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Global Investor<br />
Expert know-how for Credit Suisse investment clients August to October 2004<br />
Global strategy Difficult times<br />
Alternative investments Hedge funds coming of age<br />
Equities Where’s the impetus?<br />
Fixed income Fundamental data lend support<br />
Services Practical asset-management mandate<br />
Topics Japan/technology/Landesbanks<br />
GROWTH<br />
L<br />
Investment structures<br />
Alternative<br />
energy sources<br />
Slowdown<br />
H<br />
Purchasing power<br />
Oil price shock<br />
Squeeze<br />
China<br />
Adaptation process<br />
Global economy<br />
FINANCIAL MARKETS<br />
Production factors<br />
ENERGY BOTTLENECK
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Editorial—3<br />
<strong>Energy</strong> squeeze: A brake on the global economy<br />
In the globalized economy of the twenty-first century, cheap labor<br />
is in effectively unlimited supply. But other factors of production,<br />
including raw materials, transport capacity, and above all energy,<br />
are creating a <strong>bottleneck</strong> that cannot be relieved in the short<br />
term. It is this <strong>bottleneck</strong>, rather than US consumer debt levels,<br />
or Fed action, which will bring to an end the economic expansion<br />
that has underpinned the equity-market recovery seen over<br />
the last eighteen months.<br />
Clear, widespread slowdown in growth<br />
Measures by the Chinese authorities to choke back activity and<br />
relieve domestic shortages were only the first installment of this<br />
process. The next installment is just about to happen, as high<br />
oil prices start to erode consumer purchasing power in the USA<br />
and elsewhere. The result will be a clear and widespread slowing<br />
of the global economic expansion, gradual at first, but becoming<br />
very clear as we move into next year. This is a difficult<br />
moment for financial markets, with equity investors having to face<br />
the adverse implications of far slower or even negative earnings<br />
growth, while bond yields have to factor in a cyclical rise in inflation<br />
that is likely to turn out higher than expected. Over significant<br />
parts of the next several months, wise investors will be in<br />
cash, or investment structures whose returns are not linked to<br />
overall market levels. Because the current oil price shock largely<br />
reflects market forces rather than OPEC supply disruptions,<br />
a self-correcting process will eventually occur. The cyclical slowdown<br />
in the world economy will provide some short-term relief,<br />
but by itself will reverse only a part of the rise in oil prices seen<br />
over the last twelve months. A full reversal will take many years.<br />
The energy profligacy of US consumers, fostered by years of<br />
relatively low prices, will unwind, but only gradually. Over an even<br />
longer period, China and other emerging nations will de-emphasize<br />
the role of automobiles in their development process, and<br />
alternative energy sources, such as bio-fuels, will proliferate and<br />
their costs will fall in the meantime.<br />
Bull markets similar to 1990s not in sight<br />
Structural changes of this disruptive type make it most unlikely<br />
that we will see a return to the bull markets seen in both equities<br />
and bonds over much of the 1990s. But they will create many<br />
exciting opportunities for investors prepared to seek them out.<br />
Giles Keating, Head of Global Research
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Contents—4<br />
Global strategy<br />
Growing risk in the equity markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07<br />
Growth momentum is starting to weaken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
US dollar in state of suspense amid rate hikes . . . . . . . . . . . . 12<br />
Forecasts at a glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<br />
Technical analysis of world markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
Special topic The Japanese odyssey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18<br />
Alternative investments<br />
The hedge fund industry is coming of age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25<br />
Life Portfolio: Ideal instrument for estate planning . . . . . . . . . 28<br />
Equities<br />
Equity markets:<br />
No clear trend due to high level of uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . 31<br />
USA: Mixed bag of results and higher energy prices . . . . . . . . 33<br />
Europe: Brief pro-cyclical phase following<br />
the turnaround in US interest rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36<br />
Switzerland: A straggler in the second half of the year? . . . . . . 38<br />
SMI stocks at glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40<br />
Topic Technology stocks still make an interesting alternative . . . . 42<br />
Asia excluding Japan: Looking for signs of a soft landing . . . . 46<br />
Fixed income<br />
Sound fundamental data support corporate bonds . . . . . . . . . .49<br />
Active management is more important than ever . . . . . . . . . . . 52<br />
Bond selection list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54<br />
Emerging-market bonds: Limited upside potential . . . . . . . . . . 56<br />
Topic German Landesbanks:<br />
No guaranteed ratings after 19 July 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58<br />
Services<br />
Interview with Andreas Russenberger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62<br />
Author index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64<br />
Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66<br />
Normalization of lofty growth<br />
rates<br />
Good times for alternative<br />
investments?<br />
No sustained upmove<br />
on the horizon<br />
Improved overall returns<br />
on corporate bonds<br />
Professional investing with<br />
an asset-management mandate<br />
Product offers from Credit Suisse<br />
Pictet Funds – Japanese Equities P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<br />
JP Morgan Fleming Europe Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<br />
ACM International Health Care Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41<br />
Credit Suisse Commodity Fund Plus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41<br />
Dexia Bonds International C Cap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51<br />
RMF Convertibles Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Global agenda<br />
30 August to 2 September 2004<br />
Republican National Convention in New York:<br />
Big show for President Bush<br />
14 September 2004<br />
59th session of the UN General Assembly:<br />
New York welcomes world leaders
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Global strategy<br />
If equity markets follow the same pattern this time, we could see a period<br />
of 4 to 5 years of volatility, with no clear direction either way<br />
Most global leading indicators suggest that growth rates will return<br />
to normal, rather than decline massively<br />
How quickly US key rates return to a reasonable level depends, to a large<br />
extent, on inflation and employment trends
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—7<br />
Growing risk in the equity markets<br />
Bond yields will probably rise slightly by the end of the year, and we would not<br />
be surprised to see the stock markets suffer some marked losses in autumn.<br />
Despite the difficult environment, we think there will still be some good buying<br />
opportunities. Giles Keating<br />
Looking ahead to the end of this year, our forecasts are that bond<br />
yields will rise, taking the US ten-year Treasury to around 5%<br />
(compared to some 4.25% at the time of writing). For equities, we<br />
see a significant risk of a marked fall of around 10% (compared<br />
to the levels at the time of writing; i.e., around 1,070 on the S&P<br />
500, 2,600 on the DJ Stoxx 50). In this environment, our initial recommendation<br />
is for investors to hold short-dated or floating-rate<br />
bonds and to reduce outright exposure to equities, holding instead<br />
products offering exposure to equity volatility and based on strategies<br />
that balance a long position in one part of the equity market<br />
against a short position elsewhere. On currencies, we are mildly<br />
bearish on the dollar at its levels at the time of writing (CHF 1.25,<br />
EUR 1.22).<br />
Figure 1<br />
Global growth has peaked<br />
Source: Datastream, CSFB<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
–2<br />
–4<br />
YoY %<br />
Don’t miss the buying opportunities<br />
Higher bond yields and weaker equity markets should offer attractive<br />
entry opportunities as we move toward the end of this<br />
year. Specifically, we would look to buy bonds at around 5% for<br />
the US 10-year Treasury, or 4.75% for German Bunds, and to buy<br />
equities with the S&P 500 at around 1,000 or the DJ Stoxx 50 at<br />
2,300. At these levels, we believe that equities would offer reasonable<br />
medium-term value. We also consider the bond yield levels<br />
mentioned to be well above the figures likely to prevail<br />
throughout most of 2005 as growth slows and a new deflationary<br />
scare emerges. However, looking longer-term to 2006 and beyond,<br />
we think bond yields could rise substantially above the 5%<br />
level, but that is an issue that can be addressed nearer the time.<br />
Central to these investment recommendations is a paradox<br />
that we perceive in current asset prices. We estimate that the<br />
economic growth required to underpin current equity valuations<br />
would probably generate more inflation than is implied by current<br />
bond yields. If this is correct, then there will be disappointment,<br />
either for bond or equity investors, or both.<br />
We think the most likely scenario is that, over the next two or<br />
three months, growth will at least be strong enough to support<br />
current equity prices. If this were right, however, it would imply<br />
more inflation pressure than is currently discounted by bond<br />
yields, and so those yields would have to rise. Interest-rate<br />
increases by the Fed and other central banks would also be more<br />
rapid than currently expected. After a time, bond investors would<br />
become reassured by this tough action, allowing yields to start<br />
declining, but equities would suffer. The result could be a sharp,<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
01/94<br />
Global IP<br />
Logrithimic scale<br />
Trend = 6.4%<br />
01/96<br />
Figure 2<br />
Real equity returns at lower end of range<br />
on a long-term comparison<br />
Source: Datastream, CSFB<br />
01/98<br />
1853<br />
1863<br />
1873<br />
1883<br />
1893<br />
1903<br />
1913<br />
1923<br />
1933<br />
1943<br />
1953<br />
1963<br />
1973<br />
1983<br />
1993<br />
2003<br />
Real equity return<br />
01/00<br />
01/02<br />
01/04
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—8<br />
decisive move downward in equity prices some time in autumn,<br />
and a spike in volatility.<br />
Inflation pressure likely to increase<br />
We have just entered a new stage of the global economic cycle –<br />
one that creates the conditions for this kind of instability. From<br />
early 2003 until the middle of this year, economic growth was accelerating,<br />
underpinning equity prices with the prospect of faster<br />
corporate earnings. As growth increased, it began to run well<br />
above the pace at which capacity was growing, so the amount of<br />
slack in the world economy was progressively reduced. This started<br />
to impact inflation from spring 2004 onward, and the rally in<br />
equities stalled out. However, the downside impact was blunted<br />
by the fact that output growth was still accelerating.<br />
Over the summer, however, we have reached a new stage in<br />
the cycle, potentially less benign. Global growth reached a peak<br />
(about 7% for world industrial production, Figure 1) and has now<br />
started to slow. Compared to the first half of the year, this slowdown<br />
carries a greater risk that company earnings will disappoint.<br />
Yet, because the slowdown is happening very gradually, the margin<br />
of spare capacity is still falling and intensifying inflationary<br />
pressure – even though the monthly data on this are, as usual, erratic.<br />
With less and less slack in the world economy, we think inflation<br />
pressure will be worse in the third quarter than it was in the<br />
second, and worse again in the fourth. An adverse reaction in<br />
bond markets and in Fed policy, and from there into equities,<br />
seems the likely outcome.<br />
Start of a long-term phase of volatility?<br />
These cyclical influences can also be placed in a longer-term context.<br />
The stock market bubble that reached its zenith at the start<br />
of 2000 took equities to a position of extreme overvaluation. It<br />
also pushed the real total return on equities far above the 6.4%<br />
trend line it has followed for 150 years (Figure 2). The collapse<br />
that followed up to March 2003 and the subsequent partial recovery<br />
mean that, at the time of writing, equities are close to fair<br />
value (based on consensus earnings expectations and current<br />
bond yield levels), and also puts equity total returns back close to<br />
the trend line.<br />
These observations do not give a sense of comfort. In the<br />
current environment of rising central bank rates, potentially higher<br />
bond yields and gradually slowing growth, one would expect<br />
equity prices to stand below fair value. And following a period of<br />
excess, such as that at the end of the 1990s, we would expect<br />
prices to fall back to well below trend, not merely close to it.<br />
Following the previous four great bear markets in equity history,<br />
(Figure 3), each lasting about three years (as this time),<br />
there was a partial recovery for about one year. After that, there<br />
was a period of four or five years, when equities showed no medium-term<br />
direction either up or down, but did have substantial<br />
volatility at times, and only after that did they finally stage a convincing<br />
recovery. If the same pattern is followed this time, we are<br />
just entering that four-to-five year middle phase, during which equities<br />
should offer value, only if bought after significant downmoves.<br />
|<br />
Figure 3<br />
Major historical bear markets<br />
Source: Datastream, CSFB<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
Indexed to 100 at start of each equity bear market<br />
Years from<br />
start 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8<br />
March 2000– Dec 1972–80<br />
Aug 1929–37 Dec 1915–23<br />
Dec 1952–60
Global agenda<br />
4 to 5 October 2004<br />
IMF and World Bank 2004 annual meeting<br />
in Washington:<br />
Is the world economy picking up?<br />
9 October 2004<br />
Presidential elections scheduled<br />
in Afghanistan:<br />
A real chance for democracy?
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—10<br />
Growth momentum is starting to weaken<br />
There are signs that world economic growth momentum<br />
has reached its peak. Climbing inflation rates have increasingly stepped<br />
back into the spotlight again. Beat Schumacher<br />
The worldwide economic picture continues to be marked by solid<br />
growth rates in the USA as well as in Asia and a moderate expansion<br />
in the euro zone. Nevertheless, the leading indicator for<br />
the OECD countries, for example, is signaling that growth momentum<br />
has likely reached its pinnacle (Figure 1). But the lion’s<br />
share of leading economic indicators points more toward normalization<br />
of the very high growth rates, rather than a sharp decline.<br />
This assessment has also been underpinned by the price trend of<br />
economically sensitive industrial metals. Metals prices have declined<br />
slightly from their peak in February, though they continue<br />
to hover at a high level. The flip side of the coin with respect to<br />
robust economic growth and rising energy prices is climbing inflation<br />
rates. While rising inflation in many countries is attributable<br />
primarily to increasing energy prices, the core rate (headline<br />
inflation, excluding energy and food prices), particularly in the<br />
USA, shows a trend geared to the upside. Amid this environment,<br />
most central banks will probably continue – or commence in time<br />
– tightening the interest-rate screw.<br />
Inflation climbing in the USA<br />
The spurt in the core rate of consumer prices since the beginning<br />
of this year, from 1.1% to 1.9% in June, shows that the increase<br />
in inflation in the USA is not merely the result of energy prices. Although<br />
this surprisingly strong and precipitous jump in inflation is<br />
partially attributable to temporary factors, the future trend in the<br />
core inflation rate should continue to pursue an upward path. Various<br />
company surveys indicate that firms have recouped a little<br />
more capacity for passing on price increases. Unit labor costs<br />
should tend to have an inflationary impact as well, which can be<br />
traced to the resurgence in wage growth and especially the expected<br />
substantial drop in productivity growth. Productivity generally<br />
sees the strongest growth at the outset of a economic upswing<br />
since companies attempt to meet the higher demand with<br />
improving efficiency, holding back on creating new jobs. Thanks<br />
to the robust economic trend, however, average weekly hours<br />
rose in the second quarter, by an annualized 2%, compared with<br />
the previous quarter. Figure 2 shows that productivity growth usually<br />
decreases just as soon as input (i. e., average weekly hours)<br />
starts to expand noticeably again.<br />
US GDP growth is underpinned across a broad front and<br />
should reach roughly 3.5% in 2005, which implies a certain slow-<br />
Figure 1<br />
OECD: Growth momentum should have reached<br />
its pinnacle<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
– 2<br />
– 4<br />
– 6<br />
Annual change in %<br />
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
OECD leading<br />
indicator<br />
OECD Industrial production<br />
(6 months lagging)
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—11<br />
down in growth. Fear looms in many circles over a slump in personal<br />
consumption, against the backdrop of advancing interest<br />
rates. Indeed, private household debt levels are high, though this<br />
factor is somewhat overblown, in our view. For instance, higher<br />
rates not only constitute a growing interest burden for households,<br />
but also result in greater interest income. Moreover, a<br />
good 70% share of outstanding debt (particularly mortgage loans)<br />
is transacted at fixed interest rates, so rising rates do not directly<br />
result in higher debt-servicing costs. Although increasing interest<br />
rates shrink disposable incomes and hamper consumer<br />
spending somewhat, such effects should be offset, to a large extent,<br />
by growing employment levels and rising wages.<br />
Euro zone: Spark in the export sector has not ignited<br />
the domestic economy<br />
In contrast, in the euro zone the PMI employment subindex has<br />
yet to paint a brighter picture of the labor market situation. This<br />
is manifest in the sluggish trend in personal consumption. The<br />
quite robust development in the export sector has thus far failed<br />
to spill over into the domestic economy. This applies especially to<br />
Germany, while in France consumer spending shows a somewhat<br />
more favorable trend. Weak personal consumption in Germany<br />
can be attributed to the uncertainties surrounding the labor market<br />
and the course of politics (i. e., the future of the social insurance<br />
system), as well as to the climbing inflation rates there. Still,<br />
inflationary pressure is hardly likely to mount, against the backdrop<br />
of moderate economic growth, and we expect inflation rates<br />
to retreat again starting in autumn due to a positive base effect.<br />
Figure 2<br />
USA: Productivity growth should weaken<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
-6<br />
Annual change in %<br />
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04<br />
Productivity<br />
GDP growth<br />
Average weekly hours<br />
Japan continues to provide positive surprises<br />
The prevailing trend in Asia paints a more upbeat portrait, where<br />
economic growth should remain robust as long as US investment<br />
activity continues to expand strongly. Of course, China constitutes<br />
one factor of uncertainty. Up to now, the measures that the government<br />
has implemented to cool down the country’s overheating<br />
economic locomotive seem to be showing the desired effect.<br />
Nevertheless, we would advise continuing to keep a close eye on<br />
the situation. Meanwhile, Japan continues to show high growth<br />
momentum. Still, we foresee a danger that momentum could<br />
diminish markedly in 2005, with no rapid trend reversal emerging<br />
with respect to the deflationary trend. |<br />
Figure 3<br />
Global trend in consumer prices<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
4<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
Annual change in %<br />
0<br />
– 1<br />
– 2<br />
99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
USA Euroland Japan
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—12<br />
US dollar in state of suspense amid rate hikes<br />
Interest-rate hikes draw liquidity from the financial markets. We therefore prefer<br />
currencies of countries with current-account surpluses, such as the Swiss franc,<br />
euro and yen, versus the US dollar. Marcus Hettinger<br />
The first half of 2004 was marked by revisions to expectations for<br />
interest-rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve. The accelerated<br />
build-up in employment levels in the USA in the spring had<br />
prompted market participants to conclude that the Fed would carry<br />
out an initial rate increase already in the summer. This adjustment<br />
in interest-rate expectations also subsequently led to a cyclically<br />
induced US-dollar rally, as we had anticipated. With the initial<br />
rate hike and additional moves on the interest-rate front by the<br />
American central bank priced into the markets, new issues should<br />
drive the foreign-exchange markets in the second half of the year.<br />
The consensus view is that the Fed will follow up on the first rate<br />
hike with additional interest increases. Nevertheless, the magnitude<br />
and pace with respect to returning the US federal funds rate<br />
to a level of normalcy are, to a large extent, contingent on the<br />
inflation and employment trends. Should inflation, in particular,<br />
continue to climb substantially – a scenario that we do not expect<br />
– the Fed would likely adopt a more aggressive stance on rate<br />
hiking than is currently priced into the markets, which could<br />
underpin the dollar.<br />
Further appreciation of Swiss franc versus the euro?<br />
The US current-account deficit is likely to garner more attention<br />
again since it continues to be nearly entirely financed by inflows<br />
of foreign capital into the bond market. Interest-rate differentials<br />
and the expected shifts in these differentials should thus continue<br />
to influence exchange-rate movements. The burgeoning US<br />
current-account deficit and the historically low real interest rates,<br />
even compared with other countries, still constitute the Achilles<br />
heel for the dollar because interest-rate hikes draw liquidity from<br />
the global financial markets. The European central banks should<br />
follow in the Fed’s footsteps, tightening their monetary policies in<br />
the course of this year (Figure 1). Currencies of countries with<br />
current-account deficits that are dependent on foreign capital inflows<br />
will probably underperform currencies of nations with current-account<br />
surpluses, amid an environment marked by climbing<br />
interest rates worldwide. This phenomenon was also seen in<br />
1994, when the Fed rang in the last significant rate-hiking cycle.<br />
At that time, the euro, Swiss franc and Japanese yen outperformed<br />
other currencies of countries with current-account deficits<br />
(Figure 2). In Europe, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) carried out<br />
its initial interest-rate increase already in June, and the Swedish<br />
Riksbank, as well as the European Central Bank (ECB) at the be-<br />
Figure 1<br />
Interest-rate hikes also expected in Europe<br />
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
Basis points<br />
USA<br />
UK<br />
Australia<br />
New Zealand<br />
Current-account deficits<br />
of countries<br />
Euro zone<br />
Interest rate hike expectations between December 2004 and March 2005 (futures)<br />
Japan<br />
Switzerland<br />
Canada<br />
Sweden<br />
Current-account surpluses<br />
of countries<br />
Norway
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—13<br />
ginning of 2005, is likely to follow suit. The Bank of Canada (BOC)<br />
too should make an upmove on the interest-rate front in the autumn<br />
since the country is benefiting from the US economic upswing<br />
through its close trade links with its southern neighbor.<br />
Hence, the Swiss franc, euro, Swedish krona and Canadian dollar<br />
harbor further upside potential versus the greenback, in our view.<br />
Since the SNB kicked off its rate-tightening cycle ahead of the<br />
ECB, we expect the Swiss franc to also gain further ground against<br />
the euro. We believe that the Canadian dollar continues to look attractive<br />
thanks to the country’s twin current account and government<br />
budget surplus, the upcoming rate hike by the BOC, its commodities<br />
exports and the fair valuation (purchasing power parity).<br />
Japan, too, shows a current-account surplus, so the yen is likely<br />
to pick up territory amid an environment marked by a weaker US<br />
dollar. The signs are mounting that the export-induced upswing in<br />
Japan is increasingly spilling over into the domestic economy. Still,<br />
as long as deflation continues to persist, we are unlikely to see any<br />
effective tightening of monetary policy in Japan. The risks to our<br />
positive outlook on the yen are particularly a pullout by foreign investors<br />
from the Japanese stock market due to a slowdown in economic<br />
growth in Asia, persistently high oil prices and a noticeably<br />
more aggressive interest-hiking stance by the Fed.<br />
Figure 2<br />
1994: Euro, Swiss franc and yen outperform<br />
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
95<br />
90<br />
Index<br />
02/94<br />
6 months after the first Fed rate hike<br />
04/94<br />
06/94<br />
08/94<br />
10/94<br />
12/94<br />
02/95<br />
Housing market constitutes risk for sterling<br />
The Bank of England (BOE) should continue to boost its key interest<br />
rates. Consequently, the absolute yield advantage is likely<br />
to underpin the pound, though the signs are growing stronger that<br />
the real estate market is on the verge of cooling down. Declining<br />
housing prices should lead to less pronounced rate hikes by the<br />
BOE, against the backdrop of rising household debt levels. In our<br />
view, the following factors especially speak in favor of a strengthening<br />
euro versus the pound: the impending end to the rate-hiking<br />
cycle in England, the sizable trade deficit, the slowdown in<br />
growth as a result of climbing key interest rates and the slight<br />
overvaluation of the British pound versus the euro, as well as the<br />
risks looming over the housing market (Figure 3).<br />
Exchange-rate fluctuations present opportunities<br />
The volatility in the foreign-exchange markets should remain high in<br />
the second half of the year as well. Uncertainty surrounding the extent<br />
of rate hikes by the Fed, against the background of a slowdown<br />
in economic growth and lofty crude-oil prices, presents investors<br />
with new challenges. In addition, the US presidential elections are<br />
approaching in November. We expect a close outcome in the race<br />
to the White House, so making assessments of the impact of a new<br />
administration on the dollar (dollar, fiscal and trade policies) is still difficult<br />
at present. Nevertheless, investors should perceive these<br />
exchange-rate swings not just as risks, but as opportunities too.<br />
Active foreign-exchange management can protect against currency<br />
losses (hedging), as well as even lead to greater returns.<br />
Figure 3<br />
Housing prices a risk factor for the pound<br />
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
0.90<br />
0.85<br />
0.80<br />
0.75<br />
0.70<br />
0.65<br />
0.60<br />
0.55<br />
0.50<br />
0.45<br />
0.40<br />
EUR/GBP<br />
EUR/USD<br />
NOK/USD<br />
NZD/USD<br />
83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03<br />
EUR/GBP exchange rate<br />
UK housing price inflation<br />
(r.h.s., inverted)<br />
CHF/USD<br />
GBP/USD<br />
CAD/USD<br />
JPY/USD<br />
AUD/USD<br />
SEK/USD<br />
YoY in %<br />
–10<br />
–5<br />
0<br />
5<br />
10<br />
15<br />
20<br />
25<br />
30<br />
35<br />
40
Forecasts at a glance<br />
3-month eurorates in %<br />
End-2003 02/08/2004 3 month 1 12 month 1<br />
USA 1.15 1.69 2.00–2.20 3.10–3.30<br />
Euroland 2.12 2.12 2.20–2.40 2.60–2.80<br />
UK 4.04 4.95 5.20–5.40 5.00–5.20<br />
Switzerland 0.26 0.53 0.65–0.85 1.40–1.60<br />
Japan 0.06 0.05 0.03–0.07 0.05–0.10<br />
Yield on 10-year government bonds<br />
USA 4.25 4.45 4.70–4.90 4.30–4.50<br />
Euroland 4.29 4.20 4.30–4.50 4.10–4.30<br />
UK 4.80 5.09 5.20–5.40 4.70–4.90<br />
Switzerland 2.72 2.78 2.70–2.90 2.50–2.70<br />
Japan 1.36 1.89 1.60–1.80 1.80–2.00<br />
Exchange rates<br />
USD<br />
EUR/USD 1.26 1.20 1.25–1.27 1.29–1.31<br />
USD/JPY 107 111 108–110 99–101<br />
GBP/USD 1.79 1.83 1.83–1.85 1.81–1.83<br />
CHF<br />
USD/CHF 1.24 1.28 1.21–1.23 1.13–1.15<br />
EUR/CHF 1.56 1.54 1.51–1.53 1.47–1.49<br />
GBP/CHF 2.21 2.34 2.23–2.25 2.05–2.07<br />
JPY/CHF 1.16 1.15 1.11–1.13 1.13–1.15<br />
Stock indices<br />
End-2003 02/08/2004 12 month 2<br />
USA S&P 500 1111.92 1106.62 0<br />
Canada TSE 300 8220.89 8458.07 0<br />
Japan TOPIX 1043.69 1135.64 +<br />
Hong Kong Hang Seng 12575.94 12201.39 0<br />
Singapore STI 1764.52 1887.41 0<br />
Germany DAX 3965.16 3862.71 +<br />
France CAC 40 3557.90 3623.79 0<br />
UK FTSE 100 4476.87 4415.73 0<br />
Italy MIB 30 26715.00 27571.00 0<br />
Spain IBEX 35 7737.20 7869.00 +<br />
Netherlands AEX 337.65 325.87 0<br />
Sweden Affersval. 188.36 200.59 0<br />
Switzerland SMI 5487.80 5537.80 0<br />
1<br />
Forecasts<br />
2 Relative to MSCI World: + = outperformer 0 = market performer – = underperformer Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse
Global agenda<br />
1 November 2004<br />
New EU president assumes office:<br />
Lots of work for José Manuel Barroso<br />
2 November 2004<br />
US elections:<br />
Photofinish for Bush and Kerry?
