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consulted include Florini (2000), Reinicke (1999– 2000), Gerlach, Palmer, and Stringer (2000), and Simmons (1998); Fukuyama and Wagner (2000) for a <strong>RAND</strong> research perspective; Chayes, Chayes, and Raach (1997) on conflict management situations; Metzl (1996) and Tuijl (1999) on human rights issues; and Carothers (1999–2000) and Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler (1998) for cautionary observations about expecting too much from global civil society.
AFTERWORD (SEPTEMBER 2001): THE SHARPENING FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE 1 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt Theory has struck home with a vengeance. The United States must now cope with an archetypal terrorist netwar of the worst kind. The same technology that aids social activists and those desiring the good of all is also available to those with the darkest intentions, bent on destruction and driven by a rage reminiscent of the Middle Ages. Soon after we put the finishing touches on this book, terrorists attacked New York and Washington. In doing so, they confirmed the warnings (in retrospect, too briefly stated) in Chapter Two that information-age terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda might pursue a war paradigm, developing capabilities to strike multiple targets from multiple directions, in swarming campaigns that extend beyond an incident or two. 2 And, as Chapter Two said was increasingly likely, these terrorists used Internet email and web sites for their communications, sometimes relying on encryption and steganography for security. The picture emerging of these terrorists’ network(s), although still obscure, also substantiates the analysis in Chapter Three, which discusses how criminal and other networks have cores and peripheries, with members playing varied, specialized roles. Chapter Three also explains how to attack such networks and their financial and other operations. Moreover, al-Qaeda and its affiliates resemble the SPINtype organization and dynamics illuminated in Chapter Nine. Finally, in Los Angeles, the terrorist events had the effect of mobilizing the innovative Terrorist Early Warning Group discussed in Chapter Four. 3 This book is suddenly much more pertinent than we had expected. 4 If Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network is the principal adversary—as seems likely, although other possibilities, including sponsorship by a rogue state like Iraq, cannot be discarded yet—then it may prove useful to view the network from the perspective of the five levels of theory and practice we elucidate in Chapter Ten (organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological, and social). 5 First, at the organizational level, we see a major confrontation between hierarchical/state and networked/nonstate actors. For the United States and its friends and allies, one challenge will be to learn to network better with each other. Some of this is already going on, in terms of intelligence sharing, but much more must be done to build a globally operational counter-terror network. A particular challenge for the cumbersome American bureaucracy will be to encourage deep, all-channel networking among the military, law enforcement, and intelligence elements whose collaboration is crucial for achieving success. U.S. agencies have been headed in this direction for years—in the areas of counter-narcotics as well as counterterrorism—but interagency rivalries and distrust have too often slowed progress. Regarding al-Qaeda, the organizational challenge seems to lie in determining whether
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The Future of Terror, Crime, and Mi
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To Dick O’Neill, for his stalwart
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Defense, the Joint Staff, the unifi
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Chapter Eight ACTIVISM, HACKTIVISM,
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must continue to keep an eye on the
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are deeply grate
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as a looming mode of military confl
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With respect to Serbia, then, a bet
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of any node included in it, may be
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more about technology than organiza
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charged with taking care of specifi
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The limits on some successes and th
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the rise of netwar should prompt a
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Brin, David, The Transparent Societ
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9 This is just a short exemplary st
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Chapter Two THE NETWORKING OF TERRO
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The Emergence of Networked Terroris
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integration of communication and co
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technologies such as encryption all
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(Hoffman, 1998, p. 131). Terrorists
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terrorists who rely on the Internet
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Future Developments in Information-
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Figure 2.1—Possible Shifts in the
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hire,” and the availability of ef
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www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.h
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Nohria, Nitin, and Robert Eccles, e
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Department of the Army, 1997. 19 Fo
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Chapter Three TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINA
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policymakers concerned with develop
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there are relatively strong, direct
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Other networks will have a more end
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network a capacity to operate with
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deals. The importance of these netw
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The specific connections that facil
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superiority—the equivalent of an
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was a fascinating mix. It included
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elationships between the Christian
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organizations have hierarchical str
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example, in identifying some of the
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provide an important value-added ap
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Transformations,” in Stark and Gr
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changes benefit from these new tech
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outside of the realm of true terror
