Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films
Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films
OKUMA, SHIGENOBU • 197 Ryukyu Islands in order to acquire residents’ cooperation for enduring governance. The San Francisco Peace Treaty formally terminated the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers; however, the United States was allowed to use U.S. military bases in Okinawa. The region being declared to be outside the application of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, 1952. Washington approved Tokyo’s residual sovereignty over Okinawa, but Okinawa had different legal status from that of Japan. Consequently, people both in Okinawa and on mainland Japan promoted movements for the restitution of Okinawa back to Japan. Civilians in both Departments of State and Defense agreed that in order for the United States to maintain military bases in Okinawa, it was necessary to return the administrative rights over Okinawa back to Japan. Finally, at the summit in November 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard M. Nixon agreed the restitution of Okinawa to Japanese administration. On 17 June 1971, the United States and Japan signed the Okinawa Restitution Agreement. According to the agreement, the United States continued to retain its military bases in Okinawa, but those bases were to be nuclear-free. The U.S. military still controlled about 19 percent of Okinawa. On 15 May 1972, Okinawa was formally returned to Japanese sovereignty. OKUBO, TOSHIMICHI (1830–1878). A samurai from Satsuma domain, Okubo helped lead Satsuma and Choshu forces against the Tokugawa shogunate. Okubo was a major official in the early Meiji government, and took part in the Iwakura Mission to the United States and Europe from 1871 to 1873. He was assassinated in 1878 by former samurai from Satsuma after he helped put down a rebellion against the Meiji government in his native domain. See also MEIJI RESTORATION. OKUMA, SHIGENOBU (1838–1922). From Saga domain near Nagasaki, Okuma studied Dutch and Western learning, and then participated in the anti-Tokugawa shogunate movement in the 1860s. A member of the Iwakura Mission to the United States and Europe, Okuma later served in a number of government positions until his death, including as foreign minister and prime minister. Okuma also founded Waseda University in 1888, which remains one of the Japan’s
198 • OPEN DOOR most respected private universities. See also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI RESTORATION. OPEN DOOR. The Open Door informed American policies vis-à-vis China and Japan throughout much of the first half of the 20th century. As originally envisaged, the Open Door rested on two main principles: China’s territorial integrity should be preserved; and all nationals should receive equality of treatment in their economic pursuits in China. For many years, the Open Door remained little more than a principle, with no indication that Washington was prepared to use force in its defense. The concept of the Open Door grew out of 19th-century imperial rivalries that threatened to carve China into colonies and exclusive spheres of interest. It was formalized by Secretary of State John Hay’s Open Door notes of 1899 and 1900, and resurfaced intermittently over the ensuing years, usually in response to Japanese efforts to shut the door on American business interests in northeastern China. Then, at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, the United States, Britain, and Japan signed a treaty in which they explicitly undertook to respect China’s sovereignty as well as the principle of “equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.” In other words, the Open Door had become a treaty commitment. Through the 1930s, the Open Door continued to provide American policymakers with a point of reference in their efforts to devise a response to Japanese aggressions in China. Then, in April 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura that diplomatic rapprochement between their two nations would have to conform to several principles, included among which were respect for all nations’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, and support of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity. In other words, the principle of the Open Door had shifted away from its exclusive emphasis on China, and instead had become the benchmark of American policies toward all nations. Washington did not shift from this commitment to the Open Door throughout 1941, and Japan was equally stubborn in its refusal to acquiesce in the principle. In this sense, the Pacific War was fought over two conflicting visions of the future of East Asia. On the one hand, the United States
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198 • OPEN DOOR<br />
most respected private universities. See also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION.<br />
OPEN DOOR. The Open Door informed American policies vis-à-vis<br />
China and <strong>Japan</strong> throughout much <strong>of</strong> the first half <strong>of</strong> the 20th century.<br />
As originally envisaged, the Open Door rested on two main principles:<br />
China’s territorial integrity should be preserved; and all nationals<br />
should receive equality <strong>of</strong> treatment in their economic pursuits in<br />
China. For many years, the Open Door remained little more than a<br />
principle, with no indication that Washington was prepared to use<br />
force in its defense.<br />
The concept <strong>of</strong> the Open Door grew out <strong>of</strong> 19th-century imperial<br />
rivalries that threatened to carve China into colonies and exclusive<br />
spheres <strong>of</strong> interest. It was formalized by Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John<br />
Hay’s Open Door notes <strong>of</strong> 1899 and 1900, and resurfaced intermittently<br />
over the ensuing years, usually in response to <strong>Japan</strong>ese efforts<br />
to shut the door on American business interests in northeastern<br />
China. Then, at the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong> signed a treaty in which they explicitly<br />
undertook to respect China’s sovereignty as well as the principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> “equal opportunity for the commerce and industry <strong>of</strong> all nations<br />
throughout the territory <strong>of</strong> China.” In other words, the Open<br />
Door had become a treaty commitment.<br />
Through the 1930s, the Open Door continued to provide American<br />
policymakers with a point <strong>of</strong> reference in their efforts to devise a response<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>ese aggressions in China. Then, in April 1941, Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> State Cordell Hull informed ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura<br />
that diplomatic rapprochement between their two nations would<br />
have to conform to several principles, included among which were respect<br />
for all nations’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, and support<br />
<strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong> commercial opportunity. In other words,<br />
the principle <strong>of</strong> the Open Door had shifted away from its exclusive<br />
emphasis on China, and instead had become the benchmark <strong>of</strong> American<br />
policies toward all nations. Washington did not shift from this<br />
commitment to the Open Door throughout 1941, and <strong>Japan</strong> was<br />
equally stubborn in its refusal to acquiesce in the principle.<br />
In this sense, the Pacific War was fought over two conflicting visions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the future <strong>of</strong> East Asia. On the one hand, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>