Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

12 • INTRODUCTION
rested with China. United States Secretary of State John Hay in 1899
and again in 1900 issued his famed Open Door notes, which warned
against both encroachments on Chinese sovereignty and restrictions on
American trade in that country. The Japanese government, which was
eyeing Russian encroachments in the Chinese territory of Manchuria
and the Korean peninsula, responded favorably to the Open Door notes.
Far more significant from Tokyo’s point of view, however, was the conclusion
in January 1902 of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance. This strengthened
Japan’s hand vis-à-vis Russia to a far greater extent than did agreements
concerning the Open Door. Even so, Foreign Minister Jūtarō
Komura throughout 1903 assiduously kept American officials informed
of the state of his negotiations with Russia. Thus, when the Russo–
Japanese War broke out in February 1904, Tokyo knew that it was not
only allied to the world’s foremost power, but that it also had the sympathy
of the United States.
Acting on this perception, the Japanese government in February 1904
dispatched Kentarō Kaneko to Washington. A graduate of Harvard University
who had long known President Theodore Roosevelt, Kaneko
quietly sounded Roosevelt out on the prospect of the latter offering his
good offices to bring an end to the Russo–Japanese War. It was a sagacious
move. The vehemently anti-Russian Roosevelt believed Japan
was fighting America’s war, and Kaneko saw no need to disabuse him
of this notion. Against this promising backdrop, Kaneko broached with
Roosevelt Japan’s terms of peace with Russia, among which were included
a free hand not only in Korea but also in southern Manchuria.
Roosevelt proved amenable. In August 1905, he approved the so-called
Taft–Katsura Agreement, according to whose terms the United States
and Japan agreed to respect each other’s possessions in Asia and the Pacific.
At the same time, Roosevelt mediated an end to the Russo–
Japanese War, and in so doing oversaw the transfer to Japan of Korea,
southern Manchuria, and southern Sakhalin.
Roosevelt’s sponsorship of the Portsmouth Peace Conference marked
the zenith of the spirit of U.S.–Japanese cooperation in the period
1900–1909. If both the Japanese and American governments sought to
define their interests on a complementary basis, however, there was also
an abiding awareness of the potential for friction. One need look no further
than the fact that both the United States Navy and the Imperial
Japanese Navy (in 1906 and 1907, respectively) designated each other