Technical analysis of world markets<br />
The stock markets paint an unstable picture in the medium term, but a rally into<br />
autumn is probable. US bond yields are likely to trend weaker until the beginning of<br />
September. Beat Grunder<br />
USA<br />
Upmove with limited potential in autumn<br />
still probable<br />
The S&P 500 Index has been consolidating in a comparatively narrow<br />
range since the beginning of the year, with the indicators displaying<br />
a mixed picture. The medium-term momentum oscillator,<br />
which reflected the initial attempts at a new upmove in mid-June, has<br />
flattened again and is pursuing a neutral path in line with the trend.<br />
The long-term constellation is conflicting. A declining oscillator stands<br />
against a still-intact price trend that is geared to the upside. Against<br />
this backdrop, we expect the index to still test the key threshold located<br />
at 1,070/1,075 before the middle of the third quarter 2004,<br />
ahead of a new (albeit limited) rally into autumn. Lines of resistance<br />
are situated at 1,180 1,210, and support levels are located at 1,070<br />
and 1,010/1,020.<br />
1750<br />
1500<br />
1250<br />
1000<br />
750<br />
S&P 500 Index<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Medium-term momentum<br />
Long-term momentum<br />
30<br />
15<br />
0<br />
–15<br />
–30<br />
Source: Metastock<br />
Switzerland<br />
Indicators are waning, but a new rally<br />
is probable in August<br />
The Swiss Market Index is showing a technically comparable picture<br />
to the S&P 500 Index. Nevertheless, the intermediate-term configuration<br />
is somewhat more clearly pointing downward since the failed<br />
attempt at a turnaround in mid-June. The sliding long-term indicator,<br />
also executing a top at the beginning of the second quarter 2004,<br />
confirms the unstable constellation. Merely the long-term price trend,<br />
which turned to the upside in the third quarter of 2003, is still intact.<br />
The conflicting technical structure points to further temporary weakness<br />
(with support levels situated at 5,380 and 5,260). In the course<br />
of the month of August, the market should then pursue a countermove<br />
into autumn. Technical lines of resistance are located at 5,800<br />
and 6,220.<br />
9000<br />
7500<br />
6000<br />
4500<br />
3000<br />
Swiss Market Index<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Medium-term momentum<br />
Long-term momentum<br />
30<br />
15<br />
0<br />
–15<br />
–30<br />
Source: Metastock<br />
Japan<br />
Long-term trend still heading upward<br />
The Nikkei 225 Index is moving sideways in a triangle pattern, on the<br />
heels of its second failed attempt to boldly break through the key<br />
technical support threshold situated at around 12,000 index points.<br />
The positive long-term technical picture weakened somewhat in the<br />
second quarter of 2004, but without endangering the price trend. The<br />
medium-term technical configuration is neutral and does not emit any<br />
clear indications. Accordingly, expectations into August are geared<br />
toward a further consolidation in the aforementioned triangle pattern<br />
and a renewed assault on the 12,000 threshold (technical lines of resistance<br />
are at 12,400 and 12,700). A premature retreat below the<br />
10,900 mark would threaten this positive intermediate-term scenario.<br />
22<br />
18<br />
14<br />
10<br />
6<br />
Nikkei 225 (in thousands)<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Medium-term momentum<br />
Long-term momentum<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
–20<br />
–40<br />
Source: Metastock
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Global strategy—17<br />
Gold<br />
Consolidation at a high level,<br />
long-term trend still intact<br />
The gold price corrected and tested the support level at 370 in the<br />
wake of its second failed attempt to break through the key line of resistance<br />
located at 420/430. The picture with regard to the momentum<br />
indicator remains conflicting. Although the climbing mediumterm<br />
indicator shows sustained strength, the falling long-term<br />
momentum oscillator is likely to temporarily weaken the upward<br />
thrust. We therefore expect a continuation of the consolidation at a<br />
high level, with a renewed test of the aforementioned key line of resistance.<br />
Toward the end of the third quarter, the intermediate-term<br />
cycle could turn downward once again and, together with the longterm<br />
indicator, spark a decline in the gold price.<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
Gold (USD/ounce)<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Medium-term momentum<br />
Long-term momentum<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
–10<br />
Source: Metastock<br />
US dollar<br />
New medium-term bottom expected in August<br />
Since the last interim high at 1.3225 in May, the US dollar has executed<br />
a steady downmove, testing the support level at 1.22. The<br />
medium- and long-term price trends continue to be aligned to the<br />
downside and have been confirmed by the corresponding momentum<br />
oscillators as well. Still, noteworthy is the fact that the downward<br />
thrust of the indicator is flattening, and the intermediate-term cycle,<br />
in particular, will execute a bottom probably at the beginning of August.<br />
In this regard, we would not rule out a preceding brief slide by<br />
the greenback into oversold territory below 1.20 (support levels located<br />
at 1.1920 and 1.1800), though a new upmove should subsequently<br />
take hold. Key lines of resistance are situated at 1.2850 and<br />
1.3250.<br />
2.0<br />
1.8<br />
1.6<br />
1.4<br />
1.2<br />
CHF/USD<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Medium-term momentum<br />
Long-term momentum<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
–10<br />
–20<br />
Source: Metastock<br />
US market interest rates<br />
Bond yields should continue to trend toward<br />
weakness until September<br />
The yield on the 10-year Treasury benchmark bond has clearly declined<br />
again on the back of the interim high at 4.85% reached in<br />
June, recently breaking through the technical support level located at<br />
4.45%. The medium-term indicator has commenced a new downmove,<br />
which should prevail probably until end-August or beginning of<br />
September. Accordingly, yields are likely to retreat further toward the<br />
next support level at 4.10%. Following temporary stabilization, yields<br />
should turn to the upside, thereby continuing to pursue the turnaround<br />
in place since 2003, in line with the further rising momentum<br />
oscillator in the long term.<br />
7<br />
6<br />
5<br />
4<br />
3<br />
Yield on 10-year US Treasury benchmark bond<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Medium-term momentum<br />
Long-term momentum<br />
30<br />
15<br />
0<br />
–15<br />
–30<br />
Source: Metastock
Special topic<br />
“Risks to the recovery in Japan are rather<br />
underestimated than overestimated.” Christoph Fehr
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Special topic—19<br />
The Japanese odyssey<br />
Global and local influencing factors should sustain the recovery<br />
of the Japanese economy in the second half of the year. Despite continued<br />
good prospects, however, we think the economic rally still faces<br />
considerable risks. Christoph Fehr, Ulrich Kaiser, CEFA<br />
In the wake of the 1985 Plaza Accord, the Japanese yen appreciated<br />
massively. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) responded to this by<br />
easing its monetary policy. Between January 1986 and February<br />
1987, the BoJ cut its discount rate from 5% to 2.5%, thus laying<br />
the foundation for a speculative bubble. Stock and real estate<br />
prices subsequently exploded. The BoJ took countermeasures<br />
and raised the discount rate to 6% over the course of 1989 and<br />
1990. This burst the equity and real estate bubble and ushered in<br />
a protracted period of economic stagnation that was sporadically<br />
interrupted by brief recovery phases.<br />
The Japanese government and the BoJ attempted to revive<br />
the economy by implementing a combination of monetarist and<br />
Keynesian approaches. This economic policy was flanked by<br />
measures to protect the banking system and by additional structure-preserving<br />
interventions. Table 1 on page 20 provides an<br />
overview of the key monetary and fiscal policy decisions made<br />
over the past decade or so.<br />
Theoretical basis for evaluating Japanese economic policy<br />
The business cycle theory of the Austrian school of macroeconomics<br />
derives substantially from the work of Ludwig von Mises.<br />
The interest-rate level is set in the free market by the degree to<br />
which consumers prefer a present good over a future good. This<br />
choice between saving or consuming today as opposed to saving<br />
and investing tomorrow determines the degree to which money<br />
gets saved and invested. When central banks artificially depress<br />
the rate of interest, this has grave consequences. Businessmen<br />
notice that interest rates are falling and react accordingly. They<br />
begin to invest more in producer goods and lengthy production<br />
processes because their financing costs are now lower. Businessmen<br />
react the way they would if savings had genuinely increased.<br />
They expand their investments in plant and equipment,<br />
building materials, construction, and so on. The newly created<br />
money gets invested. This investment activity results in rising<br />
costs, including wage expenses. When the new money gets paid<br />
out in the form of higher wages, problems arise. The bulk of the<br />
increased income that flows to consumers is put toward consumption<br />
because their propensity to save has not really increased.<br />
Hence, not enough money is saved to buy the newly produced<br />
capital goods. It thus becomes clear that businesses have<br />
misinvested the limited savings available. This reveals itself in a<br />
Figure 1<br />
The OECD leading indicator points to<br />
a weakening economy…<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
–2<br />
–4<br />
–6<br />
–8<br />
Figure 2<br />
…possibly due to exports<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
–2<br />
–4<br />
–6<br />
–8<br />
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
OECD leading indicator<br />
GDP growth (r.h.s.)<br />
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
OECD leading indicator<br />
Export growth (r.h.s.)<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
–2<br />
–4<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
–5<br />
–10<br />
–15
Table 1<br />
Year Month Action<br />
1992 –1995 The government enacts a series of expansionary fiscal packages.<br />
1994 Income taxes are temporarily lowered.<br />
1995 The discount rate is cut to 0.5%.<br />
1997 April The consumption tax is raised from 2% to 5%.<br />
December Parliament enacts the Fiscal Structural Reform Law, which is aimed at reducing Japan’s budget deficit to 3%<br />
of GDP or less by fiscal 2003/2004.<br />
1999 February The BoJ cuts the overnight rate to nearly 0%.<br />
March<br />
The Financial Reconstruction Company injects JPY 7.5 trillion of public funds into Japan’s 15 largest banks.<br />
The government passes a fiscal package of approximately JPY 18 trillion.<br />
1998 January Parliament enacts temporary tax cuts amounting to JPY 2 trillion.<br />
November The government passes a fiscal package of approximately JPY 23.9 trillion.<br />
December The government nationalizes the Nippon Credit Bank and passes a tax reform bill aimed at cutting taxes by JPY 9.3 trillion<br />
in 1999/2000.<br />
2000 August The BoJ announces a hike in the overnight rate to 0.25%.<br />
October<br />
The government passes a fiscal package of approximately JPY 11 trillion.<br />
2001 February The BoJ lowers the discount rate to 0.35% and then to 0.25%. The overnight rate is pared back to 0.15%.<br />
March<br />
The BoJ reinstitutes its zero-interest-rate policy. It ceases to target the overnight call rate<br />
and instead sets a target for banks’ current account balances at the central bank (JPY 5 trillion).<br />
August<br />
The BoJ raises the target for current account balances at the central bank to JPY 6 trillion. The monthly volume of Japanese<br />
government bonds to be purchased outright by the BoJ is raised from JPY 400 billion to JPY 600 billion.<br />
October<br />
The government passes a fiscal package of approximately JPY 3 trillion.<br />
November The government passes a fiscal package of approximately JPY 4.5 trillion.<br />
2002 September The BoJ announces plans to purchase stocks held by the nation’s largest commercial banks.<br />
2003 April The BoJ raises the target for banks’ current account balances at the central bank to JPY 22–27 trillion.<br />
It announces that it is considering purchasing securitized loans and SME-related asset-backed securities from banks<br />
in order to facilitate the financing of small and midsize enterprises.<br />
2003 July Parliament allows life insurers to lower the guaranteed minimum return on life insurance policies.<br />
October<br />
The BoJ raises the target for current account balances at the central bank to JPY 27–32 trillion.<br />
2004 January The BoJ raises the target for current account balances at the central bank to JPY 30–35 trillion.<br />
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. EIU Country Profile; Credit Suisse<br />
sudden, sharp recession in the capital goods industry. The inflationary<br />
boom distorts the macroeconomy’s capital structure and<br />
pricing system. This business-cycle analysis reveals that the ensuing<br />
recession is not a scourge, but rather a necessary correction<br />
of the aforementioned misallocations of capital.<br />
How should governments and central banks respond to such<br />
a recession? Murray Rothbard composed the following list 2 :<br />
p The government must stop inflating the economy. The longer the<br />
government waits, the more painful the adjustment process will be.<br />
p After the inflationary boom collapses, the government must refrain<br />
from trying to reflate the economy. For even if this reflation<br />
succeeds, it will only lead to more severe consequences later on.<br />
p Struggling businesses must not be propped up.<br />
p The government must refrain from trying to hold up wages and<br />
prices.<br />
p The government should do nothing to stimulate consumption<br />
and should refrain from increasing its own expenditures. Boosting<br />
consumption would worsen the macroeconomy’s consumption/investment<br />
ratio.<br />
Prospects for the Japanese economy<br />
When we compare the measures that a government should appropriately<br />
take to sustainably lift an economy out of recession<br />
with the economic policies pursued by Japan over the past years,<br />
we see a chasm between theory and lived reality. This means that<br />
the Japanese economy is vulnerable to setbacks. We still believe<br />
that Japan’s economy will continue growing in 2005, but we think<br />
the risks to the recovery are being somewhat underestimated<br />
rather than overestimated. The early warning signs are in plain<br />
sight. The OECD leading indicator for Japan, for example, has<br />
been falling for quite some time now (Figure 1).<br />
The economic recovery additionally faces the following risks:<br />
p Exports: In China and the USA, Japan’s two biggest export markets,<br />
authorities have begun to implement measures that sooner<br />
or later are likely to weaken growth. The trend in the OECD leading<br />
indicator for Japan’s OECD export markets points to tougher<br />
times ahead for the Japanese export economy (Figure 2).<br />
p Monetary policy: Even if the BoJ maintains its free money policy<br />
for the time being, it is likely to lean more toward tightening
the monetary reins, albeit at a leisurely pace. One can only assume<br />
that a decline in money-supply growth rates will have a negative<br />
long-term impact on the economy.<br />
p Budget deficit: Japan’s national debt has ballooned to 160% of<br />
GDP. Although the government is striving to consolidate the federal<br />
budget, the recent upper house elections indicate that the<br />
political leeway for trenchant reforms is limited. However, if Japan<br />
does not credibly reduce its public debt, the country faces a looming<br />
rise in interest rates and a crowding out of private-sector investment,<br />
according to the Bank for International Settlements 3 .<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Special topic—21<br />
The stock market reflects Japan’s faulty crisis management<br />
Viewed in retrospect, the trajectory of the Nikkei 225 or the<br />
Topix could hardly better reflect Japan’s crisis management of the<br />
economic policy failure. The end-1989 Nikkei 225 stock average<br />
of 38,916, a record that still stands and which corresponded to a<br />
Topix reading of 2,881, cannot be explained by pure valuation<br />
analysis. The EPS estimate of roughly JPY 60 for the Topix at that<br />
time and the end-1989 bond yield of 5.5% would only have implied<br />
a fair value of 1,100 for the Topix, assuming that investors<br />
weren’t demanding a risk premium. Now the wheel has come full<br />
circle. After roughly a 15-year period that saw Japan suffer three<br />
recessions, numerous companies are now reaping the fruits of<br />
their restructuring measures, which were drastic in many cases.<br />
At the end of the 1980s, the banking subindex accounted for<br />
more than 25% of the Topix. Back then, 21 big banks traded on<br />
the stock exchange, and they were considered the mirror image<br />
of the Japanese economic miracle. The decline of the Japanese<br />
economy and the aftereffects of the bubble economy – such as<br />
collapsing real estate and stock prices – threw most Japanese<br />
banks into financial distress. The Long Term Credit Bank was<br />
temporarily nationalized, though it is now back on the stock exchange,<br />
under the name of Shinsei Bank, after its partial reprivatization<br />
at the start of this year. Other banks escaped this fate by<br />
merging. None of the seven major banks still standing today compare<br />
with the financial institutions of yore. Mitsubishi Tokyo Bank,<br />
a subsidiary of the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, comes closest.<br />
The mergers enabled Japanese banks to claw their way back<br />
to the international pinnacle, though only in terms of total assets.<br />
They are still miles away from the summit where profitability is<br />
concerned.<br />
Rosy earnings estimates for the current year<br />
Company forecasts for the current fiscal year are optimistic, but<br />
they are not stoking lofty expectations on the microeconomic<br />
side. One reason for the sharp 34% increase in the EPS estimate<br />
for 2004/05, to JPY 63, is the further reduction in exceptional expenses,<br />
since firms’ revaluation of real estate and equity holdings<br />
came in above plan in fiscal 2003. The aggregate revenue growth<br />
estimate of 2.7% is moderate considering the strong economy. If<br />
the consensus earnings estimate is met this year, it would mark<br />
the first time that absolute profits surpassed the stock-market<br />
boom level of 1989 (Figure 3), and this in the midst of earnings<br />
momentum that is still rising. The upward earnings trend looks set<br />
to continue into 2005/06.<br />
Top: Sony’s Aibo robot –<br />
Japan’s economy is still a hub<br />
of innovation<br />
Bottom: Outside a Tokyo bank – the<br />
banking sector should continue<br />
to benefit from the economic recovery<br />
Further upward earnings revisions likely<br />
At the end of July, major Japanese corporations began presenting<br />
their results for the first quarter (April–June) of fiscal<br />
2004/05. Given the economic conditions in Japan and in key
export markets like the USA and China, we think these interim results<br />
should come in at the upper end of expectations. In particular,<br />
the traditional export sectors – electronic goods, precision instruments<br />
and automobiles – are likely to post results that are well<br />
above target in some cases due to the advantageous currency exchange<br />
rates they enjoyed during the reporting period. Consequently,<br />
EPS estimates could once again be revised upward,<br />
which would make the Japanese stock market’s valuation look<br />
even more attractive. A similar process can also be expected in<br />
September in the runup to the release of half-year results. The<br />
half-year reporting season is all the more important because it affects<br />
the broad stock market, since the Topix companies that report<br />
on a quarterly basis are still in the minority. Hence, the halfyear<br />
results provide more representative insights than the<br />
quarterly figures, though the quarterly numbers serve as a better<br />
trend indicator.<br />
Foreign investors continue to set the tone<br />
The stock-market correction in May was solely attributable to a<br />
dearth of buyers, for with the exception a few days, foreign investors<br />
have remained faithful to the Japanese equity market and<br />
have turned into trendsetters for Japanese day traders. It was the<br />
day traders who were responsible for the record-high daily share<br />
turnover. This explains the sharp decline in trading activity in a<br />
phase in which no clear foreign-investor-driven stock-market<br />
trend is discernable. At the end of fiscal 2003, foreign investors<br />
owned a record-high 22% of the Topix’s market capitalization,<br />
surpassing Japanese private investors (21%) for the first time<br />
ever. Their future behavior will probably depend on two factors.<br />
First of all, Japanese stocks will become more attractive for them<br />
if the yen strengthens against the US dollar and/or the euro.<br />
There is a long-standing direct correlation between the Topix performance<br />
measured in US dollars and the JPY/USD exchange<br />
rate. Second, foreign investors’ level of surplus liquidity will be determined<br />
by their cost of capital (namely interest rates), which<br />
means their decisions will be substantially influenced by Federal<br />
Reserve monetary policy. Higher- or faster-than-expected rate<br />
hikes could spoil international investors’ appetite for Japanese<br />
stocks. For this reason alone, we do not expect share prices to<br />
jump as sharply as they did in fiscal 2003.<br />
While Japanese private investors were almost exclusively positioned<br />
on the seller side last fiscal year, their interest in buying<br />
appears to have returned very recently. Their renewed buying interest<br />
is more visible in the small-cap indices than in the trading<br />
volume statistics.<br />
Regardless of whether the stock market is valued using a dividend<br />
discount model or a risk premium approach, the theoretical<br />
fair value for the Topix lies above the current index level because<br />
the improved economic conditions, particularly in the domestic<br />
sector, have not only pushed up bond yields (to 1.78% for tenyear<br />
government bonds), but have also prompted earnings estimates<br />
to be raised for the new fiscal year. Both aforementioned<br />
valuation methods produce a fair value target range of<br />
1,300–1,350 for the Topix (Figure 4). On the valuation side, the<br />
biggest risk facing the stock market is an overheating of the<br />
Japanese economy or simply market expectations of such an occurrence.<br />
Either eventuality would make it impossible for the Bank<br />
of Japan to prolong its de facto zero-interest-rate policy and<br />
would thus fuel rate-hike expectations. A 50-basis-point rise in<br />
government bond yields to 2.50% could hardly be offset by cor-<br />
Figure 3<br />
EPS estimates are at a historical high<br />
Source: Datastream, IBES<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
Figure 4<br />
Excessive risk premium creates upside potential<br />
for the Topix<br />
Source: Datastream, Credit Suisse<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
–2<br />
–4<br />
–6<br />
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
