last accessed 31 October 2017).<br />

187 Google Spa<strong>in</strong> SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja<br />

G<strong>on</strong>zález, Case C131/12, (2014), European Court of Justice.<br />

188 Secti<strong>on</strong> 5 B, Privacy Act.<br />

189 OAIC, ‗APP Guidel<strong>in</strong>es- Key C<strong>on</strong>cepts‘ (March 2015), available at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-andorganisati<strong>on</strong>s/app-guidel<strong>in</strong>es/chapter-b-key-c<strong>on</strong>cepts#australian-l<strong>in</strong>k,<br />

(last accessed 1 November 2017).<br />

190 OAIC, ‗APP Guidel<strong>in</strong>es- Key C<strong>on</strong>cepts‘ (March 2015), available at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-andorganisati<strong>on</strong>s/app-guidel<strong>in</strong>es/chapter-b-key-c<strong>on</strong>cepts#australian-l<strong>in</strong>k,<br />

(last accessed 1 November 2017).<br />

26

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