Boiler tube failures due to Improper commissioning

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CASE STUDIES OF BOILER FAILURES DUE TO IMPROPER COMMISSIONING PROCEDURE K.K.Parthiban- Venus Energy Audit System / Sri Devi engg consultancy & agency / Sri Devi Boiler Equipment & spares Introduction There have been many unpublished cases of improper commissioning of power boilers which have led to tube failures. The boilers may have been commissioned without proper stage inspection, precommissioning & commissioning protocols. We share our experience with case studies on waterwall failures, roof tube failures, SH tube failures and main steam header failures. The failures could have been avoided by proper field inspection. CASE STUDY 1-WATERWALL TUBE BURST IN A CFBC BOILER The first CFBC boiler in this plant was commissioned in October 2009. The power plant had been in operation for a total period of 326 hrs. Within this period, there had been 34 stoppages. Out of these stoppages, three were due to waterwall tube bursts experienced in the LH & RH side wall panels towards rear. The tube failures locations were at 200 - 400 mm below the refractory lining near furnace outlet. The burst tubes showed the sudden overheating. The tubes have burst due to sudden loss of circulation / departure from nucleate boiling or steam blanketing. The failed tubes did not exhibit long term overheating. See photo 1 to 4. The boiler was under shut down at the time of visit. As requested, the steam drum was opened and offered for inspection. The boiler drum exhibited presence of high corrosion products in boiler water. See the photos 5 & 6. Boiler water & condensate chemistry problem The steam drum was seen with low pH / high PH corrosion and there was no magnetite layer formation of internal surface. There was no distinct water to steam interface seen in the drum. The steam purifying driers also showed the reddish appearance, confirming foaming due to presence of corrosion products in boiler water. It was learnt that during the entire operating period, the best silica level in condensate was only 0.07 ppm. The condensate was always seen with high silica levels. See table below: Table 1: conductivity & silica levels in return condensate Period of operation 18/9-21/9 25/9 -28/9 1/10 - 5/10 15/10 – 19/10 2/ 11 to 4 /11 Conductivity µs/cm 25.5 to 8.3 8.8 to 10.5 4.2 to 6.1 5.2 to 6.9 9.7 to 11.4 Silica ppm 0.31 to 0.42 1.67 to 0.3 0.13 to 0.41 0.07 to 0.25 0.25 to 0.35 There had been very high blow down rate done to limit the silica in boiler water. Under this circumstance, the phosphate dosing had been raised. But simultaneously, high blow down was maintained. This should have led to pH variations in boiler water. It was confirmed that the blow down water was reddish. However the boiler water phosphate and pH were high, confirming that the boiler water was alkaline. This could have been due to presence of foaming or due to drum internal arrangement. Free OH alkalinity (2P-M alkalinity) was seen in the boiler water in the earlier period

CASE STUDIES OF BOILER FAILURES DUE TO IMPROPER COMMISSIONING<br />

PROCEDURE<br />

K.K.Parthiban- Venus Energy Audit System / Sri Devi engg consultancy & agency / Sri Devi <strong>Boiler</strong><br />

Equipment & spares<br />

Introduction<br />

There have been many unpublished cases of improper <strong>commissioning</strong> of power boilers which have<br />

led <strong>to</strong> <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong>. The boilers may have been commissioned without proper stage inspection, pre<strong>commissioning</strong><br />

& <strong>commissioning</strong> pro<strong>to</strong>cols. We share our experience with case studies on waterwall<br />

<strong>failures</strong>, roof <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong>, SH <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong> and main steam header <strong>failures</strong>. The <strong>failures</strong> could have<br />

been avoided by proper field inspection.<br />

CASE STUDY 1-WATERWALL TUBE BURST IN A CFBC BOILER<br />

The first CFBC boiler in this plant was commissioned in Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2009. The power plant had been in<br />

operation for a <strong>to</strong>tal period of 326 hrs. Within this period, there had been 34 s<strong>to</strong>ppages. Out of these<br />

s<strong>to</strong>ppages, three were <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> waterwall <strong>tube</strong> bursts experienced in the LH & RH side wall panels<br />

<strong>to</strong>wards rear. The <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong> locations were at 200 - 400 mm below the refrac<strong>to</strong>ry lining near<br />

furnace outlet. The burst <strong>tube</strong>s showed the sudden overheating. The <strong>tube</strong>s have burst <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> sudden<br />

loss of circulation / departure from nucleate boiling or steam blanketing. The failed <strong>tube</strong>s did not<br />

exhibit long term overheating. See pho<strong>to</strong> 1 <strong>to</strong> 4.<br />

