Fall 2017 JPI

that an attack against Iran would be “a counterproductive failure.” The US and other states could have
used the rhetoric of keeping military options on the table, but when the issue was considered from a
purely military perspective, it was clear that there were limitations to carrying out a successful offensive
mission. Thus, arms control and cooperation through the Iran nuclear agreement were the preferable
policy options for the US
Glaser’s third argument was that military policies could be used as a communication tool and
that security-seeking states should certify that “its adversary understood that its motivations were
benign,” 26 providing a reason for the competitor state to reassess its motives and intentions. This
meant that “countries should sometimes exercise self-restraint and pursue cooperative military
policies, because these policies can convince a rational opponent to revise favorably its views of the
country’s motives.” The Iran nuclear deal represented a cooperative policy that gave concessions to
Iran and provided an incentive for the country to change its confrontational foreign policy towards
the West. Glaser argued that by eventually lifting the arms sanctions, the deal made it possible for Iran
to provide for its own defense, which also created regional stability. In addition, cooperation through
the nuclear agreement would give the US more flexibility in positioning its military resources, and
possibly support the future disentanglement from the region - which might be a part of the US longterm
strategy and national interest.
When Glaser’s perspective on structural realism was applied to the Iran nuclear deal, it
suggested that it was in the interest of the US to cooperate with Iran and other Western powers. In
the long term, the deal will strengthen the relative power and security of the US both in the greater
Middle East and internationally.
The contrast between traditional and structural realist views helps to explain why the JCPOA
continued to be one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the 2016 campaign for President
of the United States. President Obama, valuing diplomacy and cooperation, considered the deal to be
among his foremost foreign policy accomplishments. The Democratic Party’s candidate in the 2016
US presidential elections publicly backed the deal. In her speech, Hillary Clinton said that “as
President, I will take whatever actions are necessary to protect the US and its allies. I will not hesitate
to take military action.” 27 Clinton cautioned that the deal must "be enforced vigorously, relentlessly.”
In stark contrast, the Republican then-candidate, Donald Trump, opposed the Iran nuclear deal
because he analyzed it from a traditional realist perspective. He has said that he would renegotiate the
deal or "dismantle" it. Statements on both sides affirmed that it was US policy to prevent Iran from
producing sufficient fissile material for even a single nuclear weapon, and that the US would use all
means necessary, including military force, to prevent this. However, the differences were in the
approach to achieving that goal.
CONCLUSION
Nevertheless, it is implied that the Iran deal was an interest-based negotiation as both parties
used a principled approach by focusing on common interests instead of prioritizing their own to build
up the negotiations and ensure that a win-win situation was formed. In the short term, both parties
succeeded and achieved maximum outcomes. Negotiations that were done during Ahmadinejad’s
presidency were more position-based, and they failed to bear any results until there was a major change
of policy. In the position-based negotiations, Iranian delegations would only come to read the
26 Ibid.
27 Matthew Kroeing. “The American Interest” February 11, 2016.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 11