Fall 2017 JPI

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Table 3: Corrected Models vs. Mozaffar’s Models District Magnitude (logged) (1a) (1b) (3a) 0.0198 (3b) 0.0432 (4a) (4b) -0.126 -0.0170 -2.672 ∗∗∗ 3.340 (-0.61) (-0.09) (0.09) (0.22) (-4.05) (1.68) Proximity -3.366 ∗∗∗ -2.578 ∗∗∗ -3.647 ∗∗∗ -3.062 ∗∗∗ -2.059 ∗∗ -2.107 ∗∗∗ (-4.63) (-3.94) (-4.74) (-4.48) (-3.07) (-3.75) Proximity 1.283 ∗∗∗ 0.579 ∗ 1.261 ∗∗∗ 0.682 ∗∗ 0.822 ∗∗∗ 0.522 ∗ X Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (5.97) (2.33) (5.26) (2.69) (4.22) (2.64) Effective Number of Presidential Candidates 0.609 ∗∗∗ 0.576 ∗∗∗ 0.314 ∗ (4.23) (4.01) (2.58) Ethnopolitical Fragmentation -0.677 -1.163 -1.917 5.823 (-0.33) (-0.65) (-1.85) (1.53) Ethnopolitical Group Concentration 0.0771 -0.615 -0.823 ∗ 1.599 (0.09) (-0.77) (-2.28) (0.96) Ethnopolitical Fragmentation 0.656 1.406 -2.980 X Concentration (0.49) (1.20) (-1.41) District Magnitude X Fragmentation 1.701 ∗∗∗ 4.665 ∗∗ X Concentration (4.30) (3.39) Fragmentation -8.701 ∗∗ X District Magnitude (-3.45) Concentration -1.976 X District Magnitude (-1.87) Constant 2.773 ∗∗∗ 2.038 ∗∗∗ 2.387 2.253 ∗ 6.103 ∗∗∗ -0.377 (8.65) (6.24) (1.92) (2.09) (5.37) (-0.13) Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 R 2 0.43 0.58 0.52 0.64 0.65 0.82 F 12.11 16.67 8.251 11.68 14.53 18.99 t statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 The most significant finding from this actual fully-specified model is the fact that neither ethnopolitical fragmentation nor district magnitude have a significant effect on their own. Instead, they only have a significant effect in their interaction. This indicates that ethnopolitical fragmentation and district magnitude have a cross-over interaction. Thus, there is no overall effect of either ethnopolitical fragmentation or district magnitude, but instead the effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation on the number of parties is dependent on the district magnitude and vice versa. Specifically, that ethnopolitical fragmentation has a reductive effect as MSG theorized only when district magnitude is sufficiently large. JPI Fall 2017, pg. 63
CONCLUSION Overall, the findings of this paper provide some insight to this question that scholars have been debating. The major insight here is that it is likely not appropriate to make sweeping claims about the effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation in all African countries, but we should instead recognize that the effects are contingent on other aspects of each electoral system. While MSG did scratch the surface on these joint effects, they failed to make accurate statements due to some flaws in their model. With the helpful corrections in the model from GBC and the newer data narrowed down to strictly democratic elections in Africa, we can start to extrapolate these findings to the idea of stability for democracies in Africa. What are the implications? First, I can consider the reasons behind why we might have found these numbers. In light of these findings, there actually does seem to be some logic in MSG’s original theory, recalling that when levels of ethnic fragmentation are high enough, it is in the parties’ best interests to cooperate in order to reach a multiethnic base. However, since Africa’s ethnic groups tend to be highly fragmented and highly geographically concentrated, when the district magnitude is small it is possible that each district will be comprised of a small number of ethnic groups. This allows for the formation of intragroup cleavages to take over, and results in a high number of political parties. On the other hand, when district magnitude is large, there will likely be such a multitude of ethnic groups in a given district that MSG’s theory would be plausible and multiethnic coalitions would be a more beneficial strategy for the parties involved. Second, the idea that ethnopolitical fragmentation can correlate with less political parties under certain conditions, does imply that the stability of African democracies is possible. Finally, this research raises yet more questions to be studied in the future to clarify this relationship as studies have yet to control for other important variables, such as the type of electoral system in these countries that would have a significant effect on these relationships. For instance, in the case of small district magnitude and high fragmentation and concentration mentioned above, in a proportional representation system it would be much more likely to observe the results that I speculated. Whereas in a majoritarian system, it would be more likely to observe one or two parties capitalize on that small number of ethnic groups within a district to maximize votes. The interaction that I found gives way to crucial, but incomplete insights for the possible link between Africa’s emerging democracies and its unique ethnic composition. JPI Fall 2017, pg. 64
Page 1 and 2:
Fall 2017 Journal of Political Inqu
Page 3 and 4:
EDITORIAL BOARD ALINA ZHENG Editor
Page 5 and 6:
President to continue to build rela
Page 7 and 8:
economic cooperation between the se
Page 9 and 10:
Secretary Jacob Lew stated that Ira
Page 11 and 12:
ultimate authority and the ability
Page 13 and 14: statements approved at home. Under
Page 15 and 16: ights. Nevertheless, I would argue
Page 17 and 18: configurations have formed conflict
Page 19 and 20: eadiness to deploy armed force in t
Page 21 and 22: The Worthiness of Citizenship The S
Page 23 and 24: like its predecessors. It also prom
Page 25 and 26: eginning of the JDP rule in 2002, 1
Page 27 and 28: In all of the aforementioned accoun
Page 29 and 30: Amid the Litani River and the Blue
Page 31 and 32: and invaded Lebanon again in 1982 u
Page 33 and 34: who are subject to an imminent thre
Page 35 and 36: unanimously adopted the renewal of
Page 37 and 38: The Times of European Identity Alli
Page 39 and 40: to build the European Economic Comm
Page 41 and 42: “forgotten” history, not only c
Page 43 and 44: state, as a strong state containing
Page 45 and 46: The essay will be divided into five
Page 47 and 48: order, Chinese “exports and impor
Page 49 and 50: However, China does not own a globa
Page 51 and 52: to challenge this powerful hegemon.
Page 53 and 54: The Puzzle of Ethnopolitical Fragme
Page 55 and 56: alternative analysis where two meth
Page 57 and 58: single population count. 24 This le
Page 59 and 60: not every one of these types of soc
Page 61 and 62: Table 2: Determinants of Effective
Page 63: data, which don’t occur here. Fir
show all

Fall 2017 JPI

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?