The boiler was under shut down at the time of visit. As requested, the steam drum was opened and<br />

offered for inspection. The boiler drum exhibited presence of high corrosion products in boiler water.<br />

See the pho<strong>to</strong>s 5 & 6.<br />

<strong>Boiler</strong> water & condensate chemistry problem<br />

The steam drum was seen with low pH / high PH corrosion and there was no magnetite layer<br />

formation of internal surface. There was no distinct water <strong>to</strong> steam interface seen in the drum. The<br />

steam purifying driers also showed the reddish appearance, confirming foaming <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> presence of<br />

corrosion products in boiler water.<br />

It was learnt that during the entire operating period, the best silica level in condensate was only 0.07<br />

ppm. The condensate was always seen with high silica levels. See table below:<br />

Table 1: conductivity & silica levels in return condensate<br />

Period of operation 18/9-21/9 25/9 -28/9 1/10 - 5/10 15/10 – 19/10 2/ 11 <strong>to</strong> 4 /11<br />

Conductivity µs/cm 25.5 <strong>to</strong> 8.3 8.8 <strong>to</strong> 10.5 4.2 <strong>to</strong> 6.1 5.2 <strong>to</strong> 6.9 9.7 <strong>to</strong> 11.4<br />

Silica ppm 0.31 <strong>to</strong> 0.42 1.67 <strong>to</strong> 0.3 0.13 <strong>to</strong> 0.41 0.07 <strong>to</strong> 0.25 0.25 <strong>to</strong> 0.35<br />

There had been very high blow down rate done <strong>to</strong> limit the silica in boiler water. Under this<br />

circumstance, the phosphate dosing had been raised. But simultaneously, high blow down was<br />

maintained. This should have led <strong>to</strong> pH variations in boiler water. It was confirmed that the blow<br />

down water was reddish. However the boiler water phosphate and pH were high, confirming that the<br />

boiler water was alkaline. This could have been <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> presence of foaming or <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> drum internal<br />

arrangement. Free OH alkalinity (2P-M alkalinity) was seen in the boiler water in the earlier period


of operations. Though the boiler water chemistry seemed OK, the boiler internal surface did not say<br />

so. A wipe off shows the drum surface was red. There was no grey surface at water space or steam<br />

space. The following were the boiler water analysis data.<br />

Table 2: pH & silica values in boiler water<br />

The pH values<br />

The PO 4 values<br />

9.15,9.9,9.9,9.5,9.56,9.64,9.65 22.4,8.15,10.4,4.6,10.4,3.8,5.5,7.9,9.8,4.5<br />

Drum internal arrangement<br />

There is a possibility of chemical stirring effect by the feed water distribu<strong>to</strong>r pipe. See pho<strong>to</strong>graph 11<br />

& 12. It is the normal practice <strong>to</strong> locate the chemical pipe in such way that the feed water carries the<br />

phosphate chemical <strong>to</strong> the downcomers. In steam drum internal layout, the blow down pipe should<br />

be arranged in such a way that the high TDS return water is taken out without mixing any fresh water<br />

/ chemical. In the drum internal arrangement, the holes in feed distribu<strong>to</strong>r were located at 30 deg<br />

upward <strong>to</strong> horizontal. The two distribution pipes could stir up the chemical and cause a sampling<br />

error. It was advised <strong>to</strong> rotate the feed distribu<strong>to</strong>r pipe, so that the water ejects downwards. The<br />

chemical pipe could be connected <strong>to</strong> feed distribu<strong>to</strong>r pipe close <strong>to</strong> inlet point in the drum. This will<br />

help in proper mixing of chemical with feed water. Or else the chemical dosing pipe should be laid<br />

below the feed distribu<strong>to</strong>r pipe.<br />

Proper pre-<strong>commissioning</strong> care for start up of the unit<br />

Air cooled condenser has large heating surface as compared <strong>to</strong> boiler. Air cooled condensers are not<br />

chemically cleaned during pre-<strong>commissioning</strong>. It generates corrosion product during every start up.<br />

