RAND_MR1382

THREE LAYERS TO THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT
In retrospect, Mexico and Chiapas were ripe for social netwar in the early 1990s.
Mexico as a whole—its state, economy, and society—was (and still is) in a deep,
difficult transition. Traditional clannish and hierarchical patterns of behavior continued
to rule the political system. But that system was beginning to open up. Presidents
Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) had started
to liberalize the economy and, to a much lesser degree, the polity. Mexico was
beginning to adapt to modern market principles. And independent civil-society actors,
including a range of NGOs, were beginning to gain strength and to challenge the
government for lagging at democratization and for neglecting social welfare issues. 1
Meanwhile, Chiapas, once an isolated backwater on Mexico’s southern border, was
becoming awash with outside forces. It was still characterized by tremendous, age-old
gaps between the wealthy and impoverished—kept wide by privileged landowners who
ran feudal fiefdoms with private armies, by dictatorial caciques (local bosses), and by
the plight of poor indigenas (indigenous peoples) who wanted their lives improved and
their cultures respected. Mexico’s neoliberal economic reforms, especially those
instituted by the Salinas administration, made matters much worse for many indigenas,
and that set the stage for the organization and rise of the EZLN. 2
Local economic and social conditions are important, but more to the point for this
chapter is that Chiapas was increasingly subject to a plethora of transnational
influences. During the 1980s, it became a crossroads for NGO activists, Roman Catholic
liberation-theology priests, Protestant evangelists, Guatemalan refugees, guerrillas from
Central America, and criminals trafficking in narcotics and weapons. These
transnational forces were stronger and more distinctive in Chiapas than in two other
nearby states—Oaxaca and Guerrero—that have been likely locales for guerrilla
insurgencies. Transnational NGOs, notably those concerned with human-rights issues,
were showing far more interest in conditions in Chiapas, and they had better
connections there (mainly through the diocese and related Mexican NGOs in San
Cristóbal de las Casas) than they did in Guerrero or Oaxaca. 3 This helps explain why
Chiapas and not another state gave rise to an insurgency that became a netwar in 1994.
How, then, did network designs come to define the Zapatista movement? They evolved
out of the movement’s three layers, each of which is discussed below:
• At the social base of the EZLN are the indigenas from several Mayan language and
ethnic groups. This layer, the most “tribal,” engages ideals and objectives that are
very egalitarian, communitarian, and consultative.
• The next layer is found in the EZLN’s leadership—those top leaders, mostly from
educated middle-class Ladino backgrounds, who have little or no Indian ancestry and
who infiltrated into Chiapas to create a guerrilla army. This was the most