Fall 2017 JPI
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Table 1: Determinants of Effective Number of Electoral Parties<br />
(1) (2) (3) (4)<br />
log(District Magnitude) -0.351 -0.0970 -5.908 ∗∗∗<br />
(-0.96) (-0.25) (-5.34)<br />
Proximity of Presidential -5.174 ∗∗∗ -4.448 ∗∗ -2.413 ∗<br />
and Legislative Elections (-4.02) (-3.29) (-2.15)<br />
Proximity 1.928 ∗∗∗ 1.589 ∗∗∗ 1.130 ∗∗<br />
X Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (5.07) (3.77) (3.45)<br />
Ethnopolitical Fragmentation 5.649 0.240 -8.570 ∗∗∗<br />
(1.63) (0.07) (-4.94)<br />
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration 5.858 ∗∗∗ 3.200 ∗ -1.746 ∗∗<br />
(4.00) (2.03) (-2.89)<br />
Ethnopolitical Fragmentation -7.376 ∗∗ -3.381<br />
X Concentration (-3.38) (-1.45)<br />
District Magnitude × Fragmentation<br />
× Concentration<br />
3.490 ∗∗∗<br />
(5.26)<br />
Constant 3.662 ∗∗∗ -0.793 2.311 13.66 ∗∗∗<br />
(6.45) (-0.42) (1.06) (7.17)<br />
Observations 53 53 53 53<br />
R 2 0.34 0.27 0.46 0.65<br />
F 8.598 6.177 6.488 14.01<br />
t statistics in parentheses<br />
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001<br />
This three-way interaction term would seem to prove MSG’s theory right that district<br />
magnitude is only significant when in interaction with fragmentation and concentration. As in MSG,<br />
for my purely institutional model and additive model, District Magnitude did not significantly correlate,<br />
but with the "fully specified" Model 4, when both institutional and sociological interactions are taken<br />
into account, District Magnitude and District Magnitude X Fragmentation X Concentration have a significant<br />
coefficient. According to MSG, "large district magnitudes tend to reduce the number of parties if<br />
ethnopolitical fragmentation is high and ethnopolitical concentration is low, but they tend to increase<br />
the number of parties if both fragmentation and concentration are high." 32 This theory seems to hold<br />
with these results since for Model 4 in both branches, the coefficient of District Magnitude alone is<br />
negative, while the coefficient for the interactive term is positive. Moreover, similar to MSG’s results,<br />
my variable for log(District Magnitude) is insignificant until I use the interactive model, verifying that<br />
without also including the factor of ethnopolitical cleavages, the effect of log(District Magnitude) is not<br />
foreseeable.<br />
32 Ibid, 387.<br />
<strong>JPI</strong> <strong>Fall</strong> <strong>2017</strong>, pg. 59
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