The first steam that enters the ACC is generally of low pH and it leads <strong>to</strong> some corrosion. The<br />

corrosion product <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> oxygen exposures also would come in <strong>to</strong> the condensate. The contaminated<br />

condensate chokes up the strainers at CEP inlet. Also the BFP strainers will be choked as the mesh<br />

opening is lesser than that of the CEP. It was reported that the strainers got choked with reddish fine<br />

particles. This can increase the conductivity and silica depending on the condition of internal surface<br />

of the ACC <strong>tube</strong>s. This had forced the high blow down rate from the boiler. The rate of blow down<br />

had been as high as 7.7 <strong>to</strong> 9.52 %. It was confirmed that colloidal silica was not there in the feed<br />

water. Hence the source of contamination could be from ACC. When the phosphate requirement was<br />

calculated, there was a mismatch. For high pressure steam cycles with ACC, condensate filtration<br />

and polishing system is a must.<br />

Frequent tripping & ACC being offline<br />

There had been as high as 34 trippings of the power plant. During these trippings, the ACC went<br />

offline. Every time the ACC was exposed <strong>to</strong> air, it would corrode. When the condensate was taken<br />

without treatment it had contaminated the boiler water with suspended & dissolved impurities. This<br />

made the boiler water dirty causing choking the bot<strong>to</strong>m drains. The high blow down requirements<br />

and boiler drain valve choking confirmed this. The hot box of the boiler led <strong>to</strong> choking of the drain /<br />

bot<strong>to</strong>m supply pipes as the corroded iron particles begin <strong>to</strong> separate out of water.<br />

Physical arrangement of downcomers & riser<br />

The distributing pipes are tapped off from the main downcomers and connected <strong>to</strong> all four walls. See


figure 7 & 8. The <strong>failures</strong> had been in the last ten <strong>tube</strong>s at the ESP side on both left & right side<br />

panels. The distributing pipes <strong>to</strong> this section of the boiler are taken from the bot<strong>to</strong>m most point of the<br />

main downcomer. The front & rear waterwall panels (226 <strong>tube</strong>s) are fed by 18 distributing pipes. The<br />

left & right side waterwall panels (170 <strong>tube</strong>s) are fed by 14 distributing pipes. The rear waterwall<br />

<strong>tube</strong>s have lot of bends as compared <strong>to</strong> the side waterwall panels. When there is undersized<br />

downcomers, the <strong>failures</strong> will be experienced at all water wall <strong>tube</strong>s and the worst affected will be<br />

the rear waterwall panel <strong>tube</strong>s. Since the <strong>tube</strong>s of left & right side waterwall panels have failed, the<br />

problem was simply related <strong>to</strong> starvation only. Looking in<strong>to</strong> symmetry of the boiler about the centre,<br />

it was clear that water flowing was disrupted when there was s<strong>to</strong>ppage and restart. On s<strong>to</strong>ppage of<br />

boiler / load reduction / on filling, the corrosion products tend <strong>to</strong> accumulate at bot<strong>to</strong>m most pipes<br />

only. This can retard the flow rate <strong>to</strong> the extreme <strong>tube</strong>s of the LHS & RHS panel <strong>tube</strong>s.<br />

TSP consumption<br />

The TSP consumption should have been 18 <strong>to</strong> 23 kg instead of 5 kg as per log sheet. Usually the<br />

chemical consumption will be more from the estimated value <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> low purity levels.<br />

Accumulation of dirt in low heat flux <strong>tube</strong>s<br />

As such the corner <strong>tube</strong>s can have less circulation as there will be less heat pick up. Dirt build up /<br />

concentration is usually more in such <strong>tube</strong>s. This can cause overheating <strong>failures</strong> as the cooling may<br />

be retarded.<br />

Failure <strong>to</strong> do low pressure blow down during <strong>commissioning</strong><br />

During <strong>commissioning</strong> of the new boiler, low pressure blow downs are done with fire off. This helps<br />

in attaining good water chemistry in a short time. Moreover when there is a mechanism of dirt<br />

generation in the boiler or even after the <strong>tube</strong> replacement job, the boiler calls for a low pressure<br />

blow down. It was learnt that this was not done.<br />

S<strong>to</strong>rage post hydrotest stage


It was learnt that the water used for hydrotest was left inside the boiler for a long duration. This was<br />

not proper. During long outages, the boiler needs preservation against corrosion. The water should be<br />

completely removed and hot air should be admitted in the boiler. Simple alternate method is <strong>to</strong> place<br />

a tray full of silica gel / lime inside the drum. This will have <strong>to</strong> be followed at TG exhaust &<br />

condensate s<strong>to</strong>rage tank also so that the ACC will be dry. Failure <strong>to</strong> preserve the boiler & ACC will<br />

accumulate dirt inside the boiler and lead <strong>to</strong> plugging of evaporative circuits. Hot air circulation<br />

arrangement is a fool proof method for offline corrosion protection of ACC.<br />

