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Andrew Louth - Syriac Christian Church

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60 THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST<br />

The Fathers…openly confessed the difference between the two<br />

natural, but not gnomic, wills in Christ. They did not however<br />

say that there was any difference of gnomic wills in Christ, lest<br />

they proclaim him double-minded and double-willed, and<br />

fighting against himself, so to speak, in the discord of his<br />

thoughts, and therefore double-personed. For they knew that it<br />

was only this difference of gnomic wills that introduced into our<br />

lives sin and our separation from God. For evil consists in<br />

nothing else than this difference of our gnomic will from the<br />

divine will, which occurs by the introduction of an opposing<br />

quantity, thus making them numerically different, and shows<br />

the opposition of our gnomic will to God.<br />

(56BC)<br />

The idea that Christ did not deliberate (which is what is meant by not<br />

having a ‘gnomic will’) seems very strange, since deliberating between<br />

different choices is what we are accustomed to think that freewill is<br />

all about. In the course of her criticism of current trends of moral<br />

philosophy in the The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch at one point<br />

observes that ‘freedom is not strictly exercise of the will, but rather<br />

the experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes<br />

appropriate, occasions action’ (Murdoch 1970, 67). From this point of<br />

view deliberation is what we fall back on when our vision is clouded or<br />

confused: it is a measure of our lack of freedom, not the signal exercise<br />

of freedom. That Murdoch may help us to understand Maximus’<br />

picture of Christ is not perhaps surprising. Earlier on in The<br />

Sovereignty of Good, she maintains that ‘one of the main problems of<br />

moral philosophy might be formulated thus: are there any techniques<br />

for the purification and reorientation of an energy which is naturally<br />

selfish, in such a way that when moments of choice arrive we shall be<br />

sure of acting rightly?’ (Murdoch 1970, 54). That is a good way of<br />

formulating the approach of Byzantine ascetic theology, not least the<br />

approach of Maximus. And Maximus’ ascetic theology is, as we have<br />

seen, closely bound up with his dogmatic theology.

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