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Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

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14 • INTRODUCTION<br />

Manchuria, while <strong>Japan</strong> recognized American possessions in Hawaii and<br />

the Philippines.<br />

RIVALRY OVER CHINA, 1909–1921<br />

Roosevelt left the presidency in 1909, and with him went any goodwill<br />

generated by the Root–Takahira Agreement. Roosevelt’s hand-picked<br />

successor, William Howard Taft, dispensed with Roosevelt’s policies<br />

and instead chose to challenge <strong>Japan</strong>’s predominant position in southern<br />

Manchuria. Underlying this policy was the Taft administration’s<br />

faith in the power <strong>of</strong> the American dollar, as well as a belief in the compatibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> American and Chinese interests. Generally referred to as<br />

“dollar diplomacy,” this policy’s defining moment came in late 1909,<br />

when an American banking group gained Chinese approval to build a<br />

railway that would run part <strong>of</strong> the way parallel to <strong>Japan</strong>’s South<br />

Manchurian line. As if this were not enough to challenge <strong>Japan</strong>’s position<br />

on the continent, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Philander Knox immediately<br />

raised the stakes by proposing that China—replete with funds provided<br />

by a consortium <strong>of</strong> major powers—buy the Russian-owned railway in<br />

northern Manchuria and <strong>Japan</strong>’s South Manchurian line. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />

government responded by reaching an agreement with Russia that provided<br />

for cooperation over railways and railway finance in Manchuria.<br />

The British, for their part, refused to climb aboard Knox’s neutralization<br />

scheme. Roosevelt was aghast. Taft had needlessly antagonized the<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>ese, and in the process had driven them into the arms <strong>of</strong> the Russians.<br />

This phase <strong>of</strong> dollar diplomacy was as spectacular for its audacity<br />

as for its failure.<br />

U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations worsened considerably after the outbreak <strong>of</strong><br />

World War I. China was again at issue. Having entered the war ostensibly<br />

as Britain’s ally, <strong>Japan</strong> fought not for its allies’ survival but for such objectives<br />

as the seizure <strong>of</strong> German possessions in China and the Pacific, and<br />

ultimately, economic and political hegemony over all <strong>of</strong> China. In pursuit<br />

<strong>of</strong> this second objective, Foreign Minister Takaaki Katō in January 1915<br />

handed to Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai the so-called Twenty-One Demands.<br />

The administration <strong>of</strong> U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, which<br />

clung to an ill-defined policy <strong>of</strong> goodwill and friendship toward China,<br />

protested vigorously. The British, recognizing that their imperial interests

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