Hand hole pipe & drain at main downcomer<br />

The boiler was found <strong>to</strong> have no hand hole pipe system in downcomer. Hand hole pipes help <strong>to</strong> clean<br />

the system, after the alkali boil out in a better manner. In this boiler, the main downcomers act as<br />

dirt trap. In some boilers the bot<strong>to</strong>m ring headers collect the dirt. It is safer this way. The drain pipe<br />

of 50 nb was directly fitted <strong>to</strong> end plate. Further the drain valve is of 25 nb and is of globe type. See<br />

pho<strong>to</strong> 10. It is difficult <strong>to</strong> de-choke this valve even by tapping. The valves got choked often. This<br />

confirmed the presence of sufficient amount of corrosion products. The drain arrangement needs <strong>to</strong><br />

be modified. See the better arrangement in pho<strong>to</strong> 9.<br />

Globe or gate type valves for drains<br />

It was advised <strong>to</strong> provide 40 nb / 50 nb drain valves of gate type. Gate type valves help in easy<br />

removal of blockages. When the boiler is restarted after the repair work or annual overhauling, the<br />

water should be flushed out from the boiler by keeping the drain valve open. Low pressure blow<br />

down is suggested as the boiler pressure is raised during a start up.<br />

Piping system after the drain valves<br />

The drain piping from the main downcomer is connected <strong>to</strong> blow down tank. Unfortunately the drain<br />

piping is with a U loop. As long as the boiler is under pressure, the water may flow <strong>to</strong> tank. When the<br />

pressure is less, the last run of dirty water will trap in this U loop. It is a good engineering practice <strong>to</strong><br />

slope the drain lines <strong>to</strong>wards the final outlet point. An alternate direct drain <strong>to</strong> trench was<br />

recommended.<br />

A Quick check on circulation velocity<br />

This boiler has two main downcomers of 350 nb, feeding the water for the four side waterwall<br />

panels. The designer at site informed that the CR ratio is 6.7. This will have a velocity of 3.2 m/s in<br />

main downcomers. The distributing pipes are of 125 nb pipes. The water velocity in these pipes is<br />

2.1 m/s. The steam water mixture velocity in risers will be 3.95 m/s. There is no undersizing of<br />

downcomers or risers.<br />

Modifications carried out by OEM<br />

It was learnt that the boiler of same design was running at another place. This confirmed that the<br />

<strong>failures</strong> were <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> causes outlined above. The modifications carried out by OEM were seen <strong>to</strong> be<br />

out of anxiety. Connecting additional supply <strong>tube</strong>s & relief <strong>tube</strong>s from header ends was not required.<br />

Conclusion<br />

The lack of provisions for proper cleaning during pre-<strong>commissioning</strong> & operational cleaning and


ACC debris ingress had led <strong>to</strong> the multiple <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong>. The startup procedure shall include low<br />

pressure bot<strong>to</strong>m drain valve operations –with fire off condition. It was advised <strong>to</strong> drain off the ACC<br />

condensate until the condensate met the requirements.<br />

CASE STUDY 2: IMPORTANCE OF PROPER COMMISSIONING OF STEAM PIPE<br />

SPRING HANGERS & SUPPORTS<br />

There are several pipelines that connect various equipments in a power plant. These pipes are <strong>to</strong> be<br />

supported properly at regular intervals. Invariably, the pipelines are hot and hence there is thermal<br />

movement of piping in service. In order <strong>to</strong> take care of the movement and at the same time <strong>to</strong> offer<br />

proper support, a combination of rigid hanger, rigid support, roller support, guided supports, limit<br />

s<strong>to</strong>ps are provided. There is another important support system called spring supports. Spring supports<br />

are essential <strong>to</strong> take care of the movement and at the same time offer a support without straining the<br />

pipe / or the connected equipment. <strong>Boiler</strong> feed pump and turbine flanges are important connections<br />

that are not <strong>to</strong> be loaded beyond the allowable forces. Also there will be thermal movements <strong>to</strong> be<br />

taken care of. Spring supports can be variable spring support, variable spring hanger, constant load<br />

hanger & constant load support.<br />

Equipment such as Turbine genera<strong>to</strong>r, Final SH header, Steam drum, main steam header, LP heater,<br />

