Doc 155_DEFENDANT-B+L_Granted_MSJ

Case 8:10-cv-02003-MSS-TGW Document 155 Filed 08/10/12 Page 1 of 13 PageID 2689 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

TAMPA DIVISION 

CARLOS RAMIREZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No.: 8:10-cv-02003-MSS-TGW 

BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., 

Defendant. 

___________________________________/ 

ORDER 

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant‟s Motion for 

Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 78) Upon consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being 

otherwise fully advised, the Court GRANTS Defendant‟s Motion (Dkt. 78), as described herein. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Case History 

A review of the record reveals that Plaintiff Carlos Ramirez filed his Complaint against 

Defendant Bausch & Lomb, Inc. in state court, on May 26, 2010. (Dkt. 2) On September 10, 

2010, the case was removed to this Court. (Dkt. 1) On November 3, 2010, Plaintiff was granted 

leave to file an Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 8; Dkt. 7-1) On December 10, 2010, the Defendant 

filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Plaintiff‟s Complaint. (Dkt. 19) The instant 

Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on November 17, 2011. (Dkt. 78) On December 21, 

2011 Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendant‟s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

(Dkt. 87), and on January 3, 2012, Plaintiff filled a Corrected Response in opposition to 

Defendant‟s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 95) Additionally, Defendant filed a Reply to 

Plaintiff‟s Response in opposition to Defendant‟s Motion for Summary Judgment on January 23, 

2012. (Dkt. 96) 

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B. Statement of Facts 

The facts, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, reflect the following. 

Defendant employed Plaintiff from March 2006 through November 2008 as a Quality Control 

Coordinator in its packaging and filling department. (Dkt. 77-1 at P. 38-42) The Plaintiff‟s job 

duties included conducting on-line inspections, monitoring the packaging and filling processes, 

insuring conformance to current Good Manufacturing Practice regulations (“GMP”) 1 

and 

Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”) 2 , and identifying and reporting any variances to 

supervisors. (Dkts. 77-1, 77-2) 

Plaintiff testified that on March 13, 2008, while inspecting the packaging of Muro 128 

solution, he noticed that certain batches were contaminated with foreign particulate around the 

dispensing tube tip. (Dkt. 88-3 at P.3 ) Upon his discovery, Plaintiff asked the operator to stop 

the line, and the operator ignored his request. (Id. at P. 5) Plaintiff notified his supervisors of the 

operator‟s refusal to stop the line and of the non-conforming batches. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 

the operator‟s refusal and the non-conforming batches were in violation of regulation. (Dkt. 77-1 

at P. 42-3) On March 18, 2008, while performing quality control activities on Line 10, Plaintiff 

observed “anomalies.” (Dkt. 77-1 at P. 45, 46) Plaintiff asked the operator to stop the line and to 

adjust the machine on the production line. (Id.) While the machine on Line 10 was being 

adjusted, Plaintiff inspected another line, Line A, and noticed defects. (Id.) 

Plaintiff stopped 

production on Line A and asked the technician to adjust the machine. (Id.) When Plaintiff 

returned to Line 10 to check its status, he discovered that management had assigned another 

Quality Control associate to take his place. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that it was a violation of 

regulation for management to ask another operator to assume control over Line 10 in Plaintiff‟s 

stead. (Dkt. 77-1 at P. 44-5) 

1 GMP‟s are regulatory requirements for all manufacturers of drugs and medical devices, codified at 21 

C.F.R., Parts 210, 211, 600 and 820. 

2 The FDA requires that registrants manufacture their products in accordance with their SOPs, which 

must be approved by the FDA. (Dkt. 88-1 at P. 6) 

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On March 19, 2008, Plaintiff reported that he saw nine units on the medication filling line 

with foreign particulates at the dispensing tips. (Dkt. 77-3 at P. 20) Plaintiff stopped the line 

and mechanical adjustments were made. (Id.) After the adjustment, Plaintiff found thirty 

defective units. (Id. at P.21) Plaintiff‟s shift supervisor, Valerie Gordon, came over to inspect the 

units, and, according to Plaintiff, told him to record only two non-conforming units and not the 

thirty he allegedly saw. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that it was unlawful for Gordon to order him to 

record less defective units than he observed. (Dkt. 77-3 at P.14) On March 25, 2008, Plaintiff 

alleged that he discovered broken glass on the manufacturing fill Line 4 and stopped the line to 

segregate 300 units. (Dkt. 77-6 at P. 8) When Plaintiff attempted to segregate the 300 units, he 

was ordered to stop. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that this was in violation of law. (Id.) 

