trend toward intelligence-led law enforcement. Yet there is still a gap between the prevalence and sophistication of criminal networks on the one side, and law enforcement networks on the other. Closing this gap and developing more-effective strategies to attack criminal networks has to be one of the priorities in government efforts to combat transnational organized crime in the 21st century. This requires changes in attitudes and ways of thinking, in organizational structures, and in the relationship between intelligence and action. Without these changes, criminal networks will continue to retain important advantages over those who are trying to combat them. 1 The author thanks John Picarelli, Bill Koenig, and Paul N. Woessner for a series of helpful discussions on the role of network analysis in intelligence; and Gregory O’Hayon, William Cook, Jeremy Kinsell, and Brian Joyce for their work at the University of Pittsburgh’s Ridgway Center in mapping Russian and other criminal networks. He also thanks the I2 Company for providing the software used for these activities. 2 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015 (Washington: National Intelligence Council, December 2000) p. 41. 3 For an excellent excerpt summarizing Cressey’s views, see Donald R. Cressey, “The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates,” in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds., Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective (London: Sage, 1997) pp. 3– 15, especially p. 3. 4 Francis J. Ianni, Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), and Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York: Appleton, Crofts, 1971). 5 Alan Block, East Side–West Side: Organizing Crime in New York 1939–1959 (Swansea U.K.: Christopher Davis, 1979). 6 Gary Potter, Criminal Organizations: Vice Racketeering and Politics in an American City (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1993), and James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, Russian Mafia in America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998). 7 Malcolm K. Sparrow, “The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the Prospects,” Social Networks, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1991, and “Network Vulnerabilities and Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1991. 8 See Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security,” Survival, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 96–113, and “The Nature of Drug Trafficking Networks,” Current History, Vol. 97, No. 618 (April 1998) pp. 154–159. 9 FBIS, “BKA Registers Less Damage Caused by Gangs,” Frankfurter Rundschau, July 13, 1998, p. 3. 10 Cyrille Fijnaut, Frank Bovenkerk, Gerben Bruinsma, and Henk van de Bunt, Organized Crime in the Netherlands (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) p. 27. 11 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 11–12. 12 Ibid. p. 8. 13 Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 14 See Alf Steinar Saetre and David V. Gibson, The Agile Network: A Model of Organizing for Optimal Responsiveness and Efficiency, www.utexas.edu/depts/ic2/aamrc/saetr-ex.html. 15 The analysis here and the discussion of bonding mechanisms rests heavily on Ianni, 1974, pp. 282–293. 16 See David Stark and Gernot Grabher, “Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network Analysis, and Postsocialist
Transformations,” in Stark and Grabher, eds., Restructuring Networks: Legacies, Linkages, and Localities in Postsocialism (New York and London: Oxford University Press, in press). 17 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78 (1973) pp. 1360–1380. 18 Ibid. and Burt, 1992. 19 Phil Williams, “Drug Trafficking Networks,” Current History (April 1998) pp. 154–159. 20 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St Martins, 1996) p. 84. 21 INS, “INS Busts Major Counterfeit Document Ring,” Press Release, May 21, 1998. 22 I am grateful to my colleague Professor Kevin Kearns of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, for bringing this term to my attention. 23 Burt, 1992. 24 Ibid. 25 See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents (New York: Basic Books, 1984) for a fuller analysis of tight and loose coupling. The quote is from p. 332. 26 See Tom Blickman, “The Rothschilds of the Mafia on Aruba,” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1997) pp. 50–89. The analysis in this paragraph draws heavily on this article. 27 Ibid. 28 Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada, 1998. 29 Yves Lavigne, Hell’s Angels (Secaucus N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1996) p. 68. 30 Dean E. Murphy, “Biker War Barrels Across Scandinavia: Swedish Legislator Campaigns to Evict Gangs After Rumbles Kill 6,” Los Angeles Times, August 1, 1996, p. A19. 31 INS Press Release, U.S. Dismantles Largest Global Alien Smuggling Cartel Encountered to Date, November 20, 1998. 32 This theme is developed in some very interesting ways by Sparrow, “Network Vulnerabilities and Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1991. Sparrow’s analysis provided both ideas and inspiration for this section. 33 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: <strong>RAND</strong>, 1997).
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The Future of Terror, Crime, and Mi
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To Dick O’Neill, for his stalwart
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Defense, the Joint Staff, the unifi
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Chapter Eight ACTIVISM, HACKTIVISM,
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must continue to keep an eye on the
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are deeply grate
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as a looming mode of military confl
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With respect to Serbia, then, a bet
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of any node included in it, may be
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more about technology than organiza
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charged with taking care of specifi
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The limits on some successes and th
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the rise of netwar should prompt a
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Brin, David, The Transparent Societ
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7 See, for example, Marshall McLuha
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investment, the standard of living
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Chapter Six EMERGENCE AND INFLUENCE
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hierarchical layer—at least initi
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Chiapas and Mexico City in “swarm
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Transnational NGO Mobilization—A
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Acting in tandem with these organiz
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only to the conflict in Chiapas but
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comment outside as well as inside M
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and political ideals and similar co
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Cleaver, Harry, “The Zapatista Ef
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Thomas, Hugh, Conquest: Montezuma,
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The success of that networking was
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outlining their strategies and tact
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conference, rather than the success
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vandalism and nearly all of the loo
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direct transmissions from roving in
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Network planned to shut down the WT
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gas was an attempt to expand and re
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Assistant Chief Joiner was turning
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The Black Bloc engaged in vandalism
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of the AFL-CIO retreat from downtow
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for the four hours that President C
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Around midnight, the disorder had d
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vandalism by anarchists, or a divid
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summer of 2001 in Genoa indicate th
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Chapter Eight ACTIVISM, HACKTIVISM,
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The following sections discuss and
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including Western news sites. In Ap
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devastation, the latter caused not
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Privacy Information Center (EPIC),
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open.” On the downside, some post
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independence, sustained air strikes
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about an esoteric bank regulation,
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generate so much traffic against th
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actions to defend against an attack
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on three continents. Chris Ellison,
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purpose is, NATO led by U.S.A. must
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eported intrusions from outsiders.
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In the 1980s, Barry Collin, a senio
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Cyberdefense The main effect of cyb
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policymakers. It supports both open
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37 Andrew Brown, “Editors Wanted,
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89 Amy Harmon, “‘Hacktivists’
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Chapter Nine THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIA
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enough expert agreement to support
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While the press often picks out an
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It is not only those famed as evang
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and united counteraction by the “
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ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONS The type of orga
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pass a bill to establish the Bounda
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Gerlach, Luther P. 1978. “The Gre
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Chapter Ten WHAT NEXT FOR NETWORKS
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and “have-nots” portends a new
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Classic studies concern topics like
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still do) as to precisely what is a
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also characterize some sprawling te
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speed. It shows that such a partner
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and social scenes of Medellin and C
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depend on the existence of shared p
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gas and clubs, another would move i
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from other interesting cases of net
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THE PRACTICE OF NETWAR (AND COUNTER
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But today’s concept of globalizat
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Figure 10.1—The Two Axes of Strat
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world today, we see little sustaine
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Carr, Edward Hallett, The Twenty Ye
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Kumar, Kuldeep, and Han G. van Diss
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Shaw, Marvin, Group Dynamics: The P
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22 From Dan Barry and Al Baker, “
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02, Central Intelligence Agency, De
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AFTERWORD (SEPTEMBER 2001): THE SHA
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was no doubt the bombing of the Kho
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Harper & Row, 1951. Johnson, Steven
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CONTRIBUTORS Paul de Armond is dire