HP heater, Condenser, Condensate pump, BFP are somewhat fixed <strong>to</strong> some locations. These<br />

equipments yet have thermal expansion at the connecting ends <strong>to</strong> piping.<br />

The pipes have their self weight and imposed loads <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> valves. Certain reaction loads <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong><br />

opening/ closing of control valves and safety valves also act on the piping. Pipes are insulated and<br />

thus have additional loads.<br />

Pipelines are <strong>to</strong> be supported at regular intervals <strong>to</strong> prevent sagging. Pipes can be supported by pipe<br />

racks or hung or base supported from boiler supporting structure or building. The routing of pipes is<br />

done from aesthetic sense, accessibility for valves, instruments, and head room clearance and <strong>to</strong><br />

make use of nearby structure.<br />

Pipelines are subjected <strong>to</strong> thermal expansion. If the piping is not designed for flexibility, we may<br />

have strained flanges, weld joints, strained bends, and strained branches. Ultimately pipe would<br />

rupture if the piping is not designed with flexibility. We often see break down of piping, header <strong>due</strong><br />

<strong>to</strong> improper piping design and improper construction of steam pipelines.<br />

Pipeline <strong>failures</strong> are <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong>,<br />

1) Layout changes executed by construction engineers either <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> interferences or by their own<br />

decisions.<br />

2) <strong>Improper</strong> <strong>commissioning</strong> of pipe support <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> lack of knowledge.<br />

3) Inadequate rigidity of the base support.<br />

4) Failure <strong>to</strong> remove the temporary anchoring done for construction purpose.<br />

5) Failure <strong>to</strong> locate the support with a shift based on expected thermal movement as per stress<br />

analysis report.


Recently we had come across a case of a main steam header crack which occurred within few<br />

months of <strong>commissioning</strong> of a power plant. See pho<strong>to</strong>graph 15. The cause was identified as nonremoval<br />

of temporary anchors of steam piping. But the construction manager showed an attitude of<br />

disagreement <strong>to</strong> the finding. He went ahead <strong>to</strong> say that their designer had verified that the header<br />

should not fail for this reason. It appeared that the magnitude of thermal forces is not verified by<br />

calculation by the designer. The inspection made by the design engineer was not complete. The case<br />

study is presented below:<br />

This is the case study of a 2 x 25 MW power plant. The main steam parameters are 105 kg/cm 2 g and<br />

545 deg C. The newly commissioned 2 x 115 TPH boilers and two steam turbines are linked by the<br />

main steam header placed on the roof of control room. The steam pipelines from boilers are of 250<br />

nb OD x 32 thk. The steam piping <strong>to</strong> TG is also 250 nb pipe with 32 thk. The main steam header is<br />

of 400 nb dia & 44.45 thk. The main steam boiler is of 6.5 m long. It is anchored at one end allowed<br />

<strong>to</strong> expand in opposite direction. The header and pipeline arrangements are shown in figure 1. The<br />

cus<strong>to</strong>mer had arranged for all the piping system drawings. The entire pipeline from boiler <strong>to</strong> header<br />

and header <strong>to</strong> turbine was checked for the correctness of spring hangers, spring supports, guides &<br />

rigid supports. While all the supports are found at the right places, certain additional temporary<br />

supports were seen inside the insulation. After the insulation was removed, the pipelines were seen <strong>to</strong><br />

be locked at locations shown in the drawing. See pho<strong>to</strong>graphs 13 & 14.<br />

The unit had several start / s<strong>to</strong>ps since there were teething troubles with the various equipments.<br />

There were <strong>to</strong>tally about 20 s<strong>to</strong>ppages. It was concluded that the large cyclic forces must have led <strong>to</strong><br />

the failure. This led <strong>to</strong> the crack of pipe close <strong>to</strong> the weldments. Generally a weldment is stronger<br />

that the parent metal <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> extra thick reinforcement at weld. In addition, the heat affected zone is<br />

likely <strong>to</strong> have some minute hair line cracks. The cracks grow, if sufficient force is made available.<br />

