Fall 2017 JPI
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parties, based on the institutions that were in place before. Only using those elections is likely to<br />
produce biased results. Thus, they use expanded data including elections from Africa’s well-established<br />
democracies. Once again, Mozaffar and Scarritt emphasize the "distinctive" formation of African<br />
ethnopolitical groups that result in complicated and unique cleavages in two dimensions, which they<br />
define as fragmentation and concentration. 9 Mozaffar and Scarritt show that the result is the<br />
dominance of a small number of large parties accompanied by some smaller parties, most of which<br />
are able to attain only little to no representation. Once again, no single ethnopolitical group is large<br />
enough to form a political party – thus, multi-ethnic coalitions tend to form. In addition, Mozaffar<br />
and Scarritt find that high electoral volatility results "can be viewed as a system-clearing device that<br />
eliminates inefficient parties" leaving behind the system they described. 10 Overall, Mozaffar and<br />
Scarritt detail that for Africa’s emerging democracies, the remnants of authoritarian regimes are still<br />
represented in the electoral rules for legislative elections while ethnic coalitions provide an alternative<br />
source of information for voters. The result is the puzzling combination of low frag- mentation and<br />
high volatility that they present.<br />
However, the claims from these two papers have met with significant rebuttals due to errors<br />
in their methods of data analysis. Most notably, Golder et al. claim that MSG use interaction models<br />
in which they do not include all constitutive terms, interpret constitutive terms as unconditional<br />
marginal effects, and fail to calculate marginal effects and standard errors over a sufficiently large range<br />
of modifying variables. 11 They argue that although MSG made an attempt to include interaction terms,<br />
they did so without accounting for all of the base variables, which would render their models<br />
inaccurate. Thus, GBC (Golder et al.) replicate MSG’s 2003 study interpreting the effects of<br />
fragmentation and district magnitude on the number of parties with the previously omitted interaction<br />
terms of (Fragmentation x log(Magnitude)) and (Concentration x log(Magnitude)), among others. They point<br />
out that by omitting these variables, MSG made a key assumption without justification. A further<br />
problem is that even with the revised model on hand, MSG did not provide any analysis on the<br />
marginal effect of ethnic fragmentation, and there is no way of determining whether its marginal effect<br />
is statistically significant since they did not provide any standard errors. BCG find that using the<br />
revised model, "ethnic fragmentation does reduce the number of parties when concentration is zero." 12<br />
However, of the observations for which group concentration was zero, almost all of them had only a<br />
single ethnopolitical group where ethnic fragmentation could not have been the cause. Thus, the<br />
authors reject MSG’s claim about the effect of ethnic fragmentation.<br />
Finally, another notable complaint is aimed at Mozaffar and Scarritt’s 2005 paper instead.<br />
Bogaards complains that the puzzle of low fragmentation and high volatility may be jumping to<br />
conclusions since Mozaffar and Scarrit did not control for regime type as other existing literature has<br />
in similar studies. 13 Bogaards points out that in investigating the party systems of Africa, Mozaffar and<br />
Scarritt use indicators based on data from the entire continent instead of controlling for varying factors<br />
of each country, as Africa’s political climate varies greatly from country to country. Bogaards<br />
emphasizes that Mozaffar and Scarritt use the average effective number of legislative parties across all<br />
elections to measure the presence of dominant parties in the system, but don’t go into further<br />
dimensions that may also vary, such as a measure of dominance or time. Thus, Bogaards performs an<br />
9 Ibid, 400.<br />
10 Ibid, 417.<br />
11 Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. "Are African party systems different?" Electoral Studies 26, no. 2 (2007): 315-323.<br />
12 Ibid, 6.<br />
13 Matthijs Bogaards "Dominant Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Africa A Comment on Mozaffar and Scarritt." Party Politics 14, no. 1 (2008):<br />
113-130.<br />
<strong>JPI</strong> <strong>Fall</strong> <strong>2017</strong>, pg. 53