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the traditional objective of preventing and quelling the escalation of a conflict. 7 The evolution to<br />

UNIFIL II exhibits the second-generation features, transforming the PKO into an ambitious mission<br />

in which the civilian component, political negotiations, and police bodies are introduced. The<br />

uniqueness of this case comes from the spatial dimension of the ongoing conflict, which is channeled<br />

through the land, sea, and air spaces of Israel and Lebanon, which is used by both local actors (on<br />

either side) and countered by peacekeepers. The singularity UNIFIL II is also due to Europe’s<br />

behavior as the backbone of the PKO within a turbulent Middle East. Stringent research is required<br />

so that the PKO does not lag behind the real conflict in the field.<br />

BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT<br />

Lebanon’s situation operates at three levels: national (conducted by Lebanon’s central<br />

government and the insurgent group Hezbollah), regional (spawned by Israel, Iran and Syria), and<br />

international (tamed by the moral injection of the UN). At the national level, the existence of large<br />

coalitions of political parties, the system of mutual veto power, the disproportionate representation of<br />

different religious groups, and the segmentation of autonomy have not prevented Lebanon from<br />

suffering social and political volatility. 8 At the regional level, an agreement on the delimitation of<br />

borders between Israel and Lebanon through the Blue Line, presents an extraordinary complexity,<br />

particularly because of the disputes arising from the claims on the Shebaa farms territory. 9 This<br />

contested area was occupied by Israel in 1967, during the invasion that took place in the Golan<br />

Heights. 10 However, after the Israeli withdrawal from this land in 2000, the Lebanese government<br />

made a formal claim on it by defining Lebanon’s territory. 11 At the international level, the<br />

overwhelming reaction of the global community was concerned with the deterioration of the<br />

geopolitical situation in Lebanon. Some states, such as the US, followed Israeli arguments that<br />

supported the right of self-defense in the face of the Hezbollah attacks. Other states, such as Iran<br />

(whose interests were against those of Israel and the US), condemned the Israeli offensive and<br />

criticized its harshness for the attacks, referencing the principle of proportionality abided by Article<br />

51 of the UN Charter. 12<br />

Since early 1970s, Lebanese territory had become the platform from which Palestinian activists<br />

would launch commando actions against Israeli targets and vice versa. After years of aggression and<br />

ensuing responses, Israel eventually invaded Lebanon in 1978. 13 The international community<br />

responded later that year when the UNSC issued Resolutions 425 and 426, approving the mobilization<br />

of Blue Helmets to the front lines of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 14,15 Israel did not abide by the ceasefire<br />

7 Daniel Druckman, Paul C. Stern, Paul Diehl, A. Betts Fetherston, Robert Johansen, William Durch, and Steven Ratner, “Evaluating peacekeeping<br />

missions,” Mershon International Studies, Review 41, no. 1 (1997): 154. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/222819.pdf<br />

8 Waleed Hazbun, “The Politics of Insecurity in the Arab World: A View from Beirut,” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 3 (<strong>2017</strong>): 656-659.<br />

9 Greg Breining, “The Thin Blue Line,” In Wild Shore: Exploring Lake Superior by Kayak, University of Minnesota Press, (2000): 1-4,<br />

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv2b0.4.<br />

10 Frederic C Hof, “A Practical Line: The Line of Withdrawal from Lebanon and Its Potential Applicability to the Golan Heights.” Middle East Journal<br />

55, no. 1 (2001): 33, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329580.<br />

11 “Troop and police contributors archive (1990 - 2016),” United Nations. Last modified 2006. Accessed December 9, <strong>2017</strong>.<br />

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml<br />

12 “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,” United Nations, Approved in 1945. Accessed November 28, <strong>2017</strong>,<br />

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pf<br />

13 “Country Reports – Lebanon,” IHS Markit, Published February 28, <strong>2017</strong>, Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed December 12, <strong>2017</strong>,<br />

http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fa879642-ee6c-488d-9b39-e3383d670d79%40sessionmgr101<br />

14 “Israel-Lebanon” (S/RES/425), United Nations, Approved March 19, 1978. Accessed December 12, <strong>2017</strong>.<br />

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/425(1978)<br />

15 “Israel-Lebanon” (S/RES/426), United Nations, Approved March 19, 1978. Accessed December 12, <strong>2017</strong>.<br />

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/425(1978)<br />

<strong>JPI</strong> <strong>Fall</strong> <strong>2017</strong>, pg. 29

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