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a formula comparable to the type of itinerary planned in advance that the railroad companies propose to and do impose on tourists. Not that I reject analogies and comparisons (which actually I have used a great deal), but here it must be said that the terms of the comparison have been poorly chosen. The analogue of a living being, which reproduces itself according to a constant formula of evolution, is not a nation taken as a whole or even considered in one of its general aspects (language, government, religion, and so fourth). . . . Furthermore, nothing obliges us to solve these problems; we know that a science is based on an order of facts when from among those facts we succeed in grasping the general facts allied to each other, that is, groups of similar facts which repeat themselves, groups which increase and decrease, whose increases and decreases are subject to measurement and calculation, and which present themselves as bound to one another in either direct or inverse relationship. Are these groups of similarities anything other than quantities? And quantity basically is only repetition and similarity, in other words, a general fact; and wherever there is quantity there is science. It seems, in truth, that the idea of quantity is found in its purest state only in the physical sciences, but perhaps this is only an illusion. In any case, here as elsewhere, quantity is always resolved into grouped repetitions. The weight of a given chemical substance, of a volume of oxygen or nitrogen, is no more than the more or less numerous group of similar molecules of which it is composed; the heat of a body consists of the more or less numerous group of more or less voluminous and rapid calorific vibrations with which it is agitated. The vitality of animal or vegetable tissue, of muscular or mucous tissues, is also a quantity which consists of a multiplication of entirely similar cells. Finally, when social statistics, as it always ought to have, has a bearing on similar human acts or human products and does not, as it too often does, group together heterogeneous things, its curves reveal numerical highs and lows which are comparable to the preceding ones. The parallelism or the inversion of these various curves have a significance analogous to that of the quantitative correlations expressed by the physicists’ formulas or the naturalists’ remarks. Thus before all else every science presupposes quantities and repetitions, but its own characteristic quantities and repetitions, which add themselves, as elements of its formulas, to the quantities and repetitions of those sciences inferior to it. This implies first of all that there is a mode of repetition particular to physical phenomena and another particular to biological phenomena and yet another particular to social phenomena. The autonomy of social science will thus be assured if it is shown that it has its own characteristic mode of repetition. . . . VI Now, just what is the characteristic social repetition? As we have already said, it is imitation, the mental impression from a distance by which one brain reflects to another its ideas, its wishes, even its ways of feeling. Once it can be shown that, despite exceptions or simply ostensible objections, it is imitation which is the elementary and universal social fact, I presume no one will deny the autonomy of social science. For, without any doubt whatsoever, imitation can be reduced neither to generation nor to undulation. This does not keep these last two modes of repetition, the so-called biological and physical factors, race and climate, from exercising a large influence on the direction of the currents of imitation, and thus from having considerable, though auxiliary and subordinate, importance for sociology. It will be easy to prove that imitation is implied in all social relations whatsoever, that it is the common bond of these relationships. But let us say first that these social relationships can be classified in a certain number of categories: linguistic, religious, scientific, political, legal, moral, economic, aesthetic.
