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—when this aberration triumphs, is it surprising that crimes, suicides, insanity, sword-thrusts of the struggle for life, should multiply? Again, how is it that this cause of depravation has not been more fruitful? Suppose that in some period of the past a similar doctrine had been spread about, legitimating the right of force, justifying the “claims” of highway robbers and the “propaganda through action” of assassins, and just imagine the trail of murders and pillaging that would have filled and dishonored our annals! Make another hypothesis, somewhat related to the preceding one. Ask yourself what would have happened in the past if the criminal justice of the ancien régime, instead of being ferociously savage, had been as paternalistic, as lenient as our own. Because here is still another cause of criminality that I have not yet talked about, which is not at all insignificant—with all due respect for the Italian criminologist who excludes it from his list of “factors of delinquency.” We all know, however, to what degree intimidation from fear of punishment is effective, especially among youths and children. Hence it is natural that with the progress of judiciary indulgence—and there is abundant proof of indulgence of judges and juries alike—youthful criminality grows even faster than that of adults. True, to this it is objected: “Is not this mollifying indulgence itself a symptom of increasing immorality?” No, say rather that it is the very expression of the Duty which gains credence as a logical consequence of the uncertainty of principles, thus of the contradiction of principles. Severity in a skeptic would be immoral and unnatural; legitimately it falls only to a man of faith to condemn to death. Indulgence is the moral grace of skepticism, no matter how pernicious its social effects from the standpoint of utility. Thus the same cause, doctrinal contradiction, favors both the multiplication of delinquency and the reduction of punishment. In the face of all this, how can you be surprised at the advance of criminality? It would be no paradox to maintain that even the increase in homicides in these conditions testifies by its slowness to the real and increased gentleness of our morality. There is nothing more formidable for a society than a general change of credo, and we must marvel that this is even possible. 15 One must pity a poor teacher in charge of giving a course on ethics at such a time. What ethics do you want him to teach? There are at least two clearly contradictory sets present: the ethics of war and those of love. Should he be inspired by one or by the other or by both indiscriminantly? Will he add the incoherence of his own precepts to that of existing examples in order to further confuse his pupils’ consciences? Happy the school teacher in those times and countries where everyone, despite doctrinal differences, is in agreement that one Book—the Bible, the Gospel, the Koran—be regarded as the treasury of truth; he has this book read to the children, and all is said. But what is our sacred book? Not even the penal code. It leads one to think that the less talk of morals to school children, the better it will be for their morality. Ethics are a little like orthography, about which it is dangerous to reason. When someone undertakes to change spelling, he quickly perceives the impossibility of a limited and truly practical reform. Once started on this course, one is pushed much farther than intended, as if by a spring, and comes up against the problem, logically insoluble, of a rational spelling. Ethics also has archaisms and oddities, which are as respectable as they are cumbersome, its useless letters, which must be maintained until it becomes impossible to do so. I know very well that in the social world, as in the universe as a whole, there are a host of apparently insoluble problems which end up by solving themselves. Some time ago, Mr. Berthelot wrote about chemistry and crystallography as follows: 16 “Organic nature, as well as mineral nature, operates like human industry, by which I mean that it harmonizes irreconcilable effects in absolute geometry. These approximate arrangements yield different degrees and multiple solutions in the series of crystals as well as in the series of living beings.” And recalling that he was a statesman, he added:
“This is also the necessary rule for human societies.” There is nothing sounder than this view; social logic excels at these harmonies of antinomies, the squaring of the circle, which individual logic judges absurd. Religions and factions, sects and philosophies, races and classes—no matter how irreconcilable all these adversaries, it is only a game for social logic to make them embrace each other. What is needed for this? The apparition of a great man or a great idea which touches our heart; an apparition followed by a great emotion. When a star of the first magnitude rises before the nervous, discouraged, broken-down little Frenchman, the energy of the great days will reappear, the law of Duty will be known again, and all the difficulties of Reason will vanish. But where do we see shining this great collective goal capable of raising up all souls? This is the stumbling block of a civic ethics at the present time in our history. The strength that patriotism lends to ethics might be sufficient in the small republics of antiquity because the walls of the city were dearer to their citizens than the frontiers of our modern states are to ours. Hence the purely civic education of the Spartans and the Athenians, of the early Romans, gave results with which we ourselves could not be content and in which we could not take pride in our time of imperceptibly emerging international federation. Yet it is certain that even in its modern form, considerably broadened and toned down, patriotism is capable of being highly moralizing when the country is progressing, gaining greater prosperity, and when the prospect of its future success, population, wealth, and great strength electrifies the citizens. But when it seems that the hour of fatal decline has struck, what good is it to try, so why should one? Discouragement takes hold of every heart. The fact is that in its greatest difficulties the city of antiquity remained not only dear to its children like the country of today but also capable of rising again through their own sufficiently devoted efforts, whereas the defeat of modern states in the battle of European life, whether peaceful or bellicose, seems somehow impersonal and predetermined, like the movement of stars. We see, for example, that our population is going to decrease and we suffer from this, but can the