EPS in JPY (12-month forecast)<br />
Topix (r.h.s.)<br />
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
Risk premium<br />
Topix (inverse, r.h.s.)<br />
3000<br />
2500<br />
2000<br />
1500<br />
1000<br />
500<br />
500<br />
1000<br />
1500<br />
2000<br />
2500<br />
3000
porate earnings growth, which means that stock-market valuations<br />
would inevitably worsen. Hence, excessively strong economic<br />
growth is the risk on the valuation side. The recently released<br />
Tankan report, which was much better than expected, and<br />
the subsequent reaction, particularly on the bond market, provided<br />
a foretaste of things to come.<br />
Banks and retailers are still the first choice<br />
Last year’s top sectors (banking, retailing, real estate and construction)<br />
have taken a breather, but we expect them to stage a<br />
comeback, even amid rising market interest rates, because the<br />
economic rally is likely to remain the major investment theme in<br />
Japan. However, we do not think that the weaker companies will<br />
post a renewed outperformance. Instead, we believe that investors<br />
will be focusing on quality, i. e. earnings stability, and will<br />
thus be eyeing valuations. Banks and retailers remain our first<br />
choice since they stand to profit the most from an economic rally.<br />
Moreover, if Japan completes the transition from deflation to<br />
inflation, the credit business, which has been very restrictive for<br />
years, could see resurging demand. We are not quite so optimistic<br />
about the real estate sector, which admittedly would also benefit<br />
from such an environment. Our somewhat more cautious view<br />
stems less from the price trend to date and is far more a reflection<br />
of the still relatively high vacancy rate for suburban commercial<br />
properties. The sharp increase in the stake that foreign investors<br />
hold in Japan’s three leading real estate firms, which has<br />
swiftly risen to well over 30%, indicates to us that much of the optimism<br />
is already priced in. We are taking a selective stance toward<br />
export-oriented companies. Since we expect the Japanese<br />
yen to rise, we would only invest in those exporters whose product<br />
assortments give them a competitive advantage and whose<br />
annual targets are already aligned to a stronger yen. |<br />
Top Picks<br />
x 100<br />
60<br />
55<br />
50<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
x 1000<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
7<br />
6<br />
5<br />
4<br />
Kao<br />
Price rel. to Topix<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Special topic—23<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
Kao — Kao is Japan’s largest manufacturer of household goods<br />
and is number two worldwide behind Procter & Gamble (USA). —<br />
The group’s product range encompasses skin-care and hair-care<br />
items, soap, toothpaste, diapers and feminine hygiene products.<br />
— The group places value on enhancing efficiency (cost controls!)<br />
and on independent, simple (direct) distribution channels. — The<br />
stock has only a low correlation to the Topix. — Kao’s excellent<br />
management and high earnings quality justify our BUY rating despite<br />
the stock’s comparatively high P/E ratio.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
JPY 2745 2765/2100 132.31/137.46 20.75/19.97 1.37%<br />
3<br />
2<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Ito-Yokado<br />
Price rel. to Topix<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
1<br />
The term “inflationary” used here does not denote a rise in a price index, but rather refers<br />
to an expansion of the money supply through the actions of the central bank and the<br />
affiliated banking system. This form of inflation differs from price inflation, which can but<br />
does not necessarily result from an expansion of the money supply.<br />
2<br />
Drawn from Murray N. Rothbard’s essay titled “Economic Depressions: Their Cause and<br />
Cure”, published on the Ludwig von Mises Institute website.<br />
3<br />
Bank for International Settlements, 74th Annual Report, p. 26.<br />
Ito-Yokado — Ito-Yokado operates supermarkets primarily in<br />
eastern Japan. — Its superstores sell apparel, groceries and<br />
household goods. — The group’s subsidiaries operate in a variety<br />
of business sectors such as convenience stores, restaurants, discount<br />
outlets, department stores, food manufacturing and processing,<br />
financial services, real estate and publishing. — The subsidiaries<br />
include Seven-Eleven Japan (50.75% stake), Denny’s<br />
Japan and Robinson’s Japan. — Ito-Yokado stock carries a P/E<br />
valuation that looks high at first glance. — However, the group’s<br />
EV/EBITDA multiple amounts to only 4.4. — We are assigning Ito-<br />
Yokado shares a BUY rating because the upward momentum in<br />
retailing stocks is likely to remain robust for the time being.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
JPY 4270 5220/2845 151.86/172.39 27.59/24.3 0.80%
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Alternative investments<br />
The prospect of positive returns – regardless of general market trends –<br />
makes hedge funds attractive<br />
Responding to the need for enhanced monitoring, Credit Suisse has<br />
built a proprietary platform called MAP (Manager Access Platform)
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Alternative investments—25<br />
The hedge fund industry is coming of age<br />
A severe downturn in the equity markets has fuelled interest in hedge funds,<br />
resulting in a large influx of assets into the industry. Will this be a golden era of<br />
alternative investing? Clearly the industry is undergoing rapid change. Ramon Koss<br />
The last several years of rapid and accelerating asset growth in<br />
the hedge fund industry would seem to suggest that we are entering<br />
a golden era of alternative investing. Or could it be that the<br />
end is nigh, as suggested by the difficult second quarter of this<br />
year?<br />
While risk-adjusted returns on alternative investments have<br />
long outperformed those generated by traditional equity and fixed<br />
income investments, it took a severe downturn in the equity markets<br />
(2000–2002) to cause many investors – and the press – to<br />
shift their attention to hedge funds.<br />
This new high profile has resulted in significant flows of both<br />
money and talent into the alternative investment industry. Some<br />
experts believe that this large asset influx alone is sufficient to dilute<br />
returns, while others argue that assets under management in<br />
alternative strategies are still modest when compared to traditionally<br />
managed assets, such as long-only bond and equity portfolios<br />
(Figure 1).<br />
But discussions focusing on hedge fund alpha alone may be<br />
missing the point. Should we not focus on the quality of such alpha;<br />
i.e., the risks we must take to “buy” return potential? And<br />
should we not take a closer look at how alternative investments<br />
can serve to mitigate portfolio risk? The controversy continues,<br />
but there is agreement about one important thing: alternative investments<br />
provide substantial overall diversification benefits to<br />
investment portfolios.<br />
A brief historical perspective on absolute return investing<br />
One of the most advertised characteristics attributed to hedge<br />
funds, their focus on producing absolute returns (with efforts to<br />
protect capital), must ultimately be seen as a return to the roots<br />
of investing. Historically, absolute return investing dominated as<br />
the objective of virtually all client mandates. Portfolio managers<br />
were given financial assets with the clear objective of increasing<br />
their value through deliberate exposure to particular risks. It was<br />
only in the 1970s, that relative return products (such as mutual<br />
funds that measure their performance and risk against a benchmark)<br />
were emphasized as a means of managing investment<br />
risks. Index funds are the purest form of this style of investing.<br />
While alternative investment strategies are not the only available<br />
instruments that essentially provide “asymmetric” return profiles,<br />
they offer them primarily thanks to the flexibility of their<br />
Figure 1<br />
Compared to hedge funds, the mutual fund<br />
industry still accounts for the predominant share<br />
of total fund investments<br />
Source: Investment Company Institute; Hedge Fund Research, Inc.<br />
Hedge fund industry<br />
USD 817 billion<br />
Estimated assets under management<br />
as of December 2003<br />
Mutual fund industry<br />
USD13.960 trillion
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Alternative investments—26<br />
mandates. Certain structural characteristics, such as hedge-fund<br />
managers co-investing alongside investors, managers being motivated<br />
by profit participation, and the presence of high water<br />
mark compensation structures, are all typical of skill-based investment<br />
strategies, and contribute to the existence of this asymmetry.<br />
Once upon a time,<br />
hedge funds were niche investment vehicles<br />
Some of the earliest hedge funds, founded during the 1950s, employed<br />
market neutral (“hedged”) pure arbitrage strategies. During<br />
periods of extended bull markets and high-risk appetite, such<br />
as the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, hedge funds sprang up that<br />
pursued high risk, high expected return strategies. Despite these<br />
different risk profiles, there was one important similarity: hedge<br />
funds mostly took the form of partnerships, and invested the assets<br />
of a small number of very wealthy individuals. A lack of regulation<br />
and transparency, along with several highly publicized fund<br />
failures and sometimes wildly exaggerated return expectations<br />
combined to give hedge funds their reputation as black box investment<br />
vehicles characterized by extreme volatility.<br />
However, the industry is undergoing rapid change, and this<br />
description of hedge funds is no longer generally true. Today, two<br />
previously largely absent client categories are the main drivers of<br />
its growth: institutions, and affluent clients. Many institutional investors<br />
(such as pension funds, endowments and foundations)<br />
have come under pressure after the recent extended poor performance<br />
of the equity markets. As a result, their investment philosophy<br />
is evolving from one of tracking benchmarks, to one of<br />
matching liabilities. Although any perception of alternative investments<br />
as “portfolio kickers” is highly questionable, the prospect<br />
of positive returns regardless of general market trends has<br />
caused important flows of assets into the hedge fund industry.<br />
Individual investors have recently been provided access to<br />
hedge fund investments via structured products. This client segment<br />
has been – and will continue to be – strongly targeted by<br />
many financial services providers who are capable of structuring<br />
alternative investment products.<br />
Figure 2<br />
The causes of hedge fund failures imply the<br />
necessity for comprehensive due diligence<br />
Source: The Capital Markets Company Ltd.<br />
The rationale behind investing in funds of hedge funds<br />
As a result of these recent developments in the alternative investment<br />
industry, better regulation and visibility are inevitable.<br />
We believe that a certain assimilation into the “traditional” investment<br />
philosophy of the large providers who are currently discovering<br />
alternative investments is also to be expected.<br />
While, initially, hedge funds were mainly perceived as an alternative<br />
means of investing in the traditional markets, and investments<br />
into hedge funds were predominantly driven by bottomup<br />
analysis with the objective of finding highly skilled managers<br />
trading those markets, the prevalent view today is quite different.<br />
Other operational risks 14% Investment risk only 38%<br />
Operational risk where<br />
either misrepresentation of<br />
investments or misappropriation<br />
of funds were<br />
contributing factors 36%<br />
Business risk only 6%<br />
Multiple risk 6%
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Alternative investments—27<br />
Alternative investments are viewed as a separate asset class, and<br />
the focus has shifted away from a pure appraisal of managers’<br />
skill-sets, and towards diversification across heterogeneous alternative<br />
investment styles, risk allocation and risk management.<br />
Allocations are often made to certain alternative investment styles<br />
(not only single managers) and are a function of available opportunities,<br />
or the perception thereof. Within each style, allocations<br />
to skilled hedge fund managers then follow. In this sense, many<br />
funds of funds employ a mixed top-down/bottom-up allocation<br />
philosophy. Alternative multi-manager, multi-strategy portfolios<br />
are managed more actively and style drift (departure of hedge<br />
fund managers from their area of core competence) is less tolerated.<br />
At Credit Suisse, we recognize the advantages of such a<br />
mixed top-down/bottom-up approach. While in the areas of manager<br />
selection, asset allocation, portfolio management, and risk<br />
control we find value in strict adherence to standardized procedures,<br />
we also try not to be dogmatic in our “skill-seeking activity”.<br />
We recognize that, in each area, certain managers have better<br />
skills than others, but we believe that these skills are best<br />
applied where opportunities present themselves in the relevant<br />
area. Furthermore, the importance of understanding the individual<br />
risks inherent in each hedge fund strategy cannot be overstated<br />
– a sensible portfolio management and effective risk management<br />
cannot live without such considerations. In-depth<br />
understanding of the investment strategy and identifying the specific<br />
risks are therefore key elements in our due diligence process<br />
(Figure 2).<br />
platform called MAP (Manager Access Platform). Today, MAP<br />
monitors a significant and constantly increasing number of the<br />
funds and investment programs into which Credit Suisse is allocating<br />
client monies.<br />
The basic data (single position data wherever possible) is enriched<br />
by a tremendous amount of additional computed and fundamental<br />
risk-related data. We use the data to monitor both market-related<br />
as well as operational risks. As an encompassing<br />
platform, MAP provides cutting-edge tools and algorithms, such<br />
as risk reports, simulations, multi-factor models and value-at-risk<br />
calculations that allow our analysts to assess, manage, optimize<br />
and monitor the risks and characteristics of the Credit Suisse<br />
range of alternative investment products.<br />
We are a major force in the alternative investments industry.<br />
MAP is one example of how we strive to fulfill our fiduciary duties<br />
to our clients in an active (instead of reactive) and innovative (instead<br />
of defensive) manner. |<br />
Credit Suisse’s proprietary platform facilitates transparency<br />
Hedge fund critics claim that, due to their lack of transparency,<br />
hedge fund investments are inherently impossible to monitor effectively.<br />
Management of market risks, such as exposure to various<br />
market-risk factors, style drift, as well as operational risks<br />
such as pricing of positions and adherence to existing covenants,<br />
is inhibited for classical hedge fund investments, as such risks<br />
can only be properly managed if one has detailed and accurate<br />
portfolio information.<br />
Typically, investors into hedge funds see only highly aggregated<br />
data of their investment. Many hedge-fund managers are<br />
extremely reluctant to provide more detailed and timely information,<br />
citing reasons such as protection of trade secrets and proprietary<br />
investment strategies. Small investors, due to their weak<br />
negotiating power, have little possibility to combat this lack of<br />
transparency. Even if they could obtain better insight, most would<br />
have neither the time nor the expertise and resources to make effective<br />
use of it.<br />
While the issue of enhanced investment monitoring is a hot<br />
topic in the industry today, we had already addressed it several<br />
years ago, by starting to plan and build a sophisticated proprietary
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Alternative investments—28<br />
Life Portfolio: Ideal instrument for estate planning<br />
With Life Portfolio, Credit Suisse Life & Pensions is offering a modern<br />
life insurance policy tailored to the needs of affluent investors,<br />
with attractive tax advantage. Luzi Saluz<br />
More and more investors are opting to invest some of their assets<br />
in a life insurance policy. This allows them to benefit from attractive<br />
tax advantages, and it is also an interesting estate planning vehicle.<br />
Credit Suisse Life & Pensions in Liechtenstein designed Life<br />
Portfolio to meet these client requirements. Life Portfolio is currently<br />
available to clients resident in Belgium, Italy and Germany.<br />
Step 1<br />
Investment funds<br />
Structured investments<br />
Portfolio management<br />
mandates<br />
Earn a higher return after taxes<br />
The income on the investments incorporated into Life Portfolio is<br />
reinvested on an ongoing basis. During the term of the Life Portfolio,<br />
the earnings are not subject to income tax in the abovementioned<br />
countries. If the requirements of the tax authorities 1<br />
have been fulfilled at the time when the client terminates the contract,<br />
the entire sum paid out will be free of income tax in Germany<br />
and Belgium. In Italy, the policy income is taxed at 12.5%.<br />
This tax benefit means that the return after tax can be significantly<br />
higher than for comparable direct investments.<br />
There are currently no indications of a worsening in the taxation<br />
practice of life insurance policies in Italy and Belgium, but<br />
German clients who wish to benefit from all income tax privileges<br />
should take out an insurance policy before the end of this year.<br />
Stricter regulations will apply from January 1, 2005, and the full<br />
tax exemption will be replaced by a 50% tax exemption. 2<br />
Investment funds, structured investments and portfolio<br />
management mandates are selected for a life insurance policy.<br />
The premise is that the investments are professionally<br />
managed. In insurance actuarial terms, this is how a so-called<br />
internal fund is created.<br />
Step 2<br />
Life insurance<br />
Free choice of beneficiaries in the event of death<br />
In addition to its potential to reduce your income tax burden, a life<br />
insurance policy provides you with flexible and simple estate planning<br />
options.<br />
The client’s right to designate beneficiaries means that you<br />
can decide who should receive the benefits in the event of your<br />
death. The policyholder is free to appoint any beneficiaries 3 . You<br />
can, for example, nominate just one of your grandchildren or your<br />
partner as beneficiary. It is also possible to appoint several beneficiaries<br />
with different shares.<br />
On the death of the insured, the insurance benefits are paid<br />
directly to the beneficiaries. The assets are therefore available to<br />
the beneficiaries without delay and they do not have to wait for<br />
probate of the will.<br />
The benefits can be paid directly to the beneficiaries, as they<br />
have a contractual claim to these benefits under the insurance<br />
policy. It is true that heirs entitled to a compulsory portion of your<br />
estate can file legal proceedings against the beneficiaries for the<br />
The selected investments are combined into a life insurance policy.<br />
Step 3<br />
Life insurance<br />
Investment funds<br />
Structured investments<br />
In this way, a life insurance policy is created that conforms<br />
to the tax law requirements in the client’s domicile as well<br />
as reaping attractive tax advantages.<br />
Portfolio management<br />
mandates
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04 Alternative investments —29<br />
infringement of forced heirship provisions, but the insurance company<br />
for its part is obliged to pay out the benefits without checking<br />
the rights of succession.<br />
The beneficiaries can be changed free of charge at any time.<br />
The change simply has to be notified in writing to the insurance<br />
company, which will issue a new policy.<br />
Amendments any time during the term of contract<br />
Figure 1 shows how Life Portfolio works. Life Portfolio offers the<br />
client a comprehensive range of investment funds, structured investments,<br />
and portfolio management mandates. The investments<br />
selected by the client are then combined with a life insurance<br />
policy – and the result is Life Portfolio.<br />
The investment strategy can be amended at any time during<br />
the term of the contract to suit the changed circumstances of the<br />
investor.<br />
Life Portfolio’s term ends on the insured’s 100th birthday or<br />
in the event of their death. The client decides when the contract<br />
should be terminated 4 . The client is also at liberty to make a partial<br />
withdrawal and let the policy run on.<br />
Life insurance policies for european clients<br />
A life insurance policy must comply with the tax regulations of the<br />
client’s country of residence if the client wants to take advantage<br />
of the tax privileges. It may, for example, be necessary to insure<br />
a minimum lump sum payable at death or to take out a policy with<br />
a specific term.<br />
As a rule, insurance policies are taken out from a local insurance<br />
company. However, investors in the European Economic<br />
Area may buy life insurance from an insurance company that is<br />
not domiciled in their home country. This has been made possible<br />
by the EU directive on life insurance, which allows inhabitants of<br />
the European Economic Area (EEA) to buy insurance cover from<br />
any insurance company in the EEA.<br />
As the Principality of Liechtenstein is a member of the European<br />
Economic Area, Credit Suisse Life & Pensions (Liechtenstein)<br />
may offer European clients interesting life insurance options<br />
that comply with the requirements of the tax authorities in the<br />
client’s country of residence.<br />
Liechtenstein law makes provision for multifaceted investment<br />
solutions that can be incorporated into a life insurance policy.<br />
Liechtenstein insurance companies are also allowed to deposit<br />
their assets with Swiss banks. The life insurance policies are<br />
sold by Credit Suisse advisors, who continue to serve their clients<br />
after the sale of a Life Portfolio policy.<br />
On the whole, Life Portfolio is a flexible investment vehicle<br />
offering various advantages, such as the reduction of your tax<br />
burden and the possibility to divide your estate without causing<br />
unnecessary resentment. These are all benefits that will be appreciated<br />
by affluent investors. |<br />
1 Italy: the insurance policy includes death cover; Belgium: the policy includes death cover,<br />
but does not provide any investment protection; Germany: the insurance policy was<br />
financed with five equal contributions, the lump sum payable at death amounts to at least<br />
60% of the total contributions, and the capital is paid out 12 years after the commencement<br />
of the contract at the earliest.<br />
2<br />
From January 1, 2005, 50% of the proceeds on insurance policies must be taxed as<br />
income, provided that the insurance policy was financed with five equal contributions,<br />
the contract term was at least 12 years, the lump sum payable at death equals at least<br />
60% of the total contributions, and the policy does not mature before the policyholder<br />
turns 60.<br />
3<br />
Statutory heirs can claim their compulsory portions.<br />
4<br />
Early surrender of the policy may entail negative tax consequences.
