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likely it is to be imitated. 41 A new type of horsedrawn cart is not likely to be imitated by a society that has not yet invented the wheel, any more than by another which makes widespread use of automobiles and railroad trains. The “extra-logical” form of the same law—the more an invention meets the predominant cultural emphasis, the more likely it is to be imitated—calls attention to such nontechnological factors as the relative cultural emphasis on novelty as opposed to tradition. 42 Attention to these two contrasting emphases—the logical or the extra-logical—resulted in two corresponding types of laws. Concern with the logical aspects of invention and imitation moved Tarde to distinguish inventions that could be used as substitutes for one another from those that could be accumulated without displacing others. When two substitutable inventions compete—contrasting linguistic expressions, or forms of dress—the result is a “logical duel”; when two complementary inventions are brought together, the result is “logical union”—for example, the wheel and the domesticated animal in the horsedrawn cart. But even logically opposed inventions will not be forced into overt opposition with one another unless observers in the society around them point out their incompatibility; in the absence of such criticism, relatively incompatible inventions may very well coexist for some time. Eventually, however, their presence tends to generate what Tarde referred to, in a discussion in many ways similar to more recent ones dealing with “cognitive dissonance,” 43 as one of two basic types of “logical strain.” The second source of strain is in the absolute advance of knowledge, which would lead to increasing numbers of logical unions. To explain the source of this strain, Tarde does not rely on what more culturally-oriented social scientists might have posited—the incomplete attainment of a basic value favoring the increase of knowledge. On the contrary, his preference for “inter-mental” explanation becomes apparent. Both types of strains originate in a common source: the intensive interaction of minds, which leads to rapid circulation of ideas and to greater consistency of thought as well as a tendency toward the expansion of knowledge. 44 Thus, stated in propositional form, the more frequent the interaction in a society, the greater the strain toward consistency of thought, and the more rapid the growth of knowledge. But Tarde recognized that such a formulation is too simple. Ignoring cultural variables at outset he introduced them later. Societies, as well as historical periods, vary, he pointed out, in the relative emphasis that they place on consistency as opposed to inventiveness. He even suggests a cyclical pattern according to which societies would alternate between an emphasis first on inventiveness and then on consistency; when large numbers of inventions are being created, consistency is difficult to maintain, but over time efforts toward rationalization become increasingly essential. The nineteenth century, he suggests, was a century of massive invention, and perhaps the twentieth century would have to be devoted to rationalizing the discoveries of the nineteenth. As far as social thought is concerned, there seems to have been more than a grain of truth in this prediction, at least for the first half of the twentieth century. Turning to the “extra-logical” laws of imitation, we find one general principle underlying much of Tarde’s discussion: initially inventions tend to be imitated by those parts of man and society that are closest to the source of invention, from which they subsequently radiate outward to more distant parts. 45 While not explicitly stated, this principle lies behind Tarde’s otherwise less than obvious law that imitations spread “from the inner to the outer man.” Nowhere is his general preference for intellectual over material causes more apparent than in the propositions deriving from this law. 46 Tarde posits that ideas are communicated before their material expressions; religious dogmas are transmitted before the associated rites; ends are disseminated before the means to their attainment; general ideas are accepted before they receive juridical or legislative support. In this series of

propositions, Tarde seized on one lines of causation which is unquestionably valid in some instances. But in his associated discussion, he characteristically devoted far too much space to supporting examples and not enough to establishing the limiting conditions under which the propositions were in fact valid. The second basic extra-logical law is that imitation is channeled by status: it descends from social superior to social inferior. An elite functions not merely to ferment invention; it also provides the guiding model for the rest of society and thereby diffuses new discoveries. It is not always easy to separate invention from the first stages of imitation, particularly in the case of less logical or scientific inventions, such as life style. But there is often a significant overlap: as soon as a particular elite ceases to supply leadership in invention and merely preserves established custom, its decline is imminent. 47 A reasonably unified elite serves as the basic source of imitation for a society and also ensures a fundamental unity of belief throughout the society. The role played by the Roman Catholic Church in rationalizing and diffusing belief in the Middle Ages is the outstanding example cited by Tarde. In democratic periods, the functions performed earlier by nobilities tend to be taken over by capital cities. This transformation was particularly striking in France, where so much of the intellectual, economic, and political life of the country was (and is) centered in Paris. Capital cities provide leadership because in them are found those members of society who are most qualified to generate and diffuse inventions: disproportionately large numbers of males, adults, and the “most active brains” of a society. Tarde held, somewhat tautologically, that the more hierarchical a society, the greater the social distance traveled by an imitation. Social distance, in turn, may be measured operationally by the number of social strata an imitation must cross before reaching a society’s lowest sectors. Introducing the principle that people imitate the socially “closest” models, Tarde could then define a society as democratic when its lowest members could directly imitate the highest stratum without waiting for intermediary strata to transmit imitations. This view of democracy was at odds with the conception of writers like de Tocqueville, who preferred to view democracies as societies where nobilities and cities of more stratified periods are replaced by the majority of the population. As each man grows less sure of his own superiority, he will be increasingly influenced by the force of numbers in arriving at a decision. “Eighty thousand Frenchmen can’t be wrong,” was the logical conclusion to be drawn from such reasoning. But Tarde, reflecting his own aristocratic background and his emphasis on the utility of the concept of imitation, stressed that any belief held by such a large number of individuals as the majority in any society must be the inevitable product of massive imitation. Even the cherished democratic concept of equality, as Tarde delighted to recall, was of aristocratic origin: it developed with the continual interaction among members of the royal court despite opposition there by some who vehemently repulsed the pretensions of the lower nobility. 48 Thus it was virtually impossible for Tarde to conceive of a nonstratified society. Even while recognizing that social superiors might imitate social inferiors, he maintained that this was the exception; the law of imitation from superior to inferior generally held. Nevertheless, this law did not contradict another holding that logically superior inventions replaced inferior ones, regardless of the social origins of the inventor. Tarde’s reconciliation of these two laws took the form of a principle that has since had wide currency: when introduced by social inferiors, the best new ideas may not be imitated immediately, but if the leading strata merit their position, they will soon espouse them. Whereupon, having been legitimated by the elite, the new ideas will be imitated throughout the