On May 14, 2008, the Plaintiff alleged that he observed and reported a line operator‟s 

failure to change her “contaminated” personal protective clothing that touched the production 

floor when the operator bent down. (Dkt. 77-6) The line operator was not re-trained on the 

appropriate procedure, and Plaintiff alleges that the failure to re-train the operator was a 

violation of law. (Dkt. 77-6 at P. 9) On May 20, 2008, Plaintiff informed management of a nonconforming 

manufacturing process. 

(Dkt. 77-3 at P. 28-29) Plaintiff alleges that the nonconformance 

was a violation of law. (Id. at P.11) 

On May 21, 2008, Plaintiff reported to 

management that a fellow co-worker failed to log into an operating production. Plaintiff alleges 

that the failure to log in was a violation of law. (Dkt. 77-10) This same day, Plaintiff reported that 

53,300 units were contaminated and complained that the required documents per the SOP were 

missing or improperly recorded. (Dkts. 77-3 at P. 30; 77-6 at P. 12) Plaintiff contends that this 

was in violation of law. (Dkt. 77-6 at P. 12) 

On June 10, 2008, Plaintiff notified management that he discovered excess unit counts 

in the filling production line. (Dkt 77-3 at P. 39) Plaintiff testified that he was told to take no 

action other than discarding the excess unit. (Id.) Plaintiff objected because he thought it was a 

violation of law. (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff voiced his concerns of an employee inside the 

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manufacturing area not wearing prescribed personal protective clothing. (Id. at P. 40) Plaintiff 

testified that Pamerly Thomas (“Thomas”), a manufacturing team leader, was unwilling to 

discuss the issue with him and dismissed his concerns. (Id.) On July 14, 2008, Plaintiff claimed 

he found scratches on the product he was inspecting and stopped the production line. (Dkt. 77- 

13) Plaintiff‟s shift supervisor, Valerie Gordon (“Gordon”), inspected the product and could not 

see any scratches. (Id.) Thomas also inspected the units and could not see any scratches. 

(Dkt. 77-14) Plaintiff was reprimanded for improperly stopping the production line and breaching 

protocol. (Id. at P. 3; 77-16) On July 17, 2008, the Plaintiff informed Gordon that he lacked the 

prescribed training to perform the inspection duties assigned to him on the particular production 

line. (Dkt. 77-14 at P. 13) Despite his request, Plaintiff alleges he was not given the prescribed 

training. (Id.) 

From August 4, 2008 through November 3, 2008, Plaintiff took FMLA leave to care for 

his mother in Chile. (Dkt. 77-1 at P. 21) While Plaintiff was in Chile, Plaintiff‟s then attorney, 

Robert K. Michael, faxed a letter to Defendant on October 13, 2008. (Dkt. 77-17) A 

representative from Defendant‟s Human Resource Department received and reviewed the fax. 

(Id.) The fax contained a letter from Plaintiff‟s former counsel to Defendant and also confidential 

documents belonging to Defendant. (Dkt. 77-17) When Plaintiff returned to work on November 

3, 2008, he received a Final Written Warning from Defendant for removing those confidential 

documents from the premises. (Id.) Also on that same day, Anita Mujagic, Plaintiff‟s supervisor, 

gave Plaintiff a list of nineteen (19) SOPs to read. (Dkt. 77-1 at P.66) Plaintiff read seven (7) 

SOPs on November 3, 2008 and seven (7) SOPs on November 4, 2008. (Dkt. 86-12) 

Defendant‟s Director of Quality Assurance Wendy Gould testified that Plaintiff reviewed all 

updated SOPs related to Line 8. (Dkt. 77-4) Plaintiff was unable to refute this testimony as he 

could not recall which SOPs had been revised. On November 4, 2008, Management asked 

Plaintiff to start-up Line 8. (Id. at P. 26) Plaintiff refused claiming that because he had not 

completed his SOP review and training he could not start up the line as directed. (Id.) On 

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November 11, 2008, Gonzalo Javier Callejas (“Callejas”), a senior Human Resource 

representative, terminated Plaintiff for insubordination. (Dkt. 77-20) According to Defendant‟s 

Corrective Action Policy, “insubordination is cause for immediate discharge without using the 

progressive discipline approach.” (Dkt. 77-21, Bausch & Lomb‟s Corrective Action Policy 504) 

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant can show that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fennell v. 

Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 

1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007)). Which facts are material depends on the substantive law 

applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving 

party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Clark v. Coats 

& Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fennell, 559 

F.3d at 1216 (citing Welding Servs., Inc., 509 F.3d at 1356). A moving party discharges its 

burden on a motion for summary judgment by showing or pointing out to the Court that there is 

an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 

F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then 

designate specific facts (by its own affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 

admissions on file) that demonstrate there is a genuine issue for trial. Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 

1315, 1320-1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The party opposing a motion for summary 

judgment must rely on more than conclusory statements or allegations unsupported by facts. 

Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“conclusory allegations without 

specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). If a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact . . . the court may 

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grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials . . . show that the movant is 

entitled to it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

III. 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory 

discharge under the Florida Whistleblower‟s Act (“FWA”). (Dkt. 78) Conversely, Plaintiff argues 

that he can establish a prima facie case of a retaliatory discharge under the FWA because he 

can establish that there is a casual connection between his protected activity and termination. 

(Dkt. 95) 

A. Whistleblower's Act Claim 

The Plaintiff's claim is brought under the FWA, which states in pertinent part: “[a]n 

employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because the 

employee has: . . . [o]bjected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of 

the employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.” Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3). 

Claims of retaliation under the FWA employ the same analysis as retaliation claims 

under Title VII. Rutledge v. SunTrust Bank, 262 Fed. Appx. 956, 957 (11th Fla. 2008). In 

utilizing the Title VII retaliation claim analysis, a Plaintiff must show that (1) he participated in 

statutorily protected activity, (2) Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there 

was a causal link between the participation and the adverse employment action in order to 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FWA. Bell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 

F.Supp.2d 1182, 1187 (M.D. Fla. 2005); See Rutledge, 262 Fed. Appx. at 957. The Plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to determine 

that he has satisfied the elements of his prima facie case under the FWA. Rutledge, 262 Fed. 

Appx. at 957 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). If the 

Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the Defendant must then proffer a legitimate, nonretaliatory 

reason for the adverse employment action. Rutledge, 262 Fed. Appx. at 957. If the 

Defendant is successful, the Plaintiff must then come forward with evidence, which may include 

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evidence of the prima facie case, sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that each of the 

proffered reasons are merely a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Id. The Defendant's articulated 

reason is legitimate as long as it is honestly and reasonably held. Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991). A Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, without more, are 

insufficient to show pretext. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 

1996). 

B. Adverse Employment Actions and Retaliatory Harassment 

In this case the alleged protected activities and alleged adverse employment actions 

span over a period of approximately eight months. Though, as alleged, Plaintiff may have 

ultimately suffered an adverse employment action, the claimed action may not be causally 

connected to the alleged protected activity. 

The Plaintiff in his First Amended Complaint alleged that he suffered the following 

adverse employment actions: 1) Defendant‟s failure to abate a hostile work environment against 

Plaintiff; 2) employee‟s verbal abuse directed to Plaintiff; 3) threatening words that were said to 

Plaintiff; 4) Plaintiff was “dismissively rebuked” by Defendant‟s employee; 5) Plaintiff was not 

permitted to observe work lines during his lunch hour as other employees could; 6) Plaintiff was 

not permitted to observe or make compliance reports; 7) Plaintiff was forbidden from 

communicating his compliance concerns; 8) Defendant‟s managers reprimanded Plaintiff for 

improperly stopping the production line; 9) Defendant‟s employee refused Plaintiff adequate 

training; 10) Plaintiff was issued a written warning for lack of collaboration and credibility; 11) 

Plaintiff‟s position was posted on-line as an open job; 12) Defendant issued the Plaintiff a written 

warning for making copies from a company folder; and 13) Defendant terminated Plaintiff for 

insubordination. (Dkt. 7-1) However, Plaintiff has only presented competent evidence to the 

Court that he was subjected to a reprimand for improperly stopping a line, was refused 

additional training, was dismissed by a manager when he wanted to discuss his compliance 

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concerns, was issued a written warning for removing confidential documents from the 

Defendant‟s premises, and was terminated for insubordination. 

Only one of Plaintiff‟s allegations—his ultimate termination—rises to the level of an 

adverse employment action or retaliatory personnel action as contemplated by the FWA. The 

FWA defines a “retaliatory personnel action” as “the discharge, suspension, or demotion by an 

employer of an employee or any other adverse employment action taken by an employer 

against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.” Fla. Stat. § 448.101(5). In 

addition, the Eleventh Circuit's standard for “retaliation claims . . . require[s] an employee to 

establish an „ultimate employment decision‟ or make some other showing of substantiality in the 

employment context in order to establish an adverse employment action.” Crawford v. Carroll, 

529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616-17 

(11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)). 

