Fall 2017 JPI

explain the attacks on people who are fleeing a humanitarian tragedy.
Balibar’s framework of racism suggests that at times of crisis, certain racisms occur due to
historical underlying assumptions. These assumptions, which may not surface until a crisis, may
become prevalent once a new group emerges. In the case of Turkey and Syrian asylum seekers, these
assumptions had to do with the militaristic identity of the Turkish, and how this self-perceptions
conflicts with the image of Syrians fleeing from civil war instead of staying to fight. Asylum-seekers
are thus portrayed as cowards as opposed to the “heroic” nation of Turkey, and are not viewed as
“worthy of Turkish citizenship” by the public, despite the efforts of an otherwise well-supported
government.
CONCLUSION
I have argued, with the help of Balibar’s conceptualization of new racism, that the roots of the
discrimination against Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey lie in Turkey’s formation as a military nation.
Although government policy has been to let asylum-seekers in for the last three years, this policy was
not accepted by the public and caused increasing public antagonism against Syrians and the Turkish
government. This is different than what European countries have done in response to the crisis.
Turkey kept its doors open to any asylum-seeker and called them guests, although it failed in many
instances to provide them with humanitarian assistance. The Turkish public, on the other hand,
generally took a stance that is discriminatory toward Syrians. But it is different than the European
discriminatory response which tends to reveal itself as a fear of invasion. 41 Instead, Syrian asylum
seekers were not seen worthy of being a part of Turkish society because they were thought to have
abandoned their country when it was in peril. The buildup of Turkish nationalism is rooted in its
militaristic formation, which became the basis of the auto-referential racism toward Syrian asylum
seekers. Although in many instances President Erdogan referred to Syrians using signifiers of affinity
such as “brothers” or “sisters” he has failed to convince even his own voter base. The angry public
response, though he has not laid out a plan proving that a speech he gave at a public iftar dinner is
actually becoming a reality, says a lot about the level of discrimination in Turkey. The idea of granting
citizenship to asylum-seekers was a mere possibility at the time of the backlash. It still is.
All of these discussions were forgotten at the night of July 15 with military tanks crossing the
Bosphorus Bridge. For the first time in Turkish history, the people came out to fight soldiers against
a coup d’état. This was unprecedented, even in Turkey which has had its share of military coups (three
in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and many attempts in-between and after). I recognize that the valorization of
the military shifted after that point, so my analyses on the exaltation of the Turkish military may not
hold today in the post-coup Turkish context. However, the military nation argument is one that still
applies, for the people who fought against the military were deemed soldiers and martyrs in the press
and in political statements by the government, reproducing the military nation identity in a different
sphere that is more akin to civil society and spontaneous revolt.
The situation for Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey today is still precarious. The talk of
citizenship has been tabled since the attempted coup, and it is very difficult to make future predictions
at this time. However, it seems unlikely that Turkish hospitality will overcome Turkish militarism in
the near future.
41 Hage, État de siège, 39.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 27