likely it is to be imitated. 41 A new type of horsedrawn cart is not likely to be imitated by a society that<br />

has not yet invented the wheel, any more than by another which makes widespread use of automobiles<br />

and railroad trains. The “extra-logical” form of the same law—the more an invention meets the<br />

predominant cultural emphasis, the more likely it is to be imitated—calls attention to such<br />

nontechnological factors as the relative cultural emphasis on novelty as opposed to tradition. 42<br />

Attention to these two contrasting emphases—the logical or the extra-logical—resulted in two<br />

corresponding types of laws. Concern with the logical aspects of invention and imitation moved<br />

Tarde to distinguish inventions that could be used as substitutes for one another from those that could<br />

be accumulated without displacing others. When two substitutable inventions compete—contrasting<br />

linguistic expressions, or forms of dress—the result is a “logical duel”; when two complementary<br />

inventions are brought together, the result is “logical union”—for example, the wheel and the<br />

domesticated animal in the horsedrawn cart. But even logically opposed inventions will not be forced<br />

into overt opposition with one another unless observers in the society around them point out their<br />

incompatibility; in the absence of such criticism, relatively incompatible inventions may very well<br />

coexist for some time. Eventually, however, their presence tends to generate what Tarde referred to,<br />

in a discussion in many ways similar to more recent ones dealing with “cognitive dissonance,” 43 as<br />

one of two basic types of “logical strain.” The second source of strain is in the absolute advance of<br />

knowledge, which would lead to increasing numbers of logical unions. To explain the source of this<br />

strain, Tarde does not rely on what more culturally-oriented social scientists might have posited—the<br />

incomplete attainment of a basic value favoring the increase of knowledge. On the contrary, his<br />

preference for “inter-mental” explanation becomes apparent. Both types of strains originate in a<br />

common source: the intensive interaction of minds, which leads to rapid circulation of ideas and to<br />

greater consistency of thought as well as a tendency toward the expansion of knowledge. 44 Thus,<br />

stated in propositional form, the more frequent the interaction in a society, the greater the strain<br />

toward consistency of thought, and the more rapid the growth of knowledge.<br />

But Tarde recognized that such a formulation is too simple. Ignoring cultural variables at outset he<br />

introduced them later. Societies, as well as historical periods, vary, he pointed out, in the relative<br />

emphasis that they place on consistency as opposed to inventiveness. He even suggests a cyclical<br />

pattern according to which societies would alternate between an emphasis first on inventiveness and<br />

then on consistency; when large numbers of inventions are being created, consistency is difficult to<br />

maintain, but over time efforts toward rationalization become increasingly essential. The nineteenth<br />

century, he suggests, was a century of massive invention, and perhaps the twentieth century would<br />

have to be devoted to rationalizing the discoveries of the nineteenth. As far as social thought is<br />

concerned, there seems to have been more than a grain of truth in this prediction, at least for the first<br />

half of the twentieth century.<br />

Turning to the “extra-logical” laws of imitation, we find one general principle underlying much of<br />

Tarde’s discussion: initially inventions tend to be imitated by those parts of man and society that are<br />

closest to the source of invention, from which they subsequently radiate outward to more distant<br />

parts. 45 While not explicitly stated, this principle lies behind Tarde’s otherwise less than obvious law<br />

that imitations spread “from the inner to the outer man.” Nowhere is his general preference for<br />

intellectual over material causes more apparent than in the propositions deriving from this law. 46<br />

Tarde posits that ideas are communicated before their material expressions; religious dogmas are<br />

transmitted before the associated rites; ends are disseminated before the means to their attainment;<br />

general ideas are accepted before they receive juridical or legislative support. In this series of

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