The Eleventh Circuit defines “ultimate employment 

decisions as those such as termination, failure to hire, or demotion.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970 

(internal citation and quotations omitted). Furthermore, it is “required that conduct falling short 

of an ultimate employment decision must, in some substantial way, alter the employee's 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive him or her of 

employment opportunities, or adversely affect his or her status as an employee.” Id. (citing 

Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000)) (quotation and citation 

omitted). “More particularly, when defining the level of substantiality required for a Title VII 

discrimination claim, the [11th Circuit] require[s] an employee to demonstrate „a serious and 

material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment‟ to show an adverse 

employment action.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970 (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 

F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)). The “serious and material change” requirement has been 

applied by Eleventh Circuit to Title VII retaliation claims. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. 

In light of the afore-mentioned standards, the Court finds that the Defendant‟s 

termination of the Plaintiff for insubordination is the only actionable adverse employment action 

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in the case. (Dkt. 7-1 at P. 16 65) According to the Eleventh Circuit, the Plaintiff‟s termination 

is classified as an “ultimate employment decision.” Id.; Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. The 

remaining alleged adverse employment actions, noted above, cannot be deemed “ultimate 

employment decisions,” because the actions do not evidence that the Plaintiff “suffered a 

serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Dkt. 7-1 at 

P. 15-16); Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. 

C. The Alleged Protected Activity Causally Connected to the Adverse 

Employment Action 

In the absence of direct evidence of cause and effect, such as a statement or a 

memorandum or the like, the Court may consider temporal connexity of protected activity and 

an adverse employment action in assessing cause and effect. However, the Eleventh Circuit 

has spoken to the temporal relevance that may support such an inference. For there to be 

sufficient circumstantial evidence of a causal connection, it must be shown “that the decisionmakers 

were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the adverse 

action were not wholly unrelated.” Schechter v. Georgia State University, 341 Fed.Appx. 560, 

562 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 

2000)) (quotations and alterations omitted). “A close temporal proximity between the protected 

expression and an adverse action is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a causal connection for 

purposes of a prima facie case.” Schechter, 341 Fed.Appx. at 562; See also Farley v. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins., 197 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999). However, “[i]f there is a delay of 

more than three months between the two events, then the temporal proximity is not close 

enough, and the plaintiff must offer some other evidence tending to show causation.” See, e.g., 

Henderson v. FedEx Express, 442 Fed.Appx. 502, 506 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff alleges in this case that he refused to participate in and objected to the 

Defendant‟s violations of federal and state law regulations governing training, process and 

procedure control, hygiene and dress concerning drugs and medical devices, corrective action, 

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quality control, microbial control, testing, documentation, production record review and required 

investigations. (Dkt. 7-1 at P. 7-14) Among these listed activities, the only activity that Plaintiff 

asserts to have engaged in within the three months prior to his termination is his refusal to start 

up the production line. (Dkt. 77-1) 

Plaintiff offers no other evidence to support the Court‟s 

consideration of his other allegations of protected activity as temporally or causally connected to 

his termination. Plaintiff seems to argue that the prior protected activities were “effectively 

renewed” when Gonzalo Javiar Callejas (“Callejas”), a Human Resource Officer, reviewed the 

Plaintiff‟s disciplinary record and consulted Plaintiff‟s supervisor, Anita Mujagic (“Mujagic”), in 

determining whether to terminate Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff offers no evidence concerning their 

conversation, only his speculation about what must have been shared. Absent evidence of 

Mujagic‟s telling Callejas about Plaintiff‟s alleged prior protected activity and evidence that the 

termination was based on those prior actions, the Court declines to speculate about the 

communication between Mujagic and Callejas or its relation to Plaintiff‟s termination. Plaintiff 

also does not offer evidence that Callejas‟ review of Plaintiff‟s performance record, which 

contained alleged prior protected activities, influenced Callejas‟ decision. Under the Defendant‟s 

disciplinary rubric, an employee can be terminated solely for insubordination. Defendant attests 

that Plaintiff‟s termination rested solely on Plaintiff‟s insubordination (Dkt. 88-2 at P.4) and that 

termination was appropriately administered without “using the progressive disciplinary 

approach.” (Dkt. 77-21) Thus, the Court finds that the prior protected activity was not “renewed” 

and will look solely to the relevant protected activity that bears a temporal connection to the 

termination. 

