Andrew Louth - Syriac Christian Church

Andrew Louth - Syriac Christian Church Andrew Louth - Syriac Christian Church

13.12.2012 Views

COSMIC THEOLOGY 65 immediately issues in movement, and it is the purpose of movement to find rest: rest will be our final state. 11 This correction of Origenism is much more far-reaching. In starting from rest, the Origenists manifested their fundamental affinity with Neoplatonism, which saw the whole of reality as subject to the circular sequence of restprocession-return. Maximus is familiar with Neoplatonic thought, and picks up several of their ideas (mainly through Denys and his first editor John of Scythopolis, or so it appears), but his rejection of Origenism in the terms we have seen entails also a fundamental rebuttal of Neoplatonism, with its ideas of emanation and return. For Maximus we are created by God with a view to finally resting in him: it is this that undergirds his Christian metaphysic. 12 But the fact that Maximus revises Origenist (and Neoplatonic) ideas of reality enables him to preserve much of the Origenist analysis of the condition of created beings as a state of movement, without conceding anything to their myth of an original state of rest. Adam in paradise should have moved towards and around God, and in that way found rest. Instead he moved away from God and towards beings lower than himself, and condemned himself to continual movement, leading to further movement, and not to an ultimate rest at all. 13 It is in terms like this—essentially in terms of desire and longing frustrated by being misdirected—that Maximus is fond of analysing the human condition. Other elements of Origenism rethought in Maximus’ theology concern the Origenist understanding of the cosmos as a place where we discover our fallen state and learn to love God. Much of this Maximus is keen to take over. The doctrine of the logoi of created beings, the fundamental meaning in accordance with which they have been created, is an idea developed by Origen: it is these logoi that form the main object of natural contemplation. In Greek there is an obviousness about the links of this doctrine that is obscured in English, for logos means reason, meaning, or word, and is the same word as that used for the Word of God, through whom the universe was created and who became Incarnate. The logos of created things is present to them in a way analogous to the presence of the Logos (the Word) in Christ. The Greek word for ‘rational’, logikos, is the adjective from logos: it suggests participation in the Logos. There is also a kind of obviousness about the idea that rational beings, logikoi, should be able to understand the logoi of creation, but that, cut off from the Logos, because of the Fall, the logoi of creation are now obscure to them. All of these links run through Maximus’ theology. But in Maximus’ thought the doctrine of the logoi takes on an anti-Origenist turn, for his doctrine of the integrity of the logoi consorts ill with the Origenist contention that the cosmos is essentially fallen. Similarly, the doctrine of providence and judgment—as central

66 INTRODUCTION to Maximian as to Origenist theology—is detached by Maximus from its origins in the Origenist myth of the cosmos as the place of fallen souls. PASSING THROUGH THE CLOUD Amb. 7 is perhaps the most detailed rebuttal of the errors of Origenism, and has been thoroughly analysed by Dom Polycarp Sherwood (Sherwood 1955a), but Maximus’ revision of Origenism is set in the widest context in the first of the Ambigua translated below, Amb. 10. This is the longest of the Difficulties, and perhaps the most obscure, at first sight. It concerns, as do all the early Ambigua, a passage from the writings of St Gregory the Theologian. What seems to have engaged Maximus’ attention here is that Gregory seems to speak of ascent to assimilation to God by reason and contemplation without making any mention of the stage of ascetic struggle: Maximus makes this clear in his first sentence, and states uncompromisingly that, in his view, the only truly satisfactory philosophy is ‘true judgment concerning reality and activity, supported by ascetic struggle’ (1108A). It appears from this that the intellectualist Origenist monks whom Maximus has in mind in his criticisms underplayed, or even discounted, what for Maximus (and for Evagrius before him) was the foundation of any spiritual progress, namely praktikê, or ascetic struggle. In this they may have been following too closely their master Origen, of whom it has been said that ‘he is an optimist for whom the struggle against the passions is a preliminary stage in one’s interior development, to be passed through quickly’ (Harl 1958, 321). What engages Origen, and it may be the Origenist monks (subject to the proviso mentioned above, that we really know very little about them), is interpretation of Scripture and contemplation of the cosmos, that is an engagement with the Word of God, the Logos, leading to contemplation of, and assimilation to, God. For Maximus, too, engagement with Scripture and natural contemplation leading to union with God is at the heart of the Christian life, but ascetic struggle is not simply an initial stage to be accomplished as quickly as possible, it is an abiding concern of the spiritual life. The most fundamental reason for this is that, paradoxically, ascetic struggle can achieve nothing on its own. The suspicion that Origen and (perhaps with greater justice) the Origenist monks gave rise to was that the providential order of the cosmos would suffice in itself to accomplish the return of fallen souls to union with God: all souls need to do is co-operate. For Maximus any such idea grossly underestimates the damage done by the Fall. As we have already seen, ascetic struggle is, for Maximus, a response to God’s self-

66 INTRODUCTION<br />

to Maximian as to Origenist theology—is detached by Maximus from<br />

its origins in the Origenist myth of the cosmos as the place of fallen<br />

souls.<br />

PASSING THROUGH THE CLOUD<br />

Amb. 7 is perhaps the most detailed rebuttal of the errors of<br />

Origenism, and has been thoroughly analysed by Dom Polycarp<br />

Sherwood (Sherwood 1955a), but Maximus’ revision of Origenism is<br />

set in the widest context in the first of the Ambigua translated below,<br />

Amb. 10. This is the longest of the Difficulties, and perhaps the most<br />

obscure, at first sight. It concerns, as do all the early Ambigua, a<br />

passage from the writings of St Gregory the Theologian. What seems<br />

to have engaged Maximus’ attention here is that Gregory seems to<br />

speak of ascent to assimilation to God by reason and contemplation<br />

without making any mention of the stage of ascetic struggle: Maximus<br />

makes this clear in his first sentence, and states uncompromisingly<br />

that, in his view, the only truly satisfactory philosophy is ‘true<br />

judgment concerning reality and activity, supported by ascetic<br />

struggle’ (1108A). It appears from this that the intellectualist<br />

Origenist monks whom Maximus has in mind in his criticisms<br />

underplayed, or even discounted, what for Maximus (and for Evagrius<br />

before him) was the foundation of any spiritual progress, namely<br />

praktikê, or ascetic struggle. In this they may have been following too<br />

closely their master Origen, of whom it has been said that ‘he is an<br />

optimist for whom the struggle against the passions is a preliminary<br />

stage in one’s interior development, to be passed through quickly’<br />

(Harl 1958, 321). What engages Origen, and it may be the Origenist<br />

monks (subject to the proviso mentioned above, that we really know<br />

very little about them), is interpretation of Scripture and<br />

contemplation of the cosmos, that is an engagement with the Word of<br />

God, the Logos, leading to contemplation of, and assimilation to, God.<br />

For Maximus, too, engagement with Scripture and natural<br />

contemplation leading to union with God is at the heart of the<br />

<strong>Christian</strong> life, but ascetic struggle is not simply an initial stage to be<br />

accomplished as quickly as possible, it is an abiding concern of the<br />

spiritual life. The most fundamental reason for this is that,<br />

paradoxically, ascetic struggle can achieve nothing on its own. The<br />

suspicion that Origen and (perhaps with greater justice) the Origenist<br />

monks gave rise to was that the providential order of the cosmos<br />

would suffice in itself to accomplish the return of fallen souls to union<br />

with God: all souls need to do is co-operate. For Maximus any such<br />

idea grossly underestimates the damage done by the Fall. As we have<br />

already seen, ascetic struggle is, for Maximus, a response to God’s self-

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