Fall 2017 JPI

with Rouhani’s agenda.
Last, although a repeated prisoner’s dilemma model would yield similar cooperation, the focus
on power in that model is still insufficient to tactically explain the negotiation process that occurred
between the P5+1 and Iran. This because the bilateral economic interests would create an N-player
breakdown that complicates the model’s parameters. 14 The increase in players and their variation in
interests creates a prisoner’s dilemma that would suggest cooperation to be less likely than what
occurred. It would acknowledge the power of cooperation itself in a strategic sense but fail to supply
accurate reasoning tactically. Therefore, the tactics of negotiation must be observed in the two-level
game sense that balance the domestic and international needs that a negotiator must satisfy during
their rounds of talks. 15
A narrative shift and change in ordinal preferences of interest altered a previously positional
structure between the P5+1 and Iran into negotiations where each side could attain interests of mutual
international benefit. Positional power structure would fail to observe such a change because of how
it frames the scenario into a nuclear power versus non-nuclear power, omitting Germany’s alignment
with the P5. This would suggest no negotiations would occur, because the capabilities and their
consequences were not offset by clear articulated intentions prior to the election of President Rouhani
and the JPA’s implementation. The two-level game interpretation breaks the positional structure. It
not only acknowledges the interest change by each party, but that tactics occur at multiple levels in
the negotiation process. When changes in interest are acknowledged by all the parties in a negotiation,
it can progress in a manner that positional bargaining fails to achieve. The process of negotiation
pursued an approach that was not positional because of how quickly the JPA progressed into the
JCPOA after Rouhani’s expressed openness to resume negotiations.
2015 IRAN DEAL NEGOTIATION SUBSTANCE
However, the substance of the negotiation is just as important as the process itself. Substances
address what is being negotiated rather than the process, which structures how the negotiations should
occur. As stated previously, President Rouhani’s election allowed for the resumption of the nuclear
program negotiations with a higher-level of commitment and renewed importance. The agenda of the
nuclear program was to restrict and regulate Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting the
sanctions imposed by the UNSC and EU. From a P5+1 perspective, the primary concern was to
prevent Iran’s nuclear program from proliferating nuclear weapon.
While Iran certainly felt the brunt of economic sanctions, Germany, Russia and China each
had their own economic interests in Iran that were hindered by the sanctions. The sanctions did induce
cooperative behavior but not because of unilateral policy action by Iran. Rather, it was a multilateral
rebalancing of interest and recognition that the status quo must change.
Due to the recentness of the JCPOA, we need to allow for more time to understand Iran’s
real intent to resume the negotiation process and finally reach an agreement. However, preliminary
analysis could assume that some of the main reasons for Iran’s willingness to get back to the
negotiating table were a change in government political leadership and economic hardships from the
sanctions, especially in terms of the loss of oil revenue - one of Iran’s most lucrative exports. The
economic crisis in Iran was a result of sanctions implemented by the US and UNSC. US Treasury
14 Kenneth A. Oye, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton University Press, 1986.
15 Putnam D. Robert, Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games, World Peace Foundation, 1998.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 7