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hardcore Category C nucleus. Catego
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millennialist cults and such transn
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For the most part, these gangs are
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attling gangs in Cape Town and the
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Colombian cartels, and the imprison
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unknown actors in Seattle and elsew
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esponse. Finally, TEW utilizes an
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23 Consider Japan’s intelligence
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Part II SOCIAL NETWARS
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Burma (a small, and to many, obscur
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Whereas McLuhan declared “the med
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years and fines of up to $5,000 for
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Massachusetts. The “selective pur
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central in using electronic communi
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THE FREE BURMA COALITION AND THE PE
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Students at Harvard tapped into the
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eleased a list of their suppliers f
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Simons was in his high school Amnes
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Case studies and an Internet activi
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when a campaign scores successes. T
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transmit, almost in real-time, debr
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warning was made virtually unanimou
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7 See, for example, Marshall McLuha
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investment, the standard of living
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Chapter Six EMERGENCE AND INFLUENCE
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hierarchical layer—at least initi
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Chiapas and Mexico City in “swarm
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Transnational NGO Mobilization—A
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Acting in tandem with these organiz
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only to the conflict in Chiapas but
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comment outside as well as inside M
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and political ideals and similar co
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Cleaver, Harry, “The Zapatista Ef
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Thomas, Hugh, Conquest: Montezuma,
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The success of that networking was
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outlining their strategies and tact
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conference, rather than the success
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vandalism and nearly all of the loo
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direct transmissions from roving in
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Network planned to shut down the WT
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gas was an attempt to expand and re
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Assistant Chief Joiner was turning
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The Black Bloc engaged in vandalism
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of the AFL-CIO retreat from downtow
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for the four hours that President C
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Around midnight, the disorder had d
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vandalism by anarchists, or a divid
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summer of 2001 in Genoa indicate th
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Chapter Eight ACTIVISM, HACKTIVISM,
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The following sections discuss and
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including Western news sites. In Ap
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devastation, the latter caused not
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Privacy Information Center (EPIC),
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open.” On the downside, some post
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independence, sustained air strikes
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about an esoteric bank regulation,
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generate so much traffic against th
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actions to defend against an attack
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on three continents. Chris Ellison,
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purpose is, NATO led by U.S.A. must
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eported intrusions from outsiders.
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In the 1980s, Barry Collin, a senio
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Cyberdefense The main effect of cyb
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policymakers. It supports both open
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37 Andrew Brown, “Editors Wanted,
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89 Amy Harmon, “‘Hacktivists’
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Chapter Nine THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIA
Page 223 and 224: enough expert agreement to support
Page 225 and 226: While the press often picks out an
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Page 231 and 232: ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONS The type of orga
Page 233 and 234: pass a bill to establish the Bounda
Page 235 and 236: Gerlach, Luther P. 1978. “The Gre
Page 237 and 238: Chapter Ten WHAT NEXT FOR NETWORKS
Page 239 and 240: and “have-nots” portends a new
Page 241 and 242: Classic studies concern topics like
Page 243 and 244: still do) as to precisely what is a
Page 245 and 246: also characterize some sprawling te
Page 247 and 248: speed. It shows that such a partner
Page 249 and 250: and social scenes of Medellin and C
Page 251 and 252: depend on the existence of shared p
Page 253 and 254: gas and clubs, another would move i
Page 255 and 256: from other interesting cases of net
Page 257 and 258: THE PRACTICE OF NETWAR (AND COUNTER
Page 259 and 260: But today’s concept of globalizat
Page 261 and 262: Figure 10.1—The Two Axes of Strat
Page 263 and 264: world today, we see little sustaine
Page 265 and 266: Carr, Edward Hallett, The Twenty Ye
Page 267 and 268: Kumar, Kuldeep, and Han G. van Diss
Page 269 and 270: Shaw, Marvin, Group Dynamics: The P
Page 271 and 272: 22 From Dan Barry and Al Baker, “
Page 273: 02, Central Intelligence Agency, De
Page 277 and 278: was no doubt the bombing of the Kho
Page 279 and 280: Harper & Row, 1951. Johnson, Steven
Page 281 and 282: CONTRIBUTORS Paul de Armond is dire
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