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Fall 2017 JPI

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parties, based on the institutions that were in place before. Only using those elections is likely to<br />

produce biased results. Thus, they use expanded data including elections from Africa’s well-established<br />

democracies. Once again, Mozaffar and Scarritt emphasize the "distinctive" formation of African<br />

ethnopolitical groups that result in complicated and unique cleavages in two dimensions, which they<br />

define as fragmentation and concentration. 9 Mozaffar and Scarritt show that the result is the<br />

dominance of a small number of large parties accompanied by some smaller parties, most of which<br />

are able to attain only little to no representation. Once again, no single ethnopolitical group is large<br />

enough to form a political party – thus, multi-ethnic coalitions tend to form. In addition, Mozaffar<br />

and Scarritt find that high electoral volatility results "can be viewed as a system-clearing device that<br />

eliminates inefficient parties" leaving behind the system they described. 10 Overall, Mozaffar and<br />

Scarritt detail that for Africa’s emerging democracies, the remnants of authoritarian regimes are still<br />

represented in the electoral rules for legislative elections while ethnic coalitions provide an alternative<br />

source of information for voters. The result is the puzzling combination of low frag- mentation and<br />

high volatility that they present.<br />

However, the claims from these two papers have met with significant rebuttals due to errors<br />

in their methods of data analysis. Most notably, Golder et al. claim that MSG use interaction models<br />

in which they do not include all constitutive terms, interpret constitutive terms as unconditional<br />

marginal effects, and fail to calculate marginal effects and standard errors over a sufficiently large range<br />

of modifying variables. 11 They argue that although MSG made an attempt to include interaction terms,<br />

they did so without accounting for all of the base variables, which would render their models<br />

inaccurate. Thus, GBC (Golder et al.) replicate MSG’s 2003 study interpreting the effects of<br />

fragmentation and district magnitude on the number of parties with the previously omitted interaction<br />

terms of (Fragmentation x log(Magnitude)) and (Concentration x log(Magnitude)), among others. They point<br />

out that by omitting these variables, MSG made a key assumption without justification. A further<br />

problem is that even with the revised model on hand, MSG did not provide any analysis on the<br />

marginal effect of ethnic fragmentation, and there is no way of determining whether its marginal effect<br />

is statistically significant since they did not provide any standard errors. BCG find that using the<br />

revised model, "ethnic fragmentation does reduce the number of parties when concentration is zero." 12<br />

However, of the observations for which group concentration was zero, almost all of them had only a<br />

single ethnopolitical group where ethnic fragmentation could not have been the cause. Thus, the<br />

authors reject MSG’s claim about the effect of ethnic fragmentation.<br />

Finally, another notable complaint is aimed at Mozaffar and Scarritt’s 2005 paper instead.<br />

Bogaards complains that the puzzle of low fragmentation and high volatility may be jumping to<br />

conclusions since Mozaffar and Scarrit did not control for regime type as other existing literature has<br />

in similar studies. 13 Bogaards points out that in investigating the party systems of Africa, Mozaffar and<br />

Scarritt use indicators based on data from the entire continent instead of controlling for varying factors<br />

of each country, as Africa’s political climate varies greatly from country to country. Bogaards<br />

emphasizes that Mozaffar and Scarritt use the average effective number of legislative parties across all<br />

elections to measure the presence of dominant parties in the system, but don’t go into further<br />

dimensions that may also vary, such as a measure of dominance or time. Thus, Bogaards performs an<br />

9 Ibid, 400.<br />

10 Ibid, 417.<br />

11 Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. "Are African party systems different?" Electoral Studies 26, no. 2 (2007): 315-323.<br />

12 Ibid, 6.<br />

13 Matthijs Bogaards "Dominant Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Africa A Comment on Mozaffar and Scarritt." Party Politics 14, no. 1 (2008):<br />

113-130.<br />

<strong>JPI</strong> <strong>Fall</strong> <strong>2017</strong>, pg. 53

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