While we are still on the threshold of sociology, it is necessary to indicate a very remarkable characteristic which, in the field of individual consciousness—supposedly the domain of the sui generis, the unique, the incomparable, and pure quality—enables us to distinguish two homogeneous realities, identical not only from one state to another in the same mind but also from one mind to another. It is in this way, and this way only, that psychology can become exteriorized and be transformed into sociology. If the various “I’s” (les divers “moi”) were as heterogeneous as is sometimes supposed, if they had nothing in common with one another, how could they transmit or communicate anything to each other? And with no communication, with nothing in common, how could they associate and form an “ourself,” a “we” (un “nous”)? And even if we admit, against all possibility, that the juxtaposition of these heterogeneous individual selves or “I’s” does give rise to what appears to be a social group, how could we derive any kind of a science by observing and comparing such diverse associations that cannot be compared with each other, are composed of dissimilar facts and have no link between them? Collective psychology, inter-mental psychology, that is, sociology, is thus possible only because individual psychology, intra-mental psychology, includes elements which can be transmitted and communicated from one consciousness to others, elements which, despite the irreducible hiatus between individuals, are capable of uniting and joining together in order to form true social forces and quantities, currents of opinion or popular impulses, traditions or national customs. There is, I have said, in every elementary social relationship a transmission of, or the attempt to transmit, a belief or a desire. To be sure of this, it suffices to glance at the series of relationships enumerated above. All speech expresses a judgment or a plan, an idea or a desire, and tends to persuade or advise, to instruct or command. So is it for all the religious, scientific, political or legal types of speech, of clerical or lay instruction, and also of prayer, a ministerial decree, or a legal text. Every book, every newspaper, is essentially persuasive or impulsive, dogmatic or imperious. . . . From the very beginning it is important to recognize this double, common basis of all minds, this double internal environment into which they plunge and which ceaselessly penetrates them during their continual exchanges. For here is the fundamental psychological and sociological duality. But if it is through the transfusion of these two energies that all communications from one mind to another resemble each other, in their form they differ strangely, because combined with those inner qualities is a marked and specific sensate element. A belief rendered as a specific idea, a precise judgment, a specific desire, a definite act or need: this is what imitation spreads from one consciousness to the next. Looking at this phenomenon once again, what is imitation? A special type of action exercised from a distance by one mind on another, a mental imprint given or received, which is propagated in this way by a type of contagion completely different both from the transmission of periodic movements produced by two chemical substances in the process of combination and from the transmission of regulated life stages which occurs when an impregnated ovum grows and produces a living being. This mental imprint has two characteristics: first it is an imprint, an exact reproduction of the verbal articulation, the religious rite, the action ordered, the idea taught, the industrial or artistic process acquired, the virtue or vice inculcated—a reproduction of whatever model it copied, a print of the negative which has in turn become a negative. In the second place, the imprint is mental, spiritual, essentially psychological: hence the impossibility of expelling psychology from social science, as was attempted in defiance of all evidence; hence also the uselessness of seeking any other basis for sociology. Imitation, I said, is the elementary and characteristic social fact. It is now time to explain the
- Page 2 and 3: The University of Chicago Press, Ch
- Page 4 and 5: THE HERITAGE OF SOCIOLOGY a Series
- Page 6 and 7: Preface Some of the neglect of Tard
- Page 8 and 9: Tarde’s own father (1797-1850) se
- Page 10 and 11: death of the philosopher Nourrisson
- Page 12 and 13: apotheosis of the tradition of Spon
- Page 14 and 15: assumption that society consisted o
- Page 16 and 17: III. The Structure of Tarde’s Tho
- Page 18 and 19: aspects of invention and, at some p
- Page 20 and 21: likely it is to be imitated. 41 A n
- Page 22 and 23: society. This same basic principle,
- Page 24 and 25: of domination by a single all power
- Page 26 and 27: V. Methodology, Methods, and Quanti
- Page 28 and 29: Letters have just about the same fo
- Page 30 and 31: attainment of great wealth, demonst
- Page 32 and 33: ailroad, the modern public could on
- Page 34 and 35: and held that with increased commun
- Page 36 and 37: not a hope or a desire, which was n
- Page 38 and 39: psychological approaches, associate
- Page 40 and 41: I. The Nature and Scope of Sociolog
- Page 42 and 43: y the theologians and the authorita
- Page 44 and 45: certain fruitfulness? I believe it
- Page 46 and 47: science. III Now the problem is to
- Page 48 and 49: this question can perhaps be resolv
- Page 50 and 51: accepting facts which repeat themse
- Page 54 and 55: significance of this proposition. T
- Page 56 and 57: These non-imitative similarities be
