Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

38 • AMO – DOCTRINE
public statement subsequently dubbed the Amō Doctrine. Seeking to
define Japan’s role as the sole guarantor of peace in East Asia, he declared
that Japan would oppose any joint action by European nations
and the United States on behalf of China, even if it took the form of
financial and technical assistance. “We oppose, therefore,” he
warned, “any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence
of any other country to resist Japan.” In addition, Japan
would oppose any action by an individual nation that would disturb
the peace and order of East Asia.
It is clear that Amō issued this statement without the authorization
of his Foreign Ministry superiors. To be sure, he was merely paraphrasing
an earlier instruction issued by Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota,
in which Hirota had referred to Japan’s “mission” in East Asia
and its determination to maintain peace and order in that part of the
world “on its own responsibility, acting alone.” If anything, Hirota’s
wording was stronger than that of Amō, yet the foreign minister had
expressed himself behind closed doors. In any case, Hirota knew
nothing of the statement until it was printed in the newspapers on 18
April. He subsequently sought to reassure Washington that Japan had
no intention of injuring that nation’s rights and interests in East Asia.
Coming on the heels of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and its subsequent
withdrawal from the League of Nations, the Amō doctrine
might have been expected to arouse American officialdom. The ideas
it expressed were clearly inimical to American interests in China. At
the same time (if the policy debates within the State Department offer
an accurate yardstick), nor was the U.S. government willing to antagonize
Japan. The result was a somewhat oblique message delivered
to the Japanese government on April 29. It contained reference
to the Nine-Power Treaty (which was signed at the Washington
Conference and confirmed the independence and integrity of China
as well as the Open Door), together with a restatement of respect for
the “rights, the obligations, and the legitimate interests” of others and
the expectation of similar respect in return. There was also mention
of the so-called “good neighbor policy,” which is perhaps best defined
as non-interventionism in China and a multilateral sharing of
regional defense responsibilities.
In light of this, it seems fair to assume that the Amō doctrine exercised
an ambiguous effect over Japanese–American relations. Cer-