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Lecture by Mr. Durkheim 4 A DEBATE WITH EMILE DURKHEIM *1 1904 Must sociology continue to be a philosophical speculation which encompasses social life in a formula? Or, on the contrary, must it become fragmented into different sciences, and if it is to specialize, how is this specialization to occur? Purely philosophical sociology is based entirely on the idea that social phenomena are controlled by necessary laws. Social facts are linked by bonds that human volition cannot arbitrarily break. This truth assumed an advanced mentality and could only be the fruit of philosophical speculations. Sociology is the daughter of philosophical thought; it arose in the heart of Comtean philosophy and is its logical crown. But for Comte sociology does not consist in the plurality of definite problems that scholars study separately, but is embodied in a single problem, and in order to perceive the law that dominates it as a whole, sociology must embrace within an indivisible instant the course of historical development. Detailed studies are dangerous, Comte said, because they distract the attention of the sociologist from the fundamental problem which is the entirety of sociology. Social facts are solidaristic, and only by profoundly altering their nature can one study them in isolation. All Comte’s disciples have done is to reproduce the thought of their master, and the same formulas have been repeated without any advances in sociology. But why should sociology consist of a single problem? Social reality is essentially complex, not unintelligible but just uncongenial to simple forms. Sociology is not a unitary science, and, even while respecting the solidarity and interdependence of social facts, it must study each category separately. But the conception that reduces sociology to a single and unique problem is still, even among contemporary authors, the one most generally held. It is always a question of discovering the general law of sociality. Since they are social, all the facts studied by the separate social sciences supposedly have a common character, and the subject of sociology is the study of the social fact in abstraction. By comparing social facts we shall see the elements found in all types and shall distinguish the general characteristics of sociality. But where and how will this abstraction be achieved? The given facts are concrete and complex; even the most inferior civilizations are extremely complex. How can we extract the elementary fact, with its abstract characteristics, if we do not begin by studying the concrete phenomena in which it is realized? If sociology wants to live, then, it will have to reject the philosophical character that it owes to its origin and approach the concrete realities via special research. It is desirable for the public to know that sociology is not purely philosophical and that it requires precision and objectivity. But this is not to say that in order to become truly sociological sciences the special disciplines need only remain what they are already. They have not yet been adequately penetrated by the ideas brought to light by social philosophy. They need to be transformed, to orient themselves in a more expressly sociological direction. At the present time one can only pose the problem. Lecture by Tarde Should we speak of social science or of the social sciences? Sociology must be the science and not
the philosophy of social facts, for today that would be insufficient. The social sciences preceded social science and prepared its evolution. These sciences based on the comparative and evolutionary method need themselves to be compared. And this comparison of comparisons would be sociology. The specialists attacked the problem of social life, and each of them has observed the social facts that concern him. But institutions did not all arise identically in all countries. When one verifies imitative and spontaneous similarities between instituitions, it is always psychological and inter-psychological facts that we are dealing-with; in one case there was imitation, the action of a model mind on a copying mind, and in the other case the work of a single human mind which, using the same logic on givens of a similar nature, of necessity arrived at fairly similar results. As the naturalists would say, these are functional analogies which moreover attach far greater price to homologies—the equivalent of imitative similarities. The study of social facts can only concern acts relevant to inter-mental psychology. It is therefore to this inter-psychology that we must turn for the explanation of social facts. The comparative method can verify a preconceived hypothesis, but if this view is false, the results are nil. This is the way the soothsayers of antiquity, who used the comparative method so abundantly, completely wasted their time. Great thinkers did not always achieve the results that they were hoping for—witness Herbert Spencer with the organicist hypothesis and Le Play with the study of family monographs. The family is a poorly defined unit, and one must descend as far as the individual in order to find the social element. Mr. Durkheim believes that scientific progress requires increasing division of social work and that the social sciences must divide. But there are two sorts of division of labor: one anterior to unification, the other posterior to convergence. Scientific progress for the first consists of moving towards unity; and progress for the second consists of an ever-growing differentiation. There are therefore two movements: (1) separate investigations, the different sciences converging toward one point, and (2) the synthesis of these different sciences. Inter-mental psychology must be to the social sciences what the study of the cell is to the biological sciences. These special sciences must use the comparative method, but to unite them, define them, increase them, the aid of inter-mental psychology is indispensable. In the social sciences one discovers elementary agents and acts common to all sciences; these are incorporeal or inter-mental acts, but the first cannot exist without the second. This inter-mental psychology is indispensable to the study of social facts, because psychology, which studies only the individual confronting nature, is incapable of studying phenomena such as the intimidation produced by a man meeting his peers. As each of us enters social life, we feel the influence of certain great persons; these individual examples fuse with many other influences of the same type and form a collective product that acts on us who have formed it with an air of personal or external command and can only have a false air of exteriority. This collective appearance is the result of a psychological synthesis. It does not suffice for sociologists to observe the direction of evolution of the various sciences. All the sciences that took off from an objective point of view have become psychological (as for example the psychological nature of modern economic study). There are two categories of social things to study: (1) groups of people acting inter-mentally (families, classes, nations); (2) groups of actions (languages, customs, institutions). And it would be desirable for the social sciences to keep this distinction in mind instead of frequently nourishing themselves with vain entities. Inter-mental psychology is an elementary, that is, general, sociology, and thanks to it sociology can be a central science and not just a common name given to the collection of social sciences.
