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aspects of invention and, at some points, its “essentially deductive character.” 35 Inventions derive largely from conscious volition of the inventor, and occasionally may even follow, he suggested, from a syllogistic sort of reasoning: (1) the inventor recognizes a particular goal as desirable; (2) he seeks to achieve the goal with existing means, but if these are for some reason insufficient, he (3) affirms the necessity for such action as can generate a new means by which the goal can be attained. To generate sufficient means, he seeks to create an appropriate invention. But while this conscious, goal-seeking model offered a partial explanation of invention, Tarde was quick to assert the necessity of additional factors, for example, the creative inspiration of various emotions and moods which an inventor would experience at different times. And in contrast to the more rational bent of certain late nineteenth-century sociologists like Weber or Durkheim (here, once again, his indebtedness to the tradition of Spontaneity was apparent), he felt that the unconscious part of the mind, or the “sub-self,” could break through into consciousness as a source of creative inspiration. Bordering on the physiological, Tarde further pointed out an apparent overlap between the ages of greatest intellectual as well as sexual creativity: the years from about twenty-five to thirty-five. Many of his examples supporting this generalization were drawn from the natural sciences, and, indeed, subsequent more systematic studies have shown these years to be the period of greatest creativity for many of the natural sciences—although this is not the case for all fields. 36 While stressing the “external” factors producing invention, Tarde nevertheless was more careful than many social scientists of his time in calling attention to the “internal” factors of intellectual development. 37 He formulated two basic principles in this area. The first, the principle of accumulation, emphasized the essentially cumulative character of all knowledge: new discoveries do not simply replace older ones (although they may in terms of technological use, they do not from the standpoint of intellectual development); there is continual addition to the legacy of la connaissance humaine. Knowledge may grow at different rates in varying periods and societies, but the overall tendency is toward progressive accumulation of knowledge in virtually all areas. Related to the principle of accumulation is that of irreversibility. The growth of some types of knowledge may take place in essentially random order; there is no logical necessity, for example, to explore one part of an uncharted territory before other parts. But in other cases, certain inventions presuppose certain others: a cart, for example, can be created only after wheels are available. Knowledge, Tarde stressed, advances in small increments, and even the most creative discoveries are heavily dependent on antecedent ideas. The most outstanding inventions are those which recombine already acquired bits of knowledge into highly original syntheses. But although the general lines of intellectual development are governed by the dual principles of accumulation and irreversibility, the specific directions as well as the rate of advance are heavily dependent on psychological and social factors. Social stratification, in Tarde’s eyes, was functional to invention because it produced greater leisure time for the upper classes, thereby allowing greater communication and social interaction within the elite; and with this increasing density of stimulating contacts and increasing exchange of ideas, correspondingly greater numbers of creative discoveries would emerge. A certain minimal rigidity of class lines also insulates the elite from the inhibiting ideas of the populace; if leaders are forced to submit to opinions of the majority at every turn—and here Tarde cited the dysfunctional consequences of democracy as detailed by de Tocqueville—they will not be free to invent. Social stratification can thus favor discovery in the same way that university structures guarantee a certain minimum of academic freedom for those working inside them. In addition to class differences, national differences in inventiveness are also evident, Tarde

stressed. But in contrast to certain of his contemporaries—most especially the English followers of Galton—Tarde did not have recourse to racial explanations for national differences. The most striking variations across countries were the result of different combinations of educational and intellectual structures that facilitated or hampered inventiveness. On a methodological level he pointed out that to measure national differences appropriately it was essential not to compare gross indicators reflecting the diffusion of inventions, such as economic output, or the large-scale production of recent inventions. One should compare indicators directly tapping inventiveness, such as patent licenses or the inventions exhibited at an international fair. 38 The factors generating national differences in inventiveness are many and complex, but in isolation we find one structural factor which neatly arose from Tarde’s general system with its stress on communication as an antecedent to invention: the greater the isolation, ceteris paribus, the lower the inventiveness. 39 Such ancient preliterate societies as those in Oceania, Tarde reasoned, had been held back because of their extreme geographical and social isolation, while in the same years the societies bordering on Mesopotamia rapidly developed inventions through a more dense network of communications. The same principle of social isolation is thus applicable both to individuals and to social groups. Different cultural values, Tarde pointed out, also predispose societies toward different rates and types of inventiveness. The values structure the goals of individual actors within each society, emphasizing some types of activities over others. Due to their higher cultural evaluation, certain types of activities attract more and better qualified persons, with the inevitable result of greater inventiveness in these culturally preferred areas. At first glance it might appear that societies with a greater stress on economic advancement would generate more inventions than other societies where the satisfaction of immediate desires represent a higher cultural goal. But the same invention, Tarde emphasized, can sometimes result from quite diverse goals. The Spanish and Portuguese, for example, were often successful discoverers of new lands, not because they sought simply commercial gain or religious conversion—the major goals of British and Dutch exploration—but also because they were motivated by a spirit of lusty and passionate conquest. As a consequence, their discoveries were often more spectacular. A cultural propensity toward immediate gratification, combined with adventurousness, can generate invention by leaving a greater role to chance—not entirely random chance, which always has some role, but a more structured sort of calculated risk, which, in some cases, has an enormous pay-off, such as in the discovery of America. Imitation.—Some inventions or discoveries—such as America—are more easily accepted than others. Tarde, given the structure of his system, preferred to think in terms of the “imitation” instead of the “acceptance” of inventions. As one of the three central processes of his system, imitation implied a much broader concept than mere acceptance. In his volume The Laws of Imitation, Tarde offered no explicit definition of the term, and when in the preface to the second edition he stated that he referred to a “quasi-photographic reproduction of a cerebral image,” he did not greatly clarify matters. 40 But here, as in many other instances, we can best learn from Tarde not by criticizing his lack of precision but by seeking out his insights. One of the most fundamental “laws of imitation” was that the more similar are inventions to those already imitated and hence institutionalized in a particular social system, the more likely they are to be imitated. Restated as what Tarde referred to as a “logical law of imitation”—in which the rational-logical aspects of imitation were emphasized—this general idea led to the principle that the closer a particular invention is to the most advanced technological aspects of a society, the more