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
Equities<br />
The international equity markets lack the ongoing impetus<br />
to spark a robust and longer-term upmove<br />
There is definitely potential for a late-summer rally<br />
on the US stock markets, though this could be thwarted<br />
by a further rise in oil prices<br />
The Swiss market could suffer another drop in momentum<br />
in the second half of the year
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Equities—31<br />
Equity markets: No clear trend due to high level of uncertainty<br />
We do not expect more than a temporary rally up to the end of 2004 due to<br />
flattening economic growth, inflation and interest-rate risks, as well as to corporate<br />
earnings growth traversing its zenith. Bernhard Tschanz<br />
The upmove on the stock markets, which were still heading higher<br />
at the outset of the year, turned into a sideways movement in<br />
the second quarter of 2004. Japanese and especially emergingmarket<br />
stock indices retreated. Accelerating core inflation in the<br />
USA, interest-rate hikes in various countries and rising bond yields<br />
were the main culprits behind the sagging equity markets. However,<br />
economic growth and corporate earnings remained impressive.<br />
At the sector level in a nutshell, defensive industries as well<br />
as energy and manufacturing stocks outperformed financial and<br />
technology stocks.<br />
Catalysts for a longer upmove are lacking<br />
The equity markets lack sustained sources of stimulus that could<br />
spark a robust and lengthier upmove on the stock exchanges. The<br />
drivers of last year’s upswing have either lost momentum or reversed<br />
course. For example, the global economy, led by the USA<br />
and China, now appears to be losing some growth momentum on<br />
the heels of the somewhat earlier upward turnaround in inflation<br />
and interest rates. Although inflation and interest-rate fears have<br />
ebbed a bit since mid-year, the medium-term uptrend appears to<br />
continue unabated. Geopolitical risks are also unlikely to lose any<br />
of their volatility for long, and the price of oil looks set to remain<br />
comparatively high. However, corporate profits should continue<br />
rising. But here, too, a slowdown is emerging, as analysts’ earnings<br />
revisions and corporate results for the second quarter indicate.<br />
Although the leeway for price hikes has increased considerably,<br />
the reappearance of rising unit labor costs will put a drag<br />
on the global process of improving corporate profit margins, which<br />
had recently gained considerable steam.<br />
Rising inflation and climbing interest rates amid flattening economic<br />
growth do not create an ideal environment for stocks. However,<br />
the equity markets have largely factored this scenario into<br />
current share prices, at least if our forecasts are correct. The moderate<br />
valuation should subsequently support stock prices. This assessment<br />
is corroborated by, among other things, the 2005E priceearnings<br />
ratios of less than 16 for the USA (S&P 500) and below<br />
13 for the euro zone (Euro Stoxx 50). Hence, from a fundamental<br />
perspective, the stock markets look poised to finish the year slightly<br />
above their current level despite their recent weakness. Moreover,<br />
the exceedingly buoyant investor optimism that still prevailed<br />
at the start of the year has now been sharply scaled back, which<br />
makes a temporary relief rally look increasingly probable.<br />
Figure 1<br />
MSCI indices<br />
(31 December 2002 to mid July 2004)<br />
Source: Bloomberg<br />
160<br />
150<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
Indexed (31/12/2002=100)<br />
12/02<br />
MSCI World<br />
MSCI Japan<br />
06/03<br />
MSCI USA<br />
MSCI EM<br />
12/03<br />
MSCI Europe<br />
MSCI EM Asia<br />
Table 1<br />
Sector performance before and after the first<br />
Fed rate hike (1977 to present)<br />
Source: Datastream, Credit Suisse<br />
6 months before 12 months after<br />
Overall market Negative Positive<br />
Cyclicals Outperformer Underperformer<br />
Defensive stocks Underperformer Outperformer<br />
Financials Underperformer Underperformer<br />
Technology Underperformer Outperformer*<br />
* Distorted by technology boom in the 1990s<br />
06/04
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04 Equities —32<br />
Japan continues to offer the best risk/reward profile,<br />
in our view<br />
We are maintaining our geographical preference for the Japanese<br />
stock market. Japan’s economic growth has clearly surprised on<br />
the upside to date. Even the domestic economy is slowly showing<br />
signs of recovery, and the tentative turn for the better in the<br />
employment market justifies our increased confidence. This, coupled<br />
with the indisputable restructuring achievements on the part<br />
of Japanese corporations, points to sustained, favorable earnings<br />
momentum in worldwide comparison. At the same time, Japan’s<br />
export sector is profiting from very advantageous currency exchange<br />
rates. Nevertheless, our preference in Japan remains focused<br />
on domestic-oriented sectors (banks, retailers, real estate<br />
firms and construction companies) in view of the progressing economic<br />
recovery. On the whole, we expect stock indices to advance<br />
in Japan, but we do not foresee sharp gains. For a stronger<br />
rally, the yen would have to appreciate considerably to attract additional<br />
foreign investors. We do not expect this to happen.<br />
Nothing has changed in our preference for Europe over the<br />
USA. The number of upward earnings revisions for companies is<br />
now declining in both regions, but profit expectations and stock<br />
valuations are higher in the USA. We have a cautious stance on<br />
investments in the emerging markets, where growing instability<br />
and rising interest rates usually create a less-than-wonderful environment.<br />
We would wait for the current stock-market correction<br />
to run its course before making new investments.<br />
Maintain a defensive sector alignment for the longer term<br />
For the first half of 2004, we recommended giving the defensive,<br />
i.e. less cyclically exposed sectors a stronger weighting. The latter<br />
have significantly outperformed the cyclical sectors. Table 1<br />
demonstrates the appropriateness of this policy with a comparison<br />
of sector performance before and after the first Fed rate<br />
hike. In the 12 months following the first hike, defensive sectors<br />
performed relatively strongly, while cyclicals (excluding technology<br />
stocks) tended to underperform. Although technology stocks<br />
rate as outperformers, this carries little meaning because the tech<br />
bubble distorted the picture in the 1990s and therefore probably<br />
makes it look too positive now.<br />
It is also interesting to note that financials trended relatively<br />
poorly both before and after the first Fed rate hike. Since prices<br />
of financials have suffered clear setbacks, we are neutral on the<br />
sector. |<br />
Stock-market forecasts Historical Earnings<br />
index performance 1 in % growth in % P/E P/E<br />
Market Index 02/08/2004 1 MTH 3 MTH 12 MTH 2004E 2005E 2004E 2005E<br />
USA S&P 500 1106.62 –2 –1 13 18 11 17.0 15.4<br />
Germany DAX 30 3862.71 –3 –4 12 54 22 15.0 12.3<br />
UK FTSE 100 4415.73 0 –2 8 11 11 18.0 16.1<br />
France CAC 40 3623.79 –2 –2 14 19 14 14.7 12.9<br />
Netherlands AEX 325.87 –5 –5 4 18 10 12.7 11.5<br />
Italy BCI 1300.66 –1 –2 12 37 19 17.8 14.9<br />
Spain IBEX 35 7869.00 –2 –4 12 21 15 14.8 12.9<br />
Sweden OMX 678.80 –2 –2 19 49 11 15.4 13.9<br />
Finland HEX 5410.41 –7 –6 –1 14 18 16.0 13.5<br />
Switzerland SMI 5537.80 –1 –5 10 21 13 15.7 13.9<br />
Canada S&P/TSX 8458.07 0 2 17 32 13 15.1 13.3<br />
Australia ASX All Ord. 3554.50 1 5 14 19 15 16.8 14.7<br />
South Africa 2 JSE All Share 10305.89 3 –1 17 15 24 10.2 8.2<br />
Japan TOPIX 1135.64 –3 –4 21 47 9 18.2 16.7<br />
Hong Kong Hang Seng 12201.39 0 2 19 43 6 14.4 13.6<br />
China 2 Shanghai B 89.943 0 –16 –19 28 7 11.1 10.4<br />
Singapore 2 STI 1887.41 3 3 21 15 7 13.6 12.8<br />
Malaysia 2 KLCE 827.49 0 –1 14 16 12 14.5 13.0<br />
Thailand 2 SET 636.70 –2 –2 30 4 8 11.0 10.2<br />
Taiwan 2 TWSE (weighted) 5350.40 –7 –11 –1 79 7 10.3 9.6<br />
Korea 2 KOSPI 719.59 –5 –17 –1 73 6 6.4 6.1<br />
1<br />
Performance based on local currency / 2 earnings growth and P/E of MSCI Country Index Sources: IBES, Datastream, Credit Suisse
USA: Mixed bag of results<br />
and higher energy prices<br />
The outcome of the elections, conflicting<br />
economic data and higher gasoline<br />
prices: many elements of uncertainty are<br />
affecting the US equity market. Nevertheless,<br />
there is potential for a positive<br />
correction in late summer. Jeremy Baker<br />
Figure 1<br />
S&P 500 composite earnings<br />
as % of previous peak in the current cycle<br />
Source: Baseline & A.G. Edwards<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
04/00<br />
07/00<br />
10/00<br />
01/01<br />
04/01<br />
07/01<br />
10/01<br />
01/02<br />
04/02<br />
07/02<br />
10/02<br />
01/03<br />
04/03<br />
07/03<br />
10/03<br />
01/04<br />
04/04<br />
S&P operating earnings –<br />
% of previous peak in this cycle<br />
Consensus estimate<br />
Besides the upcoming elections, investors now have to interpret<br />
rising interest rates, as well as a mixed bag of economic data that<br />
appear to show moderately slower growth expectations in the<br />
USA. On top of this, consumers have to cope with higher energy<br />
costs, specifically gasoline prices. Given that Americans historically<br />
enjoy low gasoline prices relative to their European counterparts,<br />
the higher costs at the pump are likely to have some impact<br />
on consumer spending. A recent survey carried out by the National<br />
Retail Federation indicated that rising gasoline prices are<br />
shifting consumer habits, although 43% of those interviewed<br />
stated that their habits would not change significantly. Of the remainder,<br />
nearly one in three consumers said they would alter travel<br />
plans, while 27% replied they would reduce the frequency of<br />
dining out, and 21% stated they would spend less on clothing.<br />
Retailers are fully aware that when consumers are forced to spend<br />
more of their disposable income on gasoline, they will scale back<br />
spending in other areas. Ultimately, higher energy costs are, in<br />
effect, an indirect tax on consumers.<br />
Weaker year-on-year data?<br />
Nevertheless, the current economic expansion in the USA is now<br />
in full motion, but signals emanating from economic and corporate<br />
activities indicate that the country is moving toward a peak in<br />
this regard. This peak comes in the wake of a strong period of<br />
corporate earnings growth, driven by cost controls, rising sales<br />
and lower oil prices. Corporate earnings in the first quarter of this<br />
year remained robust, despite some obstacles, but this did little<br />
to buoy equity-market enthusiasm. We should see healthy corporate<br />
earnings for the second quarter as well since the pre-announcement<br />
season was favorable by historical standards. Still,<br />
the ratio of upward versus downward earnings revisions was more<br />
moderate than the year before. Furthermore, the second quarter<br />
results should constitute the third consecutive quarter where<br />
earnings growth surpassed the last cycle’s peak earnings level<br />
achieved in the second quarter of 2000 (Figure 1). Hence, the<br />
corporate earnings outlook remains favorable. Nevertheless, we<br />
believe that the second half of 2004 and early 2005 are likely to<br />
present a challenge since overall future corporate earnings growth<br />
trends should moderate, leading to softer year-on-year comparisons.<br />
The slow down will likely be induced by higher interest<br />
rates and economic growth tapering off at a sustainable rate.<br />
Investors changing their thinking<br />
Interest-rate fears and further spikes in oil prices due to geopolitical<br />
tensions have diminished equity-market performances. Furthermore,<br />
although interest-rate expectations may not trend as investors<br />
anticipate, longer-term rising interest rates should cause<br />
an earnings contraction in the price/earnings (P/E) multiple as the<br />
year 2005 unfolds. Looking back at a previous cycle – namely,<br />
1995 to 1997 – we note that the earnings growth rate had slowed,<br />
though this was also a period of attractive stock returns.<br />
The early phase of an economic recovery is generally characterized<br />
by investors focusing on very high growth rates in recovering<br />
cyclical sectors: namely, materials and technology. However,<br />
once the economy has been in a recovery phase for a couple<br />
of years – and as interest rates start to rise, which happened in<br />
June – investors start to alter their orientation toward the equity<br />
market. Earnings growth is important because it serves as a catalyst<br />
for stock performance. A slowdown in year-on-year earnings<br />
growth to normalized levels (i.e., percentages in the mid-to-low-
er teens) would likely lead to a shift by investors toward less cyclical<br />
sectors, such consumer staples and healthcare, which deliver<br />
more consistent growth.<br />
Still room for a rally<br />
In conclusion, we believe that the window of opportunity for a further<br />
late-summer rally on the US equity market is still open, but<br />
this could be hindered by a further spike in oil prices. The longterm<br />
trend for the US markets still paints a positive picture,<br />
though volumes continue to remain weak. If an uptrend fails to<br />
spark buying interest, we would not be at all surprised to see a<br />
more pronounced correction.<br />
Top Picks<br />
65<br />
60<br />
55<br />
50<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
General Electric<br />
Price rel. to S&P 500<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
General Electric — In 2Q 2004, 9 of 11 operating units posted<br />
year-on-year profit gains. — CEO Jeffrey Immelt stated that “the<br />
best economy we’ve seen in years” led to order growth. — GE<br />
closed on almost USD 30 billion in acquisition/divestitures in the<br />
second quarter as part of the company’s plan to boost profit<br />
growth in excess of 10% in 2005. — We look for GE to realize<br />
EPS of USD 1.57 in 2004 and USD 1.78 (+13%) in 2005. — We<br />
are maintaining our BUY rating on this blue-chip bellwether.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52 W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
USD 33.26 34.57/27.18 1.58/1.77 21.09/18.74 2.32%<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
McDonald’s<br />
Price rel. to S&P 500<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
McDonald’s — We are impressed with the turnaround that<br />
McDonald’s has achieved in the past 18 months, even as it has begun<br />
to face more difficult sales and earnings comparisons. — The<br />
company is clearly achieving financial results that are well above<br />
its long-term annual targets. — Our 2004 and 2005 full-year projections<br />
remain at USD 1.70 and USD 1.85, respectively. — The<br />
shares currently trade at a moderate P/E discount to that of the<br />
S&P 500 Index. — Historically, the stock has commanded a premium<br />
multiple averaging 20%. — We therefore think there is still<br />
meaningful capital appreciation left in the stock. — Our rating on<br />
McDonald’s is a BUY.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52 W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
USD 27.46 29.98/21.57 1.75/1.9 15.65/14.42 1.60%
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Product offers—35<br />
Equity Fund Japan:<br />
Pictet Funds – Japanese Equities P<br />
• The fund consists of two broadly diversified portfolios comprising<br />
a total of 250 stocks.<br />
• This fund enables investors to tap into the earnings potential of Japanese<br />
companies across the entire spectrum of market capitalizations.<br />
Source: Lipper Reuters<br />
Average peer group<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
Indexed in USD<br />
06.01<br />
09.01<br />
12.01<br />
Japan TSE<br />
1st Section-TR<br />
03.02<br />
06.02<br />
09.02<br />
12.02<br />
03.03<br />
06.03<br />
09.03<br />
Pictet F-Japanese<br />
Equities-P<br />
12.03<br />
03.04<br />
Investment objective and performance<br />
Pictet employs a differentiated investment<br />
strategy for the Japanese equity fund. The<br />
portfolio of large- and mid-cap companies<br />
is managed at Pictet’s Geneva headquarters<br />
using a combination of top-down sector<br />
allocation and bottom-up stock selection.<br />
The fund managers adhere to a<br />
cyclical, long-term investment rationale and<br />
do not allow themselves to be distracted by<br />
short-term trends. The portfolio of small<br />
and midsize companies is managed in<br />
Tokyo using a pure bottom-up approach,<br />
with great attention paid to short-term momentum<br />
and “surprises”. Both investment<br />
approaches aim to avoid capital losses, and<br />
the investments are subjected to a dynamic<br />
risk-control process.<br />
The fund is overweight in small and midsize<br />
enterprises, and its return over the past<br />
three years exceeds the benchmark index<br />
and beats rival funds.<br />
Security number: 353304<br />
Fund currency:<br />
JPY<br />
Performance past 3 years: 14.8% (in USD)<br />
Annual volatility: 20.8%<br />
Fund volume (million): JPY 110,956<br />
Portfolio manager:<br />
Yukie Suzukie<br />
Equity Fund Europe:<br />
JP Morgan Fleming Europe Equity<br />
• The strategy is designed to profit from market inefficiencies due<br />
to behavioral factors.<br />
• The manager aims to construct a portfolio displaying, as a whole, higher<br />
growth expectations and cheaper valuations than the market.<br />
Source: Lipper Reuters<br />
100<br />
Indexed<br />
Investment objective and performance<br />
The strategy is based on a quantitative proprietary<br />
model called “Trend Momentum<br />
Value.” The model suggests that portfolios<br />
are tilted in order to exploit behavioral inefficiencies<br />
(irrational behavior and mistakes<br />
due to the human psychology that people<br />
systematically make while investing). The<br />
final goal is to build a very well-diversified<br />
portfolio, with about 200 different holdings,<br />
which as a whole grows faster than the<br />
market average and trades at an attractive<br />
valuation.<br />
The fund aims to consistently outperform<br />
its benchmark (the MSCI Europe Index) by<br />
2% per year on average (after costs). The<br />
fund has ranked very consistently among<br />
the best European equity funds, in periods<br />
of rising as well as sinking equity markets.<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
Security number: 600938<br />
60<br />
Fund currency:<br />
EUR<br />
50<br />
06.01<br />
08.01<br />
10.01<br />
12.01<br />
02.02<br />
04.02<br />
06.02<br />
08.02<br />
10.02<br />
12.02<br />
02.03<br />
04.03<br />
06.03<br />
08.03<br />
10.03<br />
12.03<br />
02.04<br />
04.04<br />
Performance past 3 years: –13.6% (in EUR)<br />
Annual volatility: 18%<br />
Average peer group<br />
MSCI Europe-Gross<br />
JPMF Europe Equity A EUR<br />
Fund volume (million): EUR 1,530<br />
Portfolio manager:<br />
Chris Complin
Europe: Brief pro-cyclical phase<br />
following the turnaround in<br />
US interest rates<br />
The European stock markets are not<br />
confident that the global economy<br />
will really recover. Profit warnings from<br />
firms like Nokia have not helped much.<br />
We expect a sector rotation after the<br />
turnaround in US rates. Markus Mächler, CEFA<br />
Only exports can provide the stimulus that should help propel European<br />
businesses to higher revenue and profits. European companies<br />
generate roughly 21% of their aggregate sales revenue in<br />
the USA and 65% within Europe. The rest of the world accounts<br />
for the remaining 14%, with only a little more than 1% generated<br />
in the growth market of China. The export-driven growth component<br />
is more important than the currency component, which continues<br />
to weigh on European enterprises.<br />
The currency situation eased a bit during the course of the<br />
second quarter, making the forex environment somewhat more<br />
predictable for businesses. Many export-dependent companies,<br />
such as carmakers for example, managed to hedge their foreign<br />
currency exposure several years forward at advantageous exchange<br />
rates. If the US dollar and British pound slide into a protracted<br />
period of weakness, this would create additional strains in<br />
the coming years. Until then, what matters most is the economic<br />
upturn, which should sustain corporate earnings. We continue to<br />
foresee low-double-digit profit growth for European companies<br />
this year. The profit warnings issued with the release of secondquarter<br />
numbers – by Nokia, for example – do not alter this forecast.<br />
Technology companies are facing a difficult period. Prices for<br />
supplier parts such as semiconductors and electronic components<br />
are rising, primarily because demand is regaining some momentum<br />
while production capacity at chip manufacturers is stagnating.<br />
In the wake of Nokia declaring a price war in the third<br />
quarter in an attempt to recapture lost market share, we do not<br />
believe that rising component prices can be passed on to consumers.<br />
This is putting additional pressure on profit margins in<br />
the technology sector. Contrary to expectations, demand in the<br />
software sector has been outpaced by demand for IT hardware.<br />
Only SAP has been able to meet analysts’ expectations.<br />
Figure 1<br />
Changes in GDP correlate with<br />
market valuations (P/E)<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
01/90<br />
01/92<br />
01/94<br />
01/96<br />
01/98<br />
01/00<br />
P/E Euro Stoxx 600 (l.h.s.)<br />
GDP Euroland, % change YoY (r.h.s.)<br />
01/02<br />
01/04<br />
6<br />
5<br />
4<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
0<br />
–1<br />
–2<br />
–3<br />
We favor chemical and automotive stocks<br />
Now that a turnaround in interest-rate movements has commenced<br />
in the USA, as expected, we foresee corresponding sector<br />
rotations on the equity market, which should benefit cyclical<br />
companies in an initial phase. Our preference goes to chemical<br />
and automotive stocks. Vertically integrated chemical companies<br />
like BASF stand to profit the most because they are less exposed<br />
to rising raw-material prices than specialty chemical manufacturers.<br />
Production volume in the chemical sector appears to be improving<br />
considerably, and capacity utilization is increasing. Over<br />
the past few years, most of the chemical companies have restructured<br />
their operations, reduced their cost base and cut their<br />
investment spending. Their balance sheets now look solid. Cash<br />
flow is improving, and liquidity is being primarily used for dividend<br />
payouts and share buybacks.<br />
The automotive sector more than offset its first-quarter<br />
weakness in the second quarter on the back of the good results<br />
in the auto-parts segment. Carmakers are significantly trailing<br />
the overall market. The increasing price pressure emanating from<br />
the raw-material and auto-parts industry cannot be passed on to<br />
car buyers. Automobile company valuations are too low, in our<br />
opinion. Even the slightest market revival in 2005 would have a<br />
very positive impact on corporate profits in this sector, by our estimates.<br />
We have adopted a somewhat cautious stance on the interest-rate-sensitive<br />
housing and real estate sector. Inflation fears<br />
are also pushing up market interest rates in Europe, which is like-
ly to put additional strains on the sector. For the time being we do<br />
not foresee a significant reduction in office vacancies, which continue<br />
to burden the real estate industry.<br />
Top Picks<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Equities—37<br />
Potential in Germany and Spain<br />
We are also diversifying our country allocation and have a positive<br />
rating on Germany and Spain. Spain’s high exposure to Latin<br />
America and its attendant link to the upturn in the USA make the<br />
country an attractive investment destination. In Germany, the DAX<br />
stocks have lagged behind the broader European market as a result<br />
of the lack of confidence that profits will improve. Advance<br />
praise is not being offered at the moment, which is why the market<br />
is consistently reacting to each piece of corporate news. We<br />
think the low expectations have potential to be revised upward,<br />
which should bolster the market.<br />
The question now arises as to what impact the upcoming US<br />
elections will have on the European market. Regardless of the<br />
election outcome, a favorable market environment can be expected<br />
in the runup to the voting. This will probably have a positive<br />
influence on the European market in the short term, though<br />
cautionary voices are already warning about the urgent need for<br />
post-election austerity measures and are portraying a correspondingly<br />
gloomy scenario. |<br />
80<br />
75<br />
70<br />
65<br />
60<br />
55<br />
50<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
BASF<br />
Price rel. to DJ Stoxx 600<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
BASF — Exposure to petrochemicals: Trading volumes in the<br />
chemical sector improved significantly in 1Q 2004, and the trend<br />
probably continued in 2Q 2004, according to comments from the<br />
industry. — We believe that the global chemical industry capacity<br />
utilization rate has increased from 75%–80% to 80%–85%. —<br />
Margins and volumes in petrochemicals are improving significantly.<br />
— Price inflation is back in the industry. — BASF announced<br />
several price increases in 2Q 2004. — Exposure to agrochemicals:<br />
At the 1Q stage, BASF highlighted that 2Q would likely be<br />
the strongest quarter for agrochemicals. — Consensus estimates<br />
are currently too low, in our view.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
EUR 44.07 46.16/37.01 2.88/3.37 15.34/13.12 3.47%<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
Figure 2<br />
MSCI Europe and MSCI World (adjusted)<br />
Source: Bloomberg<br />
30<br />
20<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
160<br />
DaimlerChrysler<br />
Price rel. to DJ Stoxx 600<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
01/00<br />
04/00<br />
07/00<br />
10/00<br />
01/01<br />
04/01<br />
07/01<br />
10/01<br />
01/02<br />
04/02<br />
07/02<br />
10/02<br />
01/03<br />
04/03<br />
07/03<br />
10/03<br />
01/04<br />
04/04<br />
07/04<br />
DaimlerChrysler — Given the overweight sector view, we are<br />
convinced that now is the right time to take a medium-term position.<br />
— Labor strikes at some production plants should have come<br />
to an end. — Chrysler’s US vehicle registration and incentive figures<br />
show a positive trend for this division despite a still poor overall<br />
market environment. — We expect some positive news flow<br />
from the truck division, which has successfully turned around. —<br />
Our CFROI valuation model indicates a fair value of EUR 47 per<br />
