Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films
Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films
INTRODUCTION • 13 their hypothetical enemies. Roosevelt, too, was concerned that victory in the Russo–Japanese War might propel Japan onto a course frankly adverse to American interests in the Philippines and Hawaii. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Japanese policymakers revealed themselves no less distrustful of American designs on their newly gained sphere of influence. When the great railway builder Edward H. Harriman in October 1905 offered to purchase what was to become the South Manchurian Railway, Foreign Minister Jūtarō Komura argued successfully that Japan raise its own money so as to strengthen its hard-earned foothold in southern Manchuria. Harriman—and his financial partners on Wall Street—may have been impressed, but Roosevelt was not unduly perturbed. In his estimation, Manchuria was of peripheral interest to the United States. Although not blind to the potential presented by Chinese markets, Roosevelt rather welcomed Japan’s preoccupation with the continent because, in his calculations, it served to lessen the possibility of a U.S.–Japanese clash in the Pacific. In other words, he hoped that by engaging their respective interests in areas separate from each other, U.S.–Japanese relations might remain on a harmonious footing. This was the basic framework in which Japanese and American policymakers worked throughout the remainder of this period. Roosevelt was no less infuriated than was the Japanese government when in 1906 the San Francisco School Board segregated Japanese school children. His response was twofold. On the one hand, he managed to convince Californian authorities to rescind the offensive segregation order. On the other, he finalized with Ambassador Keikichi Aoki a deal known as the Gentlemen’s Agreement, according to whose terms the Japanese government agreed to curb immigration to the United States. In the meantime, Roosevelt resigned himself to the fact that the United States did not possess the wherewithal to defend the Philippines. In 1908, he moved the Pacific base from Manila to Hawaii. Having conceded by this act that the Philippines were militarily indefensible, Roosevelt sought to protect them by other means. It was fitting that the end of this period should be marked by the so-called Root–Takahira Agreement of November 1908. By this agreement, both nations agreed to respect China’s independence and integrity—the Open Door—while at the same time respecting each other’s possessions in the region. This meant that the United States recognized Japan’s possessions in Korea and
14 • INTRODUCTION Manchuria, while Japan recognized American possessions in Hawaii and the Philippines. RIVALRY OVER CHINA, 1909–1921 Roosevelt left the presidency in 1909, and with him went any goodwill generated by the Root–Takahira Agreement. Roosevelt’s hand-picked successor, William Howard Taft, dispensed with Roosevelt’s policies and instead chose to challenge Japan’s predominant position in southern Manchuria. Underlying this policy was the Taft administration’s faith in the power of the American dollar, as well as a belief in the compatibility of American and Chinese interests. Generally referred to as “dollar diplomacy,” this policy’s defining moment came in late 1909, when an American banking group gained Chinese approval to build a railway that would run part of the way parallel to Japan’s South Manchurian line. As if this were not enough to challenge Japan’s position on the continent, Secretary of State Philander Knox immediately raised the stakes by proposing that China—replete with funds provided by a consortium of major powers—buy the Russian-owned railway in northern Manchuria and Japan’s South Manchurian line. The Japanese government responded by reaching an agreement with Russia that provided for cooperation over railways and railway finance in Manchuria. The British, for their part, refused to climb aboard Knox’s neutralization scheme. Roosevelt was aghast. Taft had needlessly antagonized the Japanese, and in the process had driven them into the arms of the Russians. This phase of dollar diplomacy was as spectacular for its audacity as for its failure. U.S.–Japanese relations worsened considerably after the outbreak of World War I. China was again at issue. Having entered the war ostensibly as Britain’s ally, Japan fought not for its allies’ survival but for such objectives as the seizure of German possessions in China and the Pacific, and ultimately, economic and political hegemony over all of China. In pursuit of this second objective, Foreign Minister Takaaki Katō in January 1915 handed to Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai the so-called Twenty-One Demands. The administration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, which clung to an ill-defined policy of goodwill and friendship toward China, protested vigorously. The British, recognizing that their imperial interests
- Page 4 and 5: Historical Dictionary of United Sta
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- Page 9 and 10: viii • EDITOR’S FOREWORD acrony
- Page 12: Reader’s Notes Names in this work
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- Page 17 and 18: xvi • CHRONOLOGY 1833-1837 Famine
- Page 19 and 20: xviii • CHRONOLOGY Lincoln is ina
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- Page 42 and 43: Introduction The most important bil
- Page 44 and 45: INTRODUCTION • 3 THE UNITED STATE
- Page 46 and 47: INTRODUCTION • 5 also increasingl
- Page 48 and 49: INTRODUCTION • 7 President Millar
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- Page 58 and 59: INTRODUCTION • 17 recognize the v
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- Page 64 and 65: INTRODUCTION • 23 forces in Japan
- Page 66 and 67: INTRODUCTION • 25 There was a gre
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- Page 76 and 77: AKIYAMA, SANEYUKI • 35 town of Ai
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INTRODUCTION • 13<br />
their hypothetical enemies. Roosevelt, too, was concerned that victory<br />
in the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War might propel <strong>Japan</strong> onto a course frankly<br />
adverse to American interests in the Philippines and Hawaii. In the immediate<br />
aftermath <strong>of</strong> the war, <strong>Japan</strong>ese policymakers revealed themselves<br />
no less distrustful <strong>of</strong> American designs on their newly gained<br />
sphere <strong>of</strong> influence. When the great railway builder Edward H. Harriman<br />
in October 1905 <strong>of</strong>fered to purchase what was to become the South<br />
Manchurian Railway, Foreign Minister Jūtarō Komura argued successfully<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> raise its own money so as to strengthen its hard-earned<br />
foothold in southern Manchuria.<br />
Harriman—and his financial partners on Wall Street—may have been<br />
impressed, but Roosevelt was not unduly perturbed. In his estimation,<br />
Manchuria was <strong>of</strong> peripheral interest to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Although not<br />
blind to the potential presented by Chinese markets, Roosevelt rather<br />
welcomed <strong>Japan</strong>’s preoccupation with the continent because, in his calculations,<br />
it served to lessen the possibility <strong>of</strong> a U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese clash in<br />
the Pacific. In other words, he hoped that by engaging their respective<br />
interests in areas separate from each other, U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations<br />
might remain on a harmonious footing.<br />
This was the basic framework in which <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American policymakers<br />
worked throughout the remainder <strong>of</strong> this period. Roosevelt<br />
was no less infuriated than was the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government when in 1906<br />
the San Francisco School Board segregated <strong>Japan</strong>ese school children.<br />
His response was tw<strong>of</strong>old. On the one hand, he managed to convince<br />
Californian authorities to rescind the <strong>of</strong>fensive segregation order. On<br />
the other, he finalized with Ambassador Keikichi Aoki a deal known as<br />
the Gentlemen’s Agreement, according to whose terms the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government agreed to curb immigration to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
In the meantime, Roosevelt resigned himself to the fact that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> did not possess the wherewithal to defend the Philippines. In<br />
1908, he moved the Pacific base from Manila to Hawaii. Having conceded<br />
by this act that the Philippines were militarily indefensible, Roosevelt<br />
sought to protect them by other means. It was fitting that the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> this period should be marked by the so-called Root–Takahira Agreement<br />
<strong>of</strong> November 1908. By this agreement, both nations agreed to respect<br />
China’s independence and integrity—the Open Door—while at the<br />
same time respecting each other’s possessions in the region. This meant<br />
that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> recognized <strong>Japan</strong>’s possessions in Korea and