Cycling forces accelerate the growth of the crack.<br />

Reasoning by forces / bending moment / stress analysis<br />

To support the argument, the thermal forces were estimated. It could be seen from the calculations,<br />

the order of the forces were simply <strong>to</strong>o high.<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

The header is considered as a simply supported pipe with various loads acting on it. It has its own<br />

weight along with insulation. The bending stresses can be estimated for this case separately.<br />

Part of the weight of connecting pipes & valves will be acting on the header. Depending on the<br />

location of the support in the pipe, the bending stresses can be calculated.<br />

When the connecting pipes are restricted by locks, the restricted thermal expansion of pipe<br />

develops thermal stresses. The stresses transfer as forces on <strong>to</strong> the header. The forces are found <strong>to</strong><br />

be of very high order. The order of the forces can be seen below.<br />

The above three stresses are added <strong>to</strong> the longitudinal stresses developed by internal pressure.<br />

The calculations proved that the failure was bound <strong>to</strong> occur at the location where the failure had<br />

taken place.<br />

Estimation of Thermal forces on header by the restricted piping,<br />

Thermal Co-efficient For P22 Material α = 14.35x10 -6 mm / mm / °C


Young’s modulus For P22 Material E = 1.4342 x 10 4 kg/mm 2<br />

Operating temperature T = 535°C<br />

Thermal Stress (On complete restraint) = α*T*E<br />

= 14.35x 10 -6 * 535*1.434x10 4<br />

Thermal stress = 110.1 kg/mm 2<br />

Assuming the pipe is flexible <strong>to</strong> absorb the thermal expansion <strong>to</strong> an extent of 90%, the actual stress<br />

can be taken as 10% of the above.<br />

Therefore, Stress in the piping = 110.1* 10%<br />

σ = 11.01 kg/mm 2<br />

Converting stresses in<strong>to</strong> forces:<br />

Stress σ = F/A<br />

Force at R (from boiler 1)<br />

= σ A<br />

= 11.01 * π (273²-209²)/4<br />

= 266750 kg<br />

Force at S (<strong>to</strong> boiler 3) = 11.01* π (219²-163²)/4<br />

= 185000 kg<br />

Force at T (<strong>to</strong> TG3) = 11.01* π (273²-209²)/4<br />

= 266750 kg<br />

The forces act as bending moments on the header. Stresses <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> bending moment add <strong>to</strong> the<br />

longitudinal stress developed <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> internal pressure. It is found that allowable stresses have<br />

exceeded the value specified by the code.<br />

Related case studies<br />

In another installation, pho<strong>to</strong>graphs 16 <strong>to</strong> 25 were taken. In pho<strong>to</strong>graphs 16 & 17, we can see here<br />

how the inadequate structural support has yielded <strong>to</strong> load. The variable spring support close <strong>to</strong> these<br />

supports has got loaded heavily and it is no more a spring support. These developments which show<br />

up during <strong>commissioning</strong> have <strong>to</strong> be brought <strong>to</strong> the designer’s notice <strong>to</strong> avoid major catastrophe in<br />

steam piping. These pho<strong>to</strong>graphs are not covering all the wrong installations at the plant. In general<br />

such mistakes are seen in several plants.<br />

Recommendations for a proper piping support installation & <strong>commissioning</strong><br />

1. Hanger and supports are <strong>to</strong> be used only for the intended purpose. It is not <strong>to</strong> be used for<br />

scaffolding purpose.<br />

2. The pipe routing is not <strong>to</strong> be altered by erection engineer. If done, it should be after the revision<br />

of stress analysis and load calculations.<br />

3. The location of pipe support is not <strong>to</strong> be changed by the erec<strong>to</strong>r. If done, it should be after the<br />

revision in stress analysis and load calculations.<br />

4. Spring supports and assemblies should not be used for earthing.


5. Temporary supports used for piping should be removed finally after the complete insulation work<br />

also. Finally the insulation should be completed in left over area <strong>to</strong>o.<br />

6. All spring supports are <strong>to</strong> be unlocked.<br />

7. After hydro test, if the springs do not return <strong>to</strong> cold position, they have <strong>to</strong> be adjusted <strong>to</strong> match<br />

the pointer returns <strong>to</strong> cold position.<br />

8. At the first heating of the piping, the spring supports are <strong>to</strong> be moni<strong>to</strong>red till the piping reaches<br />

its rated duty condition.<br />

9. After the construction activities are completed, piping engineer should “walk through” with the<br />

drawings and spring support data sheet <strong>to</strong> ensure that the hangers and supports have been erected<br />

correctly unlocked and that no temporary support is preventing the free movement of piping.<br />