share based on a continuous turnaround of Chrysler in the USA<br />
and no further investments in Mitsubishi.<br />
MSCI Europe<br />
MSCI World (adjusted)<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
EUR 36.95 39.57/29.36 2.79/3.61 13.25/10.22 4.63%
Switzerland: A straggler in the<br />
second half of the year?<br />
The Swiss Market Index (SMI) could<br />
suffer a further drop in momentum<br />
in the second half-year.<br />
The SMI’s valuation indicates slight<br />
upside potential. Christian Gattiker-Ericsson, CFA<br />
The SMI’s absolute total return (share-price appreciation plus dividend<br />
payouts) of around +4% for the first half of 2004 beat the<br />
total return on the DJ Stoxx 50 by nearly 3 percentage points<br />
when adjusted for currency fluctuations. Compared with the<br />
whole of 2003, the first six months of 2004 saw an investment<br />
rotation out of cyclical industries and into defensive sectors, as<br />
expected (Figure 1). Investments in riskier sectors held the upper<br />
hand in 2003. However, last year’s winners, such as technology<br />
and capital goods stocks, sputtered a bit in the first half of 2004<br />
while cycle-resistant food-and-beverage and pharmaceutical<br />
stocks outpaced the overall market. Alongside the defensive sectors,<br />
late-cycle stocks such as building materials firms and chemical<br />
companies likewise advanced.<br />
Figure 1<br />
SPI sector returns in %<br />
Source: Bloomberg<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
Technology<br />
Industrial goods<br />
Financial services<br />
Banking<br />
Construction materials<br />
Total return 2003<br />
Total return 1H 2004<br />
Healthcare<br />
Overall market<br />
Cyclical consumer goods<br />
Non-cyclical consumer goods<br />
Food<br />
Telecommunications<br />
Insurance<br />
Chemicals<br />
Trending sideways<br />
The Swiss equity market could continue to trend sideways in the<br />
second half of the year. Interest-rate hikes in the USA and<br />
Switzerland are probably largely priced into the market, at least for<br />
the remainder of this year. Moreover, during the past three<br />
months, analysts have raised their earnings estimates to an extent<br />
seldom seen before and are now projecting lofty profit growth<br />
of just under 16.5% for the next twelve months. However, earnings<br />
momentum is hardly likely to stay at the current levels in the<br />
coming months (Figure 2). Hence, actual reported earnings and<br />
potential payouts to shareholders could become more and more<br />
of a theme.<br />
After the mid-year 2004 reporting season, investors are likely<br />
to turn their attention to the 2004 dividend yield and the longerterm<br />
dividend prospects. To conflate these two aspects for Swiss<br />
stocks, we have combined the expected dividend yield for 2004<br />
with the projected dividend growth through 2007 to create an indicator<br />
of dividend attractiveness. At the sector level, financials<br />
and selected chemical stocks offer the most attractive dividends<br />
in Switzerland. We recommend Swiss Re, Syngenta and Clariant<br />
for those investors who place value on longer-term dividend<br />
prospects.<br />
Leeway with dividend policies<br />
In terms of dividend cover, insurance companies appear to have<br />
the most leeway to pay out dividends for 2004. Their projected<br />
cash flow per share is several times higher than their expected<br />
dividends per share. At the sector level, financials and selected<br />
chemical stocks have the highest dividend cover ratios in Switzerland.<br />
Compared to the European average, Swiss companies have<br />
a higher average dividend cash cover (roughly 9x versus roughly<br />
5x for Europe), which is partially due to Switzerland’s lower overall<br />
dividend yield (2% versus 3% for Europe). Hence, with regard<br />
to expected dividends for 2004, Swiss companies on the whole<br />
have greater leeway in their dividend policies.<br />
Disregarding its historically lower dividend yield, the SMI currently<br />
exhibits no valuation premium to speak of relative to the<br />
global equity market. With a forward P/E of approximately 15x,<br />
the SMI is actually trading at a marginal discount to the MSCI<br />
World index. This discount is balanced by the SMI’s lower expected<br />
earnings growth (16.5% versus 18.8% worldwide). However,<br />
these aggregate earnings growth rates derived from individual<br />
company valuations lie well above the long-term average (e.g.<br />
the SMI companies posted average annual earnings growth of<br />
8.4% from 1980 to 2003). We therefore assume in our valuation<br />
model profit growth of approximately 9% for the next twelve
months. This would yield a fair value of around 6,300 for the SMI<br />
on a twelve-month horizon. We thus see little reason to revise our<br />
end-2004 SMI fair value range of 6,000–6,200 that we set at the<br />
start of the year.<br />
Short-term rally for cyclical industrials<br />
and technology stocks?<br />
At the sector level, we think an increasing rotation into less cyclical<br />
industries is appropriate for the long term, especially in the<br />
event of a cyclical rebound in the third quarter. Pharmaceutical<br />
stocks and telecom service providers offer an attractive return<br />
profile with little cyclical risk. Cyclical industrials and technology<br />
stocks, in contrast, could actually see an exit window open up in<br />
the coming months. Individual late-cyclical industries, such as the<br />
chemical sector for example, should continue to outperform the<br />
overall market in the short term. However, we expect upside potential<br />
to diminish across all cyclical sectors on a twelve-month<br />
horizon. |<br />
Top Picks<br />
200<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
Roche<br />
Price rel. to SPI<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Equities—39<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
Roche — For the next three years, we expect Roche to grow at<br />
above sector average in terms of both sales (11% vs. 8%) and<br />
earnings (19% vs. 12%) on the back of its innovative portfolio of<br />
specialty products for the treatment of cancer and Hepatitis C, and<br />
for use in transplantations. — Based on P/E 2005E, Roche’s valuation<br />
shows a premium of 35% to the sector over a short-term<br />
horizon. — Since Roche’s product portfolio is relatively young, we<br />
believe that a long-term valuation better reflects the company’s<br />
potential. — Hence, based on the group’s capital value, we calculate<br />
a fair value in the range of CHF 145–155.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
CHF 125.25 141.25/107 5.29/6.05 23.67/20.7 1.46%<br />
600<br />
550<br />
500<br />
450<br />
400<br />
Figure 2<br />
Earnings revision momentum and SMI rate<br />
of change<br />
Source: Datastream, IBES<br />
80<br />
Annual change in %<br />
%<br />
80<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
Rieter<br />
Price rel. to SPI<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
-20<br />
-40<br />
95 97 99 01 03<br />
50<br />
20<br />
-10<br />
-40<br />
-70<br />
-100<br />
Rieter — We view Rieter as a blue chip within the Swiss mechanical<br />
engineering sector. — The machinery maker has continuously<br />
posted an EBITDA margin above 10% over the past five years<br />
despite operating in a business environment that has been very<br />
tough in some instances. — Over the next six to twelve months,<br />
the group is likely to profit from sustained robust demand in the<br />
textile systems segment and from a slight easing of pricing pressure<br />
in the automotive systems segment. — Shares of Rieter look<br />
attractively valued to us with a consensus P/E 2005E below 11x<br />
and an alluring 2004E dividend yield of 2.6%.<br />
Net positive revisions as a % of the total (r.h.s.)<br />
SMI<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
CHF 332 338.5/260 26.63/29.79 12.46/11.15 2.68%
SMI stocks at a glance<br />
Reuters Rating Price Performance % Market Earnings per share P/E Dividend Yield Payout ratio<br />
02/08/04 52W 52W 1 mth 3 mth 12 mth. cap (M) % 03A 04E 05E 04E 05E 04E 04E % BV/S P/BV<br />
All values in CHF, unless otherwise noted High Low<br />
Banks 144001 21.3 3.9 6.4 7.1 11.5 10.4 2.4 3.1 36.3 2.06<br />
CS Group R CSGN.VX REST 40.95 49 40 –5.6 –9.3 –2.3 48960 7.3 0.6 4.2 4.5 9.6 9.0 1.19 2.9 28.0 32 1.30<br />
Julius Baer Holding BAER.VX HOLD 343.00 486 320 –2.0 –0.3 0.7 3085 0.5 7.9 23.1 26.5 14.9 13.0 8.02 2.3 34.8 142 2.41<br />
UBS R UBSN.VX BUY 85.75 99 74 –1.9 –6.9 10.8 91955 13.6 5.5 6.9 7.8 12.4 11.0 2.82 3.3 40.7 35 2.45<br />
Insurances 56861 8.4 9.8 15.3 16.8 8.9 8.0 2.4 2.0 17.7 1.26<br />
Bâloise Holding R BALN.VX HOLD 49.90 63 44 –8.4 –4.0 5.9 2760 0.4 1.7 5.1 5.8 9.7 8.6 1.34 2.7 26.2 135 0.37<br />
Swiss Life R SLHN.VX HOLD 147.75 231 129 –13.0 –6.6 2.6 4468 0.7 9.5 13.1 16.1 11.2 9.2 3.56 2.4 27.1 192 0.77<br />
Swiss Reinsurance R RUKN.VX REST 73.85 97 71 –7.2 –12.2 –14.1 23784 3.5 – – – – – – – – – –<br />
Zurich Financial Services R ZURN.VX BUY 179.50 220 161 –8.1 –11.3 5.8 25849 3.8 14.8 23.8 25.7 7.5 7.0 3.20 1.8 13.4 128 1.41<br />
Industrial Services & Consulting 12048 1.8 11.1 14.1 17.6 20.7 15.2 4.1 1.5 30.3 6.36<br />
Adecco R ADEN.VX BUY 60.65 84 43 –2.4 5.9 –5.6 7947 1.2 1.6 2.8 4.0 21.5 15.0 0.87 1.4 30.8 9 7.12<br />
SGS Geneva SGSN.VX BUY 687.00 803 622 2.5 1.0 9.2 4101 0.6 29.5 35.8 43.8 19.2 15.7 10.47 1.5 29.2 141 4.88<br />
Telecommunications 10314 1.5 23.7 27.3 31.3 15.3 13.3 14.0 3.4 51.2 3.38<br />
Swisscom R SCMN.VX REST 418.00 430 367 2.0 3.9 15.9 10314 1.5 – – – – – – – – – –<br />
Chemicals 28220 4.2 7.4 11.3 13.9 17.1 14.2 3.6 2.1 35.0 1.95<br />
CIBA Spec. Chemicals R CIBN.VX BUY 88.35 101 82 –1.3 1.7 –2.9 6043 0.9 5.0 5.7 6.8 15.5 13.0 2.78 3.1 48.6 63 1.41<br />
Clariant R CLN.VX BUY 17.25 20 13 –6.0 4.9 21.2 3970 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.2 14.9 14.6 0.23 1.3 19.9 8 2.25<br />
Givaudan R GIVN.VX HOLD 740.00 752 548 1.9 14.7 35.8 5282 0.8 26.9 39.8 48.6 18.6 15.2 10.73 1.5 27.0 325 2.28<br />
Lonza R LONN.VX SELL 56.25 75 54 –10.5 –10.1 –12.7 2110 0.3 1.8 3.3 4.5 16.9 12.4 1.22 2.2 36.8 26 2.16<br />
Syngenta R SYNN.VX BUY 106.50 108 69 3.5 4.3 41.0 10814 1.6 2.6 5.9 7.3 18.0 14.6 2.16 2.0 36.5 55 1.94<br />
Healthcare 238830 35.4 3.1 4.4 5.1 21.1 18.6 1.5 1.7 35.9 4.50<br />
Novartis R NOVN.VX HOLD 57.50 59 50 4.2 –0.5 12.3 145292 21.5 2.0 2.9 3.3 19.6 17.4 1.09 1.9 37.1 12 4.67<br />
Roche Holding DRC ROG.VX BUY 125.25 141 107 –1.4 –7.9 11.8 87996 13.0 3.6 5.3 6.1 23.7 20.7 1.83 1.5 34.6 30 4.22<br />
Serono<br />
SEO.VX HOLD 780.00 974 728 0.4 1.4 –9.9 5542 0.8 24.6 30.4 35.0 20.0 17.4 7.01 0.9 23.1 178 4.38<br />
Food & Beverage 131144 19.4 15.9 17.2 19.4 18.9 16.8 7.7 2.4 44.7 3.42<br />
Nestlé R NESN.VX BUY 325.00 346 272 –2.4 –0.9 21.4 131144 19.4 15.9 17.2 19.4 18.9 16.8 7.70 2.4 44.7 95 3.42<br />
Electric Components & Equipment 14430 2.1 –0.6 0.3 0.5 23.4 13.5 0.0 0.4 10.1 4.67<br />
ABB R ABBN.VX BUY 6.97 8 5 2.2 –4.5 33.1 14430 2.1 –0.6 0.3 0.5 23.4 13.5 0.03 0.4 10.1 1.5 4.67<br />
Technology 1227 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.7 28.8 20.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.78<br />
Kudelski R KUD.VX BUY 36.20 46 33 2.7 –7.8 13.7 1227 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.7 28.8 20.8 0.00 0.0 0.0 4 9.78<br />
Consumer Cyclical 24489 3.6 2.6 3.6 4.2 17.6 14.9 0.8 1.7 29.6 2.43<br />
Richemont AG CFR.VX HOLD 33.05 36 24 0.0 –0.9 35.7 17252 2.6 0.9 1.8 2.2 18.0 14.8 0.64 1.9 34.8 13 2.45<br />
Swatch Group UHR.VX BUY 162.25 181 117 –0.8 –5.0 28.3 5437 0.8 8.4 9.7 10.9 16.7 14.9 1.68 1.0 17.3 69 2.37<br />
Swatch Group R UHRN.VX BUY 33.25 37 24 –0.2 –3.9 30.2 1800 0.3 1.7 1.9 2.2 17.1 15.2 0.34 1.0 17.3 14 2.42<br />
Construction & Materials 11897 1.8 3.4 4.0 4.6 17.0 14.6 1.2 1.8 30.4 1.90<br />
Holcim HOLN.VX BUY 67.70 70 51 1.0 5.5 24.7 11897 1.8 3.4 4.0 4.6 17.0 14.6 1.21 1.8 30.4 36 1.90<br />
Technology hardware & Equipment 1342 0.2 2.5 6.4 10.7 20.2 12.1 2.1 1.6 32.3 1.13<br />
Unaxis R 20 UNAX.VX HOLD 129.75 200 116 –8.6 –10.5 6.1 1342 0.2 2.5 6.4 10.7 20.2 12.1 2.07 1.6 32.3 115 1.13<br />
Swiss Market Index 5537.80 5942 4962 –1.2 –4.0 11.5 674802 100.0 322.2 370.6 17.2 14.9 2.2 35.3 2.36<br />
1<br />
Market value of free float<br />
Legend: REST = restricted (consensus estimates, IBES) BV = book value P/E = price to earnings R/DRC = registered share/dividend rights certificate Source = Bloomberg, IBES estimates, Datastream, Credit Suisse (ratings)
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Product offers—41<br />
Sector funds:<br />
ACM International Health Care Fund<br />
• Geared toward stock investors who are seeking a well-diversified<br />
healthcare equity fund that has relatively low volatility.<br />
Source: Lipper Reuters<br />
Indexed in USD<br />
150<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
06.99<br />
12.99<br />
06.00<br />
MSCI World/Health<br />
Care-Gross USD<br />
12.00<br />
06.01<br />
12.01<br />
06.02<br />
12.02<br />
ACM International<br />
Health Care A<br />
06.03<br />
12.03<br />
Investment objective and performance<br />
Over the past five years, the fund has posted<br />
the lowest volatility in its category. Its<br />
annualized standard deviation totals<br />
12.34% compared with 13.60% for the<br />
benchmark index and 12.69% for the<br />
fund’s peer group. The fund is managed by<br />
an eminently experienced research team.<br />
The team is led by a portfolio manager who<br />
has run the fund since its inception (1983)<br />
and whose 35 years of experience in investing<br />
in the healthcare industry is nearly<br />
unparalleled. The fund is managed using a<br />
classic bottom-up approach to stock selection.<br />
The portfolio is thus assembled by<br />
means of pure stock picking, though the<br />
fund manager rigorously adheres to his<br />
cautious investment philosophy at all times<br />
(90% of the companies in the portfolio are<br />
profitable enterprises).<br />
Security number: 394827<br />
Fund currency:<br />
USD<br />
Fund volume (million): USD 701<br />
Annual return since 30 June 1999: 1.1%<br />
Annual volatility: 12.34%<br />
Portfolio manager: Norman M. Fidel<br />
Commodity funds:<br />
Credit Suisse Commodity Fund Plus<br />
• Geared toward investors who are seeking to invest directly<br />
in commodities rather than in specific companies.<br />
•Offers investors an opportunity to diversify their portfolios since<br />
commodities have a low correlation to traditional equity and fixed-income<br />
instruments.<br />
Investment objective and performance<br />
The Credit Suisse Commodity Fund Plus is<br />
a passively managed fund that aims to<br />
replicate the performance of the Goldman<br />
Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) as closely<br />
as possible by investing in futures on the<br />
GSCI. The GSCI comprises 25 commodities<br />
primarily in the energy sector (68%). In<br />
order to improve the fund’s total return,<br />
cash is invested in money-market instruments<br />
with the goal of generating a return<br />
of LIBOR plus 30 basis points. Since twothirds<br />
of the fund’s assets are invested in<br />
energy and related products, its year-todate<br />
performance has been driven mainly<br />
by the rise in energy prices.<br />
Source: Lipper Reuters<br />
130<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
95<br />
Indexed in EUR<br />
11.03<br />
12.03<br />
01.04<br />
02.04<br />
03.04<br />
04.04<br />
05.04<br />
Security number:<br />
1691241 (EUR)<br />
1691240 (CHF)<br />
1691244 (USD)<br />
Fund currency:<br />
EUR, CHF, USD<br />
Fund volume (million): EUR 32,<br />
CHF 60, USD 69<br />
Return (since 30/11/03): 17.1% (in EUR)<br />
Average peer group<br />
Goldman Sachs<br />
Commodity-TR USD<br />
Credit Suisse Commodity<br />
Fund Plus Euro<br />
Annual volatility: 13.7%<br />
Portfolio manager: Markus Huebscher
“Clamshell handsets with bigger displays and<br />
built-in cameras are in demand” Uwe Neumann, CEFA
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Equities topic—43<br />
Technology stocks still make an interesting alternative<br />
Recovering technology stocks could take a breather in the second half of the year.<br />
Looking ahead to 2005, though, we believe the sector should continue to provide<br />
some good opportunities. Selective stock picking is key. Ulrich Kaiser, CEFA, Uwe Neumann, CEFA<br />
The significant underperformance by semiconductor stocks since<br />
the start of the year has run counter to the sector’s positive operational<br />
trend. Revenue growth picked up 2.1% sequentially and<br />
37% year-on-year in May. The average selling price for semiconductor<br />
chips is up 9.6% from a year ago. NAND flash memory<br />
chips are encountering pricing pressure. DRAM memory chip<br />
prices appear to have bottomed out and are likely to experience<br />
a seasonal upturn in the third quarter. The second-quarter<br />
(April–June) business results reported so far and company outlooks<br />
for the remainder of the year and beyond paint a mixed picture.<br />
Sector giant Intel, in particular, has provided grist for the mill<br />
of industry pessimists with its motley quarterly report, and even<br />
more so with its rather cautious appraisal of its future business<br />
prospects. However, this is no reason to strike a sour note, in our<br />
opinion, because Intel’s troubles are of the company’s own<br />
making. We share the market’s viewpoint that the semiconductor<br />
cycle is close to peaking, but we believe the current slowdown<br />
or slackening of growth is merely temporary and by no means<br />
comparable with the situation that prevailed after the year 2000.<br />
In contrast to the situation back then, the current level of capacity<br />
utilization and especially the isolated expansions of production<br />
capacity are exerting a dampening and modulating effect on both<br />
the semiconductor cycle and manufacturers’ pricing power.<br />
Against this backdrop, the current market opinion looks excessively<br />
grim to us (Figure 1). We are maintaining our neutral<br />
weighting of the semiconductor sector.<br />
Figure 1<br />
The market is too negative on semiconductors<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
%<br />
%<br />
Contradictory signals in the electronic hardware sector<br />
As usual, hopes on the demand side are riding on the second half<br />
of the year. Production <strong>bottleneck</strong>s in the TFT-LCD flat-screen<br />
segment did not arise in the second quarter. However, supplier<br />
shortages left manufacturers insufficient leeway to cut prices. As<br />
a result, demand has grown more slowly than desired and a volume<br />
effect has not yet materialized. This particularly applies for<br />
flat-screen televisions, which could get a sales boost from the<br />
Olympic Games. According to recent statements, manufacturers<br />
are now willing to make price concessions in the range of<br />
10%–20%, particularly for 17- and 19-inch flat screens. We think<br />
annual price cuts of 30%–35% on flat-screen televisions would be<br />
needed to trigger a volume effect. Asian demand for mobile telephones<br />
declined in May, particularly in the lower-price segment,<br />
but rebounded in June. Increasing competition in the low-end<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
–20<br />
–40<br />
–60<br />
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04<br />
Relative performance of the US semiconductor sector (r.h.s.)<br />
Worldwide growth in semiconductors<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
–20<br />
–40<br />
–60
digital camera segment is leading to price reductions. Demand for<br />
higher-end digital cameras and cellphones remains robust, while<br />
demand for PCs and consumer electronic devices is unlikely to<br />
pick up until the third quarter, though there are conflicting opinions<br />
about the magnitude of the expected seasonal upturn. Recent<br />
orders for motherboards received by Taiwan-based manufacturers<br />
point to only moderate growth. However, the robust<br />
order intake at component makers, presumably due to multiple<br />
order placements motivated by fears of shortages, suggests the<br />
opposite. We are maintaining our neutral weighting of the electronic<br />
hardware sector in view of a potential inventory buildup for<br />
various products.<br />
Telecom service providers: Exaggerated concerns<br />
about margin pressure<br />
Now that the market penetration of mobile phone users in Europe<br />
has nearly surpassed fixed-line usage, customer growth is increasingly<br />
fading into the background as a growth driver for the<br />
sector. In the first half of 2004, combined fixed-line and mobile telephony<br />
revenues actually declined slightly from the previous year<br />
by an average of 2%, but the operating margins of European telecom<br />
service providers remain high. For the first six months of this<br />
year, operating margins ranged from 32% for pure fixed-line carriers<br />
like British Telecom to a whopping 47% for integrated incumbents<br />
like Telecom Italia, which face relatively little competitive<br />
pressure. Hence, despite stagnating revenue, telecom<br />
operators continue to generate rich cash flows, which, in the<br />
wake of the industry’s massive debt reduction over the past three<br />
years, are now increasingly accruing to shareholders both directly<br />
and indirectly in the form of dividends or share buybacks. However,<br />
new technologies and regulatory interventions are raising<br />
concerns about intensifying margin pressure. Internet telephony<br />
(VoIP), for example, is a suspected margin-destroying technology<br />
in the fixed-line business. Moreover, advancing regulatory efforts<br />
to unbundle the local loop and the admittance of mobile service<br />
resellers (mobile virtual network operators) into the market are<br />
depressing investor sentiment. Although these sector trends are<br />
unlikely to be casually tolerated, the negative dynamics of these<br />
influences are being overestimated. The risk premiums currently<br />
priced into shares of telecom service providers, particularly in Europe,<br />
are too high in our opinion. The sector P/E based on estimated<br />
2005 profits has fallen below 10, and the free cash flow<br />
yield and average dividend yield currently stand at 10.5% and<br />
3.7%, respectively (Figure 2). The second half of 2004 is likely to<br />
see an easing of margin pressure and a stabilization of the<br />
revenue trend, which should be reflected in rising share prices.<br />
We are therefore overweighting the sector, and we recommend<br />
buying stocks like Vodafone, France Telecom, Telecom Italia and<br />
Deutsche Telekom.<br />
Telecom equipment manufacturers: Price war<br />
in the cellphone business<br />
Although the mobile telephone market has been booming this<br />
year (Figure 3), industry leader Nokia has suffered an unexpectedly<br />
steep slump in net profit so far this fiscal year, evidently as<br />
a result of intensifying competition. Nokia must defend its formidable<br />
market share (31%) with all its might in order to maintain its<br />
economies of scale, which have long enabled the handset maker<br />
to achieve operating margins above 20%. However, the competition<br />
with Samsung, Sony-Ericsson, Motorola and Siemens has<br />
Figure 2<br />
Free cash flow and dividend yields<br />
of European telecom providers<br />
Source: Credit Suisse<br />
0.14<br />
0.12<br />
0.1<br />
0.08<br />
0.06<br />
0.04<br />
0.02<br />
0<br />
BT<br />
DT<br />
FT<br />
Dividend yields<br />
KPN<br />
PT<br />
SWCM<br />
Figure 3<br />
Global trend in cellular phones<br />
Source: Gartner Group<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
01/02<br />
Total<br />
04/02<br />
07/02<br />
10/02<br />
01/03<br />
04/03<br />
07/03<br />
Growth (YoY)<br />
TDC<br />
10/03<br />
TI<br />
TEF<br />
TA<br />
TLSN<br />
Free cash flow returns<br />
01/04<br />
04/04<br />
07/04<br />
10/04<br />
Sector<br />
in %<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0
grown tougher. The cellphone boom this year has been driven by<br />
the burgeoning replacement cycle in Europe and the USA and by<br />
rising demand in Asia. In the midst of this phase, Nokia has evidently<br />
neglected to adapt its product range to the needs of replacement<br />
buyers. Clamshell handsets with bigger displays and<br />
built-in, easy-to-use cameras have been particularly in demand.<br />
Samsung and Sony-Ericsson have been the best at satisfying<br />
this demand and have captured market share as a result. Their<br />
market-share gains are now sparking a price war in the cellphone<br />
segment. Nokia is slashing its handset prices in an effort to stabilize<br />
its market share, at the expense of its profit margin at<br />
present. The margin erosion has been surprisingly swift. The cellphone<br />
maker was still generating a profit margin of 27% during<br />
the Christmas quarter of 2003, but this figure stood at only 19%<br />
in the second quarter of 2004, and Nokia expects it to plunge<br />
even further to 12% in the third quarter. Keep in mind that Nokia<br />
has a war chest of more than EUR 11 billion (EUR 2.5 per share)<br />
at its disposal to defend its market share. This means that the<br />
company has the wherewithal to wage a lengthy price war. This<br />
bodes ill for the cellphone industry and sector share prices. Nokia<br />
stock has already lost more than 30% of its value since the start<br />
of this year and is unlikely to rebound much in the second half.<br />
Shares of Samsung, Motorola and Sony-Ericsson have yet to feel<br />
the effects of the price war, but they probably will later on.<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Equities topic—45<br />
Brisk order intake for network equipment manufacturers<br />
The network equipment sector is likely to be less affected by this<br />
trend. The mobile telephony network business, where Ericsson is<br />
the leader with a market share of nearly 40%, can count on robust<br />
order intake this year. Growing demand, particularly in developing<br />
countries (South America, South Africa, India, etc.), and<br />
infrastructure upgrade orders in Europe and the USA (migration<br />
from 2G to 3G networks) are having a positive impact on the revenue<br />
trend. A similar but somewhat more moderate trend is visible<br />
in the fixed-line infrastructure business, where Alcatel is well<br />
positioned. Here, the migration from pure voice networks to digital<br />
data networks is boosting order intake from telecom service<br />
providers. What’s more, the aforementioned companies have<br />
emerged from a tough period of restructuring, the fruits of which<br />
are likely to be reaped this year. Profit margins and net income are<br />
thus poised to turn around sharply in 2004. However, current<br />
stock valuations are already discounting much of the expected<br />
profit growth. Companies like Ericsson have already seen their<br />
valuations return to 2.5 times annual revenue like back in the<br />
boom days. Risk-aware investors will find the best pickings in<br />
North America, where Lucent, Nortel (Canada), Cisco and Juniper<br />
Networks are exhibiting strong earnings momentum. |<br />
Top: Hasselblad professional digital<br />
cameras – demand still big for highquality<br />
equipment.<br />
Bottom: The pavilion of the global<br />
mobile telephony company Vodafone<br />
at the Cebit 2003 IT show.
