Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

INTRODUCTION • 19
the United States determined to respond to any advances by increasing
economic pressures on Japan. At the same time, the administration of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded Germany as the greatest threat
to American security. It thus trod a delicate diplomatic line toward the
Japanese. On the one hand, there was an unmistakable display of firmness
toward Japan’s hegemonic aspirations. On the other, there was a determined
effort not to shut the door on the possibility of rapprochement
should the Japanese dissociate themselves from Adolf Hitler and his
brand of militaristic aggression.
The outbreak of the Soviet–German war in June 1941 provided the
Japanese government with a golden opportunity to follow the latter
course. After all, Hitler had launched his assault on the Soviet Union
without first informing his alliance partner. Japan, however, had never
seriously contemplated this possibility. The Soviet threat to the north
having been removed, policymakers in Tokyo determined to undertake
further advances into French Indochina. There was widespread recognition
that such a step carried with it the possibility of war with the
United States. The Imperial Japanese Navy, which would bear the brunt
of the fighting if war did break out, was particularly belligerent. For its
part, the Roosevelt administration cracked Japanese diplomatic codes
and was privy to Japan’s determination to occupy Indochina. In late
July, it froze Japanese assets in the United States. The economic pressure
quickly escalated on 1 August when Washington embargoed highoctane
gasoline as well as crude oil. In the meantime, Japanese troops
occupied the Indochinese peninsula in its entirety.
The U.S.–Japanese negotiations continued in Washington, although
any chance of diplomatic success was scuttled by the Japanese occupation
of Indochina, especially Vietnam. Neither the Japanese Army nor the
Navy held out any hope for rapprochement with the United States. Attitudes
in Washington, too, had hardened. Konoe sought to break the deadlock
by floating the idea of a summit meeting with Roosevelt, although
his unwillingness—or inability—to define the terms to which he might
agree at any such meeting merely served to further arouse the Roosevelt
administration’s suspicions. Konoe’s idea of a summit meeting collapsed,
and so did his cabinet. General Hideki Tojo did not assume the prime
minister’s post with the immediate intention of taking his country to war
against the United States. Yet, his cabinet never seriously contemplated
the painful diplomatic concessions required to avoid that outcome.