Fall 2017 JPI

alternative analysis where two methods for counting parties are taken into account. These include the
effective number of parliamentary parties to determine each party’s share of the vote; as well as the
number of relevant actors in party competition.
Significantly, Bogaards’ alternative analysis controls for regime type grouped into four
different classifications. Bogaards finds that with these changes, the calculated electoral volatility
across Africa is much lower than reported by MSG. Thus, Bogaards nullifies the discussion of the
puzzle of high electoral volatility and low fragmentation by finding relatively normal levels of electoral
volatility in Africa’s party system. Further, in determining if there is a correlation between party system
type and volatility, Bogaards finds that "dominant parties in Africa experience less electoral volatility
than non-dominant pulverized party systems." 14 Finally, Bogaards tests for a correlation between the
number of political parties and level of volatility to determine if the contradiction truly exists in Africa,
and finds that the relationship is actually positive and statistically significant instead of the negative
relationship that we would expect. However, Bogaards does not negate Mozaffar and Scarritt’s claim
of low fragmentation existing in Africa’s party system nor their theory about the effect of
ethnopolitical fragmentation.
For the purposes of this paper, I seek to clarify the puzzling debate on the effect of ethnic
fragmentation on Africa’s electoral system and party composition. Specifically, I will be analyzing new
data on Africa’s strictly democratic elections using both MSG and GBC’s methods of analysis.
DATA, METHODS, AND MODELS
The Variables
Party Systems: To evaluate the structure of the party system, I use the Effective Number of Electoral
Parties and the Effective Number of Legislative Parties in the system, employing the indices widely used and
developed by Laasko and Taagepera to operationalize these two measures. 15 These are the indicators
that MSG use in their paper as well.
Electoral Institutions: Scholars widely recognize district magnitude as the major institutional
construct that affects and determines the structure of party systems. Countries with proportional
representation electoral systems end up with many districts with varying size. 16 Consequently, I follow
Lijphart and MSG in using the logarithm of average district magnitude to measure the effects of
district magnitude, and control for the possibility of a curvilinear relationship. 17
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections: This variable is another independent variable
affecting the structure of party systems, calculated by Cox’s formula. 18 This is the length of time passed
between presidential and legislative elections. Following Cox’s theory, I expect that an increase in
proximity between presidential and legislative elections should result in a decrease in the number of
electoral and legislative parties, depending on the degree of fractionalization of presidential elections.
Thus, following MSG’s analysis, I will include the interaction variable of Proximity X Effective Number
of Presidential Candidates.
14 Ibid, 123.
15 Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. "The" Effective" Number of Parties:" A Measure with Application to West Europe"." Comparative political
studies 12, no. 1 (1979): 3.
16 Kenneth Benoit "District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties." European Journal of Political Research 39, no. 2 (2001): 203-224.
17 Arend Lijphart Electoral Systems and Party Systems. Oxford University Press, USA, 1995.
18Gary W. Cox Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 54