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Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

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18 • INTRODUCTION<br />

1937. The so-called China Incident, which Prime Minister Fumimaro<br />

Konoe hoped to bring to an early conclusion with a preponderance <strong>of</strong><br />

force, quickly developed into a deadly quagmire, including <strong>Japan</strong>ese attacks<br />

on Shanghai and Nanjing, causing widespread death to Chinese<br />

civilians. In early 1938, Konoe announced that henceforth his government<br />

would deal with Chiang only on the battlefield and at the surrender<br />

table. Later that year, Konoe proclaimed to the world that <strong>Japan</strong> sought<br />

the construction <strong>of</strong> a “new order” in East Asia. Konoe’s “new order” envisioned<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>, the puppet state <strong>of</strong> Manchukuo, and China (under a collaborationist<br />

government in Nanjing) bound together. Washington responded<br />

by announcing in July 1939 its intention to abrogate the<br />

U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation. Because <strong>Japan</strong>’s economic<br />

well-being continued to depend on close commercial relations<br />

with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, such a measure clarified American opposition to<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>’s policy <strong>of</strong> aggression in China. In taking this step, however,<br />

Washington had committed itself to nothing final. The application—or<br />

non-application—<strong>of</strong> economic sanctions would depend on subsequent<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>ese actions.<br />

The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government for a time sought to conciliate the <strong>United</strong><br />

<strong>States</strong>. The most notable attempt toward this end occurred from September<br />

1939 to January 1940 when Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura<br />

served as foreign minister. However, in the summer <strong>of</strong> 1940, German<br />

armies overran Western Europe, leaving the resource-rich regions <strong>of</strong><br />

Southeast Asia defenseless. With the advent <strong>of</strong> Konoe’s second cabinet<br />

in July 1940, attentions in Tokyo duly turned to the conclusion <strong>of</strong> an alliance<br />

relationship with Nazi Germany. As if to underscore its intentions<br />

in negotiating an alliance with the Germans, <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in late<br />

September advanced into northern French Indochina. Washington regarded<br />

the defense <strong>of</strong> Britain as vital to its own survival, viewed Nazi<br />

Germany as a quasi-enemy, and responded to <strong>Japan</strong>’s actions by slapping<br />

a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline, high-grade iron, and steel<br />

scrap for <strong>Japan</strong>. In September 1940, the <strong>Japan</strong>–Germany–Italy Tripartite<br />

Pact was formally concluded after negotiations led by Yosuke Matsuoka,<br />

the American-educated foreign minister <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />

The tone for the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese negotiations <strong>of</strong> 1941 had thus been set.<br />

<strong>Japan</strong> was allied explicitly with Nazi Germany, and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />

was allied—in fact, if not yet in name—with Great Britain. <strong>Japan</strong> had<br />

decided on an opportunistic policy <strong>of</strong> advancing into Southeast Asia, and

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