- Page 26 and 27: V. Methodology, Methods, and Quanti
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- Page 36 and 37: not a hope or a desire, which was n
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- Page 42 and 43: y the theologians and the authorita
- Page 44 and 45: certain fruitfulness? I believe it
- Page 46 and 47: science. III Now the problem is to
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- Page 54 and 55: significance of this proposition. T
- Page 56 and 57: These non-imitative similarities be
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- Page 60 and 61: values? This is a fairly well found
- Page 62 and 63: service to the rank of wealth. Agai
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- Page 66 and 67: By joining our point of view, howev
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- Page 74 and 75: of the tribes, then of the cities o
- Page 78 and 79: The third session, presided over by
- Page 80 and 81: 5 BASIC PRINCIPLES *1 1902 Let us b
- Page 82 and 83: epetition is their common tendency,
- Page 84 and 85: I 6 INVENTION *1 1902 However dange
- Page 86 and 87: shown by World Fairs, where the ind
- Page 88 and 89: and churchmen often did likewise. I
- Page 90 and 91: Imagine the effect produced by that
- Page 92 and 93: 7 OPPOSITION *1 1898 Let us, first
- Page 94 and 95: he has in his thoughts, at the same
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- Page 98 and 99: III. The Laws of Imitation
- Page 100 and 101: comes to him and then another until
- Page 102 and 103: and one of which is crowded back by
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- Page 110 and 111: aspect of effort is desire, and tha
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- Page 116 and 117: V. Methodology, Methods, and Quanti
- Page 118 and 119: the charm of theory? If history is
- Page 120 and 121: only a commercial treaty, or a new
- Page 122 and 123: were perfect. It is this ideal, an
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Lecture by Mr. Durkheim<br />
4<br />
A DEBATE WITH EMILE DURKHEIM *1<br />
1904<br />
Must sociology continue to be a philosophical speculation which encompasses social life in a<br />
formula? Or, on the contrary, must it become fragmented into different sciences, and if it is to<br />
specialize, how is this specialization to occur? Purely philosophical sociology is based entirely on<br />
the idea that social phenomena are controlled by necessary laws. Social facts are linked by bonds that<br />
human volition cannot arbitrarily break. This truth assumed an advanced mentality and could only be<br />
the fruit of philosophical speculations. Sociology is the daughter of philosophical thought; it arose in<br />
the heart of Comtean philosophy and is its logical crown.<br />
But for Comte sociology does not consist in the plurality of definite problems that scholars study<br />
separately, but is embodied in a single problem, and in order to perceive the law that dominates it as<br />
a whole, sociology must embrace within an indivisible instant the course of historical development.<br />
Detailed studies are dangerous, Comte said, because they distract the attention of the sociologist from<br />
the fundamental problem which is the entirety of sociology. Social facts are solidaristic, and only by<br />
profoundly altering their nature can one study them in isolation. All Comte’s disciples have done is to<br />
reproduce the thought of their master, and the same formulas have been repeated without any advances<br />
in sociology.<br />
But why should sociology consist of a single problem? Social reality is essentially complex, not<br />
unintelligible but just uncongenial to simple forms. Sociology is not a unitary science, and, even<br />
while respecting the solidarity and interdependence of social facts, it must study each category<br />
separately. But the conception that reduces sociology to a single and unique problem is still, even<br />
among contemporary authors, the one most generally held. It is always a question of discovering the<br />
general law of sociality. Since they are social, all the facts studied by the separate social sciences<br />
supposedly have a common character, and the subject of sociology is the study of the social fact in<br />
abstraction. By comparing social facts we shall see the elements found in all types and shall<br />
distinguish the general characteristics of sociality. But where and how will this abstraction be<br />
achieved? The given facts are concrete and complex; even the most inferior civilizations are<br />
extremely complex. How can we extract the elementary fact, with its abstract characteristics, if we do<br />
not begin by studying the concrete phenomena in which it is realized?<br />
If sociology wants to live, then, it will have to reject the philosophical character that it owes to its<br />
origin and approach the concrete realities via special research. It is desirable for the public to know<br />
that sociology is not purely philosophical and that it requires precision and objectivity. But this is not<br />
to say that in order to become truly sociological sciences the special disciplines need only remain<br />
what they are already. They have not yet been adequately penetrated by the ideas brought to light by<br />
social philosophy. They need to be transformed, to orient themselves in a more expressly sociological<br />
direction. At the present time one can only pose the problem.<br />
Lecture by Tarde<br />
Should we speak of social science or of the social sciences? Sociology must be the science and not