As noted above, the only activity that Plaintiff asserts to have engaged in three months 

prior to his termination was his refusal to start up the production line. (Dkt. 88 at P. 17; Dkt. 77 

at P.18) Plaintiff asserts that his refusal to start up the production line before he finished 

reviewing the SOPs and was retrained upon returning from leave was protected activity in that 

he was reporting or refusing to participate in a violation of a regulation. (Dkt. 7-1; Dkt. 88 at P. 

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14-18) Conversely, “Defendant asserts that requiring Plaintiff to start up the line . . . was not a 

violation of any law, rule or regulation.” (Dkt. 78 at P.19) Section 3.6 of SOP 80-010 requires 

that: 

QC's returning to work after being absent for an extended period of time (greater 

than one month; i.e., FMLA, STD, extended vacation, etcetera) will assure that 

they are in compliance with current revisions of the SOP's listed in section 4.0, 

and critical GMP functions based on their department procedures prior to 

resuming QC duties. (Dkt. 77-1 at P. 28) (emphasis added) 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not have to review the policies set forth in SOP 80-010, 

unless those policies were revised while Plaintiff was out on leave. (Dkt. 78 at P. 16) 

Plaintiff 

contends that “nowhere in [Defendant]‟s policies is the mandated SOP review limited to only 

policies that were „revised while the employee was out on leave.‟” (Dkt. 88 at P. 18) Defendant 

also claims that Plaintiff had 30 days to review the SOPs and could return to the line at any 

point in his return. (Dkt. 77 at P. 18-19) Yet, Plaintiff asserts that Quality Team Leader Anita 

Mujagic made it clear to Plaintiff that he had to review the SOPs before returning to the line. 

(Dkt. 88 at P. 18) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff‟s refusal to start up the production line was not protected 

activity. In order for Plaintiff to show that he engaged in a statutorily protected activity under the 

FWA, Plaintiff must show that the activity he refused to participate in was a violation of a “law, 

rule, or regulation,” which is defined as “any statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation 

adopted pursuant to any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance applicable to the employer 

and pertaining to the business.” Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101. 

Here, the SOP 80-010 referenced by 

Plaintiff only required that the Quality Control persons assure that they are in compliance “with 

current revisions of the SOPs.” 

Defendant demonstrates by uncontroverted evidence that 

Plaintiff reviewed the updated SOPs pertaining to the line. (Dkts. 77-4; 77-1 at P. 66) Plaintiff 

has not provided contrary evidence. Plaintiff instead argues, without reference to record 

evidence that he was required to read the entire list of SOPs given to him. (Dkt. 88 at P.17 ). 

Defendant offers uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff was afforded ample opportunity to 

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review the required SOPs and re-familiarize himself with existing protocols on the line, but he 

nonetheless refused to return to the line except on his terms based on his erroneous 

interpretation of the SOP. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that he was participating in 

statutorily protected activity, and he therefore cannot show that his termination was causally 

linked to any protected activity. 

Finally, Plaintiff offers the letter sent by his attorney to Defendant during Plaintiff‟s FMLA 

leave taken to assist his ailing mother. First, the letter on its face states that it is not to be used 

in litigation as it is a communication sent for the purpose of engaging in settlement negotiations. 

Additionally, Plaintiff offers no legal authority for the notion that sending a letter via counsel can 

somehow resurrect stale complaints such that a termination that occurs in close proximity to 

such a letter can be considered temporally connected to the previously claimed “older protected 

activity,” no matter how distant the claimed “older protected activity” from the termination. (Dkt. 

95 at P. 20-21) For these reasons the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence 

to support a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that 

1. Defendant‟s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 78) is GRANTED. 

2. Because the Court has granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 

Court has the discretion to award attorneys' fees under Florida Statute § 

448.104. Accordingly, Defendant is directed to file a separate motion for 

attorneys' fees within twenty-one (21) days of this Order setting forth its basis for 

entitlement of fees under the statute. If the Court resolves the motion in 

Defendant‟s favor, the Court will separately require an accounting for fees and 

costs. 

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3. The CLERK is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendant, 

TERMINATE any pending motions and CLOSE the case. The Court, however, 

retains jurisdiction to rule on the motion for attorneys‟ fees. 

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 10th day of August 2012. 

Copies furnished to: 

Counsel of Record 

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