10. Sliding supports should be properly designed and erected. The piping is placed centrally <strong>to</strong> the<br />

support in cold condition by many of us. Many times we can see the pipe is about <strong>to</strong> slip off from<br />

the support.<br />

11. It is vital that no pipe line fouls with the structure, cable trays, walk ways etc, hand rails, which<br />

can cause serious damage and accident when thermal expansions start occurring.<br />

Final word<br />

It is a great set back if the pipeline fails in service. The steam force in the pipe can cause damages <strong>to</strong><br />

unpredictable levels <strong>to</strong> power plant and the staff. It was <strong>to</strong> the luck of the plant that the damage was<br />

minimal when the header failed. There are so many plants, where piping supports are not<br />

commissioned by the engineers. For the reader’s information only, some pho<strong>to</strong>graphs are attached<br />

with this article.<br />

CASE STUDY 3: ROOF TUBE FAILURES IN A 250 TPH PULVERISED FUEL FIRED<br />

BOILER<br />

There are three identical boilers at this plant. Shortly after <strong>commissioning</strong>, only one unit suffered repeated<br />

roof <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong>. The cus<strong>to</strong>mer had been repairing the roof <strong>tube</strong>s for four or five times until the matter<br />

became critical when the other two units were on annual shut down. The plant was under great pressure and<br />

the management had put the foot down <strong>to</strong> resolve the matter. The boilers were of Chinese make and hence<br />

proper support was not available from the manufacturer on time and hence I had the chance <strong>to</strong> diagnose the<br />

problem. The failure was from the steam cooled roof panel.<br />

The failed <strong>tube</strong><br />

The failed <strong>tube</strong> was seen with swelling on furnace side. On inside the whitish deposits were seen. See pho<strong>to</strong><br />

26 & 27. Then I concluded there was mechanical carryover. I enquired with O&M team whether the steam<br />

drum was opened any time in the past after the <strong>failures</strong>. No one nodded yes. I prayed for a chance <strong>to</strong> see the<br />

drum inside. To my luck the boiler had <strong>to</strong> be shut for the turbine related problem. Meanwhile I had gone<br />

through the drum internal drawings. I could see that there is a possibility of cyclone coming off its position as<br />

the fit up design was not proper. See the pho<strong>to</strong> 28 & 29 enclosed.


Soon after the drum was opened the cause of the failure was identified. Three cyclone separa<strong>to</strong>rs had come off<br />

from the position. See pho<strong>to</strong> no 30 & 31. I advised that the cyclone should be wedged and welded so that it<br />

would not come off its position.<br />

Lessons for the plant personnel<br />

There are three identical boilers and the problem was encountered only in one unit. Thus the failure can be<br />

related <strong>to</strong> installation defect. The loss could have been prevented by proper inspection during construction. It<br />

must be remembered that cost of damage is phenomenal compared <strong>to</strong> expenses incurred for a construction<br />

audit. Incidentally the unit had wall <strong>tube</strong> <strong>failures</strong> which were related <strong>to</strong> improper buckstays fitment.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 1 : Burst <strong>tube</strong>s inside waterwall panels. The sudden bulge seen is a case of starvation.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 2: The swelling of <strong>tube</strong>s seen nearby failed area as well. Weldment being stronger, the<br />

swelling is seen only above and below the weld joints.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 3: The waterwall is seen dis<strong>to</strong>rted. This implies that the entire waterwall was starving for<br />

water.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 4: A close look of failed <strong>tube</strong>.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 5: The drum internal showing the pH deviations. There can be iron loading from ACC<br />

during pre-<strong>commissioning</strong>. Usually if the corrosion products are transported from the pre-boiler<br />

circuit, the dirt appears dark brown but the boiler surface will show grey surface. If the corrosion<br />

products are generated within the boiler circuit, then the surface will be reddish.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 6: The screen drier showing the foaming inside the drum <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> loose hydrated iron oxide<br />

Fe 2 O 3 in boiler water. The magnetite layer is not seen even in steam space. This is an indication of<br />

deviation of boiler water pH.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 7: The present downcomer arrangement. The bot<strong>to</strong>m most supply pipes feed the extreme<br />