- Page 58 and 59: were these initiatives imitated, an
- Page 60 and 61: values? This is a fairly well found
- Page 62 and 63: service to the rank of wealth. Agai
- Page 64 and 65: an idol, weaving a garment, cutting
- Page 66 and 67: By joining our point of view, howev
- Page 68 and 69: have intimate knowledge of its elem
- Page 70 and 71: After this admittedly incomplete in
- Page 72 and 73: We should note that matriarchy is e
- Page 74 and 75: of the tribes, then of the cities o
- Page 76 and 77: Lecture by Mr. Durkheim 4 A DEBATE
- Page 78 and 79: The third session, presided over by
- Page 80 and 81: 5 BASIC PRINCIPLES *1 1902 Let us b
- Page 82 and 83: epetition is their common tendency,
- Page 84 and 85: I 6 INVENTION *1 1902 However dange
- Page 86 and 87: shown by World Fairs, where the ind
- Page 88 and 89: and churchmen often did likewise. I
- Page 90 and 91: Imagine the effect produced by that
- Page 92 and 93: 7 OPPOSITION *1 1898 Let us, first
- Page 94 and 95: he has in his thoughts, at the same
- Page 96 and 97: Fortunately, the truth is not so sa
- Page 98 and 99: III. The Laws of Imitation
- Page 100 and 101: comes to him and then another until
While we are still on the threshold of sociology, it is necessary to indicate a very remarkable<br />
characteristic which, in the field of individual consciousness—supposedly the domain of the sui<br />
generis, the unique, the incomparable, and pure quality—enables us to distinguish two homogeneous<br />
realities, identical not only from one state to another in the same mind but also from one mind to<br />
another. It is in this way, and this way only, that psychology can become exteriorized and be<br />
transformed into sociology. If the various “I’s” (les divers “moi”) were as heterogeneous as is<br />
sometimes supposed, if they had nothing in common with one another, how could they transmit or<br />
communicate anything to each other? And with no communication, with nothing in common, how<br />
could they associate and form an “ourself,” a “we” (un “nous”)? And even if we admit, against all<br />
possibility, that the juxtaposition of these heterogeneous individual selves or “I’s” does give rise to<br />
what appears to be a social group, how could we derive any kind of a science by observing and<br />
comparing such diverse associations that cannot be compared with each other, are composed of<br />
dissimilar facts and have no link between them? Collective psychology, inter-mental psychology, that<br />
is, sociology, is thus possible only because individual psychology, intra-mental psychology, includes<br />
elements which can be transmitted and communicated from one consciousness to others, elements<br />
which, despite the irreducible hiatus between individuals, are capable of uniting and joining together<br />
in order to form true social forces and quantities, currents of opinion or popular impulses, traditions<br />
or national customs.<br />
There is, I have said, in every elementary social relationship a transmission of, or the attempt to<br />
transmit, a belief or a desire. To be sure of this, it suffices to glance at the series of relationships<br />
enumerated above. All speech expresses a judgment or a plan, an idea or a desire, and tends to<br />
persuade or advise, to instruct or command. So is it for all the religious, scientific, political or legal<br />
types of speech, of clerical or lay instruction, and also of prayer, a ministerial decree, or a legal text.<br />
Every book, every newspaper, is essentially persuasive or impulsive, dogmatic or imperious. . . .<br />
From the very beginning it is important to recognize this double, common basis of all minds, this<br />
double internal environment into which they plunge and which ceaselessly penetrates them during<br />
their continual exchanges. For here is the fundamental psychological and sociological duality. But if it<br />
is through the transfusion of these two energies that all communications from one mind to another<br />
resemble each other, in their form they differ strangely, because combined with those inner qualities<br />
is a marked and specific sensate element. A belief rendered as a specific idea, a precise judgment, a<br />
specific desire, a definite act or need: this is what imitation spreads from one consciousness to the<br />
next.<br />
Looking at this phenomenon once again, what is imitation? A special type of action exercised from<br />
a distance by one mind on another, a mental imprint given or received, which is propagated in this<br />
way by a type of contagion completely different both from the transmission of periodic movements<br />
produced by two chemical substances in the process of combination and from the transmission of<br />
regulated life stages which occurs when an impregnated ovum grows and produces a living being.<br />
This mental imprint has two characteristics: first it is an imprint, an exact reproduction of the verbal<br />
articulation, the religious rite, the action ordered, the idea taught, the industrial or artistic process<br />
acquired, the virtue or vice inculcated—a reproduction of whatever model it copied, a print of the<br />
negative which has in turn become a negative. In the second place, the imprint is mental, spiritual,<br />
essentially psychological: hence the impossibility of expelling psychology from social science, as<br />
was attempted in defiance of all evidence; hence also the uselessness of seeking any other basis for<br />
sociology.<br />
Imitation, I said, is the elementary and characteristic social fact. It is now time to explain the
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