Andrew Louth - Syriac Christian Church

10 On Maximus’ understanding of human willing, see Gauthier (1954) and,
particularly on the question of how far Maximus is indebted to any
earlier thought, J.D.Madden in Heinzer and Schönborn (1982), 61–79.
11 As Madden claims, op. cit., 79. This claim is presumably to be limited to
the Greek tradition, as similar claims have been made for St Augustine
in the West two centuries earlier (e.g., by Clark [1958]). The question of
Maximus’ relation to the great Western doctor is intriguing. Maximus
spent more than twenty years in the West, fifteen of them in North
Africa, where theology was still under the sway of Augustine, yet he
never cites Augustine. There are, nevertheless, several possible points
of contact between the two doctors of the Church, of which this question
of human willing is one. See Berthold (1982).
12 Opusc. 26:277C and (in abbreviated form) 28:301C, taken more or less
correctly from Diadochus of Photikê, Century on Spiritual Knowledge 5
(des Places [1966], 86).
13 Opusc. 26:276C. These definitions are not found in any of the works of
Clement of Alexandria that have survived, and it may well be that they
are really Maximus’ own definitions of will ascribed, by himself or a
pupil, to a figure from antiquity (one of these definitions is used by
Maximus in Opusc. 3, translated below, without any suggestion that he
has taken it from Clement of Alexandria). The status of ‘Opusc. 26’ is
quite unclear: it may consist of notes found in Maximus’ papers and
preserved by a disciple. The last two definitions of will in Opusc. 26 are
ascribed to ‘Saint’ Maximus, which strongly suggests that we are
dealing here with a later compilation. On this whole question of
definitions of will provided by Maximus, see J.D.Madden, op. cit., 61–79.
5
COSMIC THEOLOGY
NOTES 201
1 There is no need to give an elaborate bibliography, but there is a
characteristically wide-ranging and thought-provoking article on what
might be meant by a modern Orthodox cosmology by Olivier Clément in
Clément (1967).
2 Athanasius, De Incarnatione 7.
3 Ibid.
4 Tên eis to mê einai phthoran: De Incarnatione 4.
5 It is instructive to contrast Athanasius’ treatment of why repentance on
Adam’s part would have been insufficient with Anselm’s treatment of
the same problem in Cur Deus homo I. 20. Athanasius also mentions the
offence done to God’s honour, but the reason he gives for the inadequacy
of repentance is based on the cosmic effects of Adam’s sin: Anselm’s
reasoning turns entirely on the infinite offence done to God’s honour by
Adam’s sin.
6 See esp. May (1978).
7 Origen, On First Principles II.8.3.
8 Ibid. I.6.2.