individual efforts of each of us noticeably impede this current? We can do so little! By marrying young and having many children we shall be working for posterity or the prosperity of our families, for which we have sacrificed our personal well-being; but to us the service we might render our country appears infinitesimal and an inadequate recompense for our sacrifice. This is true in appearance at least; but we are wrong, nonetheless, to forget about the dissemination of our example through each of our acts and its unperceived social effectiveness, often of long duration. It seems, therefore, that in the present situation the morality of the French would gain by leaning more heavily on family sentiment; but unfortunately this sentiment is declining even faster than patriotism, though for a very different reason. Patriotism is subsiding because the patriotic future appears—now, and falsely, I believe— discouraging; family feeling is waning because both the individualism and the increasing socialization of contemporary life are killing it. Is it true, then, that we do not know what to base Duty on? Religion, country, family—everything— is on the way out? Not at all. Say, rather, that everything is being transformed. And who knows but we are approaching the time when the true and powerful major attraction will be not the absorption, but the sublimation of all this into a higher federalism, where it will be rejuvenated and reforged into that transcendant and international patriotism which, in the highest levels of modern nations, tends to become the dominant feeling and is perhaps destined to replace “the immense hope” of the past? There is something in the cult and the love of our European civilization to propagate, spread, purify, establish peacefully, something that is really more attractive and fascinating than the socialist ideal, which will, I hope, have served to pave the way. I shall stop here. I have already, kind sir, abused the hospitality you offered me, and for which I
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“This is also the necessary rule for human societies.” There is nothing sounder than this view; social<br />
logic excels at these harmonies of antinomies, the squaring of the circle, which individual logic<br />
judges absurd. Religions and factions, sects and philosophies, races and classes—no matter how<br />
irreconcilable all these adversaries, it is only a game for social logic to make them embrace each<br />
other. What is needed for this? The apparition of a great man or a great idea which touches our heart;<br />
an apparition followed by a great emotion. When a star of the first magnitude rises before the<br />
nervous, discouraged, broken-down little Frenchman, the energy of the great days will reappear, the<br />
law of Duty will be known again, and all the difficulties of Reason will vanish.<br />
But where do we see shining this great collective goal capable of raising up all souls? This is the<br />
stumbling block of a civic ethics at the present time in our history. The strength that patriotism lends to<br />
ethics might be sufficient in the small republics of antiquity because the walls of the city were dearer<br />
to their citizens than the frontiers of our modern states are to ours. Hence the purely civic education of<br />
the Spartans and the Athenians, of the early Romans, gave results with which we ourselves could not<br />
be content and in which we could not take pride in our time of imperceptibly emerging international<br />
federation. Yet it is certain that even in its modern form, considerably broadened and toned down,<br />
patriotism is capable of being highly moralizing when the country is progressing, gaining greater<br />
prosperity, and when the prospect of its future success, population, wealth, and great strength<br />
electrifies the citizens. But when it seems that the hour of fatal decline has struck, what good is it to<br />
try, so why should one? Discouragement takes hold of every heart.<br />
The fact is that in its greatest difficulties the city of antiquity remained not only dear to its children<br />
like the country of today but also capable of rising again through their own sufficiently devoted<br />
efforts, whereas the defeat of modern states in the battle of European life, whether peaceful or<br />
bellicose, seems somehow impersonal and predetermined, like the movement of stars. We see, for<br />
example, that our population is going to decrease and we suffer from this, but can the individual<br />
efforts of each of us noticeably impede this current? We can do so little! By marrying young and<br />
having many children we shall be working for posterity or the prosperity of our families, for which<br />
we have sacrificed our personal well-being; but to us the service we might render our country<br />
appears infinitesimal and an inadequate recompense for our sacrifice. This is true in appearance at<br />
least; but we are wrong, nonetheless, to forget about the dissemination of our example through each of<br />
our acts and its unperceived social effectiveness, often of long duration. It seems, therefore, that in the<br />
present situation the morality of the French would gain by leaning more heavily on family sentiment;<br />
but unfortunately this sentiment is declining even faster than patriotism, though for a very different<br />
reason. Patriotism is subsiding because the patriotic future appears—now, and falsely, I believe—<br />
discouraging; family feeling is waning because both the individualism and the increasing socialization<br />
of contemporary life are killing it.<br />
Is it true, then, that we do not know what to base Duty on? Religion, country, family—everything—<br />
is on the way out? Not at all. Say, rather, that everything is being transformed. And who knows but we<br />
are approaching the time when the true and powerful major attraction will be not the absorption, but<br />
the sublimation of all this into a higher federalism, where it will be rejuvenated and reforged into that<br />
transcendant and international patriotism which, in the highest levels of modern nations, tends to<br />
become the dominant feeling and is perhaps destined to replace “the immense hope” of the past?<br />
There is something in the cult and the love of our European civilization to propagate, spread, purify,<br />
establish peacefully, something that is really more attractive and fascinating than the socialist ideal,<br />
which will, I hope, have served to pave the way.<br />
I shall stop here. I have already, kind sir, abused the hospitality you offered me, and for which I
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