Asia excluding Japan:<br />
Looking for signs of a soft landing<br />
Asia’s stock markets have turned in a<br />
disappointing performance so far this<br />
year. This situation brings to mind an old<br />
Asian adage: “As bamboos weather even<br />
a typhoon because they seem to bow<br />
to such force, a wise man too bows to<br />
such storms, acknowledging the stronger<br />
force and preserving his strength to<br />
emerge in its wake.” Damian Sigrist<br />
In 2003, the share prices on many Asian stock markets were<br />
swept upward as if by a storm, while in 2004 these equity markets<br />
have been blown back by a strong headwind. For example,<br />
the HSI China Enterprise Index realized an advance of 152% last<br />
year, but retreated in double-digit negative territory in the first half<br />
of 2004. Other major Asian stock-market indices faced the same,<br />
if not less pronounced, fate. Amid such a situation, long-term-oriented<br />
investors merely have the possibility – like the aforementioned<br />
bamboo tree – to ride out the correction, but at the same<br />
time being on the lookout for buying opportunities. In this regard,<br />
Asia’s stock markets offer great potential in the long term.<br />
Just how long investors will have to be patient depends primarily<br />
on the developments in China, which has become a key<br />
trading partner for many Asian countries. Of course, China’s<br />
economy is growing at an above-average pace. But with this<br />
growth, the danger arises that the economy will overheat and the<br />
risk looms that China will slide into the same situation as it did in<br />
the mid-1990s. At that time, the government also attempted to<br />
put the brakes on the high-revving economic engine. The measures<br />
implemented by the state – curbing investments and hiking<br />
interest rates by 270 basis points to 12.06%, among other things<br />
– had showed their effects. However, the braking maneuver<br />
turned out to be too abrupt and presented China with a “hard<br />
landing” as well as a period of deflation.<br />
Figure 1<br />
Asia’s stock-market performance has been<br />
disappointing until now<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
-20<br />
%<br />
Kospi (Korea)<br />
KL Composite<br />
(Malaysia)<br />
STI (Singapore)<br />
TWSE<br />
(Taiwan)<br />
Performance in 2003<br />
Performance since start of year<br />
Hang Seng<br />
(Hong Kong)<br />
SET (Thailand)<br />
HSI Enterprises<br />
(China)<br />
MSCI AC<br />
(Asia/Pacific)<br />
No interest-rate hike in China until inflation<br />
surpasses the 5% mark<br />
We currently assume that history will not repeat itself in this regard.<br />
First, the set of economic data emanating from China today<br />
looks much healthier. And second, China has improved its underlying<br />
institutional and regulatory conditions, whereby market intervention<br />
shows a more effective impact. The “soft landing” that<br />
the government is striving for should thus materialize, underpinned<br />
by robust domestic consumption and export activity. In order<br />
to achieve such a feat, though, China will be compelled to intervene<br />
with further measures such as boosting lending rates and<br />
probably hiking interest rates too, in view of the climbing inflation<br />
rates. Still, the People’s Bank of China explained that it would not<br />
tighten the interest-rate screw until the inflation rate surpassed<br />
the 5% mark.<br />
For the time being, investors’ doubts that the government can<br />
succeed in carrying out a “soft landing” are likely to stand in the<br />
way of Chinese stocks breaking out of their correction phase. But<br />
as soon as progress reports increase, interest in the Chinese<br />
market will be rekindled, which could be the case in the second<br />
half of this year. Nevertheless, investors should be aware that,<br />
amid an environment of rising interest rates, the stimulus to invest<br />
in China as well as in other emerging markets should dissipate.<br />
We favor defensive sectors such as energy and utilities, which can<br />
grow successfully, even given an economic slowdown. In addition,<br />
we prefer sectors, such as the infrastructure segment (roads,<br />
harbors), in which there are <strong>bottleneck</strong>s and, as such, have drawn<br />
the government’s attention as areas of investment.<br />
Taiwan reaps rewards from boost in its index weightings<br />
Since the development in other Asian markets is tied to the trend<br />
in China, the lion’s share of these stock markets will probably be<br />
held in check for the time being too. Positive news flow stemming<br />
from China and the USA, which has a disproportionately strong influence<br />
on some of these countries, could nonetheless lead to a
more precipitous rebound in these markets. In our view, this especially<br />
applies to Taiwan as well as to South Korea. In these two<br />
countries, the technology sector carries a heavy weighting in the<br />
stock-market indices. The tech sector is likely to benefit from the<br />
prevailing boom in consumption in China, as well as from the robust<br />
– albeit with waning momentum – US economy. Moreover,<br />
Taiwan’s market will be underpinned subliminally in the coming<br />
12 months by the fact that MSCI will noticeably boost the island<br />
nation’s weighting in its country indices. Accordingly, investment<br />
funds should build up their country allocations in Taiwanese<br />
stocks. In South Korea, we expect favorable impetus from personal<br />
consumption, after the country traversed the low point in<br />
2003 with regard to its credit card debt problems. Based on P/E<br />
multiples, the South Korean stock market is among the most attractive<br />
in the region.<br />
Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand in the starting blocks<br />
Hong Kong is the most directly exposed to China’s growing influence<br />
in the Asian region. The special Chinese administrative region<br />
has profited since the outset of this year from the easing of<br />
restrictions on tourists and currency from the mainland, from<br />
which the hotel and retail sectors have already reaped rewards. In<br />
light of the climbing inflation rates, which sooner or later could<br />
lead to rising interest rates, the boom on the real estate market<br />
should continue to prevail. The pegging of the Hong Kong dollar<br />
to the US dollar exerts additional pressure on interest rates. The<br />
recent attempt by Beijing to bolster its influence on political developments<br />
in Hong Kong could dampen sentiment there. Moreover,<br />
based on P/E multiples, the Hong Kong market is among<br />
the most expensive in Asia. We are accordingly sticking to our<br />
cautious stance on Hong Kong. Ditto for Thailand. Although the<br />
country’s economy continues to expand at an above-average<br />
pace by international comparison, growth momentum has diminished<br />
as a result of waning personal consumption. Amid the current<br />
environment, this is unlikely to spark any new investment by<br />
market participants. The stock market in the city-state of Singapore<br />
has revealed itself to be as solid as a rock thus far in the<br />
course of this year. The country’s economy shows a robust trend,<br />
which has been manifest in a comparatively stable share-price<br />
performance. We are maintaining our neutral weighting on Singapore<br />
in our country allocation since this market does not count<br />
among the cheapest. |<br />
Top Picks<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0.8<br />
8.0<br />
7.5<br />
7.0<br />
6.5<br />
6.0<br />
5.5<br />
5.0<br />
4.5<br />
4.0<br />
3.5<br />
Yanzhou Coal<br />
Price rel. to Hang Seng<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Equities—47<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
Yanzhou Coal — Yanzhou Coal is one of China’s leading coal producers.<br />
— The company reaps rewards from the demand for energy<br />
emanating from China, which generates most (81%) of its<br />
electricity with coal-burning power plants. — Hence, the supply of<br />
coal may not be able to meet the demand, which is manifest in<br />
sharply rising coal prices in 2004. — The situation could intensify<br />
since additional coal-burning plants will be built in the coming<br />
years due to the <strong>bottleneck</strong>s in the electricity supply. — In addition,<br />
Yanzhou Coal is a key coal exporter (the company accounts for<br />
roughly 17% of total Chinese coal exports).<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
HKD 9.4 9.85/3.775 1.02/1.08 9.8/9.23 2.98%<br />
3.0<br />
00 01 02 03 04<br />
Table 1<br />
Asia’s stock markets are attractively valued<br />
once again<br />
Source: IBES, Credit Suisse<br />
EPS Growth % P/ E Rating<br />
2004E 2005E 2004E 2005E<br />
China 20.0 6.8 12 11 Neutral<br />
Hong Kong 31.1 4.6 16 15 Neutral<br />
Korea 71.5 8.0 7 6 Overweight<br />
Singapore 25.7 8.2 14 13 Neutral<br />
Taiwan 66.9 9.3 11 10 Overweight<br />
Thailand 0.3 9.7 11 10 Neutral<br />
Singapore Press Holdings<br />
Price rel. to STI<br />
Source: Datastream<br />
Singapore Press Holdings — The economy of the Asian nationstate<br />
Singapore is trending favorably, from which the late-cyclical<br />
media group Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) should benefit. —<br />
Why? Companies strive to steadily boost their advertising budgets<br />
in phases of economic recovery. — In this situation, Singapore<br />
Press Holdings publishes 14 newspapers and magazines, as well<br />
as operates an online news portal and is active in the television<br />
business. — The group should be in a position to not only increase<br />
advertising revenues, but also raise its fees for classified ads.<br />
Price 02/08/04 H/L 52W EPS 04E/05E P/E 04E/05E Yield 04E<br />
SGD 4.34 4.484/3.5709 0.31/0.23 13.69/18.94 4.61%
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
Fixed income<br />
The increase in consumer prices reflects the fact that companies<br />
are defending their margins and that there is little need for a widening<br />
of spreads<br />
Active management of bond portfolios is especially important in phases<br />
of rising yields
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Fixed income—49<br />
Sound fundamental data support corporate bonds<br />
There is considerable movement in government bond yields at the moment, while<br />
corporate bond spreads remain quiet and have settled at a low level. Dr. Ursula Oser<br />
The yields on government bonds and the spreads demanded by<br />
investors for buying investment-grade corporate bonds instead<br />
of sovereign issues depend crucially on the macroeconomic<br />
environment (Figure 1). In the past, the growth of gross national<br />
product and industrial production was central for the interest-rate<br />
outlook, while recently more interest has been focused on inflation.<br />
Even though the pace of US economic growth is losing<br />
momentum, the global economic upturn still appears to have a<br />
relatively sound base. The employment market has staged a – admittedly<br />
faltering – revival, and will probably help the US economy<br />
achieve a soft landing. In Europe, although unresolved structural<br />
problems and high unemployment stand in the way of a<br />
higher pace of growth, we nevertheless expect the euro-zone<br />
economy to grow by 1.5% this year and 1.6% next year.<br />
Investors are upbeat<br />
Market players in the investment-grade bond markets appear to<br />
share our relatively upbeat picture of the world economy. The<br />
lack of reaction from the credit markets to the publication of<br />
patchy economic indicators and the Fed’s past rate hike is reflected<br />
in the narrow range within which spreads have settled<br />
down since the beginning of the year. Figure 2 shows that the<br />
spread of EUR-denominated corporate bonds over sovereign issues<br />
of a comparable maturity has moved within a range of just a<br />
few basis points (bp). At present, the average spreads for a broad<br />
EUR index of liquid bonds is around 45 bp.<br />
We see greater uncertainty in the assessment of the future<br />
inflation trend. The inflation premiums priced into yields have risen<br />
significantly since mid-2003. Inflation rates themselves charted<br />
their lowest levels at the beginning of this year in the USA as well<br />
as in Europe, and have risen briskly since then – especially in the<br />
USA. US prices increased a good 3% YoY in June. Adjusted for<br />
the volatile influence of energy and food prices, this was just 2%.<br />
For several months now, US producer prices have been indicating<br />
that a certain inflation potential has built up as a result of the<br />
increase in commodity prices. And prices have now also risen,<br />
with a time lag at the consumer level. Although the inflationary influence<br />
of commodities is now fading again, the current inflation<br />
trend is enough of a cause of concern for the US central bank to<br />
continue to raise interest rates moderately in the next few months<br />
from their all-time lows. The prospect of higher key rates and the<br />
stretched budgetary situation will exert a certain amount of upside<br />
Figure 1<br />
First-half 2004 characterized by pronounced<br />
fluctuations in government bond yields<br />
Source: Credit Suisse, Bloomberg<br />
5.0<br />
4.5<br />
4.0<br />
3.5<br />
3.0<br />
% %<br />
01/04<br />
02/04<br />
03/04<br />
04/04<br />
10-year Bunds<br />
10-year US Treasuries<br />
10-year Eidgenossen (r.h.s.)<br />
05/04<br />
06/04<br />
07/04<br />
4.0<br />
3.5<br />
3.0<br />
2.5<br />
2.0
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Fixed income—50<br />
pressure on yield levels. The fact that yields and bond prices are<br />
moving in opposite directions means that total returns (capital<br />
gains/losses + coupon income) will probably be only moderate for<br />
the time being – depending on the residual maturity. On the other<br />
hand, a higher interest-rate level will create attractive opportunities<br />
for new fixed-income investments.<br />
Interest-rate fluctuations influence all fixed-income securities.<br />
Other decisive effects on the performance of corporate<br />
bonds spreads over government bonds include (1) to what extent<br />
the issuers can pass on their higher procurement costs to consumers,<br />
and (2) whether consumer spending would suffer from<br />
higher interest rates. The increase in consumer prices reflects the<br />
fact that companies are defending their margins and that there is<br />
little need for spread-widening. We therefore also assume that<br />
corporate bonds on average will bring higher total returns than<br />
government bonds in the next few months, and that investors will<br />
be compensated for the higher credit risk. Only an inflation shock<br />
– which we do not expect – would spoil this picture. We see the<br />
possibility of certain spread-widening at most in the case of bonds<br />
from issuers in the automobile sector. The US automobile sector<br />
has lured customers with extremely attractive financing models,<br />
which have motivated consumers to buy cars sooner.<br />
Companies react with bond buybacks<br />
The sound economic environment and a certain amount of pricing<br />
power have allowed companies to build up their cash reserves.<br />
In light of the inflows of liquidity and restrained investment budgets,<br />
some issuers have reacted by buying back selected outstanding<br />
bonds. It comes as no surprise that the European telecoms<br />
sector, which has devoted itself to the de-leveraging of its<br />
balance sheets, has pointed the way here. In the last few months,<br />
issuers from other sectors have also embarked on this path.<br />
Examples include the bond buybacks tendered by Linde and<br />
Saint-Gobain. The motivation for such transactions may differ<br />
greatly. Issuers that use the proceeds for longer-term financing<br />
are positioning themselves with regard to the expectation that interest<br />
rates will rise. Other companies are pursuing the objective<br />
of reducing their gearing. Basically, in our opinion, the buybacks<br />
are a sign of improving credit quality in the corporate sector. |<br />
Figure 2<br />
Since the start of 2004, the spread on EUR<br />
corporate bonds has settled down to a low level,<br />
without showing signs of widening soon<br />
Source: Credit Suisse, CSFB Liquid Eurobond Index<br />
4.5<br />
4<br />
%<br />
3.5<br />
3<br />
2.5<br />
01/04<br />
02/04<br />
03/04<br />
04/04<br />
05/04<br />
06/04<br />
07/04<br />
Average yields on corporate bonds<br />
Yields on EUR government bonds of similar duration
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Product offers—51<br />
Global Investment Grade Bonds EUR:<br />
Dexia Bonds International C Cap<br />
• Investors can profit from global bond markets’ appreciation while avoiding<br />
exchange rate risks.<br />
Source: Lipper Reuters<br />
Indexed<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
30.06.01<br />
30.09.01<br />
30.12.01<br />
30.03.02<br />
30.06.02<br />
JP Morgan Global GBI<br />
Hedged DEM/EUR-TR<br />
30.09.02<br />
30.12.02<br />
30.03.03<br />
30.06.03<br />
30.09.03<br />
30.12.03<br />
Dexia Bonds International<br />
C Cap<br />
30.03.04<br />
Investment objective and performance<br />
The fund invests globally in investment<br />
grade bonds issued by governments, their<br />
agencies and to a smaller extent by corporations.<br />
The issues can be denominated in<br />
any of the main markets’ currencies. Although<br />
the fund manager might decide on<br />
keeping some currency exposure uncovered<br />
when he foresees an appreciation in<br />
either currency, positions will in general be<br />
automatically hedged.<br />
Thanks to a very consistent and disciplined<br />
approach to investments, coupled with a<br />
large pool of research resources, Dexia is<br />
able to generate an attractive performance<br />
across its fixed income portfolios. The<br />
Bonds International fund has ranked in the<br />
top quartile over both the long-term and the<br />
short-term, while maintaining an average<br />
volatility.<br />
Security number: 607847<br />
Fund currency:<br />
EUR<br />
Yield to maturity: 4.55%<br />
Modified duration: 4.61<br />
Fund volume (million): EUR 1,102<br />
Portfolio manager:<br />
Luc D’Hooge<br />
Convertible bond funds:<br />
RMF Convertibles Europe<br />
• Convertible bonds offer the benefits of a hybrid structure that combines<br />
the defensive attributes of bonds with the earnings potential of stocks.<br />
• RMF, founded in 1992, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Man Group<br />
specializing in know-how-based strategies for hedge funds, leveraged<br />
finance and convertible bonds.<br />
Investment objective and performance<br />
The attractiveness of the underlying stock<br />
and the creditworthiness of the bond issuer<br />
are the most important criteria in the investment<br />
process. Roughly 32% of the<br />
bonds held in the fund do not carry an official<br />
credit rating. Since June 2001, it has<br />
been the number one fund in its category in<br />
terms of its Sharpe ratio, which the fund<br />
has achieved by generating very good returns<br />
while assuming below-average risk.<br />
The fund has continually reduced its delta<br />
over the past months to 0.26, which lies at<br />
the lower edge of its sensitivity range<br />
(0.25–0.70). As of end-June 2004, the<br />
fund was invested in 50 convertible bonds,<br />
28 of which are not included in the benchmark<br />
index.<br />
Source: Lipper Reuters<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
95<br />
90<br />
Indexed<br />
06.01<br />
12.01<br />
06.02<br />
12.02<br />
06.03<br />
12.03<br />
Security number: 1097919<br />
Fund currency:<br />
EUR<br />
Performance past 3 years (annual): 5.4%<br />
Annual volatility: 5.9%<br />
Fund volume (million): EUR 189<br />
Delta: 0.26<br />
Average peer group<br />
Goldman Sachs Europe<br />
Convertible-TR<br />
RMF Umbrella – Convertibles<br />
Europe<br />
Macaulay duration:<br />
Portfolio manager:<br />
4.7 years<br />
Bruno Achermann
Active management is more<br />
important than ever<br />
Improved performance in times of rising<br />
yields requires active bond portfolio<br />
management. Dr. Anja Hochberg<br />
Promptly at mid-year, the US Federal Reserve signaled the turnaround<br />
on the interest-rate front, with an initial cautious rate hike.<br />
Since the move and the accompanying commentary came as no<br />
surprise, the dreaded yield shock on the capital markets failed to<br />
materialize. Indeed, the medium-term upward trend for long-term<br />
yields is unbroken as well. Still, we do not expect to see any globally<br />
concurrent and synchronized climb in yields. Hence, active<br />
management of bond positions, with a view toward regional selection<br />
as well as duration management for boosting performance,<br />
is gaining significance.<br />
The US bond market should be the pivotal and focal point for<br />
the fixed-income market in the third quarter of this year as well.<br />
Up to now, the cautious stance taken by the US central bankers,<br />
coupled with the recent renewed weaker labor-market data (e. g.,<br />
non-farm payrolls), has kept the long end of the yield curve fairly<br />
in check, hindering the feared jump above the 5% mark (i. e., the<br />
yield on 10-year US Treasuries). Nevertheless, the US economy<br />
is wandering – notwithstanding slightly waning growth momentum<br />
– steadily toward higher capacity utilization. This premise is<br />
strongly underpinned by the closing output gap in summer of<br />
2005. Real yields are thus likely to show some upside potential as<br />
a recompense for the real capital (Figure 1). Moreover, a narrowing<br />
output gap comes in tandem with a tendency toward inflationary<br />
pressure, which is manifest particularly in a rising core<br />
rate. Although the temporarily overshooting inflation rates should<br />
retreat slightly again in the course of the year, the core rate has<br />
unlikely reached its peak. On the heels of the recently diminished<br />
expectations for inflation, we also perceive a renewed potential for<br />
climbing yields.<br />
Changing yield momentum<br />
The adjustment of inflation expectations, in particular, exerts a<br />
decisive influence on our global yield strategy. First, the spurt in<br />
yields at the long end of the curve diminishes the attractiveness<br />
of longer-dated US-dollar bonds considerably. Second, the renewed<br />
increase in inflation expectations will probably spark a<br />
noticeable trend toward flattening of the yield curve – led by the<br />
short end. The slope of US yield curve is, in any case, very steep<br />
at this end (Figure 2) and prone to flattening. Against this backdrop,<br />
we would take advantage of the current resurgence in USdollar<br />
bond prices in order to realize profits on premium bonds<br />
(i. e., bonds trading above par value) in the ultra-short and longerdated<br />
maturities segments. In light of the latent risk in the coming<br />
months to the yield curve wings (short and long end), we<br />
would advise investing in the US-dollar segment with the reinvestment<br />
floater or taking positions in bonds in the 3 to 5 year<br />
maturity segment.<br />
Within a year’s time, however, we are likely to be confronted<br />
not just with climbing yields. History shows that on the financial<br />
markets, capital-market yields typically reach their peaks already<br />
well in advance of the end of the Fed rate-hiking cycle. We see<br />
US money-market rates culminating at a historically rather low<br />
level already in 2006, against the background of our current economic<br />
forecasts. If this timing is foreseeable for the financial markets,<br />
we are likely to face an impending consolidation rally on the<br />
bond markets, in which investments in longer-dated bonds would<br />
pay off. Still, investors should keep a close eye on the active management<br />
of their bond portfolios. The emergence of the flattening<br />
of the yield curve at the peak point – led by the long end –<br />
should subsequently lead to an inverse yield curve (i. e., lower
yields at the long end than at the short end). In this regard, favoring<br />
once again rather shorter-dated maturities, with the corresponding<br />
yield advantage, could definitely pay off.<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Fixed income—53<br />
No synchronized increase in yields expected<br />
Regional diversification of a bond portfolio also constitutes as<br />
promising a factor for investing as the selection of the appropriate<br />
