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Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

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SUPER 301 PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE • 239<br />

<strong>Japan</strong> cited seven structural impediments in the American economy,<br />

including savings, investment patterns, corporate investment<br />

activities and productive power, and corporate behaviors. <strong>Japan</strong> not<br />

only pointed out the necessity <strong>of</strong> increasing individual savings rates<br />

and efforts to reduce fiscal deficit, but also suggested ideas for American<br />

corporations to recover their competitiveness. On the other hand,<br />

the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> indicated six structural impediments in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />

economy including savings and investment patterns, the product<br />

distribution system, and exclusive trade practices.<br />

It is important to note that because both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />

recognized that contributing to solving foreign trade imbalance problems<br />

and developing smooth economic relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and<br />

the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would be essential conditions for the world economy<br />

to achieve balanced growth, these countries decided to carry out the<br />

SII. In particular, it was epoch-making that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, which<br />

had <strong>of</strong>ten unilaterally passed the responsibility for trade friction to<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>, actually recognized that there were many structural impediments<br />

within the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> itself and it demonstrated its willingness<br />

to tackle the problems. The SII was not a negotiation, but an exchange<br />

<strong>of</strong> ideas to deal with structural impediments by friendly nations in various<br />

fields. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />

SUPER 301 PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND<br />

COMPETITIVE ACT OF 1988. The Super 301 provisions <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act <strong>of</strong> 1988 were enacted into<br />

law by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1988. The law was created to help identify<br />

countries, categories <strong>of</strong> foreign businesses, and import items that<br />

were associated with unfair trading practices based on annual U.S.<br />

government surveys. If an unfair trading practice was discovered, the<br />

Super 301 law provided a grace period during which the U.S. government<br />

was to negotiate an end to the practice with the <strong>of</strong>fending<br />

country. If an agreement could not be reached, the law allowed Washington<br />

to impose trade sanctions.<br />

The Super 301 law was only valid for a short period. It expired in<br />

1997, after being extended twice. However, through presidential order<br />

by President Bill Clinton on 1 April 1999, the Super 301 provisions<br />

were revived owing to new appearances <strong>of</strong> trade friction following<br />

the increase <strong>of</strong> the U.S. trade deficit and exteriorization <strong>of</strong>

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