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only a commercial treaty, or a new discovery, or a political revolution, events which make certain luxuries and powers, which had before been reserved for the privileged ones of fortune or intellect, accessible to those possessing thinner purses or fewer abilities, to convert it into actual energy. This potential energy, then, is of great importance, and it would be well to bear its fluctuations in mind. And yet ordinary statistics seem to pay no attention to this force. The labour of making an approximate esimate of it would seem ridiculous, although it might be done by many indirect methods and might at times be of advantage to Statistics. In this respect, archaeology is superior in the information which it gives us about buried societies; for although it may teach us less about their activities in point of detail and precision, it pictures their aspirations more faithfully. A Pompeiian fresco reveals the psychological condition of a provincial town under the Roman Empire much more clearly than all the statistical volumes of one of the principal places of a French department can tell us about the actual wishes of its inhabitants. Let me add that Statistics is of such recent origin that it has not yet shot out all its branches, whereas its older collaborator has ramified in all directions. There is an archaeology of language, comparative philology, which draws up separate monographs for us of the life of every root from its accidental origin in the mouth of some ancient speaker through its endless reproductions and multiplications by means of the remarkable uniformity of innumerable generations of men. There is in archaeology of religion, comparative mythology, which deals separately with every myth and with its endless imitative editions, just as philology treats every word. There is an archaeology of law, of politics, of ethnology, and, finally, of art and industry. They likewise devote a separate treatise to every legal idea or fiction, to every custom or institution, to every type or creation of art, to every industrial process, and, in addition, to the power of reproduction by example which is peculiar to each of these things. And we have a corresponding number of distinct and flourishing sciences. But, hitherto, in the matter of truly and exclusively sociological statistics, we have had to be content with statistics of commerce and industry, and with judicial statistics, not to speak of certain hybrid statistics which straddle both the physiological and the social worlds, statistics of population, of births, marriages, deaths, medical statistics, etc. In tables of election figures we have merely the germ of political statistics. As to religious statistics, which should give us a graphic representation of the relative annual spread of different sects and of the thermometric variations, so to speak, in the faith of their adherents; as to linguistic statistics, which should figure for us not only upon the comparative expansion of different idioms, but upon the vogue or decline, in each one of them, of every vocable, of every form of speech, I fear that, if I should say anything more about these hypothetical sciences, I might bring a smile to the lips of my readers. . . . If this point of view is correct, if it is really the fittest from which to elucidate social events on their regular, numerable, and measurable sides, it follows that Statistics should adopt it, not partially and unconsciously, but knowingly and unreservedly, and thus, like archaeology, be spared many fruitless investigations and tribulations. I will enumerate the principal consequences that would result from this. In the first place, sociological Statistics, having acquired a touchstone for the knowledge of what did and what did not belong to it, and having become convinced that the immense field of human imitation, and only that field, was its exclusive possession, would leave to naturalists the care of tabulating statistics so purely anthropological in their results as, for example, the statistics of exemption from military service in the different departments of France, or the task of constructing tables of mortality (I do not include tables of birth rates, for, in this case, example is a powerful factor in restraining or stimulating racial fecundity). This is pure biology, just as much as the use of Mr. Marey’s graphical method, or as the observation of disease through the myograph and
sphgymograph and pneumograph, mechanical statisticians, so to speak, of contractions and pulsations and respiratory movements. In the second place, the sociological statistician would never forget that his proper task was the measurement of specific beliefs and desires and the use of the most direct methods to grasp these elusive quantities, and that an enumeration of acts which resembled each other as much as possible (a condition which is badly fulfilled by criminal statistics among others), and, failing this, an enumeration of like products, of articles of commerce, for example, should always relate to the following, or, rather, to the two following ends: (1) through the tabulation of acts or products to trace out the curve of the successive increases, standstills, or decreases in every new or old want and in every new or old idea, as it spreads out and consolidates itself or as it is crushed back and uprooted; (2) through a