Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS • 253
was extended through 1974. In September 1977, a dumping suit was
filed against Japanese steel producers. The Japanese producers were
ready to carry out voluntary export restraint; however, Washington
introduced a price-trigger mechanism in 1978: when steel prices fell
below the standard prices, dumping investigations were automatically
initiated.
In 1968 and between 1970 and 1977, a series of dumping suits
were filed against Japanese color television manufacturers. In May
1977, Tokyo concluded an orderly marketing agreement with Washington
to pledge a three-year period of voluntary export restraint on
Japanese manufacturers.
Japan occupied 9.3 percent of U.S. automobile market share in
1976, but this had jumped drastically to 21.3 percent by 1980. Both
the private sector and U.S. Congress demanded import relief or a
market-share agreement with Japan. In May 1981, Tokyo concluded
with Washington a three-year voluntary export restraint on automobiles
and renewed this later. The restrictions were set at 2.3 million
vehicles per year in April 1985. Many Japanese automakers moved
their manufacturing base to the United States, which resulted in reducing
Japan’s exports of automobiles. In 1994, Tokyo eliminated its
voluntary export restraint on automobiles.
In the late 1970s, Washington focused not only on Japan’s exports
but also on the closed nature of Japan’s domestic market that prevented
the United States from increasing its exports to Japan. In January
1978, due to strong U.S. demand, Japan expanded its import
quotas for beef, grapefruit, and fruit juice.
In January 1985, Tokyo and Washington started Market-Oriented
Sector Selective talks (MOSS). The first round covered four sectors:
telecommunications, electronics, pharmaceuticals and medical
equipment, and forestry products. Transportation equipment was
added to the MOSS agenda in the second round in 1986.
In September 1986, the Japan–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement
was concluded in order to prevent Japanese dumping in the U.S. market
and to increase the share of foreign semiconductors in the Japanese
market. Dissatisfied with the lack of visible results, in March
1987, Washington resorted to sanctions against Japan.
In April 1988, the Super 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 were enacted by the United States. The