Fall 2017 JPI

ultimate authority and the ability to enforce agreements or order. States act as unitary rational actors
and primarily aim to achieve a secure position in the international community. They view each other
as “black boxes,” with a focus on their external actions, and leave out considerations related to internal
characteristics of their competitors, such as governance systems, personalities of decision makers,
cultural environments, and local norms. In the traditional structural realist view, the main concerns of
states are the relative gains that competing states might achieve, as well as the problem of cheating
over agreed rules. This results in a self-help system, where states provide their own security, compete
with other states, and only rarely find a path for cooperation.
However, when analyzing the Iran deal in the light of the arguments that Charles Glaser made
in his article “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” it is possible to reach an alternative
conclusion. 25 His theory is relevant to the circumstances of the deal, as it focuses on peacetime,
defining “cooperation” as coordinated policies that avoid arms races (which the Iran deal aimed to
do), and “competition” as unilateral military build-ups and alliance formation. Glaser challenges the
traditional view and argued that the basic assumptions of structural realism did not lead inevitably to
competition. He stated that “under a wide range of conditions, adversaries could best achieve their
security goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, choose
cooperation when these conditions prevail.” Glaser’s analysis introduced three arguments that showed
how structural realist assumptions would actually predict state cooperation, rather than competition.
Each of these could be applied to the Iran Nuclear Deal, creating a logical framework to support the
assumption that the outcome of the deal could be positive for all sides, and particularly to the US.
First, Glaser argued that cooperative policies were an important form of self-help. If an arms
race was seen as a risk in the case of Iran, then reciprocal constraint would be beneficial to both sides.
Especially if the outcome of the arms race was uncertain, the risk of ending up in a more
disadvantageous military position would be a genuine threat. Even if the outcome was certain, the
competition could result in technological development that would be even more destructive, leaving
all sides more vulnerable if these capabilities were deployed. Lastly, Glaser pointed out that uncertainty
about motives could also make cooperation more rational than competition, as “cooperation was
valuable if it reduced the adversary’s insecurity by reducing the military threat it faces.”
In Iran’s case, the US and its allies saw the Iranian nuclear threat as a clear security concern
and realized the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Despite
the superiority of the American military and its ability to support its allies, it was evident that the West
did not have complete knowledge of Iran’s capabilities. Thus, these countries could not be fully certain
of the outcome if a military conflict broke out. Cooperation through the nuclear deal in this case was
more advantageous than a competitive approach towards Iran. In this regard, the nuclear agreement
diminished the military threat that Iran faces because giving up its nuclear program would eliminate
motivation for states to launch an offensive attack against it. Despite uncertainty about Iran’s
motivations, the agreement created stability and room for cooperation by reducing Iran’s insecurity.
Glaser’s second argument was that “security was much more closely correlated with mission
capabilities than with power.” States, in order to increase security, should consider their ability to turn
political influence into military mission capability in the context of the current policy options. With
these conditions, cooperative options can outweigh competitive ones as more desirable and feasible.
In the case of Iran, interviews of American military leaders and the results of war games demonstrated
25 Charles Glaser. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” December 18, 2011.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 10