skilful comparison between series that have been obtained in this way, and through emphasising their concomitant variations, to denote the various aids and hindrances which these different imitative propagations or consolidations of wants and ideas lend or oppose to one another (according to the varying degrees in which the more or less numerous and implicit propositions of which they always consist, more or less endorse or contradict one another). Nor should the sociological statistician neglect the influence, in these matters, of sex, age, temperament, climate, and seasons, natural causes whose force is measured, at any rate when it exists, by physical or biological statistics. In other words, sociological statistics have: (1) to determine the imitative power which inheres in every invention at any given time and place; (2) to demonstrate the beneficial or harmful effects which result from the imitation of given inventions and, consequently, to influence those who are acquainted with such numerical results, in their tendencies towards following or disregarding the examples in question. In brief, the entire object of this kind of research is the knowledge and control of imitations. . . . When the field of sociological statistics has been clearly defined, when the curves relating to the propagation, that is to say, to the consolidation as well, of every special want and opinion, for a certain number of years and over a certain stretch of country, have been plainly traced, the interpretation of these hieroglyphic curves, curves that are at times as strange and picturesque as mountain profiles, more often as sinuous and graceful as living forms, has still to be made. I am very much mistaken if our point of view will not prove very helpful here. The lines in question are always ascending or horizontal or descending, or, if they are irregular, they can always be decomposed in the same way into three kinds of linear elements, into inclines, plateaux, and declines. According to Quételet and his school, the plateaux would belong preeminently to the satistician; their discovery should be his finest triumph and the constant object of his ambition. According to this view, the most fitting foundation for a social physics would be the uniform reproduction, during a considerable period, of the same number, not only of births and marriages, but also of crimes and litigations. Hence the error (it no longer exists, to be sure, thanks, especially, to recent official statistics concerning the progressive criminality of the last half-century), of thinking that the latter figures have, in reality, been uniformly reproduced. But if the reader has taken the trouble to follow me, he will realise that, without detracting at all from the importance of the horizontal lines, the ascending lines, indicating as they do the regular spread of some kind of imitation, have a far higher theoretical value. The reason is this: The fact that a new taste or idea has taken root in a mind which is constituted in a certain fashion carries with it no reason why this innovation should not spread more or less rapidly through an indefinite number of supposedly like minds in communication with one another. It would spread instantaneously through all these minds if they were absolutely alike and if their intercommunication
- Page 70 and 71: After this admittedly incomplete in
- Page 72 and 73: We should note that matriarchy is e
- Page 74 and 75: of the tribes, then of the cities o
- Page 76 and 77: Lecture by Mr. Durkheim 4 A DEBATE
- Page 78 and 79: The third session, presided over by
- Page 80 and 81: 5 BASIC PRINCIPLES *1 1902 Let us b
- Page 82 and 83: epetition is their common tendency,
- Page 84 and 85: I 6 INVENTION *1 1902 However dange
- Page 86 and 87: shown by World Fairs, where the ind
- Page 88 and 89: and churchmen often did likewise. I
- Page 90 and 91: Imagine the effect produced by that
- Page 92 and 93: 7 OPPOSITION *1 1898 Let us, first
- Page 94 and 95: he has in his thoughts, at the same
- Page 96 and 97: Fortunately, the truth is not so sa
- Page 98 and 99: III. The Laws of Imitation
- Page 100 and 101: comes to him and then another until
- Page 102 and 103: and one of which is crowded back by
- Page 104 and 105: 9 EXTRA-LOGICAL LAWS OF IMITATION *
- Page 106 and 107: 10 PROCESSES OF IMITATION *1 1890 A
- Page 108 and 109: IV. Personality and Attitude Measur
- Page 110 and 111: aspect of effort is desire, and tha
- Page 112 and 113: like the solidification of liquids,
- Page 114 and 115: evolution which is the inverse of t
- Page 116 and 117: V. Methodology, Methods, and Quanti
- Page 118 and 119: the charm of theory? If history is
- Page 122 and 123: were perfect. It is this ideal, an
- Page 124 and 125: 13 QUANTIFICATION AND SOCIAL INDICA
- Page 126 and 127: auditory or motor. In an overexcite
- Page 128 and 129: certain records or by the practical
- Page 130 and 131: consolation, but is it a matter of
- Page 132 and 133: eally a pure accident in the course
- Page 134 and 135: VI. Social Stratification
- Page 136 and 137: Will not a time come when, although
- Page 138 and 139: VII. Social Control and Deviance
- Page 140 and 141: And what crimes are involved! Mr. G
- Page 142 and 143: with our subject? To read certain s
- Page 144 and 145: satisfaction in a select and health
- Page 146 and 147: —when this aberration triumphs, i
- Page 148 and 149: thank you.
