RAND_MR1382

intervention” (Castells, 1997, p. 362). What is important about these networks is not
just their ability to organize activities, but also to produce their own “cultural codes”
and then disseminate them throughout societies:
Because our historical vision has become so used to orderly battalions, colorful banners, and scripted proclamations
of social change, we are at a loss when confronted with the subtle pervasiveness of incremental changes of symbols
processed through multiform networks, away from the halls of power (Castells, 1997, p. 362).
The Mexican case is so seminal that Harry Cleaver (1998, pp. 622–623) speaks of a
“Zapatista effect” that may spread contagiously to other societies:
Beyond plunging the political system into crisis in Mexico, the Zapatista struggle has inspired and stimulated a wide
variety of grassroots political efforts in many other countries…. [I]t is perhaps not exaggerated to speak of a
“Zapatista Effect” reverberating through social movements around the world—homologous to, but ultimately much
more threatening to, the New World Order of neoliberalism than the “Tequila Effect” that rippled through emerging
financial markets in the wake of the Peso Crisis of 1994.
Anti-Maastricht marches in Europe and the roles played by Zapatista-inspired Italian
radicals are among the examples he cites. But his analytical point is broader than any
single example: A new “electronic fabric of struggle” is being constructed, helping to
interconnect and inspire activist movements around the world (Cleaver, 1995 and
1998). 27
We should note that there is some intellectual circularity in our presentation here. Most
of the writings that we cite and quote from as evidence for the rise of netwar are by
authors (e.g., Castells, Cleaver, Gray) who cite and quote from our original work
proposing the netwar concept (especially Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993 and 1996).
However, this circularity does not invalidate our using their writings as evidence for the
spread of netwar. Instead, it confirms, as have discussions at the two Intercontinental
Encounters organized by the Zapatistas, that the “network” meme 28 is taking hold in
intellectual and activist circles and diffusing to new places around the world.
Thus, Chiapas provides the first of what may become a plethora of social netwars in the
years ahead. Each may have its own characteristics, depending on the country and
region in which it occurs. Chiapas, partly because it is an early case, may turn out to be
a special case; so we should beware of generalizing from it. Yet it is portentous.
The case of Chiapas instructs that netwar depends on the emergence of “swarm
networks” 29 and that swarming best occurs where dispersed NGOs are internetted and
collaborate in ways that exhibit “collective diversity” and “coordinated anarchy.” The
paradoxical tenor of these phrases is intentional. The swarm engages NGOs that have
diverse, specialized interests; thus, any issue can be rapidly singled out and attacked by
at least some elements of the swarm. At the same time, many NGOs can act, and can see
themselves acting, as part of a collectivity in which they share convergent ideological