maturity segments. In the USA, the yield risk is likely to be the<br />
most pronounced in the coming months. Nevertheless, in view of<br />
the still-intact export upswing and a European Central Bank that<br />
is striving to dampen inflation expectations with a more hawkish<br />
tone, we no longer expect to see such a robust outperformance<br />
by EUR bonds versus their American counterparts over the summer.<br />
Merely strong appreciation of the euro, which would provide<br />
the ECB with renewed maneuvering room in the eyes of the financial<br />
markets, could lead to a de-coupling of yields. Such potential<br />
should indeed be more pronounced in the autumn, when<br />
the speculation over interest-rate hikes will be dashed in the<br />
euro zone. While the expectations on the part of the financial<br />
markets for an initial ECB rate hike at end-2004 have now been<br />
pushed forward, we anticipate that the central bank will not make<br />
a move on the interest front until the beginning of 2005 – when<br />
the spark from export activities also ignites the domestic economy.<br />
In Germany’s case, this will also necessitate a boost in real<br />
disposable incomes. Although noticeably retreating inflation rates<br />
at end-2004 could provide welcome support for personal consumption,<br />
in light of the sluggish recovery of the German labor<br />
market, we foresee only modest potential for a robust spurt in<br />
growth momentum. The generally flatterer growth path in the<br />
euro zone prompts us to favor EUR bonds in the coming months,<br />
with a longer maturity spectrum of 3–7 years. If the bond markets<br />
are again overshadowed by the US-driven consolidation, EUR<br />
bonds could instead lose their attractiveness.<br />
Figure 1<br />
Real yields harbor potential to rise<br />
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
6<br />
5<br />
4<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
0<br />
Real yields in %<br />
Index<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 01 03 04<br />
10-year US Treasuries<br />
ISM/NAPM<br />
Figure 2<br />
US yield curve historically steep<br />
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
3<br />
Yield spread on 10Y–2Y US government bonds in %<br />
2<br />
1<br />
0<br />
–1<br />
–2<br />
Yield on 2-year US<br />
government bonds<br />
0 4 8 12 16<br />
Current value<br />
Regression based on historical<br />
values
Bond selection list<br />
Industrialized nations<br />
Price Yield to Cur- Spread<br />
Sec. no. Coupon in% Issuer Rating Maturity 02/08/2004 maturity Duration rency bp 3<br />
CHF foreign bonds<br />
1900340 1 3/4 Commonwealth Bank AA–/Aa3 04.09.2007 99.68 1.86 2.97 CHF 17<br />
1567665 1 1/2 Österreichische Kontrollbank AAA/Aaa 27.03.2008 98.74 1.86 3.49 CHF 2<br />
1499609 2 1/4 Bayrische Landesbank AAA/Aaa 13.11.2008 100.54 2.12 3.97 CHF 12<br />
1901291 2 1/2 Met Life Glob AA/Aa2 30.07.2009 100.28 2.44 4.63 CHF 29<br />
1652329 2 1/4 Toyota AAA/Aaa 28.08.2009 99.99 2.25 4.64 CHF 9<br />
1906789 2 1/8 Hypo Alpe-Adria AA/Aa2 15.10.2010 97.50 2.57 5.64 CHF 19<br />
USD<br />
355627 3M Libor +10 Bp Deutsche Bank (FRN) AA–/Aa3 02.03.2006 99.54 n.a. 1.56 1 USD 38 2<br />
1540667 2 1/2 Nederlandse Gemeenten AAA/Aaa 31.03.2006 99.65 2.72 1.58 USD 23<br />
1579131 2 1/4 KFW AAA/Aaa 28.07.2006 99.05 2.75 1.90 USD 6<br />
1678826 3M Libor +13 Bp General Electric (FRN) AAA/Aaa 18.09.2006 100.50 n.a. 2.08 1 USD –11 2<br />
1639156 2 1/4 Rabobank AAA/Aaa 18.12.2006 98.53 2.90 2.24 USD 4<br />
1721853 3 Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank AAA/Aaa 29.12.2006 99.76 3.10 2.24 USD 23<br />
1344766 3M Libor +10 Bp Deutsche Bank (FRN) AA–/Aa3 21.03.2007 100.31 n.a. 2.55 1 USD –2 2<br />
1898346 2 3/4 Rabobank AAA/Aaa 08.05.2007 98.74 3.23 2.59 USD 21<br />
1603953 3 General Electric AAA/Aaa 20.09.2007 98.63 3.47 2.85 USD 33<br />
1641029 3 Förderbank AAA/Aaa 30.09.2008 96.70 3.87 3.72 USD 40<br />
1706657 3 5/8 DEPFA ACS Bank AAA/Aaa 29.10.2008 98.93 3.90 3.85 USD 44<br />
1875558 4 1/4 ASIF III AAA/Aaa 30.12.2008 100.52 4.12 3.92 USD 56<br />
1711700 3 1/2 Waterschapsbank AAA/Aaa 30.01.2009 97.97 4.00 3.99 USD 42<br />
1867368 5 5/8 General Motors BBB/A3 15.05.2009 100.56 5.49 4.10 USD 185<br />
1902371 4 1/4 National Australia Bank AA–/Aa3 22.07.2009 99.90 4.27 4.38 USD 54<br />
1504890 3 7/8 Königreich Schweden AAA/Aaa 29.12.2009 99.70 3.93 4.68 USD 14<br />
EUR<br />
1598037 2 7/8 ERAP AAA/Aaa 12.07.2006 100.39 2.66 1.85 EUR 4<br />
1798056 2 3/4 Schwedischer Export Credit AA+/Aa1 30.05.2007 99.37 2.98 2.66 EUR 5<br />
1543657 3 1/2 Total Capital AA/Aa2 28.01.2008 100.77 3.26 3.18 EUR 12<br />
1548023 3 1/4 Baden-Württemberg AAA/n.a. 29.01.2008 100.16 3.20 3.19 EUR 6<br />
1563144 3 1/4 Kommuninvest Schweden n.a./Aaa 04.03.2008 99.89 3.28 3.28 EUR 11<br />
1590247 3 1/2 Eksportfinans AA+/Aaa 16.04.2008 100.60 3.32 3.38 EUR 12<br />
1728505 3 7/8 JP Morgan A+/Aa3 03.12.2008 100.92 3.64 3.83 EUR 29<br />
1664128 3 3/4 Bos. Intl. Australien AA/Aa2 15.12.2008 100.59 3.60 3.87 EUR 25<br />
1768932 4 1/8 DaimlerChrysler BBB/A3 23.01.2009 101.00 3.87 3.93 EUR 50<br />
1804674 3 1/2 ASIF III AAA/Aaa 11.03.2009 99.17 3.70 4.11 EUR 29<br />
1821178 3 1/8 Network Rail Finance AAA/Aaa 30.03.2009 98.26 3.54 4.20 EUR 12<br />
1906948 3 1/2 Capital Euro AAA/Aaa 22.07.2009 99.94 3.76 4.44 EUR 28<br />
1607643 3 5/8 Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank AAA/Aaa 15.06.2010 99.23 3.77 5.16 EUR 11<br />
1623792 3 3/8 HBOS Treasury AA/Aa2 23.06.2010 97.22 3.91 5.20 EUR 25<br />
1626851 3 1/4 Rabobank AAA/Aaa 25.06.2010 97.31 3.77 5.23 EUR 10<br />
1885375 4 1/8 Air Liquide A+/n.a. 25.06.2010 100.62 4.00 5.12 EUR 34<br />
1867308 4 5/8 Dow Chemical A–/A3 27.05.2011 100.56 4.53 5.69 EUR 69<br />
GBP<br />
1548317 4 1/8 KFW AAA/Aaa 07.06.2006 98.18 5.18 1.71 GBP 20<br />
1320547 5 1/8 Financement Foncier AAA/Aaa 06.11.2006 99.67 5.27 2.00 GBP 23<br />
1472995 4 5/8 Nederlandse Gemeenten AAA/Aaa 07.12.2006 98.47 5.33 2.09 GBP 27<br />
1686683 4 1/2 Rabobank AAA/Aaa 07.12.2006 98.38 5.24 2.10 GBP 18<br />
1483769 4 1/2 KFW AAA/Aaa 07.12.2006 98.31 5.28 2.10 GBP 22<br />
1879910 5 3/4 BMW n.a./A1 06.12.2007 100.35 5.64 2.94 GBP 51<br />
1319474 5 1/8 Landbank Hessen-Thueringen AA+/Aaa 07.12.2007 99.12 5.41 2.90 GBP 29<br />
1651046 4 3/8 ASIF III AAA/Aaa 30.12.2008 95.10 5.66 3.77 GBP 50<br />
n.a. = not available<br />
1 Spread duration<br />
2<br />
Spread over Libor<br />
3 Spread to government bonds Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Fixed income—55<br />
Emerging markets/lower credit rating<br />
Price Yield to Cur- Spread<br />
Sec. no. Coupon in% Issuer Rating Maturity 02/08/2004 maturity Duration rency bp 3<br />
Latin America<br />
881291 9 3/8 Brazil B+/B2 07.04.2008 105.00 7.78 3.00 USD 449<br />
1591043 4 5/8 Mexico BBB–/Baa2 08.10.2008 100.20 4.57 3.70 USD 113<br />
1761914 3-M-Libor + 70 bp Mexico (FRN) BBB–/Baa2 13.01.2009 101.90 n.a. 4.08 1 USD 26 2<br />
1890183 3-M-Libor + 575 bp Brazil (FRN) B+/B2 29.06.2009 103.30 n.a. 3.93 1 USD 506 2<br />
1594673 7 1/4 Uruguay B/B3 15.02.2011 88.00 9.78 4.79 USD 584<br />
Eastern Europe<br />
1702527 3-M Libor + 175 bp Sberbank (FRN) n. v./Baa3 24.10.2006 99.00 n.a. 2.13 1 USD 234 2<br />
1898890 3-M Libor + 325 bp Aries (Russia) (FRN) BB+/Ba2 25.10.2007 102.05 n.a. 2.94 1 EUR 239 2<br />
1899005 7 3/4 Aries (Russia) BB+/Ba2 25.10.2009 103.20 7.01 4.18 EUR 347<br />
1560913 4 5/8 Croatia BBB–/Baa3 24.02.2010 102.05 4.20 4.74 EUR 60<br />
1630731 5 3/4 Romania BB/Ba3 02.07.2010 105.20 4.72 4.93 EUR 105<br />
1681839 7 4/5 OAO Gazprom BB–/n.a. 27.09.2010 101.90 7.40 4.48 EUR 368<br />
n.a. = not available<br />
1 Spread duration<br />
2<br />
Spread over Libor<br />
3<br />
Spread to government bonds Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
Emerging markets at a glance<br />
Rating Political Real GDP Money Current Budget- Spread vs. govt.<br />
Country S&P 1 risk growth Inflation market account 2 deficit 2 benchmarkt Maturity<br />
Europe<br />
Czech Republic A– o k h k –5.00% –6.20% n.a. n.a.<br />
Hungary A– o h k k –4.80% –8.40% 17 bp 2014<br />
Poland BBB+ o h h h –1.70% –5.80% 79 bp 2014<br />
Russia BB+ o x x k 7.00% 1.50% 320 bp 2018<br />
Turkey B+ o x x x –3.10% –8.50% 395 bp 2014<br />
Asia<br />
China BBB+ o x h k 1.20% –2.40% 79 bp 2013<br />
Indonesia B o x x x 5.20% –1.60% 265 bp 2006<br />
Malaysia A– o h h k 9.00% –3.60% 91 bp 2011<br />
Philippines BB – h h x 3.90% –4.10% 418 bp 2014<br />
South Korea A– – h k k 4.20% 0.20% 84 bp 2013<br />
Taiwan AA– – h h k 7.40% –4.00% n.a. n.a.<br />
Thailand BBB o x h k 3.20% –0.90% 68 bp 2007<br />
Latin America<br />
Argentina SD – x h k 4.50% 0.60% n.a. n.a.<br />
Brazil B+ o h x x 0.40% –2.70% 591 bp 2013<br />
Colombia BB + h x k –1.40% –4.70% 449 bp 2013<br />
Mexico BBB– o h x x –1.90% –2.70% 165 bp 2014<br />
Venezuela B– – – h h x 8.40% –4.90% 569 bp 2013<br />
Africa<br />
South Africa BBB o h h h –2.30% –3.90% 126 bp 2013<br />
Notes Political risk, influence on the market GDP Currency Inflation, interest rates<br />
– – very negative k stable k stable k stable<br />
– negative h accelerating h up h appreciation<br />
o neutral x slowing x down x depreciation<br />
+ positive<br />
++ very positive<br />
1<br />
S&P rating on long-term foreign debt<br />
2<br />
in % of GDP (2004) n.a. = not available table as of 2 August 2004 Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse
Emerging market bonds:<br />
Limited upside potential<br />
After two years of strong performance,<br />
we expect low overall returns on<br />
EM bonds in the next 6 to 12 months.<br />
We recommend that investors adopt an<br />
active trading strategy to enhance<br />
performance. Walter Mitchell<br />
So far in 2004, the return on emerging market (EM) bonds has<br />
failed to match last year’s impressive performance, when the<br />
EMBI+ index of USD-denominated sovereign bonds was up 28%.<br />
This year, the same index is up 0.30% year-to-date, having been<br />
down as much as 9% by late April. In our view, EM bond prices<br />
are likely to remain volatile for the rest of the year. We think EM<br />
bonds will provide low total returns over the next 6 to 12 months.<br />
Figure 1 shows the 12-month rolling return for the EMBI+ index<br />
since 1994. In the last decade there have been three periods of<br />
above-average returns for EM bonds: 1995–1997, 1999–2000,<br />
and 2002–2003. After each of these “golden” phases the asset<br />
class endured a period of low or negative returns. We believe the<br />
market is in the midst of such a period now.<br />
Spreads at a historically low level<br />
First of all, spreads on EM bonds are quite low by historical standards.<br />
Indeed, the current sovereign spread (i.e. yield differential<br />
between the EMBI+ index and the equivalent duration UST bond)<br />
is 460 basis points (bp), well below the average of 730 bp over<br />
the last five years. Even taking into account the improvement in<br />
sovereign risks, spreads on EM bonds appear on the tight side, in<br />
our opinion.<br />
The ultra-low interest rate environment in the US in recent<br />
years has amplified demand for risky assets such as emergingmarket<br />
bonds. As the US Fed hikes interest rates, demand for EM<br />
bonds is likely to wane. In particular, the amount of leveraged buying<br />
by hedge funds and other investors will no doubt decline as<br />
the cost of borrowing rises. In this environment, we expect incremental<br />
demand for EM bonds to shrink not grow, hence the poor<br />
outlook for returns. In sum, narrow spreads and rising interest<br />
rates represent stiff headwinds for EM bonds as an asset class.<br />
This challenging set of circumstances stands in stark contrast to<br />
market conditions during the past two years, when a favorable<br />
constellation of falling interest rates, rising commodity prices and<br />
a recovery in global growth produced a remarkable rally in both<br />
the EM and high-yield debt markets.<br />
Figure 1<br />
Rolling 12-month return on EMBI+ Index<br />
Source: JP Morgan, Credit Suisse<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
–10<br />
–20<br />
–30<br />
–40<br />
in %<br />
12/94<br />
12/95<br />
12/96<br />
12/97<br />
12/98<br />
12/99<br />
EMBI+ Index rolling 12-month return<br />
12/00<br />
12/01<br />
12/92<br />
12/03<br />
Coping with rising interest rates<br />
Despite the meager outlook for returns on EM bonds, we believe<br />
there are several reasons for investors, who possess the required<br />
amount of risk tolerance, to remain involved in EM bonds. We<br />
think it will be possible to achieve attractive total returns, but it<br />
won’t be as easy as during the last two years. To begin with, the<br />
risk profile of many sovereign borrowers is improving. In our view,<br />
improved risk profiles will help the asset class weather a period of<br />
rising global interest rates. The swift rise in US interest rates in<br />
late 1993 and 1994 triggered a massive sell-off in EM bonds. We<br />
do not expect a similar scenario this time. EM sovereigns are<br />
better prepared for a rise in yields this time around. Most have<br />
adopted floating exchange-rate regimes, which help insulate central<br />
bank reserves from a decline in capital flows. Furthermore,<br />
external borrowing requirements are lower nowadays due to increased<br />
borrowing in domestic bond markets and to a reduction<br />
in current account deficits.<br />
While an improved risk profile helps limit downside risk, an<br />
active trading strategy can boost performance in the current<br />
market environment. Global interest rates will not rise in a linear<br />
fashion. Instead, as we saw during 1H 2004, there will be sell-offs<br />
where yields rise sharply followed by temporary rallies as bond investors<br />
try to ascertain the correct level for interest rates. We
suggest treating the sell-offs as buying opportunities and using<br />
the rallies to take profits. Admittedly, timing the market is difficult.<br />
Nonetheless, we believe active trading strategy is necessary to<br />
improve overall returns in the current market environment.<br />
Performance on Brazilian bonds during 1H 2004 illustrates<br />
this point. Year-to-date the Brazilian EMBI+ sub-index is down<br />
–2.76%, but it’s up nearly 10% since mid May. If an investor had<br />
reduced Brazilian exposure during the first quarter and then increased<br />
it in the last several months, the six-month return would<br />
most likely be in positive rather than negative territory. In our view,<br />
such trading opportunities are likely to repeat themselves in the<br />
coming six months. Investors should exploit them to enhance performance.<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Fixed income—57<br />
Strategy: Reduce duration<br />
Along with adopting a more active approach, we recommend investors<br />
reduce exposure to long-dated bonds. The longer the duration,<br />
the more volatile a bond’s price. Focusing on the short-tomedium-term<br />
part of the yield curve reduces the downside potential<br />
when the timing of the trade is wrong. For sovereign borrowers<br />
with a well established yield curve, we prefer the 2007 to<br />
2011 maturity range. This part of the curve benefits from the<br />
steep slope at the short end, while avoiding the excessive duration<br />
risk at the long end. Furthermore, the long end of a number<br />
of sovereign spread curves is flat or even inverted (Figure 2). The<br />
lack of additional spread or compensation for taking on more<br />
price volatility is another reason for not holding long-dated bonds<br />
in this kind of market.<br />
In terms of asset selection, we continue to prefer selected<br />
Russian bonds. Among sovereign issues, we recommend both<br />
EUR-denominated tranches of the recent Aries transaction. Aries<br />
is an investment vehicle that issued credit-linked notes (CLNs)<br />
that are linked to Soviet-era loans provided by Germany to Russia.<br />
These loans to the Soviet government are now being serviced<br />
by the Russian Federation. Rating agency Moody’s views these<br />
CLNs as subordinated Russian sovereign debt, which is why it<br />
rates the Aries notes Ba2 and not Baa3 like Russian Federation<br />
Eurobonds. S&P assigned a BB+ rating to the Aries notes, which<br />
is equivalent to its Russia rating. Among Russian corporate<br />
and bank borrowers, we favor the leading wireless provider<br />
Mobile Telesystems (Ba3/BB-), the leading steel producer<br />
MMK (Ba3/BB-), as well as both public-sector banks Sberbank<br />
(Baa3/n.r.) and VTB (Baa3/BB+).<br />
Besides Russia, we recommend medium-term Turkish sovereign<br />
bonds. Although yields are low compared to other EM sovereigns,<br />
recent economic and political developments have improved<br />
Turkey’s risk profile, in our view. Spreads on Turkish<br />
sovereign bonds could narrow further if the EU gives Turkey a<br />
date to begin accession negotiations next year. A decision is expected<br />
at the EU summit in December. In Latin America, we currently<br />
favor 3-to-5-year Brazilian bonds in EUR as well as USD<br />
floating-rate notes issued by Brazil and Mexico, both maturing in<br />
2009. For a look at all our current bond picks, please see the<br />
bond selection list on page 55. We recommend that clients use<br />
the recent rally in UST bonds to sell positions in the ultra-long dated<br />
USD bonds. Such long-term bonds will be the worst performers<br />
in EM if US interest rates resume their rising trend, as expected<br />
by the CSPB macroeconomics team.<br />
Figure 2<br />
Brazilian USD spread curve<br />
Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Spread on US Treasuries<br />
06<br />
05<br />
0.50<br />
09 10<br />
08N 10N<br />
C-Bond<br />
07 08<br />
07N<br />
1.50<br />
2.50<br />
Modified duration<br />
3.50<br />
11 12<br />
4.50<br />
13<br />
5.50<br />
6.50<br />
20<br />
30<br />
27<br />
24<br />
7.50<br />
8.50<br />
34<br />
9.50
“Unguaranteed ratings slightly better than<br />
expected.” Dr. Jeremy Field
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Bond topic—59<br />
German Landesbanks: No guaranteed ratings after 19 July 2005<br />
New obligations of the German Landesbanks will no longer be guaranteed<br />
by the German states from next summer onward. S&P and Fitch have published<br />
unguaranteed ratings for the Landesbanks ranging between A+ and BBB+,<br />
indicating the fundamental creditworthiness of the Landesbanks. Dr. Jeremy Field<br />
The German Landesbanks are legally independent public sector<br />
credit institutions that are owned by the German states (Laender)<br />
and regional savings bank associations (Sparkassen). There are<br />
also various crossholdings between Landesbanks. The business<br />
model of the Landesbanks is primarily a wholesale orientated and<br />
narrowly diversified merchant bank model. The banks are heavily<br />
dependent on external funding and most lack the deposit base of<br />
a retail bank network. The Landesbanks have been significant issuers<br />
of debt in the last few years, taking advantage of the window<br />
of opportunity of a low cost of capital before they lose their<br />
guarantees on 19 July 2005. In particular, they have lengthened<br />
their debt distribution profile, which means that the impact of<br />
higher capital costs will be felt gradually over the next few years.<br />
From 19 July 2005 onward, new bonds issued by the German<br />
Landesbanks will no longer be explicitly guaranteed by the German<br />
states, to be in compliance with EU competition laws.<br />
Adjusting business models to the new environment<br />
Fitch and S&P issued individual ratings on the senior unsecured<br />
unguaranteed obligations of the German Landesbanks to provide<br />
the market with insight into the fundamental creditworthiness of<br />
the Landesbanks (Table 1). Moody’s has yet to release its unguaranteed<br />
ratings for the Landesbanks. The ratings also provide<br />
the market with guidance on future counterparty credit ratings of<br />
the Landesbanks, which will also change on 19 July 2005. Since<br />
publication of the range of unguaranteed ratings in its last report<br />
on Landesbanks on 24 November 2003, S&P has had ongoing<br />
discussions with the Landesbanks on their strategies to adapt<br />
current business models in preparation for a new competitive environment,<br />
with a higher cost of capital. S&P notes that, overall,<br />
the banks have made progress in restructuring their balance<br />
sheets and business lines, improving their risk profiles and lengthening<br />
their funding profiles; the weighted-average maturity of<br />
Landesbank bond issues in EUR and USD has increased, from<br />
2.9 years in 2002 to 6.65 years in 2004.<br />
Future ratings slightly better than expected<br />
The unguaranteed ratings from S&P are marginally better than expected,<br />
with only Landesbank Sachsen rated below single A. S&P<br />
notes, however, that some of the individual ratings already reflect,<br />
and are dependent upon, the successful implementation of future<br />
changes. Failure to deliver these changes could have negative<br />
Table 1<br />
Future unguaranteed and current guaranteed<br />
ratings of the Landesbanks<br />
Source: S&P and Fitch<br />
S&P unguaranteed S&P current guaranteed<br />
rating<br />
rating/outlook<br />
S&P Fitch S&P Fitch<br />
Landesbank B-W A+ A+ AAA, neg AAA, stable<br />
Landesbank Berlin NR BBB+ NR AAA, stable<br />
Bremer LB NR A NR AAA, stable<br />
Deka Bank A A AA, neg AAA, stable<br />
LB Hessen-Thüringen GZ A A AA+, neg AAA, stable<br />
HSH Nordbank AG A A AA–, neg AAA, stable<br />
Bayerische Landesbank A– A+ AAA, neg AAA, stable<br />
LB Rheinland-Pfalz GZ A– BBB+ AA, neg AAA, stable<br />
Landesbank Sachsen GZ BBB+ A– AA, neg AAA, stable<br />
WestLB AG A– A– AA, neg AAA, stable<br />
Nord/LB NR A NR AAA, stable<br />
LB Saar NR A NR AAA, stable<br />
NR = not rated<br />
Table 2<br />
Timetable for the phasing out of guarantees<br />
Source: S&P<br />
Date of issuance Maturity Maintenance Statutory<br />
obligation guarantee<br />
until 18/07/01 until 18/07/05 yes yes<br />
19/07/01–18/07/05 until 18/07/05 yes yes<br />
until 18/07/01 any time after 18/07/05 no yes<br />
19/07/01–18/07/05 18/07/05–31/12/15 no yes<br />
19/07/01–18/07/05 after 31/12/15 no no<br />
after 18/07/05 anytime no no
ating implications. S&P will update the unguaranteed ratings on<br />
an individual basis as appropriate. Individual unguaranteed debt<br />
ratings could be amended before 19 July 2005, should circumstances<br />
change. Fitch rates some Landesbanks that are not rated<br />
by S&P: Bremer LB, LB Berlin, LB Saar and Nord LB (Table<br />
1). Fitch rates Bayerische LB at A+, two notches higher than S&P<br />
and one notch higher by LB Sachsen and West LB. Conversely,<br />
Fitch is one notch lower in its rating of LB Rheinland-Pfalz, at<br />
BBB+, than S&P. The Landesbanks will continue to benefit from<br />
guarantees with respect to both on- and off-balance-sheet obligations,<br />
as the statutory guarantee (Gewährträgerhaftung) provided<br />
by their publicsector guarantors (the German states) will be<br />
maintained until 18 July 2005, although bonds issued up to that<br />
date must mature no later than 31 December 2015. See Table 2<br />
for the detailed timetable for the removal of guarantees. Existing<br />
(grandfathered) debt and counterparty credit ratings are not<br />
affected by these unguaranteed ratings. Furthermore, public<br />
Pfandbriefe issued by the Landesbanks will continue to reflect<br />
S&P’s structured rating approach for Pfandbriefe and can be<br />
rated AAA, irrespective of the counterparty credit ratings of the<br />
issuers.<br />
German Laender are the main Landesbank guarantors<br />
There are 16 German states, three of which are city-states. However,<br />
the economic importance of the Laender varies markedly.<br />
Nordrhein-Westfalen (21.9%), Bayern (17.4%) and Baden-<br />
Württemberg (14.8%) alone made up 54.1% of German GDP<br />
in 2003. The three economically weakest states Mecklenburg-<br />
Vorpommern (1.4%), Saarland (1.2%) and Bremen (1.1%) contributed<br />
less than 5% of German GDP (see Table 3 for details).<br />
Table 4 gives the ratings from the three main ratings agencies and<br />
illustrates the differences in approach between the rating agencies.<br />
In particular, Fitch bases its ratings on the solidarity principle<br />
enshrined in the German constitution, and hence gives all<br />
Laender the same ratings as the German Federal State, namely<br />
AAA. Under the solidarity principle, the Laender are committed to<br />
support each other, as is the Federal Government. The rating<br />
ranges Aaa to Aa3 from Moody’s and AAA to AA– from S&P are<br />