- Page 150 and 151: 16 THE PUBLIC AND THE CROWD *1 1901
- Page 152 and 153: past; after the family it is the ol
- Page 154 and 155: simple epiphenomenon, in itself ine
- Page 156 and 157: of more than these two categories.
- Page 158 and 159: sorrow, with conviction or with pas
- Page 160 and 161: Opinion 17 OPINION AND CONVERSATION
- Page 162 and 163: press of our own time, and at all t
- Page 164 and 165: privileged groups, a court, a parli
- Page 166 and 167: efore this aesthetic flower of civi
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only a commercial treaty, or a new discovery, or a political revolution, events which make certain<br />
luxuries and powers, which had before been reserved for the privileged ones of fortune or intellect,<br />
accessible to those possessing thinner purses or fewer abilities, to convert it into actual energy. This<br />
potential energy, then, is of great importance, and it would be well to bear its fluctuations in mind.<br />
And yet ordinary statistics seem to pay no attention to this force. The labour of making an<br />
approximate esimate of it would seem ridiculous, although it might be done by many indirect methods<br />
and might at times be of advantage to Statistics. In this respect, archaeology is superior in the<br />
information which it gives us about buried societies; for although it may teach us less about their<br />
activities in point of detail and precision, it pictures their aspirations more faithfully. A Pompeiian<br />
fresco reveals the psychological condition of a provincial town under the Roman Empire much more<br />
clearly than all the statistical volumes of one of the principal places of a French department can tell<br />
us about the actual wishes of its inhabitants.<br />
Let me add that Statistics is of such recent origin that it has not yet shot out all its branches,<br />
whereas its older collaborator has ramified in all directions. There is an archaeology of language,<br />
comparative philology, which draws up separate monographs for us of the life of every root from its<br />
accidental origin in the mouth of some ancient speaker through its endless reproductions and<br />
multiplications by means of the remarkable uniformity of innumerable generations of men. There is in<br />
archaeology of religion, comparative mythology, which deals separately with every myth and with its<br />
endless imitative editions, just as philology treats every word. There is an archaeology of law, of<br />
politics, of ethnology, and, finally, of art and industry. They likewise devote a separate treatise to<br />
every legal idea or fiction, to every custom or institution, to every type or creation of art, to every<br />
industrial process, and, in addition, to the power of reproduction by example which is peculiar to<br />
each of these things. And we have a corresponding number of distinct and flourishing sciences. But,<br />
hitherto, in the matter of truly and exclusively sociological statistics, we have had to be content with<br />
statistics of commerce and industry, and with judicial statistics, not to speak of certain hybrid<br />
statistics which straddle both the physiological and the social worlds, statistics of population, of<br />
births, marriages, deaths, medical statistics, etc. In tables of election figures we have merely the germ<br />
of political statistics. As to religious statistics, which should give us a graphic representation of the<br />
relative annual spread of different sects and of the thermometric variations, so to speak, in the faith of<br />
their adherents; as to linguistic statistics, which should figure for us not only upon the comparative<br />
expansion of different idioms, but upon the vogue or decline, in each one of them, of every vocable,<br />
of every form of speech, I fear that, if I should say anything more about these hypothetical sciences, I<br />
might bring a smile to the lips of my readers. . . .<br />
If this point of view is correct, if it is really the fittest from which to elucidate social events on<br />
their regular, numerable, and measurable sides, it follows that Statistics should adopt it, not partially<br />
and unconsciously, but knowingly and unreservedly, and thus, like archaeology, be spared many<br />
fruitless investigations and tribulations. I will enumerate the principal consequences that would result<br />
from this. In the first place, sociological Statistics, having acquired a touchstone for the knowledge of<br />
what did and what did not belong to it, and having become convinced that the immense field of human<br />
imitation, and only that field, was its exclusive possession, would leave to naturalists the care of<br />
tabulating statistics so purely anthropological in their results as, for example, the statistics of<br />
exemption from military service in the different departments of France, or the task of constructing<br />
tables of mortality (I do not include tables of birth rates, for, in this case, example is a powerful<br />
factor in restraining or stimulating racial fecundity). This is pure biology, just as much as the use of<br />
Mr. Marey’s graphical method, or as the observation of disease through the myograph and