stressed. But in contrast to certain of his contemporaries—most especially the English followers of<br />

Galton—Tarde did not have recourse to racial explanations for national differences. The most striking<br />

variations across countries were the result of different combinations of educational and intellectual<br />

structures that facilitated or hampered inventiveness. On a methodological level he pointed out that to<br />

measure national differences appropriately it was essential not to compare gross indicators reflecting<br />

the diffusion of inventions, such as economic output, or the large-scale production of recent<br />

inventions. One should compare indicators directly tapping inventiveness, such as patent licenses or<br />

the inventions exhibited at an international fair. 38<br />

The factors generating national differences in inventiveness are many and complex, but in isolation<br />

we find one structural factor which neatly arose from Tarde’s general system with its stress on<br />

communication as an antecedent to invention: the greater the isolation, ceteris paribus, the lower the<br />

inventiveness. 39 Such ancient preliterate societies as those in Oceania, Tarde reasoned, had been held<br />

back because of their extreme geographical and social isolation, while in the same years the societies<br />

bordering on Mesopotamia rapidly developed inventions through a more dense network of<br />

communications. The same principle of social isolation is thus applicable both to individuals and to<br />

social groups.<br />

Different cultural values, Tarde pointed out, also predispose societies toward different rates and<br />

types of inventiveness. The values structure the goals of individual actors within each society,<br />

emphasizing some types of activities over others. Due to their higher cultural evaluation, certain types<br />

of activities attract more and better qualified persons, with the inevitable result of greater<br />

inventiveness in these culturally preferred areas. At first glance it might appear that societies with a<br />

greater stress on economic advancement would generate more inventions than other societies where<br />

the satisfaction of immediate desires represent a higher cultural goal. But the same invention, Tarde<br />

emphasized, can sometimes result from quite diverse goals. The Spanish and Portuguese, for example,<br />

were often successful discoverers of new lands, not because they sought simply commercial gain or<br />

religious conversion—the major goals of British and Dutch exploration—but also because they were<br />

motivated by a spirit of lusty and passionate conquest. As a consequence, their discoveries were<br />

often more spectacular. A cultural propensity toward immediate gratification, combined with<br />

adventurousness, can generate invention by leaving a greater role to chance—not entirely random<br />

chance, which always has some role, but a more structured sort of calculated risk, which, in some<br />

cases, has an enormous pay-off, such as in the discovery of America.<br />

Imitation.—Some inventions or discoveries—such as America—are more easily accepted than<br />

others. Tarde, given the structure of his system, preferred to think in terms of the “imitation” instead of<br />

the “acceptance” of inventions. As one of the three central processes of his system, imitation implied<br />

a much broader concept than mere acceptance. In his volume The Laws of Imitation, Tarde offered no<br />

explicit definition of the term, and when in the preface to the second edition he stated that he referred<br />

to a “quasi-photographic reproduction of a cerebral image,” he did not greatly clarify matters. 40 But<br />

here, as in many other instances, we can best learn from Tarde not by criticizing his lack of precision<br />

but by seeking out his insights.<br />

One of the most fundamental “laws of imitation” was that the more similar are inventions to those<br />

already imitated and hence institutionalized in a particular social system, the more likely they are to<br />

be imitated. Restated as what Tarde referred to as a “logical law of imitation”—in which the<br />

rational-logical aspects of imitation were emphasized—this general idea led to the principle that the<br />

closer a particular invention is to the most advanced technological aspects of a society, the more

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