also primarily based on the current mutual support obligation between<br />
the Laender and the Federal Government, with the rating<br />
floors currently at Aa3 and AA–, respectively. All members of the<br />
German federation are deemed to be jointly responsible for supporting<br />
a state that is in financial distress. However, the states’<br />
budgets are not subject to individual approval by the central government,<br />
as is the case in most other European countries. The<br />
fiscal flexibility of the states is limited in the short term because<br />
tax rates and the apportionment of revenues are largely set by<br />
both houses of parliament. Expenditure obligations are largely<br />
determined by nationally dictated standards of service provision<br />
and wage agreements. German real GDP growth declined from<br />
2.9% in 2000 to –0.1% in 2003; we expect 1.20% growth in<br />
2004. Between 2000 and 2003, state revenues declined by<br />
8.3%, whereas total expenditure grew by 3.8%. As a consequence<br />
the states’ deficit has grown from 0.5% of GDP in 2000<br />
to an estimated 1.5% in both 2002 and 2003. Total German state<br />
budget deficits were EUR 31.7 billion in 2003. The states’ nominal<br />
outstanding debt has been increasing more rapidly than expected.<br />
S&P recently stated that the German states continue to<br />
be the highest indebted sub-sovereign issuers rated by them<br />
worldwide.<br />
Table 3<br />
German Laender – key data<br />
Source: German Laender and federal government, Credit Suisse estimates<br />
Population Share GDP per Real GDP<br />
(m) of total capita growth<br />
GDP (%) 2003 (E) 2003 (%)<br />
Nordrhein-Westfalen 18.1 21.9 25.8 –0.4<br />
Bayern 12.4 17.4 29.9 0.2<br />
Baden-Württemberg 10.7 14.8 29.4 –0.2<br />
Hessen 6.1 9.1 31.8 0<br />
Niedersachsen 8 8.6 22.9 0.4<br />
Rheinland-Pfalz 4.1 4.4 22.9 0.1<br />
Berlin 3.4 3.6 22.8 –1.3<br />
Hamburg 1.7 3.6 44.5 –0.4<br />
Sachsen 4.3 3.6 17.8 1.2<br />
Schleswig-Holstein 2.8 3.1 23.4 –0.2<br />
Brandenburg 2.6 2.1 17.5 –0.9<br />
Sachsen-Anhalt 2.5 2.1 17.4 0.3<br />
Thüringen 2.4 2 17.6 0.5<br />
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1.7 1.4 17.1 –1.6<br />
Saarland 1.1 1.2 24.3 –1.1<br />
Bremen 0.7 1.1 35.3 –0.9<br />
Deutschland 82.6 100 25.8 –0.1<br />
Table 4<br />
Credit ratings of the German states<br />
Source: Bloomberg<br />
Moody’s S&P’s Fitch<br />
Bayern Aaa / stable AAA / stable AAA / stable<br />
Baden-Württemberg Aaa / stable AAA / neg AAA / stable<br />
Hessen n.a. AA+ / stable AAA / stable<br />
Nordrhein-Westfalen Aa2 / stable AA / stable AAA / stable<br />
Brandenburg Aa2 / stable AA– / stable AAA / stable<br />
Berlin Aa3 / stable n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Sachsen-Anhalt Aa3 / stable AA– / stable AAA / stable<br />
Hamburg n.a. AA– / stable AAA / stable<br />
Bremen n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Niedersachsen n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Rheinland-Pfalz n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Saarland n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Schleswig-Holstein n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Sachsen n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
Thüringen n.a. n.a. AAA / stable<br />
n.a. = not available
Sharp increase in the proportion of bond financing<br />
The deterioration in public finances in recent years has been a<br />
major factor in the growth of bond financing. From the end of<br />
1999 to 2003, the proportion of state funding provided by bond<br />
financing increased from 17.6% to 36.4%. The proportion of bond<br />
funding ranges from 9% in the Saarland to 83% in Sachsen-Anhalt.<br />
The Laender issued EUR 35 billion of bonds in 2002 and EUR<br />
42 billion in 2003. It is to be hoped that the new debt issuance will<br />
stabilize around the 2003 levels in view of the pickup in GDP<br />
growth. The support system of the solidarity principle will be tested<br />
by Berlin’s appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court in 2003<br />
to obtain specific budget-balancing grants from the Federal government<br />
on the basis of a structural imbalance in Berlin’s budget.<br />
Berlin has the highest per capita debt of all the German states<br />
at EUR 14,365, compared to EUR 1,639 per capita in Bayern.<br />
Berlin is following the same route as Bremen and Saarland in the<br />
early 1990s, when the Federal Constitutional Court decided that<br />
special transfers would be paid to these two states. The ruling of<br />
the Constitutional Court is not expected before the end of 2005.<br />
We expect the court to rule in Berlin’s favor. A negative decision<br />
would likely have a considerable impact on credit spreads and<br />
Laender ratings. We expect Laender bond spreads to remain in<br />
a trading range over the next 12 months. The ratings of the Laender<br />
are not only important in their own right, because they are<br />
significant bond issuers, but also because they are the main guarantors<br />
of the grandfathered guaranteed debt on the Landesbanks.<br />
|<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Bond topic—61<br />
Top: Landesbank Sachsen is the<br />
only bank rated lower than a single A<br />
by S&P.<br />
Bottom: Nord/LB comprises the<br />
three states of Niedersachsen,<br />
Sachsen-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-<br />
Vorpommern.
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
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Services<br />
“A discretionary mandate<br />
is particularly worthwhile in<br />
difficult times”<br />
Andreas Russenberger, Head of<br />
Sales &Consulting Switzerland,<br />
Investment Management, on the logic<br />
of discretionary mandates and the<br />
need for a professional investment<br />
strategy.<br />
Peter Christoph Discretionary mandates are in heavy demand at<br />
the moment. Is this a consequence of the volatile situation<br />
on the financial markets that private investors are up against?<br />
Andreas Russenberger The current situation certainly has an<br />
influence. This year alone, more than 4,000 new discretionary<br />
mandates have been entrusted to us. Many investors<br />
have burned their fingers in the past and lost money.<br />
It’s agonizingly hard to make the right choice in a tough economic<br />
environment and amid a growing number of investment<br />
vehicles. Many long-standing Credit Suisse<br />
clients are also now opting for a discretionary mandate.<br />
Lack of time and missing expertise are frequently cited<br />
reasons for delegating the management of one’s assets to<br />
a specialist. Is such a step also worthwhile for avid, wellinformed<br />
investors?<br />
Definitely. The investor who opts for a discretionary mandate<br />
no longer needs to keep track of the financial markets,<br />
though it is still recommendable to do so and is an even<br />
more enjoyable pursuit with a mandate. Each quarter –<br />
or on demand at any time – the investor receives a comprehensive<br />
report showing an overview of all transactions.<br />
We emphasize transparency. Every private banking customer<br />
should put at least a portion of his or her money in a discretionary<br />
mandate.<br />
How much money must a client be able to invest?<br />
A fund mandate requires a minimum investment of 250,000<br />
Swiss francs. A classical direct-investment mandate<br />
is obtainable for a sum starting at 500,000 Swiss francs.<br />
Solutions for clients truly become cost-efficient at such a<br />
level.<br />
How good are the results that Credit Suisse asset managers<br />
have achieved?<br />
The focus right now is on preserving capital. That may<br />
sound meek, but bear in mind that the bond index is down<br />
on the year and most of the stock markets are trending<br />
on the weak side. Our investments have performed<br />
well above average over the long term. We place great<br />
importance here on strict risk controls. Where currencies<br />
and stock indices are concerned, we ensure against<br />
risks through the partial use of targeted hedges.<br />
An asset-management mandate particularly pays off in<br />
difficult times.<br />
When a client signs a discretionary mandate, he puts<br />
enormous trust in the bank. How can he be sure that this faith<br />
is warranted?<br />
First let me mention the legal safeguards. Asset-management<br />
products have a long tradition in Switzerland. A clear<br />
legal framework for such products has evolved as a result.<br />
Moreover, our range of discretionary latitude is contractually<br />
Andreas Russenberger: “Our specialists make rational decisions”
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CIO Notes – analyses and strategies<br />
An exclusive service for Credit Suisse clients and employees:<br />
CIO Notes deliver a monthly analysis of developments<br />
on the financial markets. CIO Notes do more than just<br />
provide a review and outlook for the various asset classes.<br />
They distill the analysis into a concrete strategy for assetmanagement<br />
mandates in simple, concise terms.<br />
Portfolio reporting – complete transparency at all times<br />
Credit Suisse’s unique portfolio reports provide an overview<br />
of all transactions and intricately track your portfolio’s<br />
development. Portfolio reports are automatically sent to<br />
clients on a quarterly basis, but are also obtainable<br />
at any time on demand.<br />
stipulated. Another question is how the bank specifically<br />
operates. We employ a well-structured investment process<br />
and are very close to the pulse of the market. Our assetmanagement<br />
specialists make decisions rationally, as opposed<br />
to the many private investors who let themselves be<br />
guided by their emotions. An important role is also played by<br />
the Investment Committee, which meets at least once a<br />
week. The committee members include our CEO Oswald J.<br />
Grübel and our chief investment officer. The top executives<br />
at Credit Suisse stand behind the asset-management mandates<br />
and set the strategy.<br />
Quite a few clients value close personal contact with a bank<br />
advisor. Don’t they get short-changed when so many specialists<br />
are involved?<br />
Not at all. We are very close to our clients. The relationship<br />
manager is the client’s sole contact person. It’s important at<br />
the outset to carefully assess the client’s financial needs and<br />
to select a suitable mix of investment products. Once the<br />
risk profile has been established, the relationship manager<br />
does not invest on the basis of his market opinions or<br />
instincts. At Credit Suisse, our experts go to work behind<br />
the scenes once the risk profile has been set. They swing<br />
into action where their talents lie and make decisions<br />
with cool professionalism. Hence, a mandate is not managed<br />
by a single person, but rather by teams that are each<br />
responsible for a specific market. The person analyzing the<br />
trend in Asian stocks at three o’clock in the morning<br />
cannot also be evaluating US equities at ten o’clock at night.<br />
That would be far from ideal.<br />
Asset management is geared to the long term. How long does<br />
a mandate run?<br />
The client is free to cancel the contract at any time, but<br />
a long-term commitment is definitely desirable. It makes no<br />
sense for a client to place 100 percent of his assets in<br />
a mandate if he already knows in advance that he will need<br />
75 percent of the funds in three months’ time to purchase<br />
a house.<br />
Can the risk profile be altered during the course of the year?<br />
Yes, but it doesn’t make sense to alter the profile unless<br />
the client’s personal circumstances have changed. It would<br />
be a mistake to alter a profile in reaction to changes in<br />
the markets. Our investment managers promptly adjust the<br />
strategy within the predetermined discretionary guidelines.<br />
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Services—63
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Authors—64<br />
Giles Keating, Head of Global Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
Luzi Saluz, Insurance Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28–29<br />
Beat Schumacher, Fixed Income and Forex Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10–11<br />
Bernhard Tschanz, Head of Research Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31–32<br />
Marcus Hettinger, Fixed Income and Forex Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–13<br />
Jeremy Baker, Equity Sector Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33–34<br />
Beat Grunder, Technical Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16–17<br />
Andrea Schulzke, Head of Fund Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 41, 51<br />
Ulrich Kaiser, Equity Sector Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19–23<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43–45<br />
Markus Mächler, Equity Sector Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36–37<br />
Christoph Fehr, Fixed Income and Forex Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19–23<br />
Christian Gattiker-Ericsson, Head of Equity Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38–39<br />
Ramon Koss, Alternative Investments & Mutual Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25–27<br />
Uwe Neumann, Equity Sector Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43–45
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Research team—65<br />
Research and Publications<br />
Giles Keating, Managing Director, Head of Global Research . . . . . . . (1) 332 22 33<br />
Research Switzerland<br />
Bernhard Tschanz, Managing Director, Head of Research Switzerland . (1) 334 56 27<br />
Damian Sigrist, Equity Sector Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46–47<br />
Dr. Ursula Oser, Global Credit Strategist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49–50<br />
Dr. Anja Hochberg, Head of Global Macro Economics<br />
and Forex Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52–53<br />
Dr. Jeremy Field, Credit Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59–61<br />
Walter Mitchell, Emerging Market Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56–57<br />
Credit Research<br />
Dr. Ursula Oser, Vice President, Global Credit Strategist . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 92<br />
Yvonne Baumeler, Assistant Vice President, Corporate Bonds . . . . . . (1) 333 13 70<br />
John Feigl, Corporate Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 13 70<br />
Dr. Jeremy Field, Vice President, Corporate Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 29<br />
Walter Mitchell, Vice President, Emerging Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 67<br />
Felix Schafroth, Assistant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 13 62<br />
Equity Sector Research<br />
Robin Seydoux, Director, Head of Equity Sector Research . . . . . . . . (1) 333 37 39<br />
Jeremy Baker, Assistant Vice President,<br />
<strong>Energy</strong>, Basic Resources, United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 24<br />
Dr. Luis Correia, Vice President,<br />
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Italy, Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 37<br />
Dr. Maria Custer, Vice President,<br />
Chemicals & Medical Technology, Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 332 11 27<br />
Ulrich Kaiser, Vice President,<br />
IT Components, Japan, Head of Equity Research Overseas . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 49<br />
Markus Mächler, Vice President,<br />
IT Services & Automotive, Head of Equity Research Europe . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 41<br />
Uwe Neumann, Vice President,<br />
Telecommunications, UK, Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 45<br />
Christine Schmid, Vice President, Banking, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 43<br />
Damian Sigrist, Assistant Vice President, Asia (excl. Japan) . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 49<br />
Harald Zahnd, Vice President,<br />
Consumer and Luxury Goods, Retail, Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 88 53<br />
Christian Bauer, Assistant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 47<br />
Claude Vautier, Assistant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 88 38<br />
Global Equity Strategy<br />
Christian Gattiker-Ericsson, Director,<br />
Engineering, Steel, Pulp & Paper, Head of Equity Strategy . . . . . . . . (1) 334 56 33<br />
Cédric Spahr, Assistant Vice President,<br />
Equity Strategy, Construction, Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 96 48<br />
Global Economics<br />
Dr. Anja Hochberg, Vice President,<br />
Head of Global Macro Economics and Forex Research . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 52 06<br />
Christoph Fehr, Vice President, Fixed Income Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 52 06<br />
Marcus Hettinger, Assistant Vice President,<br />
Forex Analysis and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 13 63<br />
Roland Kläger, Fixed Income Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 332 09 69<br />
Beat Schumacher, Vice President, Fixed Income USA . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 52 06<br />
Technical Research<br />
Rolf Bertschi, Director, US Equities, Bonds, Currencies . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 24 05<br />
Beat Grunder, Assistant Vice President,<br />
Equities Switzerland and Asian Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 53 58<br />
Sigisbert Koch, Europe Equities excl. Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 94 64<br />
Mensur Pocinci, Assistant Vice President,<br />
US Equities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 20 69<br />
Fund Selection<br />
Andrea Schulzke, Vice President, Head of Fund Selection . . . . . . . . (1) 332 43 67<br />
Nicola Nolè, Vice President,<br />
Global Equity Funds, US Equity Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 74 97<br />
Andrea Guzzi, Assistant Vice President,<br />
European Equity Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 79 64<br />
Jiannan Wang, Assistant Vice President, Asian Equity Funds,<br />
Emerging Market Equity Funds, Real Estate Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 332 33 20<br />
Karim Jabri, Fixed Income Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 333 10 88<br />
Walter H. Fodor, Assistant Vice President,<br />
Sector Funds, Portfolio Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) 334 41 97<br />
Uetlibergstrasse 231, CH-8070, Zurich Dialing Code (Country/Area): +41
GLOBAL INVESTOR 3.04<br />
Imprint—66<br />
This document was produced by and the opinions expressed are those of Credit Suisse<br />
as of the date of writing and are subject to change. It has been prepared solely for information<br />
purposes and for the use of the recipient. It does not constitute an offer or an<br />
invitation by or on behalf of Credit Suisse to any person to buy or sell any security.<br />
Any reference to past performance is not necessarily a guide to the future. The<br />
information and analysis contained in this publication have been compiled or arrived at<br />
from sources believed to be reliable but Credit Suisse does not make any representation<br />
as to their accuracy or completeness and does not accept liability for any loss<br />
arising from the use hereof. The issuer of the securities referred herein or a Credit<br />
Suisse Group company may have acted upon the information and analysis contained in<br />
this publication before being made available to clients of Credit Suisse. A Credit Suisse<br />
Group company may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in other<br />
financing transactions with the issuer of the securities referred herein, perform services<br />
or solicit business from such issuers, and/or have a position or effect transactions in the<br />
securities or options thereof.<br />
An investment in the funds described in this document should be made only after careful<br />
study of the most recent sales prospectus and other fund regulations and basic legal<br />
information contained therein. The sales prospectuses and other fund regulations may<br />
be obtained free of charge from the fund management companies and/or from their<br />
agents.<br />
Alternative investments, derivative or structured products are complex instruments, typically<br />
involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to investors who are<br />
capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. Investments in Emerging Markets<br />
are speculative and considerably more volatile than investments in established markets.<br />
Some of the main risks are Political Risks, Economic Risks, Credit Risks, Currency<br />
Risks and Market Risks. Furthermore, investments in foreign currencies are subject<br />
to exchange rate fluctuations. Before entering into any transaction, you should consider<br />
the suitability of the transaction to your particular circumstances and independently<br />
review (with your professional advisers as necessary) the specific financial risks as well<br />
as legal, regulatory, credit, tax and accounting consequences.<br />
Neither this document nor any copy thereof may be sent to or taken into the United<br />
States or distributed in the United States or to a US person, in certain other jurisdictions<br />
the distribution may be restricted by local law or regulation.<br />
This document may not be reproduced either in whole, or in part, without the written<br />
permission of Credit Suisse. © 2004, Credit Suisse<br />
Publisher<br />
Credit Suisse<br />
Research & Publications<br />
P.O. Box 300, CH-8070 Zurich<br />
Director: Bernhard Tschanz<br />
Editors<br />
Christian Gattiker-Ericsson<br />
Peter Christoph, Infel AG, Zurich<br />
Editorial deadline<br />
2 August 2004<br />
Organization<br />
Bernhard Felder<br />
Technical coordinators<br />
Monika Tiemann, Ross Hewitt<br />
Design and concept<br />
Arnold Design AG<br />
Urs Arnold, Maja Davé, Renata Hanselmann,<br />
Andrea Studer<br />
Layout<br />
gdz AG, Zurich<br />
Printer<br />
Feldegg AG, Zollikerberg<br />
Stämpfli AG, Bern<br />
Translations<br />
Robert Anderson (E)<br />
Beatrice Eigenmann (G)<br />
Agentur der Dolmetscher- & Übersetzervereinigung (G)<br />
Stefan Bersal (G)<br />
Übersetzer Gruppe Zurich (F/Sp)<br />
Alleva Übersetzungen (I)<br />
Thanks to Mark Rabinowitz (E)<br />
Language editors<br />
Robert Anderson (E)<br />
Beatrice Eigenmann (G)<br />
gdz AG, Zurich (G)<br />
Übersetzer Gruppe Zurich (F/Sp)<br />
Alleva Übersetzungen (I)<br />
Photographs<br />
Roger Ressmeyer/Corbis (Cover, 04), Martin Stollenwerk<br />
(03, 62, 64, 65), Cornell Capa/Magnum Photos (04),<br />
David Boe/Corbis (09),Thomas Dworzak/Magnum<br />
Photos (09), Magnopress/Keystone (15), Brooks Kraft/<br />
Corbis (15), Flueeler/mediacolors (18), Chris Steele-<br />
Perkins/Magnum Photos (21/42), Stuart Franklin/<br />
Magnum Photos (21), Peter Marlow/Magnum Photos<br />
(45), Michael Kneffel (45), Roettgers/GRAFFITI (58),<br />
Thomas Langreder/VISUM (61), Kaiser/Caro (61)<br />
Copies of this publication may be ordered via your<br />
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
In this issue:<br />
Funds<br />
ACM International Health Care Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41<br />
Credit Suisse Commodity Fund Plus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41<br />
Dexia Bonds International C Cap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51<br />
JP Morgan Fleming Europe Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<br />
Pictet Funds – Japanese Equities P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<br />
RMF Convertibles Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51<br />
Equities<br />
BASF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37<br />
DaimlerChrysler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37<br />
General Electric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34<br />
Ito-Yokado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23<br />
Kao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23<br />
McDonald’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34<br />
Rieter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39<br />
Roche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39<br />
Singapore Press Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47<br />
Yanzhou Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47<br />
www.credit-suisse.com/research<br />
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