Fall 2017 JPI

economic cooperation between the seven parties.
Relationships between the seven parties had varying levels of strength, creating a complex and
dynamic negotiation scenario. As Oye notes, the increase in the number of players in a game made
cooperation harder to achieve compared to that of a two-person game. The most famous example of
game theory is called the Prisoner's Dilemma, a mixed motive game. There is a clash of interests
between the two actors who would be better-off not cooperating. This game shows that instead of
attempting to find the best solution for the pair, both parties will try to choose the one that is best for
themselves, taking into account the fact that the other might defect. This scenario can also be observed
in the JCPOA negotiations as the bilateral economic relations were separate from the positional aspect
between the P5+1 and Iran. The US, U.K., and France’s relationships with Iran were weak, While
Germany, Russia, and China’s were stronger because of their economic ties to Iran. These bilateral
economic ties provided incentives for cooperation because of the linkage of domestic economic
benefits to non-proliferation policy concerns. A split in this interest between the P5+1 could have
caused negotiations to fail because the positional aspect relied on the power of sanctions. The P5+1
leverage of power against Iran would have been diminished if one party had rescinded its participation.
President Rouhani’s election signaled to the P5+1 that a cooperative effort could be reached
if sanctions were lifted for greater transparency. A new channel of communication was created when
Iran sent Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to the UN General Assembly to propose the possibility of
renewed negotiations under a “new future vision” 12 on September 26 and 27, 2013. Within a month,
the P5+1 resumed negotiations to create a framework for “comprehensive agreement” with an
“interim confidence boosting measure.” Formal meetings in Geneva on November 7, 2013 would
start the first rounds of negotiations for the Joint Plan of Action (JPA). The JPA allowed for the
necessary time to establish the framework to the JCPOA, while simultaneously allowing Iran to show
its commitment for cooperation. The JPA was signed by the P5+1 and Iran on November 24. After
additional rounds of negotiations, the P5+1 and Iran established that the JPA would officially be
implemented on January 20, 2014. The P5+1 and Iran conducted ten rounds of negotiations before
November 18. This round extended talks on negotiation and implemented interim provisions of the
JPA. Iran’s commitment to the JPA allowed for the JCPOA to be agreed upon on July 14, 2015.
Ultimately, it appeared that cooperative communication was a key difference from the other
diplomatic endeavors Iran had had with the P5+1. Previous communications were based on positions,
with Iran steadfastly pursuing a nuclear program unaligned with the interests of the UNSC. This
positional obstacle was corrected when Rouhani selected Zarif as the lead negotiator representing
Iran. Zarif had been formally educated in the West, and had a greater command of English than past
diplomats in their careers. 13 The selection of Zarif was a two-pronged communication tactic.
First, the Western formal education provided the necessary perspective to fit Rouhani’s
narrative that was more accepting of the West. This aided the confidence building measures to satisfy
P5+1. Second, the command over English prevented any confusion in translation. As noted in the
book Getting to Yes, Farsi and English have words that could translate into words that connotatively
differ from their denotations. A breakdown in linguistic intent could have created significant obstacles
in the understanding. Given that the stakes in this negotiation were economic gains and security for
each party, a strategic selection in diplomats that could effectively employ linguistic tactics aligned
12 Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht. “An Iranian Moderate Exposed,” New Republic, January 23, 2014.
13 Ibid.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 6