WW <strong>tube</strong>s in the LHS & RHS. If this is choked then the <strong>tube</strong>s may starve.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 8: Even the front & rear waterwall <strong>tube</strong>s are fed by the bot<strong>to</strong>m most supply pipes. But the<br />

connection is at middle. The remaining supply pipes would ensure supply.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 9: Good engineering practice by another boiler maker. The main downcomer has a hand hole<br />

& a drain valve taken above the end cover. In this arrangement <strong>commissioning</strong> debris can be<br />

cleared easily.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 10: The main downcomer is not provided with a dirt trap / hand hole plate. The drain size is<br />

small. It was informed that the drain was choked during boiler operation. On every hot box up, the<br />

floating dirt would settle at this header end cap.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 11: The feed water distribu<strong>to</strong>r is arranged in such a way that the water outlet holes are facing<br />

30 deg up <strong>to</strong> horizontal. This arrangement can stir up the phosphate and lead <strong>to</strong> high phosphate in<br />

blow down. Then the boiler water chemistry will be different from what the sample indicates. It<br />

was advised <strong>to</strong> direct the holes downwards. Though the boiler water pH and PO 4 were OK as per<br />

report, the drum internal surface indicated low pH. The chemical dosing line has <strong>to</strong> be connected <strong>to</strong><br />

feed distribu<strong>to</strong>r itself.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 12: Arrangement of feed distribu<strong>to</strong>r with holes facing upwards. See the color of drum.


Figure 1: The drawing shows the piping arrangements connected <strong>to</strong> the main steam header. The<br />

drawing shows the location of temporary anchoring. The pipelines & headers are meant for carrying<br />

steam at a pressure of 100 kg/cm 2 & at 540 deg C.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 13: The steam piping from header <strong>to</strong> old<br />

TG is seen locked up. The insulation was<br />

removed <strong>to</strong> identify the temporary anchoring.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 14: The steam piping from boiler no 2 <strong>to</strong><br />

header is seen locked up. The insulation was<br />

removed <strong>to</strong> identify the temporary anchoring.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 15: The header crack can be seen here very close <strong>to</strong> the weldment.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 17: In the main steam piping, this is the<br />

status of the next support. The rigid hanger<br />

support base is not rigid enough.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 16: This is a mistake by a designer that a<br />

base support for hanger is not rigid enough. This<br />

is from another installation.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 18: We can see that the spring support next<br />

<strong>to</strong> the above two supports has got overloaded.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 19: A constant load hanger is seen with an<br />

improvised lock at a recently commissioned<br />

installation.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 20: A spring support waiting <strong>to</strong> be loaded in<br />

the operating power plant.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 21: A pipe is seen with temporary support<br />

though the permanent support is installed nearby.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 22: Pipe support partially commissioned by<br />

the <strong>commissioning</strong> team.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 23: A rigid hanger in the boiler feed piping<br />

designed for 125 kg/cm 2 is seen fallen <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> poor<br />

welding at support.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 24: Steam piping <strong>to</strong> TG is seen buried in<br />

the building wall. This is a common mistake seen.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 25: Due <strong>to</strong> burying the steam line inside the<br />

TG wall, the pipe support gets lifted off it is base.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 26: This is the inside surface of the failed <strong>tube</strong>. The <strong>tube</strong> indicates the phosphate carryover.<br />

Silica carryover does not affect the roof <strong>tube</strong>. It can affect the turbine blades only. This can be<br />

purely <strong>due</strong> <strong>to</strong> defective drum internal.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 27: This is another <strong>tube</strong> from the same boiler, which failed by swelling. The external surface<br />

proved mechanical carryover.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 28: The cyclone is not fully bolted type. This can lead <strong>to</strong> passing of steam- water mixture<br />

from the flange and cause mechanical carryover.<br />

Pho<strong>to</strong> 29: The cyclone is fitted with a wedge. This can get loosened over a period and lead <strong>to</strong><br />

mechanical carryover.


Pho<strong>to</strong> 30 & 31: The drum internal of boiler is in open condition. Many cyclones were seen in fallen<br />

down. This had resulted in direct water carryover (mechanical) <strong>to</strong> the superheater. Over a period<br />

the carryover must have been there. When the PO 4 levels were haphazard and crossed the<br />

permissible limits, the carryover of phosphate leads <strong>to</strong> overheating failure.

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