Fall 2017 JPI

election that caused massive protests across the country. This meant continuation of the hardline
policies and the development of the nuclear program. In response, US Congress and the EU adopted
additional sets of sanctions on Iran. During 2011 and 2012, talks between the P5+1 and Iran continued
in Geneva, Istanbul, Baghdad, and Moscow, but Iran sustained its enrichment processes.
In 2013, the P5+1 negotiations resumed in Almaty, Kazakhstan with the sides still far apart.
The breakthrough came when moderate President Hassan Rouhani was elected in Iran. He also
appointed Western-educated and English-speaking Foreign Minister Javad Zarif as the new leader of
the negotiation team. In October 2013, negotiation talks resumed in Geneva. Finally, in February
2014, after the P5+1 and Iran met three times in Geneva, the two parties agreed on the agenda and
framework to guide the talks reaching the JCPOA.
2015 IRAN DEAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS
So, how did the JCPOA negotiation process occur and more importantly, why was it so unique
and ultimately successful in terms of reaching the agreement? The parties to the JCPOA negotiations
could be split into two formal positional sides. Iran represented itself as a non-nuclear power,
negotiating with the P5+1 nations. The IAEA also played a supporting role as the implementer of the
regulations that Iran became subject to as a part of this deal.
Each permanent member of the UN Security Council had its own nuclear weapons program
and had full capability to engage in nuclear warfare. Germany and Iran were the only parties to the
negotiations that did not have this capability. The negotiations might have been more difficult if Iran
was negotiating with countries that all had actual nuclear weapons instead of just nuclear programs.
The presence of Germany, with support from the EU and the IAEA, gives strength to the call for not
seeking nuclear weapons in these debates. After all, countries seek nuclear military capabilities to
maximize their power and security in the international system; the fact that a powerful country like
Germany stays at such a high position without this capability can embolden the non-proliferation call.
Some argue that the previous sanctions on Iran were successful in the P5+1 goal of nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons. 10 The economic pressure from the US sanctions, UNSC sanctions,
and EU sanctions fostered an environment that induced concessions by the Iranian government in its
nuclear energy pursuance to protect its national security interests. Economic needs created the issue
linkage necessary to create cooperation between the P5+1 and Iran. Economic interest became the
stronger interest of the two for the Iranians, which could have only been achieved through negotiation.
In addition, the election of President Rouhani changed the direction and narrative of the
Iranian government’s stance on its nuclear program. Unlike his predecessor President Ahmadinejad,
Rouhani’s rhetoric was focused on economic interests because of the benefit to the Iranian people. 11
Pursuance of nuclear weapons was not replaceable in its direct benefits. Moreover, Rouhani previously
served as a nuclear negotiator. His understanding of the scenario created by Iran’s nuclear program
was fundamentally different from Ahmadinejad’s understanding, which saw the nuclear program as a
method of increasing Iranian power in the international system. President Rouhani was much more
receptive to cooperative diplomacy, and he articulated this by calling for the resumption of talks and
prescribing how Iran should conduct its nuclear program. The positional aspect of power that
previously existed between the P5+1 and Iran was diminished by changing the issue to that of
10 Zachary Laub.” International sanctions on Iran”, council on foreign relations July 15, 2015
11 Ali Reza, “Who benefits from Iran Sanctions Belief”, The National Interest July 2, 2015
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 5